

Earthquake insurance in Iran: Solvency of local insurers in light of the current market practice

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Abstract:

Owing to its geographical positioning within one of the most seismically active zones globally, Iran has experienced numerous historically impactful earthquakes. To finance a part of these losses and reconstruction expenses, earthquake insurance has been offered as a rider of fire insurance policy by the Iranian insurers. This mechanism, if well operated, can substantially contribute to disaster risk management. On the other hand, if the pricing and management of catastrophe risk lack a sound, risk modelling-based practice, it might add to the problems and act to the detriment of disaster risk management. In this paper, we first compare the current earthquake insurance pricing and risk management in the Iranian insurance industry with a state-of-the-art insurance regulation in the European Union (Solvency-II). Then, we examine the consequence of following each approach in terms of business profitability and viability by conducting a numerical analysis on a hypothetical portfolio of property risks in Iran. In so doing, a seismic risk model has been developed by adopting EMME hazard model and a peer-reviewed vulnerability model, and by developing an exposure model for residential dwellings in Iran. The results suggest that modelled earthquake premium rates are about 5 times larger than the rates currently used in the market. Furthermore, a comparison between solvency capitals calculated following the methods specified by the European Solvency II and the Iranian Directive 69 indicates a visible underestimation of the earthquake solvency capital by the Iranian insurers. It seems that maintaining the current insurance pricing and risk management practice in Iran will probably lead to a substantial accumulation of earthquake risk for domestic firms and eventually endanger the solvency of these companies in the event of large-scale earthquake losses in future.

Keywords: Iran earthquake risk, probabilistic event-based modeling, Insurance pricing, Insurance regulatory, Solvency

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30 1 Introduction

31 Being positioned in one of the most seismically active regions in the world, Iran has witnessed many devastating
32 earthquakes through history, such as the 1978 M7.4 Tabas (USD 11 mn), the 1990 M7.4 Manjil–Rudbar (USD 2.8 bn),
33 the 2003 M6.6 Bam (USD 1.5 bn), and most recently the 2016 M7.3 Sar-e Pol-e Zahab (USD 5 bn) [(Ibrion, Mokhtari,
34 & Nadim, 2015) and (Maghsoudi & Moshtari, 2020)]. Although almost all these events occurred in rural areas or
35 small-size cities with less than 100,000of inhabitants, the resulting socio-economic consequences have been
36 substantial. If a similar magnitude earthquake struck a major Iranian city with millions of populations, the volume of
37 physical and human losses would be much higher.

38 To compensate a part of earthquake losses and facilitate the process of reconstructions, Iranian insurance firms offer
39 earthquake insurance as a rider of fire insurance policy. However, despite the common practice in the global
40 insurance market, almost none of the domestic insurers use catastrophe risk models to quantify seismic risk for
41 pricing policies, purchasing reinsurance, and managing accumulated risks. Instead, old-fashion and seemingly
42 underestimating pricing tables are still utilised nationally to determine earthquake insurance policies based on main
43 construction materials and geographical location of insured buildings. This pricing approach is likely to result in
44 insurance companies collecting insufficient premiums to cover future catastrophe losses. In a similar way, on the
45 regulatory side, the solvency capital for catastrophe properties is not risk-based and is determined according to the
46 amount of premium collected (which seem to be not commensurate to risk) and history of company’s losses (which
47 does not reflect long-return period events risks like earthquakes). To date, due to the low penetration rate of
48 insurance in Iran, about 1.8% in 2022, catastrophe risks assumed by Iranian insurance companies are not significant,
49 implying that even in the event of medium to large natural catastrophes, the insurance losses usually are
50 reimbursable by the insurers. With the expected Iran Building Catastrophe Insurance Pool (IBCIP) starting to operate
51 soon, all residential buildings will be covered under a national policy. As such, there will be likely considerable
52 business opportunities for domestic insurers to extend their catastrophe property portfolio to provide
53 supplementary coverage to the primary protection which IBCIP offers. These new business opportunities, although
54 financially attractive, can dramatically expose Iranian insurance and reinsurance companies to natural hazards risk.
55 In other words, in the event of major catastrophe events, such as earthquakes in urban cities or widespread flooding,
56 which are likely in the Iranian geography, many local insurers can quickly become insolvent. These said, it is essential
57 to examine the of sufficiency of the current insurance rates and the effectiveness of the solvency capital
58 requirements mandated by Central Insurance of Iran (CII) to cover future catastrophe losses to happen in Iran.

59 In so doing, two parallel approaches have been followed. First, a probabilistic event-based earthquake risk model
60 was developed which helps calculate risk-based pricing framework for earthquake insurance policies. The model
61 entails components of a standard catastrophe risk model, namely exposure, hazard, and vulnerability which are
62 separately adopted, tailored, or developed based on the state-of-the-art methodologies and up-to-date data. These
63 components are convolved using GEM’s OpenQuake as a probabilistic event-based risk assessment platform to
64 generate risk output such as Average Annual Loss (AAL) and loss Exceedance Probability (EP). In addition, a similar
65 risk-based methodology to what employed by the European insurance solvency regime, Solvency II, was adopted to
66 create a standard formula for determining solvency capital for given earthquake risk portfolios. A hypothetical
67 portfolio of earthquake risks was assumed to compare the factor-based solvency capital (as mandated by CII) with a
68 risk modeling-based one (as determined following Solvency II methodology) to examine the sufficiency of the current
69 earthquake rates and solvency capital. Further, the profitability of the underwriting and the likelihood of solvency is
70 benchmarked using the values generated using the risk-based pricing method and the standard formula of solvency
71 capital.

72 This paper comprises six sections. First, a background on insurance solvency with a focus on the European Solvency-
73 II and its proposed method for calculating risk-based solvency capital earthquake is provided in Section 2. Then,
74 Section 3 describes the evolution of earthquake risk models in Iran. Section 3 provides information on the
75 methodology and data adopted or developed to calculate risk parameters such as AAL and EP (99.5% percentile) and
76 estimate risk-based solvency capital for a portfolio of risks with earthquake coverage. Numerical results of the
77 proposed methodology are outlined in Section 4, where the solvency capital of a hypothetical portfolio of risks under
78 earthquake policy is calculated using the current factor-based and the proposed risk-based methods. A discussion
79 on the differences between the two methods and possible consequences on the viability of Iranian insurers is given
80 in Section 5. And finally, section six concludes the process and its findings. A reference list is also provided at the end
81 of the article.

82 2 Natural Catastrophe Insurance Regulations in the European Union (EU) and Iran

83 The significance of natural catastrophes and their impact on the viability of insurance firms has received increasing
84 attention over time, and the occurrence of major catastrophic events such as Hurricane Andrew (1992), the
85 Northridge Earthquake (1994), Hurricane Katrina (2005), the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami has
86 highlighted the issue. Catastrophe losses endanger the solvency of small and medium reinsurance firms and
87 consume the accumulated provisions of well-capitalised reinsurers (Anderson, 2002). While, to many, the term
88 catastrophe is closely associated with natural hazards (e.g. earthquake, flood and windstorm), it can also be used to
89 address intensive damages from human-made events (Lawson, et al., 2001). Catastrophe risks have different
90 characteristics compared to non-catastrophe losses. They are highly dependent and occur so rarely that historical
91 claims data could not be efficiently utilised to predict future losses. As a result, the insurance industry has evolved
92 to prepare for the consequences imposed by disasters by developing risk management rules and regulations. This
93 section provides a brief history of the regulations regarding the insurance solvency capital as a risk management
94 measure in the insurance industry, focusing on the European Solvency-II regime and the solvency regulations set by
95 the Central Insurance of Iran (CII) as the national insurance regulator. In addition, technical aspects of calculating
96 SCR in the two abovementioned regulatory systems are described with brevity.

