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volcanic crises: the example of Mayotte,

Risk communication during sismo-

Abstract

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> a supprimé: On 10 May 2018, an active seismic crisis began on French island of Mayotte, which a year later will be shown to be related to offshore volcanic activity. It affects a vulnerable territory exposed to risks of many kinds (poverty, violence, lack of basic resources). In the absence of known events in human memory, the population is naive with regard to seismic and volcanic hazards. The concern is therefore very strong. In spite of a large number of , the communication set up by the main actors of the risk chain does not answer the population's concern. To understand why, we analyse a large corpus of the textual communications (press releases, web pages, scientific bulletins, reports, etc.) issued by the authorities and scientists from May 2018 to April 2021. We draw lessons on the communication strategy put in place in the first three years of the crisis; and we issue recommendations for improvement in the future, in Mayotte, but also elsewhere in contexts where comparable geo-crises may happen. We notably stress the importance of ensuring that communication is not overly technical, that it aims to inform rather than reassure, that it focuses on risk and not only on hazard and that it provides clues to possible risk scenarios.¶

a supprimé: successes and limits

a supprimé: i

43 Population information is a fundamental issue for effective disaster risk reduction. As 44 demonstrated by numerous past and present crises, implementing an effective communication 45 strategy is however not a trivial matter. This paper draws lessons from the seismo-volcanic "crisis" 46 that began in the French overseas department of Mayotte in May 2018 and is still ongoing today. 47 Mayotte's case study is interesting because: i) although the seismo-volcanic phenomenon 48 itself is associated with moderate impacts, it triggered a social crisis that risk managers 49 themselves qualified as "a communication crisis", ii) risks are perceived mostly indirectly by the 50 population, which poses specific challenges, in particular to scientists who are placed at the heart 51 of the risk communication process, iii) no emergency planning or monitoring had ever been done 52 in the department of Mayotte with respect to volcanic issues before May 2018, which means that 53 the framing of monitoring and risk management, as well as the strategies adopted to share 54 information with the public, have evolved over time. 55 Our first contribution is to document the gradual organisation of the official response. Our 56 second contribution is an attempt to understand what may have led to the reported 57 "communication crisis". To that end, we collect and analyse the written information delivered by 58 the main actors of monitoring and risk management to the public over the last three years. Finally,

59 we compare its volume, timing and content with what is known of at-risk populations information 60 needs. Our results outline the importance of ensuring that communication is not overly technical, 61 that it aims to inform rather than reassure, that it focuses on risk and not only on hazard and that 62 it provides clues to possible risk scenarios. We finally issue recommendations for improvement 63 of public information about risks, in the future, in Mayotte, but also elsewhere in contexts where 64 comparable geo-crises may happen.

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66 1. Introduction

67 As recalled by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, population information is a fundamental issue for effective disaster risk reduction (UNISDR, 2015, article 18.g.). Some 68 69 researchers even consider that a disaster is a result of a crisis or a breakdown in the 70 communication process (e.g. Gilbert, 1998). Implementing an effective communication strategy 71 is however not a trivial matter. As pointed out by previous studies, and as exemplified by the 72 current COVID-19 crisis, there are numerous pitfalls (see Lagadec, 1993; Lindell, Prater and Perry 73 2006 or Rodriguez et al., 2007 for overviews). Deciding what content, format and medium to use 74 to share information is a first challenge. The information held by the actors in charge of risk 75 management is often partial, sometimes contradictory, especially at the beginning of a crisis when 76 there are many unknowns; the information available - and especially the information produced by 77 scientists - can be difficult to translate into operational terms when there are large uncertainties; 78 actors might also have difficulties in sharing information and/or in coordinating (see Doyle and 79 Paton, 2018; Donovan, Bravo and Oppenheimer, 2012; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012; 80 Fearnley and Beaven, 2018 for application on volcanic risks). Reaching the population at-risk is 81 a next challenge. Traditional channels (press releases, public conferences, mass media) may 82 allow reaching a majority of people, but might not help reaching minorities whose habits, customs, 83 and sometimes day-to-day language, differ (Lindell and Perry, 2004). And, it is not enough for a

message to reach people, it must then be understood, believed and confirmed to have a chance
 to induce the expected response (e.g. Mileti and Sorensen, 1990; Mileti, 1999; Lindell and Perry,
 2004). This implicitly raises the issue of trust and of the perceived credibility and legitimacy of
 information providers (see Haynes, Barclay and Pidgeon, 2008 for a reflection on the importance
 of trust in the management of volcanic risks).

90 The present paper contributes to the effort made by human and social sciences to build 91 knowledge on risk communication processes. It draws lessons from the seismo-volcanic "crisis" 92 that began in the French overseas department of Mayotte in May 2018 and is still ongoing at the 93 time of writing. It focuses on "public information" i.e. on the information shared by the actors in 94 charge of monitoring and risk management with the public. The corresponding processes are 95 sometimes called "external" communication processes, "internal" communication referring to the 96 exchanges taking place between the actors (e.g. Becker et al., 2018).

97 Mayotte's case study is interesting because, although the seismo-volcanic phenomenon 98 itself has been associated with moderate impacts (see section 2), it triggered a social crisis that 99 the risk managers themselves qualified as "a communication crisis" (see section 3). The situation 100 has eased in part nowadays but scientists and authorities are still regularly taken to task, 101 especially on social media (see section 5). Mayotte's case study is also interesting because, with 102 the exception of felt seismicity, deep sea dead fishes occasionally found by fishermen, and gas 103 bubbling in a few spots on land, risks are perceived mostly indirectly by the population at risk. As 104 Skotnes, Hansen and Krovel (2021) point out, risk and crisis communication about "invisible" 105 hazards poses specific challenges. While trust is a key factor in communication in general, it 106 becomes all the more crucial when one must rely entirely on the knowledge and experience of 107 others to make decisions. The seismo-volcanic phenomena at stake here are not, strictly 108 "invisible" (not in the sense of chemical or radiological pollution for instance) but speaking. everything one knows about it comes from scientific observation and interpretation. This puts 109 110 scientists at the heart of the risk communication processes. Public information emerges thus in 111 Mayotte, more than ever, as an end product of a complex interface between science, policy and 112 society. Decrypting this interface's mechanisms and dynamics is necessary to help actors, 113 including scientists, better understand their role and its limits¹.

