

Earthquake insurance in Iran: Solvency of local insurers in light of the current market practice

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Abstract:

Owing to its geographical positioning within one of the most seismically active zones globally, Iran has experienced numerous historically impactful earthquakes. Due to its location in one of the most seismically active regions in the world, Iran has witnessed many devastating earthquakes through history. To finance a part of these losses and reconstruction expenses, earthquake insurance has been offered as a rider of fire insurance policy by the Iranian insurers. This mechanism, if well operated, can substantially contribute to disaster risk management. On the other hand, if the pricing and management of catastrophe risk lack a sound, risk modelling-based practice, it might add to the problems and act to the detriment of disaster risk management. In this paper, we first compare the current earthquake insurance pricing and risk management in the Iranian insurance industry with a state-of-the-art insurance regulation in the European Union (Solvency-II). Then, we examine the consequence of following each approach in terms of business profitability and viability by conducting a numerical analysis on a hypothetical portfolio of property risks in Iran. In so doing, a seismic risk model has been developed by adopting EMME hazard model and a peer-reviewed vulnerability model, and by developing an exposure model for residential dwellings in Iran. The results suggest that modelled earthquake premium rates are about 5 times larger than the rates currently used in the market. Furthermore, a comparison between solvency capitals calculated following the methods specified by the European Solvency II and the Iranian Directive 69 indicates a visible underestimation of the earthquake solvency capital by the Iranian insurers. It seems that maintaining the current insurance pricing and risk management techniques practice in Iran will probably lead to a substantial accumulation of earthquake risk for domestic firms and eventually endanger the solvency of these companies in the event of large-scale earthquake losses in future.

Keywords: Iran earthquake risk, Probabilistic-probabilistic catastrophe-event-based modeling, Insurance pricing, Insurance regulatory, Solvency

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31 **1 Introduction**

32 Being positioned in one of the most seismically active regions in the world, Iran has witnessed many
33 devastating earthquakes through history, such as the 1978 M7.4 Tabas (USD 11 mn), the 1990 M7.4 Manjil–Rudbar
34 (USD 2.8 bn), the 2003 M6.6 Bam (USD 1.5 bn), and most recently the 2016 M7.3 Sar-e Pol-e Zahab (USD 5 bn) [
35 (Ibrion, Mokhtari, & Nadim, 2015) and (Maghsoudi & Moshtari, 2020)]. Although almost all these events occurred in
36 rural areas or small-size cities with less than 100,000 of inhabitants, the resulting socio-economic
37 consequences have been substantial. If a similar magnitude earthquake struck a major Iranian city with millions of
38 populations, the volume of physical and human losses would be much higher.

39 To compensate a part of earthquake losses and facilitate the process of reconstructions, Iranian insurance firms offer
40 earthquake insurance as a rider of fire insurance policy. However, despite the common practice in the global
41 insurance market, almost none of the domestic insurers use catastrophe risk models to quantify seismic risk for
42 pricing policies, purchasing reinsurance, and managing accumulated risks. Instead, old-fashion and seemingly
43 underestimating pricing tables are still utilised nationally to determine earthquake insurance policies based on main
44 construction materials and geographical location of insured buildings. This pricing approach is likely to result in
45 insurance companies collecting insufficient premiums to cover future catastrophe losses. In a similar way, on the
46 regulatory side, the solvency capital for catastrophe properties is not risk-based and is determined according to the
47 amount of premium collected (which seem to be not commensurate to risk) and history of company's losses (which
48 does not reflect long-return period events risks like earthquakes). To date, due to the low penetration rate of
49 insurance in Iran, about 1.8% in 2022, catastrophe risks assumed by Iranian insurance companies are not significant,
50 implying that even in the event of medium to large natural catastrophes, the insurance losses usually are
51 reimbursable by the insurers. With the expected Iran Building Catastrophe Insurance Pool (IBCIP) starting to operate
52 soon, all residential buildings will be covered under a national policy. As such, there will be likely considerable
53 business opportunities for domestic insurers to extend their catastrophe property portfolio to provide
54 supplementary coverage to the primary protection which IBCIP offers. These new business opportunities, although
55 financially attractive, can dramatically expose Iranian insurance and reinsurance companies to natural hazards risk.
56 In other words, in the event of major catastrophe events, such as earthquakes in urban cities or widespread flooding,
57 which are likely in the Iranian geography, many local insurers can quickly become insolvent. These said, it is essential
58 to examine the of sufficiency of the current insurance rates and the effectiveness of the solvency capital
59 requirements mandated by Central Insurance of Iran (CII) to cover future catastrophe losses to happen in Iran.

60 In so doing, two parallel approaches have been followed. First, a probabilistic event-based earthquake risk model
61 was developed which helps calculate risk-based pricing framework for earthquake insurance policies. The model
62 entails components of a standard catastrophe risk model, namely exposure, hazard, and vulnerability which are
63 separately adopted, tailored, or developed based on the state-of-the-art methodologies and up-to-date data. These
64 components are convolved using GEM's OpenQuake as a probabilistic event-based risk assessment platform to
65 generate risk output such as Average Annual Loss (AAL) and loss Exceedance Probability (EP). In addition, a similar
66 risk-based methodology to what employed by the European insurance solvency regime, Solvency II, was adopted to
67 create a standard formula for determining solvency capital for given earthquake risk portfolios. A hypothetical
68 portfolio of earthquake risks was assumed to compare the factor-based solvency capital (as mandated by CII) with a
69 risk modeling-based one (as determined following Solvency II methodology) to examine the sufficiency of the current
70 earthquake rates and solvency capital. Further, the profitability of the underwriting and the likelihood of solvency is
71 benchmarked using the values generated using the risk-based pricing method and the standard formula of solvency
72 capital.

73 This paper comprises six sections. First, a background on insurance solvency with a focus on the European
74 Solvency-II and its proposed method for calculating risk-based solvency capital earthquake is provided in Section 2.
75 Then, Section 3 describes the evolution of earthquake risk models in Iran. Section 3 provides information on
76 the methodology and data adopted or developed to calculate risk parameters such as AAL and EP (99.5% percentile)
77 and estimate risk-based solvency capital for a portfolio of risks with earthquake coverage. Numerical results of the
78 proposed methodology are outlined in Section 4, where the solvency capital of a hypothetical portfolio of risks under
79 earthquake policy is calculated using the current factor-based and the proposed risk-based methods. A discussion
80 on the differences between the two methods and possible consequences on the viability of Iranian insurers is given
81 in Section 5. And finally, section six concludes the process and its findings. A reference list is also provided at the end
82 of the article.

83 2 Natural Catastrophe Insurance Regulations in the European Union (EU) and Iran

84 The significance of natural catastrophes and their impact on the viability of insurance firms has received increasing
85 attention over time, and the occurrence of major catastrophic events such as Hurricane Andrew (1992), the
86 Northridge Earthquake (1994), Hurricane Katrina (2005), the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami has
87 highlighted the issue. Catastrophe losses endanger the solvency of small and medium reinsurance firms
88 and consume the accumulated provisions of well-capitalised reinsurers (Anderson, 2002). While, to many, the term
89 catastrophe is closely associated with natural hazards (e.g. earthquake, flood and windstorm), it can also be used to
90 address intensive damages from human-made events (Lawson, et al., 2001). Catastrophe risks have different
91 characteristics compared to non-catastrophe losses. They are highly dependent and occur so rarely that historical
92 claims data could not be efficiently utilised to predict future losses. As a result, the insurance industry has evolved
93 to prepare for the consequences imposed by disasters by developing risk management rules and regulations. This
94 section provides a brief history of the regulations regarding the insurance solvency capital as a risk management
95 measure in the insurance industry, focusing on the European Solvency-II regime and the solvency regulations set by
96 the Central Insurance of Iran (CII) as the national insurance regulator. In addition, technical aspects of calculating
97 SCR in the two abovementioned regulatory systems are described with brevity.