97 2.1 European Insurance Solvency Regulation

98 In 2004, Thorburn has provided a history of the difficult times that catastrophic losses created for the insurance
99 industry and the countries' response to these challenges in the form of developing insurance regulatory institutions
100 and adopting solvency mandates as an effective measure to manage catastrophe risks to which insurers are exposed
101 (Thorburn, 2004).

102 In general, insurance supervision aims to protect policyholders' interests by ensuring a sound financial operation
103 and proper management in the insurance business. Therefore, effective regulations must be established to evaluate
104 insurers' liabilities adequately and determine provisions to cover these commitments. It is also necessary to consider
105 an extra layer of protection in the form of capital margin to respond to unexpected financial shocks, e.g. catastrophic
106 losses. That is why solvency supervision regulations were established and improved over time.

107 Catastrophic losses, both natural and man-made, have resulted in higher claims provisions, reduced capital power,
108 reduced profitability, and in some cases, made insurance firms insolvent. Remarkable examples of such bankruptcies
109 are the 1906 San Francisco earthquake with 12 insurance companies declared insolvent, the 1992 Hurricane Andrew
110 with nine firms being bankrupt, and the 2011 Christchurch quakes that resulted in the ruin of two insurance
111 companies (Kelly & Stodolak, 2013).

112 The first steps in harmonising Europe-wide insurance supervision were taken by the approval of the first ³non-life
113 and life insurance Directives in the 1970s [(First Council Directive, 1973), (First Council Directive, 1979)]. These
114 directives required the European Member States to comply with harmonised solvency capital requirements. The
115 Directives were later revised by adding second and third amendments in 1982 and 1992 [(Second Council Directive,
116 1988), (Council Directive, 1990), (Directive, 1992), (Council Directive, 1992)]. The entirety of these regulations, which
117 were later named Solvency-0 by (Sandström, 2019), underwent a comparative examination in the 1990s, showing
118 that they were not sufficiently taking into account the full spectrum of risks that insurance companies were exposed
119 to. As such, new directives (known as Solvency I) were again introduced to both life and non-life insurance in 2002
120 to fortify the stance of insurers in the event of catastrophic losses [(Directive, 2002), (Directive, 2002)]. Both
121 Solvency-0 and Solvency-I regulations followed a similar approach in determining the Solvency Capital Margin, which
122 was mainly based on factoring gross earned premium and gross incurred claims (Sandström, 2019). However, this
123 was only a transitional remedy to incorporate a risk-based approach in the insurance solvency capital requirement
124 regulations, as Solvency I was still inefficient in terms of asset and liability valuation and capital allocation (Rae, et
125 al., 2018). A drastic reform to solvency regulation was introduced about one decade later as the Solvency-II
126 Framework.

127 Influenced by the then-new risk-based banking regulation, Basel-II (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004),
128 Solvency-II, the latest European insurance supervising regime, replaced Solvency-I in 2016. This new regime provides
129 a more comprehensive risk-based approach for determining solvency requirements for insurance undertakings. The
130 new regulation also includes a market-based valuation system for assessing companies' assets and liabilities
131 (Directive, 2009). With a higher degree of confidence, this could potentially reduce the risk of insurance firms being
132 insolvent. In addition, the Directives contribute to the harmonisation of insurance supervision in the European
133 market. Solvency-II encompasses three pillars, namely Pillar I, Pillar II, and Pillar III. The first pillar focuses on the
134 quantitative aspects of solvency capital that insurers must hold to cover their risks adequately.. The second pillar
135 addresses the qualitative aspects of solvency regulation, emphasizing risk management and governance, and Pillar
136 III aims to enhance market discipline by promoting transparency and accountability. Two types of capital
137 requirements are represented in Pillar I: the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR), which is the least authorised
138 capital of insurance companies, and the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) which enables an insurance institution
139 to absorb significant financial shocks, giving reasonable assurance to policyholders and beneficiaries. Under the
140 underwriting risk category, the institution can use either a Standard Formula or an Internal Model, each having its
141 pros and cons regarding the level of sophistication and SCR size. Despite all the promising features and
142 improvements of Solvency-II, it has been subject to much research since its introduction [(Rae, et al., 2018), (Linder
143 & Ronkainen, 2004), (Kousky & Cooke, 2012), (Gurenko & Itigin, 2013), (Clarke, et al., 2014), (Baione, et al., 2018),
144 (Deligiannakis, et al., 2021)]. These researches mainly focused on the areas such as economic justification of the
145 then-new solvency regime, different results obtained using the Standard Formula of Solvency-II and Internal Models,
146 comparison between the implications of Solvency II and Solvency I, and possible improvements to the new directive.

147 2.2 Iranian Insurance Solvency Regulation

148 The Central Insurance of Iran (CII) is the regulator of the Iranian insurance market. As one of its principal duties, CII
149 approves and enacts decrees and directives through the High Council of Insurance (HCI) to regulate different aspects

³ Life insurance provides coverage for an individual's life and offers fixed health benefits for critical illnesses such as cancer, heart ailments, and more. On the other hand, general insurance encompasses non-life assets, including houses, vehicles, health, events, travel, and other aspects.

150 of the insurance business in Iran (High Council of Insurance, 2019). Before the approval of the first Directive on the
151 solvency capital adequacy, CII supervised the operation of Iranian insurance firms by examining monthly reports on
152 companies' collected premiums and paid claims (Hashemi, et al., 2010). As the pricing system in the Iranian insurance
153 market was no longer tariff-based then, new regulations needed to be developed and implemented by CII to monitor
154 the financial solvency of insurance firms. Consequently, Directive 69 was approved and enacted by HCI in 2011,
155 which required insurance firms to put aside a factor-based solvency capital for four categories of risks: insurance,
156 market, credit, and liquidity. The Directive also recognized the market value (compared to book value) as the correct
157 method of valuing own funds in the accounting system. This regulation, which is still in place, represents five classes
158 of solvency. A company belongs to the first solvency capital level when it keeps a solvency capital equal to or greater
159 than the Solvency Capital Margin (SCM). Should an insurance company fail to maintain a sufficient solvency margin,
160 it enters levels 2 to 5 depending on the capital deficit. At level 5 of solvency, CII can officially cancel the business
161 permission of the insolvent firm. For natural catastrophe policies (fire, engineering, automobile, and life), the SCM
162 is the greatest of gross earned premium and gross incurred claims, each multiplied by a fixed risk factor (Similar to
163 Solvency-0). These fixed factors were calculated based on an assessment carried out on the financial statements of
164 Iranian insurance firms and the financial time series of the Iranian real estate and stock market. The computed
165 solvency capitals of the named risks are ultimately combined assuming zero correlation between risks to form the
166 company's SCM. Directive No. 69 was reviewed by Shahriar et al., and a number of improvements regarding changing
167 the risk metric to Value at Risk (VaR), using a 99% confidence level for calculation SCM, and consideration of linear
168 correlation for different risks was suggested (Shahriar, et al., 2016).