115 Scientists and authorities have complementary roles to play with respect to population 116 information. The local and national authorities are in charge of informing populations at risk about 117 the nature and evolution of the threat and about the measures put in place to manage or reduce 118 it. Scientists have a key role to play in helping the other stakeholders of the "risk chain", including 119 the at-risk population and the wider public, to comprehend scientific information as the latter is 120 often too technical for non-specialists (e.g. Newhall, 1999; Fearnley and Beaven, 2018). This role 121 is essential to maintain the legitimacy and credibility of the information on which public decisions 122 are based, scientists being generally more trusted than their official counterparts (e.g. Eiser et al.,

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¹ As emphasized by Jasanoff (2004), although science is produced by a specific method in a specific social context, it is influenced by the broader social and political context in which scientists themselves are embedded (this is especially true in risk management contexts when scientists intervene not as researchers but as experts). And science in turn influences the way societies order themselves and organize their response.

2008 on the predictors of trust and Donovan, 2021 for an overview of the challenges faced by
 experts in crisis contexts).


125 In Mayotte, as far as seismo-volcanic risk is concerned, a disaster has not yet occurred -126 the seismic crisis, although worrying for the population, has not caused significant damage. But 127 many questions remain unanswered concerning the potential effects of the current activity in the 128 short or medium term (see section 2). Today's challenges are therefore those of scientific 129 research to understand, monitoring to alert, and prevention and preparedness to reduce potential 130 impacts, improve emergency management, and foster individual and collective resilience. As a 131 recent report commissioned by the French ministry in charge of risk management (ministère de 132 la Transition écologique et solidaire) reminds us, the involvement of the population is crucial for 133 the success of the process as a whole (Courant et al., 2021). There are, however, several 134 indications that Mayotte's inhabitants have not been satisfied with the way information has been 135 shared about the current event (see section 3). Although, as we will demonstrate later on, there 136 has been a persistent effort by risk managers and monitoring experts to share information with 137 the public. The issue hence arises of understanding what may have led to the reported 138 "communication crisis". We propose here to compare the information delivered by the main actors 139 of monitoring and risk management to Mayotte's inhabitants with what is known of at-risk 140 populations information needs.

141 First, we provide a brief overview of what is known about Mayotte's geological setting and 142 the ongoing seismo-volcanic activity (section 2). We then relate some elements of the political 143 and social context that contributed to transform a telluric phenomenon with relatively minor 144 consequence into a situation of crisis (section 3). The corpus and methodology used in our 145 analysis are described in Section 4. Section 5 describes the successive stages of organisation of 146 the monitoring and risk management response. As no emergency planning or monitoring had 147 been done in the department of Mayotte with respect to volcanic issues before May 2018, the 148 framing of the official response has evolved significantly over time. Documenting this evolution 149 was a significant part of our work. It led us to distinguish four main phases (1, 2, 3, 4) that are 150 presented chronologically in section 5. Because public information strategies have not always 151 evolved coincidently with monitoring and risk management frameworks, communication issues 152 are discussed separately in section 6. Analysis of the volume, timing and content of the written 153 documents used by authorities and scientists to share information with the public leads us to 154 distinguish three main phases of communication (A, B, C). In section 7, we discuss our results 155 and issue recommendations to improve future communication strategies. We believe that the 156 lessons learnt from the relatively long-lasting case study of Mayotte (3 years), in a relatively 157 unprecedented context (mostly submarine phenomena, leading to "invisible" risks, whose study requires significant resources and technical innovation), can usefully nourish the reflection carried 158 159 out in the literature about risk communication and, more generally, disaster risk reduction.

Mayotte's geological setting and what is known today about the ongoing seismo volcanic activity

163 Mayotte belongs to the Comoros archipelago, a chain of four main volcanic islands that 164 extends ~E-W between the east African coast and the northern tip of Madagascar (Figure 1). 165 Recent studies link the formation of these islands to an E-W zone of diffuse transtensional right-166 lateral shear at the immature boundary between the Somalia and Lwandle plates (e.g. Famin et 167 al. 2020, Feuillet et al. 2021, Tzevahirtzian et al. 2021). Following this interpretation, the Comoros 168 volcanism occurs along en échelon NW-SE tensional fractures affecting the lithosphere in a 169 context of NE-SW extension (Famin et al., 2020; Feuillet et al., 2021). The location and genesis 170 of this volcanism would be mostly due to lithospheric deformation (Michon, 2016; Famin et al., 2020; Feuillet et al., 2021; Tzevahirtzian et al., 2021) rather than to an hotspot trail as previously 171 172 proposed by several authors (e.g. Emerick and Duncan, 1982; Class et al., 2009). Volcanism and 173 formation of the Comoros islands started at least ~10 Ma ago (e.g. Emerick and Duncan, 1982; 174 Michon, 2016). The Karthala volcano in the westernmost island of Grande Comore (Bachéléry et 175 al., 2016) is still active today. It is monitored by the Karthala Observatory of the CNDRS (Centre 176 National de Documentation et de Recherche Scientifique, in Moroni) in collaboration with the Institut de Physique du Globe in Paris and the University of La Réunion. In Mayotte, recent 177 178 volcanism is documented with eruptive products as young as ~4 ky inland (e.g. Pelleter et al., 179 2014), and actual at the "new volcanic edifice" (NVE) discovered in May 2018 (Feuillet et al. 2021). 180 Recent analysis of seismic receiver functions by Dofal et al. (2021) points to a thinned continental 181 crust beneath Mayotte with a former continental moho at 17-19km depth, underlined by a 9-10km 182 fast layer interpreted to result from magmatic underplating (Dofal et al., 2021). According to these 183 authors, the magmatic reservoir feeding Mayotte's new volcanic edifice would be located below 184 the interface between the underplated magmatic layer and the underlying mantle lithosphere.

