

1 **Effective earthquake early warning systems: Appropriate messaging** 2 **and public awareness roles**

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10 **Abstract.** The earthquake early warning systems (EEWSs) in China have achieved great progress, with warning alerts being
11 successfully delivered to the public in some regions. We examined the performance of the EEWS in China's Sichuan
12 Province during the 2019 Changning Earthquake. Although its technical effectiveness was tested with the first alert released
13 10 s after the earthquake, we found that a big gap existed between the EEWS's message and the public's response. We
14 highlight the importance of EEWS alert effectiveness and public participation for long-term resiliency, such as delivering
15 useful alert messages through appropriate communication channels and training people to understand and properly respond.

16 **1 Why are earthquake early warnings important?**

17 An earthquake is an intense shaking of the Earth's surface, caused by the sudden movement of a plate in the Earth's crust.
18 Destructive earthquakes, such as the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake (M_w 7.9) in China, the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (M_w 7.0), and
19 the 2011 Tohoku-Oki Earthquake (M_w 9.0) in Japan, trigger multiple secondary hazards (e.g., landslides, tsunamis, and
20 Natech disasters). These earthquakes cause millions of deaths, widespread property damage to buildings and infrastructure,
21 and severe regional economic fallout. Earthquakes are impossible to avoid, and predicting their occurrence remains difficult,
22 so more and more countries have focused on developing earthquake early warning (EEW) and emergency management
23 systems.

24 An EEW is the detection and characterization of earthquakes as they occur with rapid delivery of alerts to areas potentially
25 affected before the strongest shaking begins (Allen and Melgar, 2019). Because most of an earthquake's energy is carried by
26 the damaging S- and surface waves, which arrive after the faster and lower amplitude P-waves, EEW is possible because
27 both waves travel far slower than the electromagnetic waves used to transfer information (Cremen and Galasso, 2020).
28 Although the potential warning time may only be seconds to minutes, this time is precious so that individuals and institutions
29 (e.g., airports, trains, manufacturing, and energy facilities) can take action to save lives and mitigate the potential damage
30 from earthquakes (Strauss and Allen, 2016).

31 **2 EEW systems and their applications**



32 Generally, EEW systems (EEWSs) are real-time information systems that consist of three modules, including: 1) monitoring
33 and detecting earthquakes based on seismic networks; 2) EEW processes, e.g., estimation of location, magnitude, maximum
34 seismic intensity, and earliest arrival time, as well as alert notification decisions; and 3) information delivery (Cremen and
35 Galasso, 2020). The importance of EEWSs for disaster mitigation has been widely studied. Many jurisdictions have
36 operational systems to deliver alerts to the general public (e.g., Mexico, Japan, and South Korea), or target specific
37 stakeholders in limited areas (e.g., United States, Turkey, Romania, and India) (Allen and Melgar, 2019, and references
38 therein). There are also some EEWSs in the preparation and testing stages, including in Switzerland, Italy, China Mainland,
39 Nicaragua, and Chile (Allen and Melgar, 2019, and references therein).


40 Although the theory of EEWSs is simple, the implementation is much more complicated (Allen and Melgar, 2019). An
41 effective EEWS must accurately provide estimated earthquake parameters with long enough warning time to be of practical
42 use for recipients where possible damages may occur. Therefore, most research over the last three decades has focused on
43 evaluating the systems and optimizing their algorithms with the goal of enhancing the quality and accuracy of EEWSs.
44 However, several technical challenges are revealed by reviewing the EEWS development (Allen et al., 2009; Allen and
45 Melgar, 2019; Cremen and Galasso, 2020; Hoshiba and Ozaki, 2014; Kamigaichi et al., 2009). For example, 1) it is hard to
46 provide timely warnings in areas closest to epicentres (e.g., the blind zones); 2) when more than two earthquakes occur in
47 close temporal or spatial proximity, the estimation parameters become hard to process and the error substantially increases; 3)
48 the unsaturated magnitude and seismic intensity of large earthquakes ($M > 8$) may be underestimated, such as the Tohoku-Oki
49 Earthquake (Hoshiba and Ozaki, 2014); and 4) the EEWSs may not work properly due to power failures, wiring disconnects,
50 and high background noise caused by large earthquakes and their aftershocks.