98 2.1 European Insurance Solvency Regulation

99 In 2004, Thorburn has provided a history of the difficult times that catastrophic losses created for the insurance
100 industry and the countries' response to these challenges in the form of developing insurance regulatory institutions
101 and adopting solvency mandates as an effective measure to manage catastrophe risks to which insurers are exposed
102 (Thorburn, 2004).

103 In general, insurance supervision aims to protect policyholders' interests by ensuring a sound financial operation
104 and proper management in the insurance business. Therefore, effective regulations must be established to evaluate
105 insurers' liabilities adequately and determine provisions to cover these commitments. It is also necessary to consider
106 an extra layer of protection in the form of capital margin to respond to unexpected financial shocks, e.g. catastrophic
107 losses. That is why solvency supervision regulations were established and improved over time.

108 Catastrophic losses, both natural and man-made, have resulted in higher claims provisions, reduced capital power,
109 reduced profitability, and in some cases, made insurance firms insolvent. Remarkable examples of such bankruptcies
110 are the 1906 San Francisco earthquake with 12 insurance companies declared insolvent, the 1992 Hurricane Andrew
111 with nine firms being bankrupt, and the 2011 Christchurch quakes that resulted in the ruin of two insurance
112 companies (Kelly & Stodolak, 2013).

113 The first steps in harmonising Europe-wide insurance supervision were taken by the approval of the first ³non-life
114 and life insurance Directives in the 1970s [(First Council Directive, 1973), (First Council Directive, 1979)]. These
115 directives required the European Member States to comply with harmonised solvency capital requirements. The
116 Directives were later revised by adding second and third amendments in 1982 and 1992 [(Second Council Directive,
117 1988), (Council Directive, 1990), (Directive, 1992), (Council Directive, 1992)]. The entirety of these regulations, which
118 were later named Solvency-0 by (Sandström, 2019), underwent a comparative examination in the 1990s, showing
119 that they were not sufficiently taking into account the full spectrum of risks that insurance companies were exposed
120 to. As such, new directives (known as Solvency I) were again introduced to both life and non-life insurance in 2002
121 to fortify the stance of insurers in the event of catastrophic losses ~~[(Directive, 2002), (Directive, 2002)]~~. Both
122 Solvency-0 and Solvency-I regulations followed a similar approach in determining the Solvency Capital Margin, which
123 was mainly based on factoring gross earned premium and gross incurred claims (Sandström, 2019). However, this
124 was only a transitional remedy to incorporate a risk-based approach in the insurance solvency capital requirement
125 regulations, as Solvency I was still inefficient in terms of asset and liability valuation and capital allocation (Rae, et
126 al., 2018). A drastic reform to solvency regulation was introduced about one decade later as the Solvency-II
127 Framework.

128 Influenced by the then-new risk-based banking regulation, Basel-II (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004),
129 Solvency-II, the latest European insurance supervising regime, replaced Solvency-I in 2016. This new regime provides
130 a more comprehensive risk-based approach for determining solvency requirements for insurance undertakings. The
131 new regulation also includes a market-based valuation system for assessing companies' assets and liabilities
132 (Directive, 2009). With a higher degree of confidence, this could potentially reduce the risk of insurance firms being
133 insolvent. In addition, the Directives contribute to the harmonisation of insurance supervision in the European
134 market. Solvency-II encompasses three pillars, namely Pillar I, Pillar II, and Pillar III. The first pillar
135 focuses on the quantitative aspects of solvency capital that insurers must hold to cover their risks adequately.
136 . The second pillar addresses the qualitative aspects of
137 solvency regulation, emphasizing risk management and governance, and Pillar III aims to enhance market discipline
138 by promoting transparency and accountability. Two types of capital requirements are represented in Pillar I: the
139 Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR), which is the least authorised capital of insurance companies, and the Solvency
140 Capital Requirement (SCR) which enables an insurance institution to absorb significant financial shocks, giving
141 reasonable assurance to policyholders and beneficiaries. Under the underwriting risk category, the institution can
142 use either a Standard Formula or an Internal Model, each having its pros and cons regarding the level of
143 sophistication and SCR size. Despite all the promising features and improvements of Solvency-II, it has been subject
144 to much research since its introduction [(Rae, et al., 2018), (Linder & Ronkainen, 2004), (Kousky & Cooke, 2012),
145 (Gurenko & Itigin, 2013), (Clarke, et al., 2014), (Baione, et al., 2018), (Deligiannakis, et al., 2021)]. These researches
146 mainly focused on the areas such as economic justification of the then-new solvency regime, different results
147 obtained using the Standard Formula of Solvency-II and Internal Models, comparison between the implications of
148 Solvency II and Solvency I, and possible improvements to the new directive.

³ Life insurance provides coverage for an individual's life and offers fixed health benefits for critical illnesses such as cancer, heart ailments, and more. On the other hand, general insurance encompasses non-life assets, including houses, vehicles, health, events, travel, and other aspects.

149 2.2 Iranian Insurance Solvency Regulation

150 The Central Insurance of Iran (CII) is the regulator of the Iranian insurance market. As one of its principal duties, CII
151 approves and enacts decrees and directives through the High Council of Insurance (HCI) to regulate different aspects
152 of the insurance business in Iran (High Council of Insurance, 2019). Before the approval of the first Directive on the
153 solvency capital adequacy, CII supervised the operation of Iranian insurance firms by examining monthly reports on
154 companies' collected premiums and paid claims (Hashemi, et al., 2010). As the pricing system in the Iranian insurance
155 market was no longer tariff-based then, new regulations needed to be developed and implemented by CII to monitor
156 the financial solvency of insurance firms. Consequently, Directive 69 was approved and enacted by HCI in 2011,
157 which required insurance firms to put aside a factor-based solvency capital for four categories of risks: insurance,
158 market, credit, and liquidity. The Directive also recognized the market value (compared to book value) as the correct
159 method of valuing own funds in the accounting system. This regulation, which is still in place, represents five classes
160 of solvency. A company belongs to the first solvency capital level when it keeps a solvency capital equal to or greater
161 than the Solvency Capital Margin (SCM). Should an insurance company fail to maintain a sufficient solvency margin,
162 it enters levels 2 to 5 depending on the capital deficit. At level 5 of solvency, CII can officially cancel the business
163 permission of the insolvent firm. For natural catastrophe policies (fire, engineering, [automobile](#), and life), the
164 SCM is the greatest of gross earned premium and gross incurred claims, each multiplied by a fixed risk factor (Similar
165 to Solvency-0). These fixed factors were calculated based on an assessment carried out on the financial statements
166 of Iranian insurance firms and the financial time series of the Iranian real estate and stock market. The computed
167 solvency capitals of the named risks are ultimately combined assuming zero correlation between risks to form the
168 company's SCM. Directive No. 69 was reviewed by Shahriar et al., and a number of improvements regarding changing
169 the risk metric to [Value at Risk \(VaR\)](#), using a 99% confidence level for calculation SCM, and consideration of linear
170 correlation for different risks was suggested (Shahriar, et al., 2016).

171 3 Methodology and Data

172 This section describes the theoretical framework of the quantitative comparison between the methods for
173 calculating earthquake risk solvency in the Solvency-II Directive and Directive 69 of the Iranian insurance regulation.
174 In so doing, mathematical formulations are detailed in both methodologies, encompassing the selection of risk
175 metrics, risk factors, and implementation of the risk diversification effect. Then, as a pre-requisite for calculating the
176 solvency capital, components of a stochastic earthquake risk model for Iran are outlined, covering seismic hazard,
177 vulnerability, exposure, and financial calculation [models](#). The introduced earthquake risk model estimates
178 the 99.5 loss percentile and Average Annual Loss (AAL) of earthquakes in Iran as input to Solvency-II formulas. To
179 feed Directive 69, the conventional earthquake risk pricing table of the industry is utilised.