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• Earthquakes prior to 2018 seismo-volcanic crisis • • Earthquakes from start of seismo-volcanic crisis M4.5-5 M≥5 (1 Jan 1950 to 9 May 2018, NEIC-USGS) M4-5 M≥5 (May 2018 to April 2020, Lemoine et al. 2020, Saurel et al. 2021)

Figure 1. Location of Mayotte, easternmost island of the Comoros archipelago. Blue dots: epicenters of seismic events prior to seismic crisis that started on 10 May 2018 (Magnitude ≥4.5, Jan. 1950 to 9 May 2018, USGS catalog); Red (magnitude ≥5) and orange (4 ≤ magnitude < 5) dots show earthquake epicenters with well-constrained hypocentral depth from 10 May 2018 to April 2020 - locations from Lemoine et al. (2020) between May 2018 and March 2019 and REVOSIMA catalog between April 2019 and April 2020 (Saurel et al., 2021). Most earthquakes of the ongoing seismic crisis as well as the new offshore volcanic edifice discovered in May 2019 (Feuillet et al., 2019, 2021) are located 10-50km east of Mayotte island. To avoid problems with mislocated events on this map we excluded epicenters with 10km fixed depth, and only plotted the ones with well-determined hypocentral depths. Topographic and bathymetric visualisation is from GeoMapApp (www.geomapapp.org - CC-BY).

The ongoing activity started on the night of 10 to 11 May 2018 with an earthquake of magnitude ML4.3 felt by the population. Seismicity intensified on 15 May 2018 with several earthquakes of magnitude > 4, all largely felt, and an event of magnitude ML5.8 (MW 5.9) (Lemoine et al., 2020). Although diminishing over time, seismic activity has continued since and is still active at the time of writing, >3.5 years after its beginning. Prior to May 2018, regional instrumental seismicity near the islands (blue dots in Figure 1) was moderate, with the largest magnitudes recorded between M_b 5 and 5.5.

In May 2018, Mayotte's area was poorly instrumented. The ability to identify and precisely
 locate the earthquakes improved gradually with the development of the network of seismic
 stations (Bertil et al., 2021; Saurel et al. 2021). The inclusion of underwater stations (OBS for
 Ocean Bottom Seismometer) from February 2019 (Feuillet et al., 2021, Saurel et al., 2021), and

211 the use of refined seismic velocity models (Lavayssière et al., 2021; Saurel et al., 2021), were 212 determinant to this respect. The study of the seismicity since the OBS deployment allowed to 213 locate two clusters of seismicity: a dense "proximal cluster" located close to Mayotte's eastern 214 coast, and a "distal cluster" located about 30 to 40km east of the islands extending eastward in 215 the direction of the new volcanic edifice (Feuillet et al. 2021, Saurel et al. 2021, Lavayssière et al. 216 2021). According to Lemoine et al. (2020), these two clusters are active since the end of June 217 2018, while, from May to June 2018, the earthquakes occurred in a more distal cluster, shallower 218 and closer to the new volcanic edifice. This earlier cluster would have included the large 219 earthquakes that marked the beginning of the crisis. Distal clusters are interpreted to result from 220 the fracturation and diking processes that allowed magma migration from the deep magma 221 chamber to the new volcanic edifice (e.g., Cesca et al., 2020; Lemoine et al., 2020; Feuillet et al., 222 2021; Lavayssière et al., 2021). The proximal cluster is composed of deep (~35-50km) seismic 223 events that might be linked to the deformation induced by a deflating deep reservoir (e.g., Feuillet 224 et al. 2021, Lavayssière et al. 2021). It also contains less deep events (20-35km) that might be 225 due to stress perturbations around a shallower (~25km) reservoir, as suggested by the location 226 of very long period seismic events (Feuillet et al. 2021, Lavayssière et al. 2021). Being close to 227 the islands, it is this proximal seismic cluster, and the magmatic processes related to it, and their 228 uncertain evolution, that present the real significant hazard. 229

230 Inhabitants have mainly experienced the ongoing activity through felt earthquakes. More 231 than 20 earthquakes with magnitudes 5+ were recorded during the first month of the crisis, from 232 10 May to mid-June 2018 (Bertil et al., 2021), while ~1900 events with magnitudes >3.5 happened during the first year (Cesca et al., 2020; Lemoine et al., 2020). About 140 of these earthquakes 233 234 were reported as felt by the population in the LastQuake crowdsource-based information app of 235 the Euro-mediterranean Seismological Center (EMSC-CSEM, 2021). There was a sharp 236 decrease in the number of felt earthquakes after June 2018, in line with the decrease in the 237 number of instrumentally recorded earthquakes and of their average magnitude (e.g. Lemoine et 238 al. 2020, Bertil et al. 2021). EMSC-CSEM catalog reports only ~4 felt events per month until the 239 end of 2018, and then a moderate recovery in the number of felt events between February and 240 June 2019 (~9 felt events per month on the average) (the red curve in Figure 3 summarizes this 241 information).