51 Recently, more and more scholars have devoted attention to increasing EEWS effectiveness through social means (e.g.,
52 Santos-Reyes, 2019; Sutton et al., 2020), which can alleviate the limitations that are difficult to solve with technical
53 innovations. For example, Japan's EEWS has significantly contributed to reducing social vulnerability to earthquakes
54 through nationwide participation. Most of the alerted respondents could understand and act to protect themselves due to their
55 previous education and training, although the magnitude of the 2011 Tohoku-Oki Earthquake was under-estimated due to
56 technical limitations, resulting in poor-quality alerts (Fujinawa and Noda, 2013; Hoshiba and Ozaki, 2014). In addition, the
57 United States' EEWS (ShakeAlert) enables recipients to immediately participate in the alert process and define the system
58 capability to enhance public participation, which is currently being tested in California, Oregon, and Washington states
59 (Allen and Melgar, 2019). Comparatively, Mexico's EEWS detected and issued warnings for the 2017 Puebla Earthquake;
60 however, the public took a negative attitude towards its performance since they received little information about either the
61 EEWS or the warnings themselves and had not been previously educated how to act during an emergency situation (Santos-
62 Reyes, 2019). These events demonstrate the importance of EEWSs, but also show the critical importance of public
63 awareness education and training before an earthquake occurs, to activate the full benefits of EEWSs.

64 3 China's EEWS Development

65 China's EEWS development is particularly challenging because multiple regions are prone to earthquakes, including major
66 metropolitan areas. Therefore, following the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, China's central government encouraged the
67 establishment of a national EEWS, initially focusing efforts on four seismic regions for pilot testing (**Fig. 1a**). With support
68 from the "National System for Fast Seismic Intensity Reporting and Earthquake Early Warning [ProjectProgram](#)" led by the
69 China Earthquake Administration (CEA), a high-quality national seismological network was installed with 15,000 stations,
70 1,928 seismic stations (equipped with collocated broadband seismometers and force-balanced accelerometers), 3,114 strong-
71 motion stations (equipped with force-balanced accelerometers), and 10,349 low-cost micro-electro-mechanical system
72 (MEMS)-based sensors (Peng et al., 2020). The instruments aimed at quickly reporting earthquake intensities and earthquake
73 early warnings in key areas on the minute and second scales, respectively. EEWSs in the pilot regions (e.g., the Beijing
74 capital region, southeastern coastal areas, north-south seismic belt, and northern Xinjiang) are now operational and have
75 proven technologically effective to some degree (e.g., physical networks, algorithms, software). Detailed descriptions can be
76 found in Peng et al. (2011), Peng et al. (2020), and Zhang et al. (2016), but few of these studies have focused on the
77 information dissemination mechanisms and public perception to the EEWS.





79

80 **Figure 1** Seismic activity and EEWSs across China. (a) Distribution of earthquake intensity and EEWSs in various Chinese regions
 81 (modified from seismic peak ground acceleration zonation map of China; Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of
 82 China, 2015); (b) historical earthquakes (January 1949-August 2020) in Sichuan Province; and (c) location of the Changing Earthquake.

83 3.1 Fujian case

84 As one of the main pilot areas, a provincial EEWS was first built in Fujian in 2009, with 125 seismic monitoring stations
 85 (equipped with velocity and acceleration meters) across the whole region with an average distance of 31 km between them.
 86 Each station connects to the Fujian Earthquake Agency (FJEA) for EEW processing and information release through
 87 dedicated optical fiber cables provided by China Telecom. The preparatory process of Fujian's EEWS included two steps: 1)
 88 design the EEWS and test its technical capabilities (Zhang et al., 2016); and 2) design the content and criteria for issuing
 89 EEW alerts to the public (Zhang et al., 2016), which is similar to the development of Japan's EEWS (Kamigaichi et al.,
 90 2009). The FJEA can issue alerts and authorized third parties can forward these alerts through multiple channels, including
 91 broadcast (television and radio), special terminals, Internet, and smartphone Apps¹. EEW alert receiving terminals are
 92 preferably installed in schools, factories, and residential communities, especially those in high earthquake risk areas, where
 93 the coverage rate must be greater than 60%. More importantly, when, what, and how to deliver an EEW alert is regulated by

¹ The mobile app Earthquake Warning in Fujian can be downloaded at <http://www.fjdzj.gov.cn/ar/2018050814000013.htm>.