180 A [hypothetical](#) portfolio of 1500 residential dwellings [evenly distributed between three main construction](#)
181 [types of steel, reinforced concrete and masonry, and across five](#) provincial capital cities of Tehran, Esfahan,
182 Tabriz, Ahvaz and Kerman has been considered to compare the earthquake risk solvency charge calculated by each
183 methodology. The reason for selecting these capital cities is that they are located in various and seismicity zones and
184 contain different composition of construction types. This allows us to consider the effect of diversification in the
185 comparison process.

186 **3.1 Calculation of earthquake solvency capital**

187 *3.1.1 Directive 69*

188 High Council of Insurance (2011) requires insurance and reinsurance institutions to hold eligible own funds as the
189 solvency capital using the fixed factors determined for different types of risks, namely underwriting, market, credit
190 and liquidity risks. The Directive provides risk factors for miscellaneous lines of business, including catastrophe fire
191 insurance (non-life) without any distinction between various natural catastrophes in terms of fixed risk factors and
192 assumes zero correlation between risks in different lines of business and geographies (meaning that losses are
193 deemed fully independent). According to this directive, to calculate the solvency charge of a property catastrophe
194 portfolio, first, the products of gross earned premiums and gross incurred claims with their corresponding risk factors
195 (0.580 and 0.841, respectively) are computed, and then the greatest of these values is considered as the solvency
196 capital. Since no reliable information on the gross incurred earthquake loss claims were available to us at the time
197 of writing this paper, we only use the term determined by gross earned premiums. In so doing, average values of
198 earthquake premium rates of five Iranian insurance firms, which were extracted from a popular Iranian insurance
199 quotes aggregator website⁴ are employed to calculate the premium-based part of the formula for the portfolio.
200 These rates are still based on a study conducted in 1991 by Ghafory-Ashtiany (1991) who determined the relative
201 riskiness of different construction types in various seismic zones in Iran (please see the original table at Table A1).
202 Table 1 presents average ~~market~~ earthquake insurance premiums for masonry, concrete and steel buildings of 10
203 years of age in five provincial capital cities. We have selected these cities as representatives of different seismic
204 zones in Iran; Tehran and Tabriz in highly seismic Alborz zone in Northern Iran, Esfahan in low seismicity central
205 areas, Khuzestan in low seismicity southwestern Iran, and Kerman to medium-high seismic zone of Zagros. ~~of~~
206 different tectonic natures and seismic hazard levels. Needless to say, the portfolio of risks used for the comparative
207 analysis is consistent with construction characteristics assumed in the earthquake premium table.

Table 1: ~~Earthquake~~Market earthquake premium rates (in 1000) for different building types in various province capital cities in Iran⁴

Province	County	City	Construction type		
			Masonry	Steel	Concrete
Tehran	Tehran	Tehran	1.1	0.50	0.50
East Azarbayjan	Tabriz	Tabriz	1.1	0.50	0.49
Esfahan	Esfahan	Esfahan	0.78	0.33	0.32
Kerman	Kerman	Kerman	1.1	0.37	0.36
Khuzestan	Ahvaz	Ahvaz	0.78	0.33	0.32

208

209 *3.1.2 Solvency-II*

210 As outlined in Annex IV of Directive 2009/138/EC (2009) and CEIOPS (2010) on the application of the natural
211 catastrophe Standardised Scenarios (standard formula), to calculate earthquake charge, the Weighted Total Value

⁴ Azki.com

212 Insured (WTIV) should be computed at CRESTA⁵ level using the Total Insured Value⁶ (TIV) for each line of business.
 213 Eq.1 presents the mathematical formulation of this stage [(Directive, 2009), (Committee of European Insurance and
 214 Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), 2010)].

$$WTIV_{ZONE} = F_{ZONE} \times TIV_{ZONE} \quad \text{Equation 1}$$

215 Since the 99.5% ~~Value at Risk~~ (VaR), as the risk factor, are provided at the country level in CEIOPS (2010), a relativity
 216 factor (F_{ZONE}) takes the role of adjusting the national risk factor at subnational (CRESTA) level in the Standardised
 217 Scenario. The catastrophe capital charge ($CAT_{peril-ctry}$) is then calculated by applying the effect of geographical
 218 aggregation of WTIVs of different CRESTA zone within the country of interest multiplied by Q_{CTRY} (1-in-200-year risk
 219 factor of earthquake at country level). Eq.2 illustrates the calculation of solvency capital required for earthquake risk
 220 at the country level.

$$CAT_{PERIL-ZONE} = Q_{CTRY} \times \sqrt{[WTIV_{ZONE}]^T [AggMat] [WTIV_{ZONE}]} \quad \text{Equation 2}$$

221 Where $[WTIV_{ZONE}]$ is the array presentation of WTIV within the country (of interest and $[WTIV_{ZONE}]^T$ is its
 222 transposed form. $[AggMat]$ is basically a correlation matrix determining how different CRESTA zones are correlated
 223 to each other in terms of experiencing simultaneous earthquake loss and it comprises elements of 1 (fully
 224 correlated), 0.5 (semi correlated), 0.25 (slightly correlated), and 0 (no correlation). CEIOPS (2010) provides sub-
 225 country correlation matrices for EEA countries in an excel spreadsheet.

226 To follow the procedure proposed by Solvency II to calculate the catastrophe charge for earthquake risks in Iran, we
 227 use the output of a stochastic earthquake risk model developed in this study, separately presented in section 3.2.
 228 This catastrophe model can produce risk results (e.g. AAL or 1-in-200-year loss) at finer administrative levels than
 229 CRESTA. In accordance with local underwriting and risk management practice in Iran, we use the county-level
 230 resolution to calculate the solvency capital. Therefore, there is no need to use a relativity factor for TIV at the county
 231 level since we already have the Q factor for each county. That said, we can rewrite Eq.1 to Eq.3:

$$CAT_{EQ-County} = Q_{County} \times TIV_{County} \quad \text{Equation 3}$$

232 Here, we can directly calculate each county's catastrophe charge for earthquake risk. Following that, we aggregate
 233 these charges at a province and then ~~national-country~~ level to determine the total solvency capital for a given
 234 portfolio of earthquake risks. Eq.4 and Eq.5 exhibit the mathematical form of these calculations.

$$CAT_{PERIL-ZONE} = \sqrt{[WTIV_{ZONE}]^T [AggMat_{Province}] [WTIV_{ZONE}]} \quad \text{Equation 4}$$

235

$$CAT_{PERIL-ZONE} = \sqrt{[WTIV_{ZONE}]^T [AggMat_{Country}] [WTIV_{ZONE}]} \quad \text{Equation 5}$$

⁵ CRESTA zones are a system used in the insurance industry to evaluate and manage catastrophe risks. CRESTA stands for "Catastrophe Risk Evaluation and Standardizing Target Accumulations." These zones are geographic areas that are defined based on various factors, including seismic activity, weather patterns, and other natural perils.

⁶ Total Insured Value (TIV) refers to the total amount of insurance coverage that an individual, organization, or entity has on its assets, properties, or liabilities

236 The symmetric aggregation matrices for province and country levels are constructed using either 1 (fully correlated),
237 0.5 (semi-correlated), 0.25 (slightly correlated) and 0 (non-correlated) members. It is assumed, mainly considering
238 distance factor, that each county is fully correlated with itself and semi correlated with its neighbouring counties. In
239 the case of provinces, due to the larger size, the neighbouring provinces are assumed to be slightly correlated.

240 3.2 Modelling the Earthquake Risk in Iran

241 As a requisite for using a risk-based methodology in calculating the earthquake risk capital charge, for example, the
242 described method by Solvency-II, it is necessary to have a stochastic catastrophe model for quantifying the required
243 percentile of confidence of seismic losses (here, 99.5%) at different locations and for various construction types. This
244 subsection explains how we developed an earthquake risk model for Iran utilising the most reliable methodologies
245 and the highest quality of data. The subsection describes the risk model components: the calculation platform
246 (OpenQuake), seismic hazard model, residential building exposure model, and vulnerability functions. Because this
247 paper's main objective is to compare solvency capital calculation methods, efforts were made to keep the risk model
248 development description as brief as possible.