3. The social and political context of Mayotte's seismo-volcanic "crisis"

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Geoscientists are accustomed to speaking of seismic-volcanic "crises," although the use
 of the term "crisis" is not always relevant to disaster risk management definitions. However, in the
 case of Mayotte, the observed activity did indeed give rise, at least in the first months, to a crisis
 situation that required the intervention of the authorities in charge of civil protection and crisis
 management. We relate here some elements of the political and social context that contributed
 to this.

A vulnerable territory

252 Mayotte, which became a French Department in 2011, is a particularly vulnerable territory. 253 It is marked by great poverty and high social inequality (Roinsard, 2014). In a population of 256 254 000, 77% live under the poverty line and over 30% are unemployed, 48% are foreign (and often undocumented), 30% have no access to clean drinking water, and four in ten live in informal 255 256 housing (Données 2017 - INSEE, 2021). Mayotte's multiculturalism is a wealth that proves 257 difficult to manage when the situation requires informing the widest possible audience: 95% of 258 the population is Muslim (ministère des Outre-mer, 2016), 45% is from the Comoros (INSEE, 259 2021), and while French remains the official language, about 37% of the population do not speak 260 it (Données 2017 - INSEE, 2017). Oral culture is the dominant one and the most commonly 261 spoken languages are Shimaore and Shibushi. There is no real integration between the traditional 262 culture of the villages and the more westernized culture of large cities (Lambek, 2018). According 263 to Regnault (2011), "three guarters of the Mahorais - rural or, at least, still very attached to their 264 village - live a culture other than the "westernized" culture of the cities" (trad. by the authors). The 265 relationship with state authorities is complicated by the island's colonial past, but also by a sense 266 of disappointment among the population, who expected more rapid changes to bring the island 267 up to French standards after departmentalization (Roinsard, 2019). Since 2011, Mayotte has been 268 regularly shaken by social crises. The most recent one, which brought the economy to a standstill 269 for two months in the spring of 2018, was just ending as the first earthquakes began (Roinsard, 270 2019; Mori, 2021). Lastly, the absence in living memory of seismic and volcanic events in Mayotte 271 meant that part of the inhabitants were relatively naïve about such risks (although people coming 272 from the neighboring Comoros islands may have experienced previous seismic and volcanic 273 crises as four eruptions occurred in 2005, 2006 and 2007, see Morin et al., 2016).

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A recurring complaint about a lack of information

276 The intensity and duration of the initial seismic crisis surprised not only the population but 277 also the authorities and scientists. On 16 May 2018, the director of the scientific institution locally 278 in charge of seismic monitoring (the Bureau de Recherche Géologique et Minière, BRGM²) 279 gualified the activity as "exceptional beyond anything recorded in Mayotte" (AFP dispatch picked 280 up by many media, e.g. Le Point (2018), 16 May 2018). A few days later, the prefect of Mayotte³ 281 talked about "an abnormal and persisting activity" (Le Journal de Mayotte, 19 May 2018). A month later, in an interview given to the French national press, the director of BRGM Mayotte declared: 282 283 "Unfortunately, we are in the unknown" (15 June, Le Figaro, 2018b).

Although the earthquakes were of moderate intensity, they affected vulnerable buildings and their multiplication caused the appearance of cracks leading some municipalities to close schools (Sira et al., 2018). Local observers reported strong anxiety among inhabitants, many people leaving their houses to sleep outside (Mori, 2021, Fallou & Bossu, 2019; Fallou et al.,

² The Bureau de Recherche Géologique et Minière (BRGM) is a public industrial and commercial institution dedicated to geological resources and placed under the joint supervision of the ministries in charge of ecology, research and economy. It is the only expert earth-sciences institution with a local branch in Mayotte. It is in charge of seismic monitoring in the area when the current crisis begins.

³ In France, each department is governed by a prefect, appointed by the president. The prefect is responsible for risk and crisis management at the departmental level in coordination with the mayors, who are responsible for risk and crisis management in their municipalities.

288 2020; it was also currently reported in our interviews). They also testified of a general feeling of confusion linked to the unfamiliar nature of the hazard, and to a lack of information. A group of 289 290 citizens created a Facebook feed called "Signalement tremblement de terre de Mayotte" (STTM), 291 aimed at reporting felt events and at sharing experiences. The success of the feed, which soon 292 gathered more than 10,000 members (about 4% of the population), attested to the existing thirst 293 for information. The posts exchanged at that time show a lack of confidence in the authorities' 294 willingness to take charge of the situation: "Earthquakes that sometimes exceed magnitude 5, 295 cracks in buildings, fires, landslides, etc.... and no real reaction from the state apart from 296 information on the magnitude of the tremors already felt." (excerpt from STTM Facebook group, 297 26 May 2018); "How much do you want to bet that in a year nothing will have been done? As soon 298 as the crisis passes we⁴ play the watch hoping that the next one will come when we leave the 299 island. That's how the administration has managed Mayotte for decades." (excerpt from STTM 300 Facebook group, 27 May 2018). On 5 June 2018, the deputy of Mayotte in the French national 301 assembly warned the government against the consequences of a lack of public information 302 leading to the spread of "false information fueled by fantasies that have the effect of increasing 303 people's anxiety, generating a state of panic and even psychosis" (Ali, 2018). Eight months later, 304 in February 2019, members of the STTM facebook feed published an open letter urging the state, 305 local elected representatives and scientists to provide more information about the ongoing activity 306 (Picard, 2019). Although this group is not really representative of the sociology or the demography 307 of Mayotte's population, it soon became a serious interlocutor for the local authorities, and the 308 prefect invited its most visible members to the discussion table in 2019 (Journal de Mayotte, 9 309 August, YD, 2019). It remains today one of the public arenas where information about the seismic-310 volcanic crisis is followed with the most attention.