94 provincial standards². For example, only when the predicted seismic intensity is greater than VI (Chinese intensity scale)³,
95 ~~can will~~ FJEA warn the provincial public with red or orange signal icons (I and II EEWS) and sounds. Fujian's EEWS began
96 issuing alerts to the public in 2017, and Fujian's successful model was later extended to other regions in China.

97 3.2 Sichuan case

98 Sichuan is a major earthquake-prone region. ~~Since the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, based~~Based on the China Earthquake
99 Networks Center (CENC, <http://www.ceic.ac.cn/history>), 73 earthquakes above magnitude Ms 5.0 ~~have~~ occurred in Sichuan
100 ~~between the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake and April 1, 2020~~ (Fig. 1b). A hybrid demonstration EEWS was built in the border
101 region between Sichuan and Yunnan provinces in 2015, with 270 MEMS-based stations, as a part of China's EEWS (Peng et
102 al., 2020). The real-time data recorded by these stations can be transferred through 3G/4G mobile network to the Sichuan
103 Earthquake Administration (Peng et al., 2020). In contrast to the ~~hybrid~~ demonstration EEWS; ~~introduced in Peng et al.~~
104 (2020), Sichuan's EEWS is operated by a third-party (Institute of Care-Life, ICL) in collaboration (at the ~~city~~municipality
105 and county level) with the Emergency Management Bureau (Wang and Lin, 2020). The recent Ms 6.0 Changning Earthquake
106 happened at 22:55 PM on 17th June 2019 in southeast Sichuan's Yibin Municipality, triggering an alert in some cities across
107 the province, including Yibin (52 km from epicenter), Leshan (168 km), and Chengdu (245 km) (Fig. 1c). The alerts were
108 issued approximately 10 s, 43 s, and 61 s prior to major shaking in the above cities, respectively. It was the first time that an
109 EEWS alert was triggered to the general public in Sichuan, which generated great public interest and confusion.

110 In Chengdu, the provincial capital city, the alert was delivered in several ways, including broadcast sirens, as well as text
111 messages on televisions and cell phones that had special applications installed. ~~Of these, the~~The broadcast siren notified the
112 most people with speakers located in more than 110 residential areas. The alert began with a countdown, followed by loud
113 alarm sirens. However, few people understood what the siren pertained to or what was about to happen with only a
114 countdown and then siren. Only when the shaking began did most people realize the alarm was intended to warn of an
115 impending earthquake. Most people reported that when the countdown began over broadcast speakers followed by the siren,
116 they were confused and unsure what to do. They did not know what was happening or what would happen, because the
117 countdown and siren were unaccompanied by clear audio messages with explanatory information. Many people interpreted
118 the alarm as a firemen's duty task, an air raid alert test, an explosion, theft alarm from a car or electric bicycle, or a special
119 sales event. Clearly, due to the diversity of reactions, the alert caused more confusion, fear, and disturbance than what was
120 intended by the EEWS. Some people were less concerned with the earthquake than by the confusion over the loud
121 countdown and siren, as it was nearly midnight.

² Release of earthquake warning information (DB35/T 1666-2017). (In Chinese)

³ The Chinese seismic intensity scale (GB/T 17742-2008).

<http://c.gb688.cn/bzgk/gb/showGb?type=online&hcno=AE2DAA79A7404FFAC73A9F3A33FBAA5A> (In Chinese)

122 We examined the public perception of Sichuan's EEWS during the Changning Earthquake through an internet-based survey
123 conducted June 21-23, 2019, in Chengdu. The online questionnaire was administered by the survey platform Wenjuanxing
124 (<https://wjx.cn>) and delivered to the public via social media (WeChat). We received a total of 770 responses. The survey
125 contained 11 questions in total, with 9 quantitative (single choice) and 2 qualitative (free response) questions, related to
126 demographics, earthquake preparedness and knowledge, behavioural responses to EEW alerts, and reasons for those
127 responses (see questionnaire in the Supplement). Survey respondents were asked whether or not they had heard the sirens on
128 the day of the earthquake, and based on their response, the participants were divided into two groups: 1) those who heard the
129 broadcast siren alert in real time (Group A, n=261) and 2) those who did not (Group B, n=509). Although participants in
130 Group B had not heard the sirens on the day of the earthquake, both groups were shown a video of the siren/alert at the time
131 of the survey to detect their behavioural responses to the sirens. The descriptive information, basic frequency, and cross-
132 tabulation analyses of the collected data were undertaken using SPSS-[software \(Lee Abbot and Mckinney, 2013\)](#). For cross-
133 tabulations, statistical significance was determined using the Pearson Chi-Square test.