249 The common practice for quantifying natural catastrophe risks in the insurance industry is (event-based) stochastic
250 catastrophe modelling. The process incorporates three main components of hazard, exposure and vulnerability using
251 a Monte Carlo simulation method to generate loss results. Loss results are then
252 post-processed to calculate risk parameters such as Average Annual Loss (AAL) and loss Exceedance Probability
253 (EP) for specific level of confidence which are employed for various underwriting and risk management
254 decisions in the business. The practice of modelling seismic risk in Iran is rather in its early stage and a few studies
255 have been conducted on catastrophe modelling over the last decade, e.g. (Ghafory-Ashtiany & Nasseradi, 2012),
256 (Pakdel-Lahiji, et al., 2019), (Motamed, et al., 2019), (Shahbazi, et al., 2020), and (Bastami, et al., 2022). In this study,
257 the open-source OpenQuake platform developed by the Global Earthquake Model (GEM) foundation was utilised to
258 do the seismic risk modelling, due to its recognition in the insurance market and its flexibility in terms of input
259 data and generation of required risk parameters.

260 3.2.1 Seismic hazard model

261 After reviewing several available studies on the seismic hazard of Iran [(Motamed, et al., 2019), (Mirzaei, et al.,
262 1997), (Tavakoli & Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1999), (Yazdani & Kowsari, 2013), (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018), (Lotfi, et al., 2022),
263 (Pagani, et al., 2020)), the Earthquake Model of Middle East (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018) was selected due to the
264 availability of its OpenQuake-ready input data and credibility of the study in the earthquake engineering society. The
265 seismic model comprises two models for line and area sources, prepared with collaboration of seismologists from
266 Iran, the region and international research institutes in Iran, Middle East region, and Europe. Figure 1 illustrates the
267 delineation of seismogenic zones and active faults used in the input seismicity model .

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


Figure 1: Seismogenic sources used in the seismicity model: Area sources (left) and fault sources (right)
(Şeşetyan, et al., 2018)

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269 In addition, a set of Ground Motion Prediction Model Equations (GMPE) for different seismic source tectonic
 270 characteristics in Iran (including active shallow crustal, stable shallow crustal, subduction, and deep seismicity
 271 sources), and two logic trees for treating epistemic seismic hazard uncertainty were utilized to calculate the ground
 272 motion intensity parameter (PGA) at exposure locations. Figure 2 exhibits the structure of the GMPE logic tree and
 273 the attenuation relationships that were employed in the hazard model. The minimum magnitude of 5 was used in
 274 the analysis due to its impact on building damage and optimizing the computation demand. These are the same
 275 settings suggested in EMME project, however; we used a more recent version of GMPEs whenever possible.

276

277

Table 2: GMPEs used in the hazard model and their corresponding weights

Seismotectonic type	GMPE	Weight
Active shallow crust	(Akkar & Cagnan, 2010)	0.20
	(Akkar, et al., 2014)	0.35
	(Chiou & Youngs, 2008)	0.35
	(Zhao, et al., 2006)	0.10
Stable shallow crust	(Atkinson & Boore, 2006)	0.40
	(Toro, 2002)	0.25
	(Campbell, 2003)	0.35
Subduction interface	(Atkinson & Boore, 2003)	0.20
	(Lin & Lee, 2008)	0.20
	(Youngs, et al., 1997)	0.20
	(Zhao, et al., 2006)	0.40
Subduction in-slab	(Atkinson & Boore, 2003)	0.20
	(Lin & Lee, 2008)	0.20

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	(Youngs, et al., 1997)	<u>0.20</u>
	(Zhao, et al., 2006)	<u>0.40</u>
<u>Deep seismicity</u>	(Lin & Lee, 2008)	<u>0.50</u>
	(Youngs, et al., 1997)	<u>0.50</u>

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278
 279 ~~and~~ To convert bed rock ground motion intensity to ground-level PGA, a soil model (shear velocity distribution)
 280 based on methodology suggested by Allen and Wald for taking into account amplification effect of soil (Allen & Wald,
 281 2009) was used. Using the components adopted, an event-based probabilistic seismic hazard analysis was carried
 282 out using GEM⁷'s OpenQuake engine and 20,000 years of seismicity were simulated. Figure 4-2 illustrates the Peak
 283 Ground Acceleration (PGA) distribution on the bedrock with an equivalent return period of 475 years in Iran, using
 284 the EMME seismic hazard model based on averaging several realizations of PGAs.




Figure 24: Spatial distribution of hazard parameter (PGA) of 475-year return period

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285 As seen in Figure 2Figure-4, the northern part of the country (Alborz and Koppe-Dagh seismotectonic zones),
 286 including the cities of Tabriz and Tehran, and south-eastern regions (central Iran and Makran zones) containing the
 287 city of Kerman show the highest levels of seismic hazard. In the Zagros zone in western-southwestern Iran, the PGA
 288 level is lower than northern and southeastern parts, but still high. On the flip side, the cities-provinces of Esfahan in
 289 central Iran and Ahvaz-southwestern parts of Khuzestan in south-western Iran belong-contain to zones with the
 290 lowest PGA levels. Other regions fall between these upper and lower figures.

⁷ Global Earthquake Model

291 To validate the results of the hazard model, we compared our results with some recent seismic hazard analysis
 292 studies conducted at national or regional levels for Iran over the recent years, including (Lotfi, et al., 2022), (Lloyd's
 293 and CAT Risk Solutions, 2017), and (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018). Table 3 summarizes the results of seismic hazard analysis
 294 (10% probability of exceedance in 50 years equal to 475-year) for these studies with the present work.

Table 3: Comparison of the seismic hazard analysis results in this research with other studies

Study	Min PGA (g) on bedrock	Max PGA (g) on bedrock	Geographic zones with highest PGA
Lotfi et al. (2022)	0.1	0.55	N and SE (very high), W-SW (high)
Şeşetyan, et al. (2018)	0.1	0.5	N and SE (very high), W-SW (high)
Lloyd's and Cat Risk Solutions (2017)	0.05	>0.40	N and W-SW (very high), SE (high)
Present study	0.05	0.55	N and SE (very high), W-SW (high)

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295 As seen, there is an acceptable similarity between the range of 475-year PGAs and spatial distribution of it at the
 296 national level.

297 3.2.2 Vulnerability model

298 To estimate the damage ratio of exposed assets under a given earthquake scenario with known intensity parameters
 299 (e.g. PGA, PGV, or M_{MM} in this study PGA), it is necessary to use vulnerability functions. These are typically functions
 300 or curves that relate various levels of hazard intensity to damage ratio or percentage for specified types of groups
 301 of assets (vulnerability classes). In this study, the vulnerability curves developed by (Mansouri & Amini-Hosseini,
 302 2013) Mansouri and Amini-Hosseini [38] as one of the components of the project Earthquake Model for of the
 303 Middle East (EMME) (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018) was used due to the reliability/credibility of the methodology used (RISK-
 304 UE), consistency with building attributes publicly available for Iranian buildings (please look at the exposure model
 305 section), and compatibility with past earthquake losses in Iran and the credibility of the main project (EMME). In this
 306 study, 10 building vulnerability classes have been/were defined based on construction material, height of building,
 307 and construction vintage as a proxy for the ductility of the structure to earthquake loads. Table 4 summarizes this
 308 classification, the vulnerability classification of Iranian buildings based on their physical attributes.