169 3 Methodology and Data

170 This section describes the theoretical framework of the quantitative comparison between the methods for
171 calculating earthquake risk solvency in the Solvency-II Directive and Directive 69 of the Iranian insurance regulation.
172 In so doing, mathematical formulations are detailed in both methodologies, encompassing the selection of risk
173 metrics, risk factors, and implementation of the risk diversification effect. Then, as a pre-requisite for calculating the
174 solvency capital, components of a stochastic earthquake risk model for Iran are outlined, covering seismic hazard,
175 vulnerability, exposure, and financial calculation models. The introduced earthquake risk model estimates the 99.5
176 loss percentile and Average Annual Loss (AAL) of earthquakes in Iran as input to Solvency-II formulas. To feed
177 Directive 69, the conventional earthquake risk pricing table of the industry is utilised.

178 A hypothetical portfolio of 1500 residential dwellings evenly distributed between three main construction types of
179 steel, reinforced concrete and masonry, and across five provincial capital cities of Tehran, Esfahan, Tabriz, Ahvaz and
180 Kerman has been considered to compare the earthquake risk solvency charge calculated by each methodology. The
181 reason for selecting these capital cities is that they are located in various and seismicity zones and contain different
182 composition of construction types. This allows us to consider the effect of diversification in the comparison process.

183 3.1 Calculation of earthquake solvency capital

184 3.1.1 Directive 69

185 High Council of Insurance (2011) requires insurance and reinsurance institutions to hold eligible own funds as the
186 solvency capital using the fixed factors determined for different types of risks, namely underwriting, market, credit
187 and liquidity risks. The Directive provides risk factors for miscellaneous lines of business, including catastrophe fire
188 insurance (non-life) without any distinction between various natural catastrophes in terms of fixed risk factors and
189 assumes zero correlation between risks in different lines of business and geographies (meaning that losses are
190 deemed fully independent). According to this directive, to calculate the solvency charge of a property catastrophe

191 portfolio, first, the products of gross earned premiums and gross incurred claims with their corresponding risk factors
 192 (0.580 and 0.841, respectively) are computed, and then the greatest of these values is considered as the solvency
 193 capital. Since no reliable information on the gross incurred earthquake loss claims were available to us at the time
 194 of writing this paper, we only use the term determined by gross earned premiums. In so doing, average values of
 195 earthquake premium rates of five Iranian insurance firms, which were extracted from a popular Iranian insurance
 196 quotes aggregator website⁴ are employed to calculate the premium-based part of the formula for the portfolio.
 197 These rates are still based on a study conducted in 1991 by Ghafory-Ashtiany (1991) who determined the relative
 198 riskiness of different construction types in various seismic zones in Iran (please see the original table at Table A1).
 199 Table 1 presents average market earthquake insurance premiums for masonry, concrete and steel buildings of 10
 200 years of age in five provincial capital cities. We have selected these cities as representatives of different seismic
 201 zones in Iran; Tehran and Tabriz in highly seismic Alborz zone in Northern Iran, Esfahan in low seismicity central
 202 areas, Khuzestan in low seismicity southwestern Iran, and Kerman to medium-high seismic zone of Zagros. .

Table 1: Market earthquake premium rates (in 1000) for different building types in various province capital cities in Iran

Province	County	City	Construction type		
			Masonry	Steel	Concrete
Tehran	Tehran	Tehran	1.1	0.50	0.50
East Azarbayjan	Tabriz	Tabriz	1.1	0.50	0.49
Esfahan	Esfahan	Esfahan	0.78	0.33	0.32
Kerman	Kerman	Kerman	1.1	0.37	0.36
Khuzestan	Ahvaz	Ahvaz	0.78	0.33	0.32

203

204 3.1.2 Solvency-II

205 As outlined in Annex IV of Directive 2009/138/EC (2009) and CEIOPS (2010) on the application of the natural
 206 catastrophe Standardised Scenarios (standard formula), to calculate earthquake charge, the Weighted Total Value
 207 Insured (WTIV) should be computed at CRESTA⁵ level using the Total Insured Value⁶ (TIV) for each line of business.
 208 Eq.1 presents the mathematical formulation of this stage [(Directive, 2009), (Committee of European Insurance and
 209 Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), 2010)].

$$WTIV_{ZONE} = F_{ZONE} \times TIV_{ZONE} \quad \text{Equation 1}$$

210 Since the 99.5% VaR, as the risk factor, are provided at the country level in CEIOPS (2010), a relativity factor (F_{ZONE})
 211 takes the role of adjusting the national risk factor at subnational (CRESTA) level in the Standardised Scenario. The
 212 catastrophe capital charge ($CAT_{peril-ctry}$) is then calculated by applying the effect of geographical aggregation of
 213 WTIVs of different CRESTA zone within the country of interest multiplied by Q_{CTRY} (1-in-200-year risk factor of

⁴ Azki.com

⁵ CRESTA zones are a system used in the insurance industry to evaluate and manage catastrophe risks. CRESTA stands for "Catastrophe Risk Evaluation and Standardizing Target Accumulations." These zones are geographic areas that are defined based on various factors, including seismic activity, weather patterns, and other natural perils.

⁶ Total Insured Value (TIV) refers to the total amount of insurance coverage that an individual, organization, or entity has on its assets, properties, or liabilities

214 earthquake at country level). Eq.2 illustrates the calculation of solvency capital required for earthquake risk at the
 215 country level.

$$CAT_{PERIL-ZONE} = Q_{CTRY} \times \sqrt{[WTIV_{ZONE}]^T [AggMat] [WTIV_{ZONE}]} \quad \text{Equation 2}$$

216 Where $[WTIV_{ZONE}]$ is the array presentation of WTIV within the country (of interest and $[WTIV_{ZONE}]^T$ is its
 217 transposed form. $[AggMat]$ is basically a correlation matrix determining how different CRESTA zones are correlated
 218 to each other in terms of experiencing simultaneous earthquake loss and it comprises elements of 1 (fully
 219 correlated), 0.5 (semi correlated), 0.25 (slightly correlated), and 0 (no correlation). CEIOPS (2010) provides sub-
 220 country correlation matrices for EEA countries in an excel spreadsheet.