134 Demographics of respondents can be found in **Table 1**. We separately tested for differences between the two independent
135 sample populations for each response. The results ([Fig. 2](#)) show that large pluralities of both groups (Group A, 41%; Group
136 B, 45%; $p < 0.001$) did not understand the purpose of the alert and felt confused or scared by it. The proportion of
137 respondents from both groups who stated that they understood the alert but did not know how to react was the same (7% vs.
138 7%, $p < 0.001$). Surprisingly, a significantly larger proportion of respondents from Group B understood and knew what
139 actions to take (32%, $p < 0.001$) than Group A (21%, $p < 0.001$). Of those from Group A who knew what actions to take, their
140 knowledge came primarily from previous training (26), hearing a brief note at the beginning of the alert (11), being informed
141 by people nearby when the alert was ongoing (7), or for several other reasons (11). Because so few people knew what the
142 alert was about or recognized what was about to happen, most people did not have sufficient knowledge or awareness of the
143 correct actions to take. Consequently, this alert could have caused additional problems, including injuries or cardiovascular
144 problems due to fear or panic from the sudden high-decibel sirens blaring over loudspeakers, and the resulting confusion
145 could also have led to more acute harm if the shaking level had been higher.

146 We also tested the role demographic variables (e.g., gender, age, and occupation) may have on predicting how the public
147 may respond to EEWs and their earthquake awareness. The results (Table S1) show that both gender and occupation were
148 significantly associated with how the public responds to earthquake warnings. From our sample results, it appears males and
149 people holding certain occupations (e.g., governmental organizations and emergency institutions) were more likely to have
150 already received the type of pre-earthquake training necessary for them to know how to respond to the earthquake warnings.
151 If this is true, special effort should be made to target those segments of the population that were under-prepared. However,
152 due to the likelihood of self-selection bias in our sample, more research is necessary to verify and further explore the
153 implications of these findings so as to better inform policy and guide future pre-earthquake preparedness efforts.


154 **Table 1** Demographic profile of internet-based survey participants regarding responses to early warning of Changing earthquake (N=770)

Variable		N	%
Gender	Male	220	28.6
	Female	550	71.4
Age	≤18	5	0.6
	19-30	204	26.5
	31-40	326	42.3
	41-60	165	21.4
	>60	70	9.1
Education level	Primary or below	28	3.6
	High school	69	9.0
	Undergraduate	491	63.8
	Postgraduate	182	23.6
Occupation	Students, educational employees, and academics	167	21.7
	Governmental organizations	58	7.5
	Emergency institutions and companies	97	12.6
	Private business and farmers	330	42.9
	Other	118	15.3
Earthquake training and education	Yes	518	67.3
	No	252	32.7

155 Note: The category of emergency institutions and companies refer to those that typically require earthquake alerts, such as hospitals,
 156 railways, and factories with hazardous environments. The category of “others” included those without formal jobs and retirees.

157

Whether Respondents Heard Siren



158

159 **Figure 2** Public responses to the siren/broadcast speaker of early warning for the Changning Earthquake from an internet-based survey in
160 Chengdu, China.

161 4 EEWS Limitations and Implications from Sichuan

162 The Changning Earthquake's example highlights some challenges with Sichuan's EEWS. We are not arguing against issuing
163 earthquake alerts. ~~However,~~ however, this event and the resulting confusion raises four important issues that should be
164 addressed moving forward:

165 First, a big gap exists between the intention of an EEWS and its reality in Sichuan. The most important intended effect of an
166 EEW is to enable residents to take protective actions within the short time before the shaking arrives (Nakayachi et al., 2019).
167 Only when an EEWS is sufficiently tested and widely publicized (Kamigaichi et al., 2009) can people understand the
168 meaning of an alert and take appropriate actions (Kamigaichi et al., 2009). When installed in a residential area, inhabitants
169 should be notified about the system, and most importantly, informed about what actions they should take after receiving an
170 alert, but before shaking begins. In the case of the EEWS's alert in Chengdu following the Changning Earthquake,
171 inadequate efforts had been made to inform the public prior to the earthquake, so few people were able to understand or
172 respond appropriately to the alert. The experience of countries like Japan shows that public training, education, and
173 widespread awareness campaigns about EEWSs are the key factors to their success (e.g., Fujinawa and Noda, 2013;
174 Kamigaichi et al., 2009).