Table 4: Comparison of the seismic hazard analysis results in this research with other studies Classification of Iranian building vulnerability based on physical attributes (Mansouri & Amini-Hosseini, 2013)

Vulnerability class	Material type	Height category	Construction date	Short description
Adobe	Adobe	Low-rise	All time periods	High vulnerability
M1	Reinforced masonry	Low-rise	1996-2006	Low vulnerability
M2	Unreinforced masonry	Low-rise	1996-2006	High vulnerability

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M3	Unreinforced masonry	Low-rise	Before 1976	High vulnerability
RC3	Concrete frame	Mid-rise	Before 1976	High vulnerability
RC2	Concrete frame	Mid-rise	1976-1996	Moderate vulnerability
RC1	Concrete frame	Mid-rise	1996-2006	Low vulnerability
S3	Steel frame	Mid-rise	Before 1976	High vulnerability
S2	Steel frame	Mid-rise	1976-1996	Moderate vulnerability
S1	Steel frame	Mid-rise	1996-2006	Low vulnerability

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312 [Since the newest vintage of buildings at the time conducting this study was 2016, we shifted the original vulnerability](#)
313 [\(Table 4\) by 10 years to pre-1986, 1986 to 2006, and post-2006. This is a valid modification because buildings had](#)
314 [become 10 years older after the publication of the original paper and since then a new version of the Iranian](#)
315 [Standard for Seismic design of buildings had come into force in 2014. These curves classes and their corresponding](#)
316 [vulnerability curves](#) represent the seismic vulnerability of ten building classes of adobe (one class), masonry (three
317 classes), steel (three classes), and reinforced concrete (three classes). Figure 3-3 exhibits examples of these curves
318 for different types of building with medium-quality construction. [a, m, rc, s in this figure stand for adobe, masonry,](#)
319 [reinforced concrete, and steel buildings.](#)




Figure 34 Vulnerability curves for medium-quality adobe (am), masonry (mm), reinforced concrete (rcm), and steel (sm) buildings (Mansouri & Amini-Hosseini, 2013)

320
321 As shown in this diagram, adobe is the most vulnerable class of building to earthquakes, while RC and steel buildings
322 offer the highest resistance to seismic loads. Masonry buildings fall within-between these two ranges. Also, buildings
323 with older date of construction are considered more vulnerable to seismic forces.

325 3.2.3 Residential building exposure model

326 The exposure model provides attributes of the buildings at risk, such as physical attributes (material type, year built,
327 height of the building), their monetary value, and their geographic locations in terms of, for example, geographic
328 coordinates. The Iranian census data classifies the building materials into three main classes of steel, reinforced
329 concrete, and masonry. The masonry class is furthered split to Brick & Steel or Stone & Steel, Brick & Wood or Stone
330 & Wood, Cement Block (all kind of Roofs), All Brick or Brick & Stone, and All Wood. In this study, we only consider
331 residential building because their attributes are collected on a regular basis in the national population and housing
332 census and reported by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) every 5 years. The date of constructions is expressed in
333 10-year, 5-year and 1-year bins depending on the vintage of buildings since 1966. The census data is freely available
334 at SCI website at county granularity. Due to the fact that the census data has not been updated since 2016, we have
335 used 2016 datasets to develop the exposure model. Figure 4 illustrates common types of Iranian residential buildings
336 in the city of Tehran.

337 The basis for building a residential building exposure model for Iran is the census data collected in the two census
338 years of 2011 and 2016. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 census survey faced delay and was not ready
339 at the time of the study. Based on the best practice of catastrophe modelling, an ideal exposure model should
340 contain fields relating to the location, replacement cost, and construction characteristics such as type of material,
341 number of storeys, and vintage of construction. Iran's 2011 building and population census collected information on
342 the location (at the county-level data which is publicly available), construction year, and materials types. No
343 information on the height of structures or number of storeys is gathered in five-year censuses, so, we assumed low
344 (1-2 storeys) height for adobe and masonry, and medium height (3-6 storeys) for steel and RC buildings. This decision
345 is in accordance with the assumptions made by Mansouri, Kiani and Amini-Hosseini, whose vulnerability curves were
346 used in this study (Mansouri, et al., 2014).

347 Another challenge was that in 2016 census the housing census stopped collecting data on the year of residential
348 building construction. To overcome this problem, the construction time field of 2011 census data were upgraded by
349 considering a set of expert-based assumptions. For instance, we assumed that the number dwellings increased in
350 each county after the census 2011 were constructed with modern material such as steel and RC and according to
351 the most recent Iranian seismic code (Standard 2800 version 4). We divided the age of buildings into three classes
352 of pre-1985, between 1986 and 2005, and post-2006 which were approximately consistent with the data of national
353 census and dates where different version of the Standard 2800 came into force. The building vintage was used as a
354 proxy for the quality of construction.

355



Figure 42: Examples of different common construction classes residential buildings -in District 2 of Tehran: adobe (upper left), steel (upper right), reinforced concrete (lower left), masonry (lower right)

Photos by Ms. Niloofar Kazemi Asl


356 Until 2011, SCI reported four sets of building attributes, namely building material, construction date, and number
357 and build area of dwellings split by building types and year built. We used the same vulnerability classes introduced
358 by (Mansouri & Amini-Hosseini, 2013) as exhibited in Table 3 so that they are consistent with adopted vulnerability
359 curves. Because census data of 2016 lacked the attribute of building vintage, we used the previous census data
360 (2011) vintage attribute and updated it by making an assumption that if the number of dwellings has decreased
361 between 2011 and 2016 census in a given county, the reduction would be due to destruction of buildings belonging
362 to the oldest vintage bin, and if the number increased, that would be because of newly built buildings, thereby
363 affiliating to the newest vintage bin. This assumption is compatible to the reconstruction trend of buildings and
364 settlement development in Iran.

365 No national dataset on the number of stories or height of the buildings is available in Iran. As a results, we assumed
366 a low-rise height class for adobe and masonry buildings and mid-rise class for steel and reinforced concrete buildings
367 in Iran based on an engineering judgement. An estimate of construction cost of residential buildings can be enquired


368 from builders in different provinces. The value of existing buildings can also be estimated by depreciating the value
369 of the newly constructed buildings based on the date of construction or building vintage bins in the vulnerability
370 model. Based on the research conducted, the average cost of construction per square meter in Iran in 2016 was USD
371 300. Using the data on build area and number of dwellings, we estimated the average building surface area of about
372 100 sqm for Iranian dwellings.

373 After creating the datasets for 10 building types at the county level, we used population data of Landsat (Bright, et
374 al., 2017) with a 30-arc-second resolution to downscale the county-level building exposure data to a finer resolution
375 for the loss calculation purpose. To accomplish this, we divide the number of dwellings of each building type by the
376 total number of population of the county to compute the number of dwellings per person, then we multiply the
377 results to the number of population in each cell to come up with number of dwellings in that cell. The process is
378 repeated for all types of building for each county. Figure 5 presents the spatial distribution and monetary value of
379 different building types of residential dwellings in Iran at the county level. Please note that numbers are absolute
380 value of each building type at the county level.


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
(a)



(b)



(c)



(d)

Figure 53: Exposure of residential buildings in Iran, adobe (a), masonry steel (b), steel concrete (c), and concrete masonry (d)

382 Most From a holistic point of view, most residential buildings are concentrated around the highly-populated province
 383 capital cities of Tehran, Tabriz, Esfahan, Mashhad and Shiraz. As observed in map (a), the highest value of county-
 384 wise adobe buildings as the most vulnerable type is Esfahan (center of Iran), Fars (south), Kerman (east) and Sistan
 385 and Baluchestan (southeast). Also, masonry buildings, as the second most vulnerable building type, are almost
 386 common across the country with a more visible presence around the capital cities of Tabriz, Tehran and Mashhad in
 387 the north, Esfahan in the center, Shiraz in the south and Ahvaz in southeast (See map 'b'). The two more earthquake
 388 resistant building types, namely steel and reinforced concrete are more frequent around capital cities of Tehran,
 389 Tabriz, followed by Esfahan and Mashhad and Shiraz. The more vulnerable types of construction (adobe and
 390 masonry) have expanded around Esfahan, Shiraz, Kerman, and in the southeastern corner of Iran by the Pakistan
 391 border. The more resistant classes of building such steel and RC have more prevalence in provinces of Tehran, East
 392 Azarbaijan (with Tabriz as capital city), Esfahan, and to some extent in Razavi Khorasan (with Mashhad city as
 393 capital). According to statistical analyses on the exposure data, about 55% of residential building dwellings in 2016
 394 were made of modern construction materials such as steel and RC reinforced concrete, while the remaining 45%
 395 belonged to other types including masonry and adobe.