221 To follow the procedure proposed by Solvency II to calculate the catastrophe charge for earthquake risks in Iran, we
 222 use the output of a stochastic earthquake risk model developed in this study, separately presented in section 3.2.
 223 This catastrophe model can produce risk results (e.g. AAL or 1-in-200-year loss) at finer administrative levels than
 224 CRESTA. In accordance with local underwriting and risk management practice in Iran, we use the county-level
 225 resolution to calculate the solvency capital. Therefore, there is no need to use a relativity factor for TIV at the county
 226 level since we already have the Q factor for each county. That said, we can rewrite Eq.1 to Eq.3:

$$CAT_{EQ-County} = Q_{County} \times TIV_{County} \quad \text{Equation 3}$$

227 Here, we can directly calculate each county's catastrophe charge for earthquake risk. Following that, we aggregate
 228 these charges at a province and then country level to determine the total solvency capital for a given portfolio of
 229 earthquake risks. Eq.4 and Eq.5 exhibit the mathematical form of these calculations.

$$CAT_{PERIL-ZONE} = \sqrt{[WTIV_{ZONE}]^T [AggMat_{Province}] [WTIV_{ZONE}]} \quad \text{Equation 4}$$

230

$$CAT_{PERIL-ZONE} = \sqrt{[WTIV_{ZONE}]^T [AggMat_{Country}] [WTIV_{ZONE}]} \quad \text{Equation 5}$$

231 The symmetric aggregation matrices for province and country levels are constructed using either 1 (fully correlated),
 232 0.5 (semi-correlated), 0.25 (slightly correlated) and 0 (non-correlated) members. It is assumed, mainly considering
 233 distance factor, that each county is fully correlated with itself and semi correlated with its neighbouring counties. In
 234 the case of provinces, due to the larger size, the neighbouring provinces are assumed to be slightly correlated.

235 3.2 Modelling the Earthquake Risk in Iran

236 As a requisite for using a risk-based methodology in calculating the earthquake risk capital charge, for example, the
 237 described method by Solvency-II, it is necessary to have a stochastic catastrophe model for quantifying the required
 238 percentile of confidence of seismic losses (here, 99.5%) at different locations and for various construction types. This
 239 subsection explains how we developed an earthquake risk model for Iran utilising the most reliable methodologies
 240 and the highest quality of data. The subsection describes the risk model components: the calculation platform
 241 (OpenQuake), seismic hazard model, residential building exposure model, and vulnerability functions. Because this
 242 paper's main objective is to compare solvency capital calculation methods, efforts were made to keep the risk model
 243 development description as brief as possible.

244 The common practice for quantifying natural catastrophe risks in the insurance industry is (event-based) stochastic
245 catastrophe modelling. The process incorporates three main components of hazard, exposure and vulnerability using
246 a Monte Carlo simulation method to generate loss results. Loss results are then post-processed to calculate risk
247 parameters such as Average Annual Loss (AAL) and loss Exceedance Probability (EP) for specific level of confidence
248 which are employed for various underwriting and risk management decisions in the business. The practice of
249 modelling seismic risk in Iran is rather in its early stage and a few studies have been conducted on catastrophe
250 modelling over the last decade, e.g. (Ghafory-Ashtiany & Nasserasadi, 2012), (Pakdel-Lahiji, et al., 2019), (Motamed,
251 et al., 2019), (Shahbazi, et al., 2020), and (Bastami, et al., 2022). In this study, the open-source OpenQuake platform
252 developed by the Global Earthquake Model (GEM) foundation was utilised to do the seismic risk modelling, due to
253 its recognition in the insurance market and its flexibility in terms of input data and generation of required risk
254 parameters.

255 3.2.1 Seismic hazard model

256 After reviewing several available studies on the seismic hazard of Iran [(Motamed, et al., 2019), (Mirzaei, et al.,
257 1997), (Tavakoli & Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1999), (Yazdani & Kowsari, 2013), (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018), (Lotfi, et al., 2022),
258 (Pagani, et al., 2020)), the Earthquake Model of Middle East (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018) was selected due to the
259 availability of its OpenQuake-ready input data and credibility of the study in the earthquake engineering society. The
260 seismic model comprises two models for line and area sources, prepared with collaboration of seismologists from
261 Iran, the region and international research institutes in Iran, Middle East region, and Europe. Figure 1 illustrates the
262 delineation of seismogenic zones and active faults used in the input seismicity model .




Figure 1: Seismogenic sources used in the seismicity model: Area sources (left) and fault sources (right)
(Şeşetyan, et al., 2018)

263
264 In addition, a set of Ground Motion Prediction Model Equations (GMPE) for different seismotectonic characteristics
265 in Iran (including active shallow crustal, stable shallow crustal, subduction, and deep seismicity sources), and two
266 logic trees for treating epistemic seismic hazard uncertainty were utilized to calculate the ground motion intensity
267 parameter (PGA) at exposure locations. Figure 2 exhibits the structure of the GMPE logic tree and the attenuation
268 relationships that were employed in the hazard model. The minimum magnitude of 5 was used in the analysis due
269 to its impact on building damage and optimizing the computation demand. These are the same settings suggested
270 in EMME project, however; we used a more recent version of GMPEs whenever possible.

271

272

Table 2: GMPEs used in the hazard model and their corresponding weights

Seismotectonic type	GMPE	Weight
Active shallow crust	(Akkar & Cagnan, 2010)	0.20
	(Akkar, et al., 2014)	0.35
	(Chiou & Youngs, 2008)	0.35
	(Zhao, et al., 2006)	0.10
Stable shallow crust	(Atkinson & Boore, 2006)	0.40
	(Toro, 2002)	0.25
	(Campbell, 2003)	0.35
Subduction interface	(Atkinson & Boore, 2003)	0.20
	(Lin & Lee, 2008)	0.20
	(Youngs, et al., 1997)	0.20
	(Zhao, et al., 2006)	0.40
Subduction in-slab	(Atkinson & Boore, 2003)	0.20
	(Lin & Lee, 2008)	0.20
	(Youngs, et al., 1997)	0.20
	(Zhao, et al., 2006)	0.40
Deep seismicity	(Lin & Lee, 2008)	0.50
	(Youngs, et al., 1997)	0.50

273

274 To convert bed rock ground motion intensity to ground-level PGA, a soil model (shear velocity distribution) based
 275 on methodology suggested by Allen and Wald (Allen & Wald, 2009) was used. Using the components adopted, an
 276 event-based probabilistic seismic hazard analysis was carried out using GEM⁷'s OpenQuake engine and 20,000 years
 277 of seismicity were simulated. Figure 2 illustrates the Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) distribution on the bedrock
 278 with an equivalent return period of 475 years in Iran, based on averaging several realizations of PGAs.

⁷ Global Earthquake Model




Figure 2: Spatial distribution of hazard parameter (PGA) of 475-year return period

279 As seen in Figure 2, the northern part of the country (Alborz and Koppe-Dagh seismotectonic zones), including the
 280 cities of Tabriz and Tehran, and south-eastern regions (central Iran and Makran zones) containing the city of Kerman
 281 show the highest levels of seismic hazard. In the Zagros zone in western-southwestern Iran, the PGA level is lower
 282 than northern and southeastern parts, but still high. On the flip side, the provinces of Esfahan in central Iran and
 283 southwestern parts of Khuzestan in south-western Iran contain zones with the lowest PGA levels. Other regions fall
 284 between these upper and lower figures.

285 To validate the results of the hazard model, we compared our results with some recent seismic hazard analysis
 286 studies conducted at national or regional levels for Iran over the recent years, including (Lotfi, et al., 2022), (Lloyd's
 287 and CAT Risk Solutions, 2017), and (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018). Table 3 summarizes the results of seismic hazard analysis
 288 (10% probability of exceedance in 50 years equal to 475-year) for these studies with the present work.