175 Second, of vital importance is what and how to deliver actionable warnings to the public. An effective early alert should not
176 only inform the public about hazards, but also protective actions (Allen and Melgar, 2019; Sutton et al., 2020). The default

177 messages must be simple, because the content and comprehension of EEW messages should result in people taking
178 appropriate actions (Allen and Melgar, 2019; Becker et al., 2020a; Santos-Reyes, 2019). Messages can be instructions (e.g.,
179 Drop, cover, and hold on; US), origin time, and names of epicenter regions and subprefecture areas (e.g., Earthquake early
180 warning. An earthquake has occurred in Area X. Please prepare for strong temblor; Japan) (Kamigaichi et al., 2009; Allen
181 and Melgar, 2019). Providing information about expected shaking intensity or arrival time (countdown) are not
182 recommended, as these can lead to unnecessary panic (Allen and Melgar, 2019; Kamigaichi et al., 2009), but some studies
183 hold the opposite viewpoint (Santos-Reyes, 2019). Furthermore, the information and alerts should be delivered in stable,
184 useful, and suitable ways. As our case study shows, some claimed that the earthquake itself did not scare them as much as
185 the blaring siren did. It seemed unnecessary to use sirens on loudspeakers that day, especially during the night. While the
186 advantage of using sirens is that it rapidly reaches people simultaneously, the use of such “shocking” alarms is needed only
187 with high risks and likelihood of considerable damage. For those that may not lead to casualties or considerable social or
188 economic losses, use of more “gentle” alert channels is recommended. Alerts delivered over the radio, TV, SMS messages,
189 emails, and smartphone applications have shown greater effectiveness in documented cases (Hoshiba and Ozaki, 2014).

190 Third, at what level of seismic intensity the alert should be triggered is a key issue. It is essential to avoid the fabled “boy
191 crying wolf” or over-alerting, which can lead to public frustration and apathy, so alert messages should not be issued unless
192 the shaking is expected to cause considerable damage. The Changning Earthquake did not cause strong motion or significant
193 damage in Chengdu, but 15% and 24% of the participants from Groups A and B (**Fig. 2**) were terrified by the alarm sound,
194 respectively. At the time, Sichuan did not have specific criteria for when to issue EEW alarms. The provincial standard was
195 only issued in April 2019, so it had not yet been formally implemented. According to this standard (draft version)⁴, a
196 warning should only be issued (to the general public) when the seismic intensity is expected to be VI on the Chinese scale.
197 However, despite the higher level in Yibin, the seismic intensity in Chengdu was lower than VI (**Fig. 1c**), so the alert should
198 not have been issued in Chengdu. In addition, there continues to be insufficient guidance about how to handle false alarms,
199 updates, and canceled warnings.

200 Fourth, earthquake alerts should be released by an authoritative government agency. The public should be informed that only
201 alerts from the authorized body are reliable. But it was unclear who released the alert on June 17, 2019. There can be many
202 third-party warning service providers, who forward EEW messages by multiple transmission routes. Yet, according to
203 Sichuan’s draft standard, the publishing body should only be the Provincial Earthquake Warning Release Center. In addition,
204 the Sichuan case shows that one region may have multiple EEWSs (Wang and Lin, 2020), which will raise greater

⁴ Sichuan Seismological Bureau organized institutions to complete the drafting of “emergency earthquake information release earthquake warning information”. The local standard draft was published for public comments.

http://www.scdzj.gov.cn/jlhd/yjzi/202004/t20200429_54006.html (Accessed on ~~29th~~ April 29, 2020)

205 challenges regarding best practices for issuing EEW and popularizing how to interpret them. Therefore, greater supervision
206 and management systems are urgently needed in Sichuan's EEW practice.