396 4 Results and Discussion Numerical Results

397 After preparing the components of the risk model components, an comprehensive event-based probabilistic
 398 approach has been used to assess seismic risk assessment for the entire country and risk results were generated of
 399 the Iranian residential dwellings. In so doing to achieve that, GEM's OpenQuake hazard and risk calculation engine
 400 was adopted due to its credibility in within the earthquake engineering society, its decent transparency in terms of
 401 technical documentations, and flexibility in using different approaches in modelling risk. Figure 6 illustrates the
 402 schema of OpenQuake's probabilistic event-based engine and its input and output structure.




Figure 65: Exposure of residential buildings in Iran, adobe (a), masonry (b), steel (c), and concrete (d)GEM's OpenQuake schema and its input and output components (OpenQuake website⁸)

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 404 As described, the exposure, vulnerability, and hazard models need to be converted to required format before being
 405 incorporated in the engine. In addition to that, a configuration file that introduces the input data and other analysis
 406 parameters such as type of analysis (here: probabilistic event-based), number of simulated years (here: 20,000
 407 years), and types of output, is required to set up the risk analysis. The risk assessment process starts with OpenQuake
 408 hazard engine generating sampled earthquake events using the hazard model provided. For each seismic event
 409 generated, ground motion field (distribution of PGA on top soil) is calculated using GMPE models and the soil shear
 410 velocity information for all the locations existing in the exposure model within a defined radius around the sampled
 411 epicenter (here 150 km). Then, based on the typology of buildings at each location (a cell of 30-second arc
 412 dimension), relevant vulnerability curves are used to convert PGA value to damage percentage. Further, the damage
 413 percentage is multiplied with replacement value of that type of building to calculate loss. These OpenQuake output
 414 is then post-processed to calculate aggregate loss at different levels, namely county, province, and country. These
 415 values should be normalized to their corresponding exposure values for each building type to compute AAL rates.
 416 The same process is done, this time using EP 99.5% to calculate 1-in-200 EP loss for each building type at
 417 aforementioned aggregate levels which are adopted as solvency capital required according to Solvency II regime.
 418 The results include risk metrics such as AAL and EP (99.5% confidence) for nine most common classes of Iranian
 419 buildings. We utilised EP results for calculating the SCR of the chosen portfolio of residential buildings according to
 420 the Solvency II Directive instructions. In parallel, the solvency capital of the portfolio was computed using the factor-
 421 based method introduced by the Iranian Directive No. 69. The section concludes with a comparative analysis
 422 between the current market earthquake premium rates in Iran and those calculated by the model, as well as a

⁸ <https://docs.openquake.org/oq-engine/manual/latest/risk.html> accessed in 10 December 2023

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4.1 Earthquake Risk Assessment Results

Figure 7 shows the spatial distribution of seismic AAL for all residential building types in Iran, aggregated at the county level. Few studies exist on seismic risk topic for Iran at a national level [e.g. Ghafory-Ashtiany & Nasserasadi (2012) and Notamed et al. (2019)] which were previously done by authors of this study and are thus considered biased to be used to validate the risk results. Therefore, a risk component validation method is followed to control the sensibility of the results, in which it is tried to validate the risk distribution and intensity based on the values in the exposure, hazard, and vulnerability models used. As observed, almost all parts of the country are exposed to medium and high levels of seismic risk, except for sparsely populated areas of central deserts and the northern coasts of the Oman Sea. There are also visible high-risk counties, especially around major cities of Tehran and Tabriz in northern and north-western Iran, as well as in other populated areas proximate to Mashhad (northeastern Iran), Esfahan (central Iran), and Ahvaz, Shiraz and Kerman in southern parts of the country. This pattern seems to be in accordance with the distribution of different classes of buildings and their exposure to the seismic hazard (please see figures 2 and 5 and comparative vulnerability of main building types in Table 4); in areas with a concentration of buildings and very high level of earthquake hazard (such as in Tehran and Tabriz cities) the seismic risk is the highest. Similarly, we can witness a high potential of loss in the populated southern cities of Ahvaz, Shiraz and Kerman, that are subject to medium to high seismicity. The city of Esfahan, despite being located in a low seismicity zone, also shows high seismic risk, most probably due to its very high building exposure (the second-highest exposure value after Tehran) and the prevalence of more vulnerable building classes of masonry and adobe (look at map 'a' and 'b' in Figure 5). In south-eastern Iran, where the province of Sistan and Baluchestan exists, a medium to rather high level of risk can be distinguished, mainly because of the high level of seismicity in southern parts of province. existence of extremely vulnerable types of buildings (e.g. adobe).






Figure 75 Earthquake Average Annual Loss (AAL) of residential buildings in Iran (million USD)


447 From what figure-Figure 5-8 presented as the spatial pattern of one1-in-200-year losses of earthquakes in Iran, one
 448 could acquire an idea of the level of earthquake insurance capital required by the Solvency II regime for different
 449 types of buildings at the county level in Iran. Assuming a 100% insurance coverage for residential homes in Iran, the
 450 SCR or 1-in-200 loss for steel and RC buildings would be the highest in Tehran, Tabriz, and to a lower extent in Esfahan
 451 (and their surrounding counties). The situation is more homogenous for masonry structure (because of its high
 452 prevalence and rather even distribution in the entire across the country), where significant seismic losses with 99.5%
 453 confidence could be distinguished in almost all major cities in the country, namely Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Esfahan,
 454 Kermanshah, and Kerman. In terms of For adobe construction, again, a medium-to-high degree of losses could be
 455 expected in many counties except for areas located in Khuzestan and Fars provinces in the southwest. The only
 456 observable anomaly for 1-in-200 earthquake losses in adobe buildings is found in the country's most south-eastern
 457 counties in Sistan and Baluchestan province, particularly along the border with Pakistan. This pattern could be first
 458 due to the weighty number of absolutely vulnerable buildings made of adobe in these areas compared to other parts
 459 of the country. The second reason would be the eminent seismicity of this region, which is influenced by both shallow
 460 crustal and subduction seismic zones of Makran.




(a)



(a)



(c)



(d)

Figure 86: Earthquake 1-in-200 loss of residential buildings in Iran, *adobe (a), masonry (b), steel (c), and concrete (d)*

461 Table 5 Table 3 Table 2 presents the pure premium rate (AAL rate) of calculated for the same cities previously selected
 462 in Table 1 to compare solvency capital charges in of Section 3. If we draw a comparison between these rates and
 463 those used currently by the market for pricing earthquake insurance in the Iranian market Iran (Table 1), we notice
 464 a vast difference, implying difference, implying a sizeable underestimation undervaluation of earthquake risk in the
 465 Iranian insurance industry, including the insurers and supervising bodies like CII. Here, we used county-level AAL
 466 rates as the representative of the modelled seismic risk of capital cities previously mentioned in Table 1. This is
 467 because the current market rates are only retrievable at the city level from the Iranian insurance quote aggregator
 468 websites.