Table 3: Comparison of the seismic hazard analysis results in this research with other studies

Study	Min PGA (g) on bedrock	Max PGA (g) on bedrock	Geographic zones with highest PGA
Lotfi et al (2022)	0.1	0.55	N and SE (very high), W-SW (high)
Şeşetyan, et al. (2018)	0.1	0.5	N and SE (very high), W-SW (high)
Lloyd's and Cat Risk Solutions (2017)	0.05	>0.40	N and W-SW (very high), SE (high)
Present study	0.05	0.55	N and SE (very high), W-SW (high)

289 As seen, there is an acceptable similarity between the range of 475-year PGAs and spatial distribution of it at the
 290 national level.

291 3.2.2 Vulnerability model

292 To estimate the damage ratio of exposed assets under a given earthquake scenario with known intensity parameters
 293 (in this study PGA), it is necessary to use vulnerability functions. These are typically functions or curves that relate
 294 various levels of hazard intensity to damage ratio or percentage for specified types of groups of assets (vulnerability
 295 classes). In this study, the vulnerability curves developed by (Mansouri & Amini-Hosseini, 2013) as one of the
 296 components of the project Earthquake Model of the Middle East (EMME) (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018) was used due to
 297 the credibility of the methodology used (RISK-UE), consistency with building attributes publicly available for Iranian
 298 buildings (please look at the exposure model section), and compatibility with past earthquake losses in Iran). In this
 299 study, 10 building vulnerability classes were defined based on construction material, height of building, and
 300 construction vintage as a proxy for the ductility of the structure to earthquake loads. Table 4 summarizes the
 301 vulnerability classification of Iranian buildings based on their physical attributes.

Table 4: Classification of Iranian building vulnerability based on physical attributes (Mansouri & Amini-Hosseini, 2013)				
Vulnerability class	Material type	Height category	Construction date	Short description
Adobe	Adobe	Low-rise	All time periods	High vulnerability
M1	Reinforced masonry	Low-rise	1996-2006	Low vulnerability
M2	Unreinforced masonry	Low-rise	1996-2006	High vulnerability
M3	Unreinforced masonry	Low-rise	Before 1976	High vulnerability
RC3	Concrete frame	Mid-rise	Before 1976	High vulnerability
RC2	Concrete frame	Mid-rise	1976-1996	Moderate vulnerability
RC1	Concrete frame	Mid-rise	1996-2006	Low vulnerability
S3	Steel frame	Mid-rise	Before 1976	High vulnerability
S2	Steel frame	Mid-rise	1976-1996	Moderate vulnerability
S1	Steel frame	Mid-rise	1996-2006	Low vulnerability

302

303 Since the newest vintage of buildings at the time conducting this study was 2016, we shifted the original vulnerability
 304 (Table 4) by 10 years to pre-1986, 1986 to 2006, and post-2006. This is a valid modification because buildings had
 305 become 10 years older after the publication of the original paper and since then a new version of the Iranian
 306 Standard for Seismic design of buildings had come into force in 2014. These classes and their corresponding
 307 vulnerability curves represent seismic vulnerability of ten building classes of adobe (one class), masonry (three
 308 classes), steel (three classes), and reinforced concrete (three classes). Figure 3 exhibits examples of these curves for
 309 different types of building with medium-quality construction. a, m, rc, s in this figure stand for adobe, masonry,
 310 reinforced concrete, and steel buildings.




Figure 3 Vulnerability curves for medium-quality adobe (am), masonry (mm), reinforced concrete (rcm), and steel (sm) buildings (Mansouri & Amini-Hosseini, 2013)

311 As shown in this diagram, adobe is the most vulnerable class of building to earthquakes, while RC and steel buildings
 312 offer the highest resistance to seismic loads. Masonry buildings fall between these two ranges. Also, buildings with
 313 older date of construction are considered more vulnerable to seismic forces.

314

315 3.2.3 Residential building exposure model

316 The exposure model provides attributes of the buildings at risk, such as physical attributes (material type, year built,
 317 height of the building), their monetary value, and their geographic locations in terms of, for example, geographic
 318 coordinates. The Iranian census data classifies the building materials into three main classes of steel, reinforced
 319 concrete, and masonry. The masonry class is furthered split to Brick & Steel or Stone & Steel, Brick & Wood or Stone
 320 & Wood, Cement Block (all kind of Roofs), All Brick or Brick & Stone, and All Wood. In this study, we only consider
 321 residential building because their attributes are collected on a regular basis in the national population and housing
 322 census and reported by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) every 5 years. The date of constructions is expressed in
 323 10-year, 5-year and 1-year bins depending on the vintage of buildings since 1966. The census data is freely available
 324 at SCI website at county granularity. Due to the fact that the census data has not been updated since 2016, we have
 325 used 2016 datasets to develop the exposure model. Figure 4 illustrates common types of Iranian residential buildings
 326 in the city of Tehran.

327

328



Figure 4: Examples of common residential buildings in Tehran: adobe (upper left), steel (upper right), reinforced concrete (lower left), masonry (lower right)

Photos by Ms. Niloofar Kazemi Asl


329 Until 2011, SCI reported four sets of building attributes, namely building material, construction date, and number
 330 and build area of dwellings split by building types and year built. We used the same vulnerability classes introduced
 331 by (Mansouri & Amini-Hosseini, 2013) as exhibited in Table 3 so that they are consistent with adopted vulnerability
 332 curves. Because census data of 2016 lacked the attribute of building vintage, we used the previous census data
 333 (2011) vintage attribute and updated it by making an assumption that if the number of dwellings has decreased
 334 between 2011 and 2016 census in a given county, the reduction would be due to destruction of buildings belonging
 335 to the oldest vintage bin, and if the number increased, that would be because of newly built buildings, thereby
 336 affiliating to the newest vintage bin. This assumption is compatible to the reconstruction trend of buildings and
 337 settlement development in Iran.

338 No national dataset on the number of stories or height of the buildings is available in Iran. As a results, we assumed
 339 a low-rise height class for adobe and masonry buildings and mid-rise class for steel and reinforced concrete buildings
 340 in Iran based on an engineering judgement. An estimate of construction cost of residential buildings can be enquired


341 from builders in different provinces. The value of existing buildings can also be estimated by depreciating the value
342 of the newly constructed buildings based on the date of construction or building vintage bins in the vulnerability
343 model. Based on the research conducted, the average cost of construction per square meter in Iran in 2016 was USD
344 300. Using the data on build area and number of dwellings, we estimated the average building surface area of about
345 100 sqm for Iranian dwellings.

346 After creating the datasets for 10 building types at the county level, we used population data of Landscan (Bright, et
347 al., 2017) with a 30-arc-second resolution to downscale the county-level building exposure data to a finer resolution
348 for the loss calculation purpose. To accomplish this, we divide the number of dwellings of each building type by the
349 total number of population of the county to compute the number of dwellings per person, then we multiply the
350 results to the number of population in each cell to come up with number of dwellings in that cell. The process is
351 repeated for all types of building for each county. Figure 5 presents the spatial distribution and monetary value of
352 different building types of residential dwellings in Iran at the county level. Please note that numbers are absolute
353 value of each building type at the county level.