207 The most important component of a successful EEWS is a group of users with awareness and preparedness, who want alerts
208 and ~~can define the necessary capabilities of the system, and~~ will take protective actions (Allen and Melgar, 2019). The next is
209 the physical infrastructure and sensor system (Allen and Melgar, 2019). The Changing Earthquake warning event showed
210 that the transmission and utilization of the EEW lagged behind the technological development and physical construction.
211 Moreover, the public in affected areas were not well-informed by EEWS alerts, nor were they adequately trained on how to
212 respond. Therefore, we highlight the successful public education and preparedness training model from Japan's seismic
213 culture, because the relatively poor understanding of an EEWS by the public can result in confusion. Useful strategies
214 include: 1) launching education programs on what actions should be taken before, during (at various timeframes), and after
215 an earthquake (Santos-Reyes, 2019). Research indicates that alert messages with guidance on actions may be useful as a
216 reminder to achieve optimal behavioral responses, but only when people are already familiar with these actions prior to
217 receiving a warning (Becker et al., 2020b); 2) carrying out drills and exercises to improve personal practical skills and
218 earthquake preparedness (Nakayachi et al., 2019), which is particularly important for regions new to EEWSs. Yet, beyond
219 what actions are necessary to take in response to warnings (Ji et al., 2019; Sutton et al., 2020), the public also needs
220 education regarding the technical limitations and accuracy of EEWSs (Kamigaichi et al., 2009). We also suggest that
221 Chinese scholars should focus more effort on the public response to and perception of EEWSs to get more insights for
222 issuing alerts, managing emergencies, and making policy.

223 Furthermore, due to differences in geological settings, socio-economic development statuses, and population densities, losses
224 caused by earthquakes of the same magnitude can vary greatly. Therefore, it is also very important to decide where an
225 EEWS should be set up. Since earthquakes are disasters faced by many countries, collaboration in development and
226 application of EEWSs among countries or regions should be encouraged, so that appropriate efforts are made to reduce loss
227 of life and property when earthquakes occur, despite their inability to reduce losses in epicenter areas.

228 Several limitations of the present study and current scholarship are as follows. First, our research revealed that what and how
229 to deliver actionable warnings to the public is of vital importance, but we also found that differences exist even between
230 countries with relatively mature EEWSs. For example, some research on the public's perception of Mexico's EEWS
231 highlighted the need to issue warning times (Santos-Reyes, 2019), while other studies thought it was unnecessary (Allen and
232 Melgar, 2019; Kamigaichi et al., 2009; ~~Santos Reyes, 2019~~). More work is needed about what and how best to deliver
233 warnings in the Chinese context. Second, many studies concluded that education and training are crucial for enhancing
234 earthquake preparedness (Nakayachi et al., 2019; Santos-Reyes, 2019; Sutton et al., 2020), but few tested whether these
235 strategies were useful or not. Local people's knowledge about earthquake risks as well as their previous training/education
236 about how best to respond were ascertained in our survey by asking whether respondents had previously received training

237 and/or obtained education. Nevertheless, the lack of reliable data about dissemination of earthquake awareness training and
238 education materials is a challenge for these types of studies. Further research efforts should investigate strategies to increase
239 public attention to this aspect of EEWSs.

240 **5 Conclusion**

241 The Changing Earthquake warning event demonstrated that EEWSs are not simply technological engineering infrastructure,
242 but they are also social systems for disaster mitigation. There will be no substantive benefit without proper knowledge and
243 appropriate emergency responses by the public, even if the warning is issued accurately and timely, as evidenced by the
244 [facts](#)[experiences](#) of Mexico and Chengdu, China. Although authoritative government agencies have emphasized that
245 information release services are the “last kilometer” for earthquake warning systems to reach the public, the actual
246 implementation showed that the “last kilometer” was not obstacle-free. It is worth considering how to best release and
247 effectively convey early warning information based on China’s actual reality, not an idealized situation. The construction of
248 EEWSs, issuance of alarms to the public, and formation of public awareness by science education are inseparably related.
249 We recommend that China should collect best practices of EEWS utilization domestically and internationally in cases of
250 EEW alert delivery to the public for the purpose of more effective promotion of [EEW](#)[EEWs](#). Finally, greater collaboration
251 among countries would benefit many more people around the world.