469 This difference is more pronounced for cities with a higher level of seismicity, such as Tabriz where the risk-
 470 based modelled AAL rate (8.65) is about eight 7.89 times larger than the current market premium rate (1.1) for
 471 masonry buildings, even after neglecting the loading factors that are used to convert pure premium to technical
 472 premium. Considering that retrieved market premium rates are 'technical premium', the real discrepancy between
 473 risk-based and market rates are event higher. For seismically calmer cities like Esfahan, the discrepancy becomes
 474 milder, reaching a ratio factor of 0.63 about 2 for RC-reinforced concrete buildings.

Table 53: Risk-based (modelled) earthquake pure premium rates (in 1000x 0.001) for different types of selected cities in Iran

Province	County	City	Risk-based earthquake pure premium rates		
			Masonry	Steel	Concrete
Tehran	Tehran	Tehran	7.15	2.01	1.65
East Azarbaijan	Tabriz	Tabriz	8.68	3.73	3.03

Esfahan	Esfahan	Esfahan	1.07	0.45	0.20
Kerman	Kerman	Kerman	3.35	0.90	1.04
Khuzestan	Ahvaz	Ahvaz	3.23	0.83	1.00

475

476 **4.2 Calculation of Solvency Capital under Solvency-II and Directive 69**

477 In this section, we utilize the modelled solvency capital rates, specifically the 1-in-200 loss rates, and the current
478 premium rates prevailing in the market (averaged across the market) to conduct a comparative analysis of the capital
479 requirements for earthquake risk in Iran. The assessment is based on two distinct methodologies specified by the
480 European Solvency II regime and the Iranian Directive 69. Having the earthquake risk results for 1 in 200 loss and the
481 market premium rates for various types of residential buildings in Iran, now the solvency capital charge can be
482 calculated at the county (or with an acceptable approximation at the city) level according to the methodology
483 suggested by two different solvency regimes, namely Solvency II and the Iranian Directive 69. To highlight the
484 difference between modelled (risk-based) solvency figures and those calculated based on the earned premium which
485 are, per se, acquired by underwriting earthquake risks according to market premium rates, we use a hypothetical
486 portfolio of risks in the five capital cities we selected previously in section 3.1. As mentioned before, these cities have
487 been selected because they represent different seismic zones of Iran, namely Alborz (from northwest to north east
488 including Tabriz and Tehran), Zagros (west, south, and southeast, including Ahvaz and Kerman), and Central Iran
489 (Esfahan). These cities also lie within regions with different seismicity level, for example Tehran and Tabriz are highly
490 seismic, Ahvaz and Kerman have medium-to-high seismicity and Esfahan is located in a seismically calm area.

491 To illustrate the influence of building types on solvency capital, we examined three primary construction classes:
492 steel, reinforced concrete, and masonry. For all building classes, we assumed a replacement cost of USD 300 per
493 square meter and an average built area of 100 square meters per housing unit, consistent with the parameters used
494 in the exposure model. Additionally, we presumed an equal number of dwellings (100 dwellings for each
495 construction type in each city) within the hypothetical portfolio. Using the city- and building type-specific solvency
496 capital rates, we calculated the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) by multiplying the exposure values for each
497 construction type by the corresponding SCR rates. Subsequently, the city-level SCRs needed to be aggregated to the
498 portfolio level. In the Solvency II methodology, unlike Directive 69, which simply sums up city-level values to compute
499 the portfolio-level SCR, a geography-based correlation matrix is utilized to aggregate results. Therefore, we initially
500 developed a correlation matrix for the selected five cities.

501 At first, we consider a hypothetical portfolio of risks in five cities (counties) in Iran. It is assumed that 100 residential
502 buildings of masonry, steel and RC types with a total built area of 100,000 m² are covered by earthquake policies in
503 each of the selected cities in the country. The replacement cost for all types of buildings is supposed to be USD 300
504 according to the current market rates.

505 Unlike Directive 69, which uses an algebraic summation of spatially distributed risks, Solvency II employs a
506 correlation matrix for aggregating risk capital at the portfolio level (national level). Therefore, we must first define a
507 matrix at the province and country levels. Similar to the methodology provided in Annex IV of Directive (2009) and
508 CEIOPS (2010), five simplified earthquake correlation matrices were defined for provinces where the selected
509 counties exist and another matrix at the national level. The correlation matrices' values were determined based on
510 the proximity of admin divisions (counties or provinces): each county has one correlation factor with itself and 0.5
511 with its neighbouring county. The same rules apply to the national correlation matrix. However, the correlation
512 factor for the neighbouring province was chosen to be 0.25 due to the large dimensions of provinces in Iran. As an

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513 [Following a methodology akin to that outlined in Annex IV of Directive \(2009\) and CEIOPS \(2010\), we established five](#)
514 [Following a methodology akin to that outlined in Annex IV of Directive \(2009\) and CEIOPS \(2010\), we established five](#)
515 [Table 6](#) shows the results of solvency capital calculation based on the two [solvency regimes](#) at the county, province
516 and [portfolio levels](#) for the hypothetical portfolio of risks.

517

518

Table 6-3: Earthquake risk solvency capital [rates](#) based on the methodologies suggested by the Iranian Directive 69 (D-69) and Solvency II (S-II)

Level		Exposure (USD million)			D-69 solvency capital rates (x 0.001)			S-II solvency capital rates (x 0.001)			D-69 solvency capital (USD)	S-II solvency capital (USD)
		M	S	RC	M	S	RC	M	S	RC		
Location	Tehran	30	30	30	0.64	0.29	0.29	17.00	4.76	3.89	36,540	769,500
	Tabriz	30	30	30	0.64	0.29	0.29	17.25	8.65	6.00	36,366	957,000
	Esfahan	30	30	30	0.45	0.19	0.19	3.49	1.91	1.02	24,882	192,600
	Kerman	30	30	30	0.64	0.21	0.21	7.44	2.74	2.42	31,842	378,000
	Ahvaz	30	30	30	0.45	0.19	0.19	6.02	2.15	2.67	24,882	325,200
Portfolio											154,512	1,339,296

519

520 [As illustrated in the table, there's an approximately tenfold difference in the solvency capital requirement when](#)
521 [calculated using the approach specified by Directive 69 compared to the European Solvency II for the same residential](#)
522 [dwelling portfolio in the pilot cities. Two key factors contribute to this notable gap in required capital charges. Firstly,](#)
523 [the variance in catastrophe capital rates between Directive 69 and the Solvency II system plays a significant role. The](#)
524 [second contributing factor, albeit with a minor impact, is the dissimilarity in aggregation methods employed by each](#)
525 [methodology. In the Iranian approach, where portfolio capital is determined by summing up county-level figures, the](#)
526 [mitigating effect of geographical diversification is simply disregarded, leading to even higher results. According to the](#)
527 [data presented in Table 5, the Solvency II risk-based rates are roughly twenty times greater than the Directive 69](#)
528 [capital rates. As mentioned, this disparity is somewhat mitigated when aggregating the solvency capital at the](#)
529 [portfolio level. The ultimate catastrophe capitals at the portfolio level for the Iranian and European systems are](#)
530 [reported as USD 154,512 and USD 1,339,296, respectively.](#)

531 5 Discussion

532 The findings from the analysis indicate that the constant-factor approach utilized by the Central Insurance of Iran
533 (CI) for calculating solvency capital related to earthquake risks significantly underestimates the risk compared to the
534 methodology recommended by the Solvency II regime. This discrepancy raises concerns about the capacity of Iranian
535 insurers and reinsurers to withstand catastrophic shocks stemming from medium to significant earthquake events
536 in major cities across Iran. It is worth noting that, despite the low insurance penetration rate in Iran and the absence
537 of medium to large events in main cities, there have been no recorded instances of catastrophe-related insolvency
538 in the country. However, persisting with the current approach may jeopardize the stability of the insurance market
539 in Iran, potentially giving rise to financial and social challenges in the event of future disasters.