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
(a)



(b)



(c)



(d)

Figure 5: Exposure of residential buildings in Iran, adobe (a), masonry (b), steel (c), and concrete (d)

355 From a holistic point of view, most residential buildings are concentrated around the highly-populated capital cities
 356 of Tehran, Tabriz, Esfahan, Mashhad and Shiraz. As observed in map (a), the highest value of county-wise adobe
 357 buildings as the most vulnerable type is Esfahan (center of Iran), Fars (south), Kerman (east) and Sistan and
 358 Baluchestan (southeast). Also, masonry buildings, as the second most vulnerable building type, are almost common
 359 across the country with a more visible presence around the capital cities of Tabriz, Tehran and Mashhad in the north,
 360 Esfahan in the center, Shiraz in the south and Ahvaz in southeast (See map 'b'). The two more earthquake resistant
 361 building types, namely steel and reinforced concrete are more frequent around capital cities of Tehran, Tabriz,
 362 followed by Esfahan and Mashhad and Shiraz. According to statistical analyses on the exposure data, about 55% of
 363 residential dwellings in 2016 were made of modern construction materials such as steel and reinforced concrete,
 364 while the remaining 45% belonged to other types including masonry and adobe.

365 4 Numerical Results

366 After preparing the components of the risk model, an event-based probabilistic approach has been used to assess
 367 seismic risk of the Iranian residential dwellings. To achieve that, GEM's OpenQuake hazard and risk calculation
 368 engine was adopted due to its credibility within the earthquake engineering society, its transparency in terms of
 369 technical documentations, and flexibility in using different approaches in modelling risk. Figure 6 illustrates the
 370 schema of OpenQuake's probabilistic event-based engine and its input and output structure.




Figure 6: GEM's OpenQuake schema and its input and output components (OpenQuake website⁸)

371

372 As described, the exposure, vulnerability, and hazard models need to be converted to required format before being
 373 incorporated in the engine. In addition to that, a configuration file that introduces the input data and other analysis
 374 parameters such as type of analysis (here: probabilistic event-based), number of simulated years (here: 20,000
 375 years), and types of output, is required to set up the risk analysis. The risk assessment process starts with OpenQuake
 376 hazard engine generating sampled earthquake events using the hazard model provided. For each seismic event
 377 generated, ground motion field (distribution of PGA on top soil) is calculated using GMPE models and the soil shear
 378 velocity information for all the locations existing in the exposure model within a defined radius around the sampled
 379 epicenter (here 150 km). Then, based on the typology of buildings at each location (a cell of 30-second arc
 380 dimension), relevant vulnerability curves are used to convert PGA value to damage percentage. Further, the damage
 381 percentage is multiplied with replacement value of that type of building to calculate loss. These OpenQuake output
 382 is then post-processed to calculate aggregate loss at different levels, namely county, province, and country. These
 383 values should be normalized to their corresponding exposure values for each building type to compute AAL rates.
 384 The same process is done, this time using EP 99.5% to calculate 1-in-200 EP loss for each building type at
 385 aforementioned aggregate levels which are adopted as solvency capital required according to Solvency II regime.

386 4.1 Earthquake Risk Assessment Results

387 Figure 7 shows the spatial distribution of seismic AAL for all residential building types in Iran, aggregated at the
 388 county level. Few studies exist on seismic risk topic for Iran at a national level [e.g. Ghafory-Ashtiany & Nasserasadi
 389 (2012) and Notamed et al. (2019)] which were previously done by authors of this study and are thus considered
 390 biased to be used to validate the risk results. Therefore, a risk component validation method is followed to control
 391 the sensibility of the results, in which it is tried to validate the risk distribution and intensity based on the values in

⁸ <https://docs.openquake.org/oq-engine/manual/latest/risk.html> accessed in 10 December 2023

392 the exposure, hazard, and vulnerability models used. As observed, almost all parts of the country are exposed to
 393 medium and high levels of seismic risk, except for sparsely populated areas of central deserts and the northern
 394 coasts of the Oman Sea. There are also visible high-risk counties, especially around major cities of Tehran and Tabriz
 395 in northern and north-western Iran, as well as in other populated areas proximate to Mashhad (northeastern Iran),
 396 Esfahan (central Iran), and Ahvaz, Shiraz and Kerman in southern parts of the country. This pattern seems to be in
 397 accordance with the distribution of different classes of buildings and their exposure to the seismic hazard (please
 398 see figures 2 and 5 and comparative vulnerability of main building types in Table 4); in areas with a concentration of
 399 buildings and very high level of earthquake hazard (such as in Tehran and Tabriz cities) the seismic risk is the highest.
 400 Similarly, we can witness a high potential of loss in the populated southern cities of Ahvaz, Shiraz and Kerman, that
 401 are subject to medium to high seismicity. The city of Esfahan, despite being located in a low seismicity zone, also
 402 shows high seismic risk, most probably due to its very high building exposure (the second-highest exposure value
 403 after Tehran) and the prevalence of more vulnerable building classes of masonry and adobe (look at map 'a' and 'b'
 404 in Figure 5). In south-eastern Iran, where the province of Sistan and Baluchestan exists, a medium to rather high
 405 level of risk can be distinguished, mainly because of the high level of seismicity in southern parts of province,
 406 existence of extremely vulnerable types of buildings (e.g. adobe).






Figure 7 Earthquake Average Annual Loss (AAL) of residential buildings in Iran (million USD)

407 From what Figure 8 presented as the spatial pattern of 1-in-200-year losses of earthquakes in Iran, one could acquire
 408 an idea of the level of earthquake insurance capital required by the Solvency II regime for different types of buildings
 409 at the county level in Iran. Assuming a 100% insurance coverage for residential homes in Iran, the SCR or 1-in-200
 410 loss for steel and RC buildings would be the highest in Tehran, Tabriz, and to a lower extent in Esfahan (and their
 411 surrounding counties). The situation is more homogenous for masonry structure (because of its high prevalence and
 412 rather even distribution across the country), where significant seismic losses with 99.5% confidence could be
 413 distinguished in almost all major cities in the country, namely Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Esfahan, Kermanshah, and
 414 Kerman. For adobe construction, again, a medium-to-high degree of losses could be expected in many counties


415 except for areas located in Khuzestan and Fars provinces in the southwest. The only observable anomaly for 1-in-
 416 200 earthquake losses in adobe buildings is found in the country's most south-eastern counties in Sistan and
 417 Baluchestan province, particularly along the border with Pakistan. This pattern could be first due to the weighty
 418 number of absolutely vulnerable buildings made of adobe in these areas compared to other parts of the country.
 419 The second reason would be the eminent seismicity of this region, which is influenced by both shallow crustal and
 420 subduction seismic zones of Makran.




(a)



(b)



(c)



(d)

Figure 8: Earthquake 1-in-200 loss of residential buildings in Iran, adobe (a), masonry (b), steel (c), and concrete (d)

421 Table 5 presents the pure premium rate (AAL rate) calculated for the same cities previously selected in Table 1 of
 422 Section 3. If we draw a comparison between these rates and those used currently by the market for pricing
 423 earthquake insurance in Iran (Table 1), we notice a vast difference, implying a sizeable undervaluation of earthquake
 424 risk in the Iranian insurance industry, including the insurers and supervising bodies like CII. Here, we used county-
 425 level AAL rates as the representative of the modelled seismic risk of capital cities previously mentioned in Table 1.
 426 This is because the current market rates are only retrievable at the city level from the Iranian insurance quote
 427 aggregator websites.