311 It took a whole year between the beginning of the seismic crisis and the official declaration, 312 in an interministerial press release dated from 16 May 2019 (ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire, ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur, de la recherche et de l'innovation, ministère 313 314 des Outre-mer, ministère de l'Intérieur, 2019), of the discovery of the new volcanic edifice. The 315 event closed a year of questioning about the possible origin of earthquakes. The unexpected 316 "birth of a new volcano" (BBC - Science in Action, 2019) caused enthusiasm in the national and 317 international scientific community, and in the media (e.g., Andrews, 2019; Minassian, 2019; Wei-318 Haas, 2019; Devès et al., 2022). The discovery has been described as "exceptional": first, 319 because of the large volume of lavas involved, more than 5 km³ (Feuillet et al., 2021) -320 corresponding to the largest eruption ever observed with modern techniques (Cesca et al., 2020; 321 Feuillet et al., 2021; Thordarson & Self, 1993) - and, second, because of the submarine nature of 322 the activity - marking the beginning of an exciting scientific adventure to develop new techniques 323 of observation. The local press welcomed this sudden interest in Mayotte's actuality (Devès et al., 324 2022), the volcano being presented as a more positive way of talking about the 101st department 325 than the usual references to its social misery (Journal de Mayotte, 28 May 2018). But "discovering" 326 the volcano is insufficient to characterize the associated threats. In this sense, the advance in 327 knowledge showed itself to be frustrating for the inhabitants, for the authorities, and for journalists 328 alike (Devès et al., 2022). In June 2019, STTM's facebook feed members were still complaining 329 about the official communication: "Say nothing, explain nothing... Can only create confusion ...

⁴ "We" refers here to the civil servants coming from metropolitan France to work in the overseas department of Mayotte.

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a supprimé: (10 to 20% of the population according to official sources, pers. com.)

a supprimé: Whether or not we know what's going on at more than 3,000 meters deep, there are facts that are there.

(a supprimé: since the Laki eruption in 1783-1784

Questions that go around in circles because we don't have the answers! When there is neither
answer nor explanation ... One can only wonder ... Why this? What interest or motivation do they
have in not giving the information ... They would like the population to worry: they couldn't do
better! The sickly inability of administrations to communicate ..." (excerpt from Facebook group
STTM, 20 June 2019).

³⁴¹ 4. Material and methods

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The present research is part of a research project entitled MAY'VOLCANO dedicated to the study of the circulation of knowledge between scientists, risk and crisis management actors, the media and the population of Mayotte during the current seismo-volcanic crisis. This paper aims at providing a first analytical view of the public information process, and of its potential limitations.

349 The empirical data for the research presented here were collected between 10 May 2018 350 and 1 April 2021, covering more or less the three first years of the ongoing seismo-volcanic 351 "crisis". The work was organized in three tasks: 1) documenting and understanding the 352 organisation of the monitoring and risk management response and its evolution over time, 2) 353 documenting and understanding the organisation of the process of public information and its B54 evolution over time, and 3) examining the process of public information with regard to what is 355 known of at-risk population information needs. The first two tasks were done in parallel. In the 356 following, we describe the empirical data and the methods used to complete each of these tasks. 857 The corresponding results are presented in section 5 (task 1), 6 (task 2) and 7 (task 3).

4.1. Documenting and understanding the organisation of the "official response" and its evolution over time

<u>Our first task was to capture and understand the organisation of the "official response". By</u> <u>"official response", we mean the decisions and actions taken by the local and national authorities</u> in charge of risk and crisis management and by the scientific experts in charge of monitoring the ongoing seismo-volcanic activity. As emphasized in the introduction, the framing of that response evolved significantly over time and it was important to be able to document and describe these evolutions before addressing the issue of public information.

The methods chosen were participant observation, semi-structured interviews, collection and analysis of written archives. The fact that three of the authors worked at the Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris (IPGP), which is currently in charge of monitoring the activity, facilitated contact with experts. The involvement of the first author in previous research projects associating crisis management officials facilitated contact with authorities.

Participant observation was done within the framework of a day-to-day cohabitation with
 scientists at IPGP, within the scientific council of the REVOSIMA since February 2020 (when the
 first author was invited to join) and, between January and June 2021, within a working group
 coordinated by the interministerial delegation for major risk reduction in overseas territories (the

a supprimé: The announcement of the birth of the volcanological and seismological observation network of Mayotte (REVOSIMA) in June 2019 only partially meets expectations.

a supprimé: 2.1. A two step-methodology combining quantitative and qualitative approaches¶ We focus on the first three years of the Mayotte seismic-volcanic crisis, more precisely from 10 May 2018 to 1 April 2021. We build our analysis on the following methodology and datasets.¶

We searched the archives and in particular the web archives of the scientific and state institutions involved in the monitoring and management of the crisis. We collected and analyzed all the documents made public by the authorities and scientists during these first three years such as press releases, scientific bulletins, news on websites and public notes (table 1). Hereafter, we are citing scientific bulletins and websites as references (including their URL when existing) while authorities press releases are given in the supplementary dataset (ministerial press releases as well as those from the Préfecture of Mayotte). We also included the academic papers published during our 3 years period of study (Cesca et al., 2020; Famin et al., 2020; Feuillet et al. 2021; Lemoine et al., 2020; Tzevahirtzian et al., 2021) We coded this dataset by date of publication and by publishing institution/author, and quantitatively analysed it to show the time evolution of the publication rate by the different actors of the risk management (see Figure 4). Using the catalog of the felt seismicity provided by EMSC for the period from May 2018 to April 2021 (EMSC-CSEM, 2021), we compare this publication rate to the number of earthquakes felt by Mayotte citizens and its evolution in time (Figure 3, 4). This analysis was made using the R software package. This allows us to quantitatively put the scientist's and authorities' communication effort in perspective with the evolution of the geophysical signal that directly affected the