252 **Author contributions**

253 YT and XQ designed the research. [BFD and WY conducted the survey](#). MZ and XQ performed the data curation, formal
254 analysis, and wrote the original paper. YT, XQ, and BCS were responsible for supervision. All authors participated in
255 improving the paper by editing.

256 **Competing interests**

257 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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Table S1. Differences of responses and knowledge of the EEW by location, gender, age, educational level and occupation (%)

	Location ^a		Gender ^a		Age ^a					Educational level ^a				Occupation ^a				
	Chengdu	Others	Male	Female	≤18	19-30	31-40	41-60	>60	Primary & below	High school	Undergraduate	Graduate	Students, educational employees, academics	Governmental organizations	Emergency institutions & companies	Private business & farmers	Other
Response^b																		
Understood but did not know how to react	6.1	12.4	6.8	7.1	0.0	4.4	7.7	11.4	7.0	7.1	4.3	6.3	9.9	9.7	3.2	4.1	8.6	4.2
Understood & knew how to react	28.6	26.5	38.6	24.2	40	30.9	22.4	32.1	38.6	39.3	31.9	28.7	24.2	27.4	40.5	31.0	25.1	25.2
Not understood & confused	23.1	21.2	23.2	22.7	0.0	17.6	24.2	27.3	22.9	25.0	34.8	21.0	23.1	20.4	27.6	19.3	22.6	25.9
Not understood & scared	20.7	21.2	11.8	24.4	20.0	26.0	24.2	14.5	4.3	7.1	11.6	23	20.3	25.8	13.0	26.2	19.3	20.1
Not understood but felt nothing terrible would happen	13.7	13.3	12.7	14.0	20.0	11.3	15.0	14.5	11.4	7.1	8.7	13.6	16.5	8.6	9.2	12.8	17.4	17.9
Others	7.8	5.3	6.8	7.6	20	9.8	6.4	4.2	11.4	14.3	8.7	7.3	6.0	8.1	6.5	6.6	6.9	6.7
Awareness^c																		
<i>Respondents had actively/proactively obtained education^d</i>																		
No	32	37.2	31.8	33.1	0	19.1	36.8	41.8	34.3	57.1	24.6	22	18.7	19.7	21.6	15.2	25.4	32
Yes	68	62.8	68.2	66.9	100	80.9	63.2	58.2	65.7	42.9	75.4	78	81.3	80.3	78.4	84.8	74.6	68
<i>Respondents had received training^e</i>																		
No	21.5	30.1	21.8	23.1	20.0	27.5	20.9	20.6	22.9	57.1	40.6	30.5	31.9	27.8	21.6	22.4	35.6	21.5
Yes	78.5	69.9	78.2	76.9	80.0	72.5	79.1	79.4	77.1	42.9	59.4	69.5	68.1	72.2	78.4	77.6	64.4	78.5

311 ^a Percentages (%) are given within location, gender, age, educational level, and occupation.

312 ^b Location: $\chi^2 = 6.566$, $df=5$, $p=0.255$; gender: $\chi^2 = 23.859$, $df=5$, $p<0.001$; age: $\chi^2 = 43.327$, $df=20$, $p=0.002$; educational level: $\chi^2 = 49.108$, $df=15$, $p<0.001$; occupation: $\chi^2 = 85.205$, $df=20$, $p<0.001$

313 ^c Knowledge on how to response by asking whether respondents had received training and/or actively/proactively obtained education

314 ^d Location: $\chi^2 = 1.186$, $df=1$, $p=0.276$; gender: $\chi^2 = 0.116$, $df=1$, $p=0.734$; age: $\chi^2 = 28.333$, $df=4$, $p<0.001$; educational level: $\chi^2 = 46.303$, $df=4$, $p<0.001$; occupation: $\chi^2 = 14.243$, $df=3$, $p=0.003$

315 ^e Location: $\chi^2 = 4.086$, $df=1$, $p=0.043$; gender: $\chi^2 = 0.145$, $df=1$, $p=0.703$; age: $\chi^2 = 3.685$, $df=4$, $p=0.45$; educational level: $\chi^2 = 25.480$, $df=3$, $p<0.001$; occupation: $\chi^2 = 19.283$, $df=4$, $p=0.001$

316