428 This difference is more pronounced for cities with a higher level of seismicity, such as Tabriz where the modelled
 429 AAL rate (8.65) is about eight times larger than the current market premium rate (1.1) for masonry buildings.
 430 Considering that retrieved market premium rates are ‘technical premium’, the real discrepancy between risk-based
 431 and market rates are even higher. For seismically calmer cities like Esfahan, the discrepancy becomes milder,
 432 reaching a ratio factor of about 2 for reinforced concrete buildings.

Table 5: Risk-based (modelled) earthquake pure premium rates (x 0.001) for different types of selected cities in Iran

Province	County	City	Risk-based earthquake pure premium rates		
			Masonry	Steel	Concrete
Tehran	Tehran	Tehran	7.15	2.01	1.65
East Azarbayjan	Tabriz	Tabriz	8.68	3.73	3.03
Esfahan	Esfahan	Esfahan	1.07	0.45	0.20
Kerman	Kerman	Kerman	3.35	0.90	1.04

Khuzestan	Ahvaz	Ahvaz	3.23	0.83	1.00
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433

434 **4.2 Calculation of Solvency Capital under Solvency-II and Directive 69**

435 In this section, we utilize the modelled solvency capital rates, specifically the 1-in-200 loss rates, and the current
 436 premium rates prevailing in the market (averaged across the market) to conduct a comparative analysis of the capital
 437 requirements for earthquake risk in Iran. The assessment is based on two distinct methodologies specified by the
 438 European Solvency II regime and the Iranian Directive 69. To highlight the difference between modelled (risk-based)
 439 solvency figures and those calculated based on the earned premium which are, per se, acquired by underwriting
 440 earthquake risks according to market premium rates, we use a hypothetical portfolio of risks in the five capital cities
 441 we selected previously in section 3.1. As mentioned before, these cities have been selected because they represent
 442 different seismic zones of Iran, namely Alborz (from northwest to north east including Tabriz and Tehran), Zagros
 443 (west, south, and southeast, including Ahvaz and Kerman), and Central Iran (Esfahan). These cities also lie within
 444 regions with different seismicity level, for example Tehran and Tabriz are highly seismic, Ahvaz and Kerman have
 445 medium-to-high seismicity and Esfahan is located in a seismically calm area.

446 To illustrate the influence of building types on solvency capital, we examined three primary construction classes:
 447 steel, reinforced concrete, and masonry. For all building classes, we assumed a replacement cost of USD 300 per
 448 square meter and an average built area of 100 square meters per housing unit, consistent with the parameters used
 449 in the exposure model. Additionally, we presumed an equal number of dwellings (100 dwellings for each
 450 construction type in each city) within the hypothetical portfolio. Using the city- and building type-specific solvency
 451 capital rates, we calculated the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) by multiplying the exposure values for each
 452 construction type by the corresponding SCR rates. Subsequently, the city-level SCRs needed to be aggregated to the
 453 portfolio level. In the Solvency II methodology, unlike Directive 69, which simply sums up city-level values to compute
 454 the portfolio-level SCR, a geography-based correlation matrix is utilized to aggregate results. Therefore, we initially
 455 developed a correlation matrix for the selected five cities.

456 Following a methodology akin to that outlined in Annex IV of Directive (2009) and CEIOPS (2010), we established five
 457 province-level and one portfolio-level correlation matrices for the provinces hosting the pilot cities. The values within
 458 these correlation matrices were determined based on the proximity of administrative divisions, considering the
 459 relative positioning of counties within each province and the proximity of provinces. It was assumed that each county
 460 exhibits 100% correlation with itself. Similarly, each province is considered fully correlated with itself, reflected by a
 461 correlation value of 1.0. Furthermore, a 50% correlation was assumed between each county and its neighboring
 462 county. For provinces, a 25% correlation was assumed between proximate provinces, accounting for the larger
 463 dimensions of provinces compared to counties. As an illustrative example, Figure A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix
 464 depict the configuration of counties in Tehran province and its corresponding earthquake risk correlation matrix,
 465 providing a visual representation of the methodology applied.

466 Table 6 shows the results of solvency capital calculation based on the two solvency regimes at the county, province
 467 and portfolio levels for the hypothetical portfolio of risks.

468

469

Table 6: Earthquake risk solvency capital rates based on the methodologies suggested by the Iranian Directive 69 (D-69) and Solvency II (S-II)

Level		Exposure (USD million)			D-69 solvency capital rates (x 0.001)			S-II solvency capital rates (x 0.001)			D-69 solvency capital (USD)	S-II solvency capital (USD)
		M	S	RC	M	S	RC	M	S	RC		
Location	Tehran	30	30	30	0.64	0.29	0.29	17.00	4.76	3.89	36,540	769,500
	Tabriz	30	30	30	0.64	0.29	0.29	17.25	8.65	6.00	36,366	957,000
	Esfahan	30	30	30	0.45	0.19	0.19	3.49	1.91	1.02	24,882	192,600
	Kerman	30	30	30	0.64	0.21	0.21	7.44	2.74	2.42	31,842	378,000
	Ahvaz	30	30	30	0.45	0.19	0.19	6.02	2.15	2.67	24,882	325,200
Portfolio											154,512	1,339,296

470

471 As illustrated in the table, there's an approximately tenfold difference in the solvency capital requirement when
472 calculated using the approach specified by Directive 69 compared to the European Solvency II for the same residential
473 dwelling portfolio in the pilot cities. Two key factors contribute to this notable gap in required capital charges. Firstly,
474 the variance in catastrophe capital rates between Directive 69 and the Solvency II system plays a significant role. The
475 second contributing factor, albeit with a minor impact, is the dissimilarity in aggregation methods employed by each
476 methodology. In the Iranian approach, where portfolio capital is determined by summing up county-level figures, the
477 mitigating effect of geographical diversification is simply disregarded, leading to even higher results. According to the
478 data presented in Table 5, the Solvency II risk-based rates are roughly twenty times greater than the Directive 69
479 capital rates. As mentioned, this disparity is somewhat mitigated when aggregating the solvency capital at the
480 portfolio level. The ultimate catastrophe capitals at the portfolio level for the Iranian and European systems are
481 reported as USD 154,512 and USD 1,339,296, respectively.

482 5 Discussion

483 The findings from the analysis indicate that the constant-factor approach utilized by the Central Insurance of Iran
484 (CII) for calculating solvency capital related to earthquake risks significantly underestimates the risk compared to the
485 methodology recommended by the Solvency II regime. This discrepancy raises concerns about the capacity of Iranian
486 insurers and reinsurers to withstand catastrophic shocks stemming from medium to significant earthquake events
487 in major cities across Iran. It is worth noting that, despite the low insurance penetration rate in Iran and the absence
488 of medium to large events in main cities, there have been no recorded instances of catastrophe-related insolvency
489 in the country. However, persisting with the current approach may jeopardize the stability of the insurance market
490 in Iran, potentially giving rise to financial and social challenges in the event of future disasters.

491 Moreover, following the establishment of the Iran Building Catastrophe Insurance Pool (IBCIP), which provides
492 primary insurance coverage for all residential buildings in the country, a substantial business opportunity arises for
493 local insurance companies to address the gap between the partial coverage offered by IBCIP and the total insurable
494 sum. However, if these insurance firms persist in utilizing the existing premium rates in this scenario, a significant
495 accumulation of risk may occur over time due to the disparity between the actual risk and the written premium. This
496 poses a considerable challenge, as the solvency capital held by these entities might be inadequate to cover losses
497 resulting from medium-to-large seismic events in urban settlements, potentially leading to the insolvency of Iranian
498 insurers. Additionally, given that a majority of domestic insurance firms are reinsured internally due to financial
499 sanctions on Iran, the solvency issues of insurers could potentially have repercussions on other financial institutions.