population.¶ However, to understand people's feeling of a lack of communication and how the communication has been managed by the scientists and authorities as the crisis developed, we also needed more qualitative approaches: i.e. qualitative analysis of the content of the different documents. We thus studied the content of all the documents in the above dataset and the way it has evolved in time. We also aimed to identify the main stages of scientific monitoring and to understand how the circulation and transfer of knowledge has been managed by the different actors. With this objective, we conducted semi-structured interviews with scientists from the main institutions in charge of the geophysical monitoring of the crisis (7 interviews lasting from 1 to 3 hours within BRGM, IPGP, CNRS and REVOSIMA) and with local and national risk managers (6 interviews lasting from 40 minutes to 2 hours within the Préfecture of Mayotte, the DIRMOM, the Ministries of Research Environment and Interior[MD6]). We asked questions about the actors involved in the monitoring and their role, about the procedures, contents and formats used to exchange between them, with the media and th(...[1])

Délégation interministérielle aux Risques majeurs en Outre-mer, DIRMOM) who developed a
 sensibilisation campaign (using videos) about the seismic and tsunami risks in Mayotte.

517 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted with the persons who were identified as pivotal 518 to the overall monitoring and risk/crisis management process: 8 with scientists directly involved in 519 the organisation of monitoring (sometimes at different moments of the crisis), 7 with risk or crisis 520 managers acting at the local, national or inter ministerial levels. Two of these persons were 521 interviewed twice, before and after the creation of the REVOSIMA which allowed us to gain a 522 better insight into the associated changes. Most interviews were conducted via visioconference 523 because of the restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemy. During the interviews, we asked 524 guestions about the actors involved in monitoring, risk and crisis management, about their role, 525 about the procedures, contents and formats used to exchange information, between them, with 526 the media and the public. We also asked more specific questions about the communication 527 process (see section 4.2). All interviews were recorded (with the agreement of the interviewees) 528 and transcribed soon after. The transcriptions were anonymized when used for discussion 529 between the members of the team (only the first author has access to the original files as she was 530 the one conducting the interviews). Citations taken from interviews for illustration in the present 531 paper are anonymized to respect interviewees' confidentiality. We also provide our own English 532 translation. The interviews were analyzed gualitatively with the aim to understand the organisation 533 of the official response and its evolution. The chosen method places emphasis on the meaning 534 rather than the quantification of the materials.

Regarding the collection of archives, we collected public press releases, public scientific
 bulletins and official reports. Interviewees often spontaneously shared the materials they used to
 communicate and the materials on which they based their decision, such as internal notes and
 reports. We cite here only the documents that are public.

The work carried out on the basis of those data allowed us to identify the main actors to be considered for studying the process of public information (Figure 2).

INSERT FIGURE 2

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Figure 2: Cartography of the actors who played an active role in public information during our period of
 study.

Two main categories of actors are distinguished according to their function: risk and crisis management or scientific monitoring.

549 On the risk and crisis management side, the main actors are 1) the prefecture of Mayotte, 550 which is the body representing and implementing government policy at the local level, and 2) the 551 ministries concerned with risk prevention (ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire), civil 552 protection (ministère de l'Intérieur), research (ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur, de la 553 recherche et de l'innovation), and overseas administration (ministère des Outre-mer). The 554 interministerial level is also to be considered because of the active role played by a temporary 555 interministerial delegation called DIRMOM (Délégation interministérielle aux Risques majeurs en 556 Outre-mer) whose task was to improve coordination between ministries on the topic of major risk reduction in the French overseas. The delegation was in activity between April 2019 and June 557 558 2021. The end of our study period therefore corresponds approximately to the end of the

559 DIRMOM's activity, at the dawn of a possible reorganisation of interministerial coordination on 560 major risk management overseas. In the French system, mayors are usually key actors of risk 561 and crisis management. But, in the case of the seismo-volcanic crisis of Mayotte, it soon appeared 562 that public information was mainly being orchestrated at the departemental and national levels 563 (anonymous from interviews conducted in June 2020, April, June and September 2021). The 564 explanation that was given to us by interviewees is that the initial crisis overwhelmed the capacity 565 of response of local mayors requiring the intervention of the prefecture of Mayotte, with the 566 support of the national level. 567 On the monitoring side, the number of actors involved has evolved significantly over time. 568 In summary⁵, the Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris (IPGP), the School and Observatory of 569 Earth Sciences in relation with the École et observatoire des sciences de la terre / Institut de

Physique du Globe de Strasbourg (hereafter referred as EOST), the Bureau de Recherche
Géologique et Minière (BRGM) and the Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la
Mer (IFREMER) have been directly involved in monitoring, although in different ways over time.
They are the main partners of the REVOSIMA network. The latter, born in June 2019, is operated
by the IPGP from its closest observatory of the Indian Ocean region, i.e. the Observatoire