540 Moreover, following the establishment of the Iran Building Catastrophe Insurance Pool (IBCIP), which provides
541 primary insurance coverage for all residential buildings in the country, a substantial business opportunity arises for
542 local insurance companies to address the gap between the partial coverage offered by IBCIP and the total insurable
543 sum. However, if these insurance firms persist in utilizing the existing premium rates in this scenario, a significant
544 accumulation of risk may occur over time due to the disparity between the actual risk and the written premium. This
545 poses a considerable challenge, as the solvency capital held by these entities might be inadequate to cover losses
546 resulting from medium-to-large seismic events in urban settlements, potentially leading to the insolvency of Iranian
547 insurers. Additionally, given that a majority of domestic insurance firms are reinsured internally due to financial
548 sanctions on Iran, the solvency issues of insurers could potentially have repercussions on other financial institutions.
549 To break this cycle of catastrophe risk accumulation, it is advisable for the Iranian insurance regulator to transition
550 from the current catastrophe pricing practice to a risk-based pricing system, incorporating scientifically-approved
551 catastrophe modelling techniques.

552 Another consideration which is relevant to the topic of insurance solvency is the public-private collaboration for
553 adopting and implementing new measures like the risk-based catastrophe solvency requirement. As the first step,
554 governmental bodies and insurers can initiate educational programs to raise awareness about catastrophe
555 modeling's significance in assessing natural hazards risk. Forming alliances between international institutions and
556 local insurers is beneficial for knowledge exchange, especially amid current financial sanctions. Moreover, the
557 government can incentivize insurers to integrate catastrophe modeling into risk assessments before enforcing
558 capital mandates. This involves offering tax benefits or reduced regulatory burdens, prompting insurers to embrace
559 advanced risk evaluation tools. These proactive steps aim to fortify the Iranian insurance market, preventing
560 undervaluation, and enhancing resilience through modern practices.

561 It is important to note that the outcomes derived from this current research are significantly influenced by the
562 quality of the input data utilized, including exposure, vulnerability, and hazard data available during the study
563 period. Undoubtedly, an enhancement in the quality of input data would enable a more precise assessment of
564 the seismic risk associated with Iranian buildings. This, in turn, would contribute to a more accurate evaluation
565 of the prevailing insurance underwriting and pricing practices.

566 6 Conclusion

567 A numerical analysis was carried out in this paper to compare the earthquake catastrophe capital required by
568 the European Solvency-II and Directive 69 of the Central Insurance of Iran
569 . Based on the literature reviewed, in the Iranian system, a constant
570 factor is used to compute catastrophe charges based on each policy's earned premium and incurred losses. These
571 earned earthquake insurance premiums are the result of an underwriting practice that uses a market-agreed rating

572 schemes which seems to be not a proper representative of the existing seismic risk in the country. On the other
 573 hand, the Solvency-II Directive requires a risk modelling-based capital calculation
 574 approach to compute the necessary catastrophe charge. In addition to the difference in the calculation of
 575 solvency capital rates, there is also a discrepancy between the two methodologies in risk aggregation:
 576 while the Iranian directive simply sums up the required capital charges
 577 at the city-level to calculate the portfolio-level figure, the European
 578 regime considers the diversification impact by making use of correlation matrices.
 579 To be able to implement Solvency II approach in calculating the risk-based solvency capital, a seismic risk model has
 580 To be able to implement Solvency II approach in calculating the risk-
 581 based solvency capital, a seismic risk model has been developed by adopting Earthquake Model of Middle East
 582 (EMME) seismicity model (Şeşetyan, et al., 2018), creating an exposure model for Iranian residential buildings based
 583 on the newest census data, and using an earthquake vulnerability model for Iranian buildings (Mansouri & Amini-
 584 Hosseini, 2013) and combining them in GEM's OpenQuake hazard and risk assessment engine. Average Annual Loss
 585 (AAL) and 1-in-200 EP values have been calculated for four main types of Iranian buildings at 30-second arc grid
 586 granularity.

587 The initial segment of the numerical findings was presented as the Average Annual Loss (AAL) and Exceedance
 588 Probability (EP) figures at the county level, achieved by aggregating the OpenQuake risk output tables for four
 589 distinct construction types. A comparison between these values and the AAL rates currently employed in the Iranian
 590 insurance market reveals a noticeable undervaluation of seismic risk, ranging from 1/2 to 1/8, depending on the risk
 591 location and construction type. Furthermore, to comprehend the implications of this dissonance between risk
 592 modelling-based and market-agreed rates, we computed the earthquake capital requirement for a hypothetical
 593 portfolio of residential dwellings in five Iranian cities situated in different seismotectonic zones. This calculation was
 594 conducted using the methodologies specified by Solvency II and the instructions provided by Directive 69 of the
 595 Iranian Central Insurance. The results demonstrate a significant 20-fold underestimation of earthquake solvency
 596 capital in the Iranian Directive 69 system compared to Solvency II. This undervaluation of earthquake risk poses a
 597 substantial risk of accumulating undue exposure for the Iranian insurance market. In the event of medium-to-large
 598 urban earthquakes, it could potentially lead to the insolvency of insurance undertakings due to the inadequacy of
 599 reserved catastrophe capital.

600 Given the significant impact of input data and models on the results of catastrophe modelling, it is crucial to
 601 acknowledge that a different risk perception may emerge if the same process is repeated using more recent
 602 exposure data or improved seismic hazard and vulnerability models, which may become available in the future.
 603 Consequently, the authors of this paper highly advocate for ongoing research focusing on various components of
 604 risk, specifically hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. Additionally, the introduction of more state-of-the-art
 605 earthquake models is encouraged to foster a more comprehensive and accurate seismic risk assessment for the
 606 Iranian insurance market.

607 7 Appendix

608 *Table A1: Riskiness of different construction types in Iran (Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1991)*

Type	Building Typology	Level of Earthquake Hazard				
		1	2	3	4	5
1	Adobe and Traditional	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.5	1.8
2	Confined Masonry	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.4	1.6

3	Pre-code Steel Structure	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.4
4	Pre-code Reinforced Concrete	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.0
5	Code Based Buildings Design and Construction (Post 1991)	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8

Note: Hazard levels are based on zones defined in 'Iranian Code of Practice for Seismic Resistant Design of Buildings - Code 2800' as 1: no, 2: low (0.2g), 3: moderate (0.25g), 4: high (0.3g), 5: very high (0.35g).

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Figure A1: Tehran province and its counties

	Tehran	Shahriar	Eslamshahr	Baharestan	Malard	Pakdasht	Rey	Qods	Robat Karim	Varamin	Qarchak	Pardis	Damavand	Pishva	Shemiranat	Firuzkuh
Tehran	1															
Shahriar	0.5	1														

Eslamshahr	0.5	0.5	1														
Baharestan	0	0.5	0.5	1													
Malard	0	0.5	0	0	1												
Pakdasht	0.5	0	0	0	0	1											
Rey	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	0.5	1										
Qods	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0	0	1									
Robat Karim	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	1								
Varamin	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	1							
Qarchak	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.5	1						
Pardis	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	1					
Damavand	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1				
Pishva	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	1			
Shemiranat	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	1		
Firuzkuh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	1	

616

617 **8 Data Availability**

618 Data used in this research are the intellectual property of Iran National Science Foundation who funded the study
619 and cannot shared by the authors.

620 **9 Authors Contribution**

621 In the preparation of this report, Prof. Mohsen Ghafory-Ashtiany has planned the research project and contributed
622 to the content of different chapters mainly in the earthquake hazard and risk assessment and modelling and review
623 and validation of results. Dr. Hooman Motamed has been mainly responsible for authoring the insurance regulation
624 content and numerical analysis. Both authors have equally edited the final manuscript.

625 **10 Competing Interests**

626 The contact author has declared that none of the authors has any competing interests.

627 **11 Acknowledgement**

628 The authors would like to express their gratitude to Iran National Science Foundation for the financial support they
629 provided for conducting this research work under the research project number 94811162.

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