500 To break this cycle of catastrophe risk accumulation, it is advisable for the Iranian insurance regulator to transition
501 from the current catastrophe pricing practice to a risk-based pricing system, incorporating scientifically-approved
502 catastrophe modelling techniques.

503 Another consideration which is relevant to the topic of insurance solvency is the public-private collaboration for
504 adopting and implementing new measures like the risk-based catastrophe solvency requirement. As the first step,
505 governmental bodies and insurers can initiate educational programs to raise awareness about catastrophe
506 modeling's significance in assessing natural hazards risk. Forming alliances between international institutions and
507 local insurers is beneficial for knowledge exchange, especially amid current financial sanctions. Moreover, the
508 government can incentivize insurers to integrate catastrophe modeling into risk assessments before enforcing
509 capital mandates. This involves offering tax benefits or reduced regulatory burdens, prompting insurers to embrace
510 advanced risk evaluation tools. These proactive steps aim to fortify the Iranian insurance market, preventing
511 undervaluation, and enhancing resilience through modern practices.

512 It is important to note that the outcomes derived from this current research are significantly influenced by the quality
513 of the input data utilized, including exposure, vulnerability, and hazard data available during the study period.
514 Undoubtedly, an enhancement in the quality of input data would enable a more precise assessment of the seismic
515 risk associated with Iranian buildings. This, in turn, would contribute to a more accurate evaluation of the prevailing
516 insurance underwriting and pricing practices.

517 6 Conclusion

518 A numerical analysis was carried out in this paper to compare the earthquake catastrophe capital required by the
519 European Solvency-II and Directive 69 of the Central Insurance of Iran. Based on the literature reviewed, in the
520 Iranian system, a constant factor is used to compute catastrophe charges based on each policy's earned premium
521 and incurred losses. These earned earthquake insurance premiums are the result of an underwriting practice that
522 uses a market-agreed rating schemes which seems to be not a proper representative of the existing seismic risk in
523 the country. On the other hand, the Solvency-II Directive requires a risk modelling-based capital calculation approach
524 to compute the necessary catastrophe charge. In addition to the difference in the calculation of solvency capital
525 rates, there is also a discrepancy between the two methodologies in risk aggregation: while the Iranian directive
526 simply sums up the required capital charges at the city-level to calculate the portfolio-level figure, the European
527 regime considers the diversification impact by making use of correlation matrices. To be able to implement Solvency
528 II approach in calculating the risk-based solvency capital, a seismic risk model has been developed by adopting
529 Earthquake Model of Middle East (EMME) seismicity model (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018), creating an exposure model for
530 Iranian residential buildings based on the newest census data, and using an earthquake vulnerability model for
531 Iranian buildings (Mansouri & Amini-Hosseini, 2013) and combining them in GEM's OpenQuake hazard and risk
532 assessment engine. Average Annual Loss (AAL) and 1-in-200 EP values have been calculated for four main types of
533 Iranian buildings at 30-second arc grid granularity.

534 The initial segment of the numerical findings was presented as the Average Annual Loss (AAL) and Exceedance
535 Probability (EP) figures at the county level, achieved by aggregating the OpenQuake risk output tables for four
536 distinct construction types. A comparison between these values and the AAL rates currently employed in the Iranian
537 insurance market reveals a noticeable undervaluation of seismic risk, ranging from 1/2 to 1/8, depending on the risk
538 location and construction type. Furthermore, to comprehend the implications of this dissonance between risk
539 modelling-based and market-agreed rates, we computed the earthquake capital requirement for a hypothetical
540 portfolio of residential dwellings in five Iranian cities situated in different seismotectonic zones. This calculation was

541 conducted using the methodologies specified by Solvency II and the instructions provided by Directive 69 of the
 542 Iranian Central Insurance. The results demonstrate a significant 20-fold underestimation of earthquake solvency
 543 capital in the Iranian Directive 69 system compared to Solvency II. This undervaluation of earthquake risk poses a
 544 substantial risk of accumulating undue exposure for the Iranian insurance market. In the event of medium-to-large
 545 urban earthquakes, it could potentially lead to the insolvency of insurance undertakings due to the inadequacy of
 546 reserved catastrophe capital.

547 Given the significant impact of input data and models on the results of catastrophe modelling, it is crucial to
 548 acknowledge that a different risk perception may emerge if the same process is repeated using more recent
 549 exposure data or improved seismic hazard and vulnerability models, which may become available in the future.
 550 Consequently, the authors of this paper highly advocate for ongoing research focusing on various components of
 551 risk, specifically hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. Additionally, the introduction of more state-of-the-art
 552 earthquake models is encouraged to foster a more comprehensive and accurate seismic risk assessment for the
 553 Iranian insurance market.

554 **7 Appendix**

555 *Table A1: Riskiness of different construction types in Iran (Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1991)*

Type	Building Typology	Level of Earthquake Hazard				
		1	2	3	4	5
1	Adobe and Traditional	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.5	1.8
2	Confined Masonry	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.4	1.6
3	Pre-code Steel Structure	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.4
4	Pre-code Reinforced Concrete	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.0
5	Code Based Buildings Design and Construction (Post 1991)	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8

556 Note: Hazard levels are based on zones defined in 'Iranian Code of Practice for Seismic Resistant Design of
 557 Buildings - Code 2800' as 1: no, 2: low (0.2g), 3: moderate (0.25g), 4: high (0.3g), 5: very high (0.35g).

558




Figure A1: Tehran province and its counties

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Table A2: Earthquake correlation matrix for Tehran province based on the methodology suggested by Solvency-II

	Tehran	Shahriar	Eslamshahr	Baharestan	Malard	Pakdasht	Rey	Qods	Robat Karim	Varamin	Qarchak	Pardis	Damavand	Pishva	Shemiranat	Firuzkuh
Tehran	1															
Shahriar	0.5	1														
Eslamshahr	0.5	0.5	1													
Baharestan	0	0.5	0.5	1												
Malard	0	0.5	0	0	1											
Pakdasht	0.5	0	0	0	0	1										
Rey	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	0.5	1									

Qods	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	1								
Robat Karim	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	1							
Varamin	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	1						
Qarchak	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.5	1					
Pardis	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	1				
Damavand	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1			
Pishva	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	1		
Shemiranat	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	1	
Firuzkuh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	1

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562 **8 Data Availability**

563 Data used in this research are the intellectual property of Iran National Science Foundation who funded the study
564 and cannot shared by the authors.

565 **9 Authors Contribution**

566 In the preparation of this report, Prof. Mohsen Ghafory-Ashtiany has planned the research project and contributed
567 to the content of different chapters mainly in the earthquake hazard and risk assessment and modelling and review
568 and validation of results. Dr. Hooman Motamed has been mainly responsible for authoring the insurance regulation
569 content and numerical analysis. Both authors have equally edited the final manuscript.

570 **10 Competing Interests**

571 The contact author has declared that none of the authors has any competing interests.

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