- ⁵ The Bureau de Recherche Géologique et Minière (BRGM) and the Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER) are public industrial and commercial institutions dedicated to, respectively, georessources and marine resources placed under the joint authority of the Ministries in charge of ecology, research and, respectively, economy or agronomy. The National Institute of Geographic and Forest Information (IGN) is a public administrative establishment placed under the joint authority of the Ministries in charge of ecology and forestry.
- The Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris (IPGP) is an institution for higher education and research in geosciences which is in charge of certified observation services in volcanology, and seismology through its permanent volcanological and seismological observatories like the one in La Réunion island (OVPF for Observatorier Volcanologique du Piton de la Fournaise). It operates the Volcanological and Seismological Monitoring Network of Mayotte (REVOSIMA).
- The School and Observatory of Earth Sciences (EOST) is an institution under the supervisory authority of the University of Strasbourg and the CNRS (French National Center for Scientific Research) in charge of education, research, and observation in Earth Science. The IPGP and EOST equip and maintain global geophysics networks that monitor seismic activity (GEOSCOPE network) around the globe. EOST is sometimes referred to as the Institut de physique du Globe de Strasbourg (IPGS), the two bodies having intimate links. The EOST pilots the BCSF-RéNass, Bureau central sismologique français Réseau national de surveillance sismique, which is in charge of centralising, archiving and distributing national seismic data. The BCSF-RéNass issues a bulletin after each event and collects public testimonies of felt earthquakes (www.franceseisme.fr). It also provides assistance to the public authorities by sending a task force of seismologists (GIM for Groupe d'intervention macrosismique) to estimate impacts after significant earthquakes in French territories.
- The French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) is an interdisciplinary public research organisation under the administrative supervision of the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research. A significant part of French researchers belong to CNRS and work within laboratories which are placed under the joint authorities of the CNRS and the local university. The National Institute for Universe Sciences from CNRS (INSU) has the mission to develop and coordinate French research in astronomy and Earth sciences, as well as ocean, atmospheric, and space sciences.
- The European-Mediterranean Seismological Centre (EMSC) runs an Earthquake Alert System for potentially damaging earthquakes in the Euro-Mediteranean region. As BCSF-RéNass, EMSC collects testimonies through its Lastquake application (e.g., Bossu et al., 2019). Within the hour following the occurrence of an earthquake, EMSC publishes a web page with its epicentre and magnitude, and the collected testimonies.

volcanologique du Piton de la Fournaise (OVPF) in Reunion Island, and with the support of the
 antenna of BRGM in Mayotte. The Bureau central sismologique français - Réseau national de
 surveillance sismique (BCSF-RéNass), the European-Mediterranean Seismological Centre
 (EMSC) and the National Institute of Geographic and Forest Information (IGN) centralise,
 distribute or provide data.

4.2. Documenting and understanding the organisation of the process of public information and its evolution over time

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584 The ultimate goal of this research being to examine the process of public information, it 585 required documenting and understanding how the above-mentioned network of actors organized 586 its "external" communication (Becker et al., 2018) and how it evolved with time. We used the same 587 methods as those mentioned in section 4.1. In addition to the questions listed earlier, we also 588 asked the interviewees what were the role of the various actors with respect to public information, 589 what role they played at an individual scale, what were the most important moments for them with 590 respect to public information and to give their view on the effectiveness of that information 591 regarding risk reduction. We also took note of the media most commonly used to share 592 information with the public and decided to systematically collect the documents that were 593 available (either online or with the help of the interviewees).

594 We searched the archives and in particular the web archives of the scientific and state 595 institutions involved in monitoring and risk management. We collected all the written documents. 596 By the end of our period of study, we had collected 320 items including press releases, scientific 597 bulletins, news on websites and public notes (Table 1). Hereafter, we are citing scientific bulletins 598 and websites as references (including their URL when existing) while authorities' press releases 599 are given in the supplementary dataset (press releases are typically from the prefecture of 600 Mayotte but there are also a few press releases from the government and from ministries). We 601 did not consider the numerous automatic bulletins emitted by REVOSIMA (daily automatic 602 bulletins are emitted since march 2020), BCSF-RéNass and EMSC but we included the report 603 published by the BCSF-RéNass's Groupe d'intervention macrosismique (GIM) and a web article 604 from the EMSC aiming at providing a global view of the seismic crisis. We also included in our 605 database the five academic papers (one was a preprint version of a submitted paper) dedicated 606 to the crisis that were published during our period of study (Cesca et al., 2020; Famin et al., 2020; 607 Feuillet et al., 2021; Lemoine et al., 2020; Tzevahirtzian et al., 2021) and commented by the press 608 and/or the members of STTM facebook group. We also took into account the contribution of 609 individual researchers who issued key analyses at crucial times during the crisis (Briole, 2018). 610

Each item was downloaded, stored in pdf under a specific ID, and then read independently by 2 to 3 researchers who completed a table with information about format and content. Disagreements were discussed and solved collectively. We took note of the ID, the date of publication, the URL (when existing), the publishing authors/institutions, the title, the public it aimed to, the number of words, the presence or absence of illustrations and the nature of these illustrations (scientific, local, etc.). We also took note of the main topics covered by the text and of the list of actors that were mentioned. This dataset was used to quantify the volume and timing

617 of public information, and to undertake a qualitative analysis of content.

To complete our understanding of the public information process, we also explored Facebook publication feeds when they existed (i.e. for OVPF-IPGP, REVOSIMA and prefecture of Mayotte) but without aiming for exhaustiveness as it was difficult to achieve without adequate tools.

Using the catalog of felt seismicity provided by EMSC (EMSC-CSEM, 2021), we compared
 the publication rate to the number of earthquakes felt by Mayotte citizens and its evolution in time
 (Figures 3 and 4). This allowed us to put the scientist's and authorities' communication effort in
 perspective with the evolution of the geophysical signal that directly affected the population.

4.3. Examining the process of public information with regard to what is known of atrisk population information needs

The combination of these data (archives, interviews, notes of participant observation, written documents used by the actors to share information with the public) provided the basis for examining the public information process with regard to what is known of at-risk populations' information needs. The latter is inferred from the existing literature on risk communication (which is abundant on this particular topic, see section 7), while bearing in mind the social and cultural context of Mayotte.

We also explored STTM's Facebook publication feed but, again, without aiming for
 exhaustiveness as it was difficult to achieve without adequate tools. Hereafter, we use excerpts
 from STTM facebook posts to illustrate some of our statements. We anonymised these citations,
 and provide our own English translation (anonymised French original versions of the facebook
 posts are given in supplementary dataset).

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
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 The organisation of the "official response" and its evolution

645 As no emergency planning or monitoring had ever been done in the department of Mayotte with respect to volcanic issues before May 2018, the framing of the official response has evolved 646 647 significantly over time. Here we provide a description of its gradual organisation. We distinguish 648 four main successive phases (1, 2, 3, 4). The first phase goes from the recording of the first 649 earthquakes to the recording of the first unambiguous signals of a volcanic component. The 650 second phase corresponds to the mobilization of scientists, and funding agencies in relation to 651 ministries, to get the financial means to instrument the area. The third phase runs from the first 652 measurement campaigns to the proof of the volcanic activity which signed the official setting up 653 of the seismo-volcanic monitoring network of REVOSIMA. The fourth phase begins with the 654 official creation of REVOSIMA and ends with our windows of study. Figure 3 summarizes the key 655 events that marked each of these four phases. In addition to the events linked to monitoring, we 656 also discuss some key events in the response of scientists, authorities and inhabitants of Mayotte. 657

a supprimé: Description of the phases of the crisis from a monitoring and risk management perspectiveThe seismic crisis starts on the night of 10 to 11 May 2018 with an earthquake of magnitude ML4.3 being felt by the population. It intensifies on 15 May 2018 with several earthquakes of magnitude ML greater than 4 and an earthquake of ML5.8 (MW 5.9) that slightly damages buildings (Lemoine et al., 2020). One month after the beginning of the crisis, 140 earthquakes with magnitudes ML>4 have been recorded (Lemoine et al., 2020). For weeks, the people of Mayotte feel several earthquakes a day During the first month of the crisis, the EMSC catalog (EMSC-CSEM, 2021) reports ~10 to 20 felt earthquakes per week (i.e. seismic events with at least 4 online citizen testimonies, which EMSC call "felt reports"). Mayotte citizens testify largely after earthquakes of the largest magnitudes: EMSC catalog lists ~200 to more than 500 felt reports for each ML>5 events that occurred in May and June 2018. Between May 2018 and May 2019, the seismic networks record about 1900 events with ML≥3.5 (Cesca et al., 2020; Lemoine et al., 2020), However, there is a sharp decrease in the number of felt earthquakes after June 2018 (Figure 3), with only ~4 felt events per month until the end of 2018, and then a moderate recovery in the number of felt events between February and June 2019 (~9 felt events per month on the average). The seismic crisis is still ongoing at the time of writing, 3 years after its start.

a supprimé: The following description illustrates the role of these different actors and the timing and context of their involvement phase by phase.





692 Figure 3: Major phases and markers of the response by local and national authorities in charge of risk and 693 crisis management and by scientific experts in charge of monitoring the seismic-volcanic activity in 694 Mayotte. Our period of study extends from 10 May 2018 to 1 April 2021. The lockdown periods that are 695 shown are those of metropolitan France (note that most of the scientific institutions involved in 696 monitoring are located in metropolitan France). Mayotte endured longer lockdowns in spring 2020 and 697 2021 but there was no proper lock down in autumn 2020. 698

Phase 1: 10 May 2018 to 10 November 2018

700 During the first phase of the crisis, the French Geological Bureau (BRGM) played, a 701 central role. It was the only geo-scientific institution with a permanent office in Mayotte and, at the 702 beginning of the seismic crisis, it was, in charge of maintaining the only 3 accelerometric seismic 703 stations installed on the island (known as moderately active). BRGM Mayotte was hence the 704 natural interlocutor of the local and national authorities for decision support. But the situation was, 705 difficult as crucial data were, missing. Only the largest magnitude earthquakes (M>5) were, 706 reported by global seismic networks while the existing local network - the few accelerometric 707 stations in Mayotte completed by few regional stations in Comoros and in Madagascar - did not 708 allow a good record of the surge of moderate magnitude earthquakes felt by the population. 709 Because of this inadequate network, the BRGM operators initially encountered difficulties in 710 accurately locating the earthquakes and assessing their epicentral depths (see section 2).

711 In June 2018, the persistence of the seismic crisis led to the involvement of new actors, 712 Ministries in charge of civil protection (ministère de l'Intérieur) and disaster risk prevention 713 (ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire) sent an interministerial mission composed of 714 civil protection experts and seismologists (e.g., Mayotte la 1ère, 2018; Perzo, 2018b). The experts 715 concluded that the impact of the earthquakes mainly resulted in an aggravation of disorders on 716 buildings that were already vulnerable (widening, elongation of cracks) and reported that about 717 thirty people got minor injuries that were indirectly linked with the earthquakes (e.g. falling down 718 stairs to get out of the house). They also outlined that the repetition of shaking had been causing 719 a feeling of anxiety and fear among the population, all the more marked as this seismic swarm 720 phenomenon was unknown in Mayotte until then⁶. Mid-June 2018, a team of seismologists from 721 BCSF-RéNass was, sent to "estimate the levels of damage induced by this seismic swarm 722 according to the vulnerability of the buildings at the date of the field analysis," (Sira et al., 2018), 723 3 more seismic stations were, installed (two short-period RaspberryShake velocimeters by the 724 BCSF, one broad-band velocimeter in the frame of the 'Sismo à l'École' network). During the 725 summer, scientists from IPGP and EOST helped the BRGM team to monitor the activity⁷, In July, 726 the French scientific community started organising to seek funding to instrument the area, notably 727 at sea. A note was sent to the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) to attract funding agencies' attention to Mayotte's issues⁸. 728

⁶ The problem of anxiety was addressed with the opening of a toll-free phone number and a psychological support unit release of the prefecture of Mayotte, 19 June 2018 the local hospital (Pre

Until the creation of REVOSIMA, real-time data processing was organized through the voluntary commitment of scientists

The issue of funding is not simple. The activity being mostly submarine, surveys have to be done mostly offshore using research vessels and heavy human and technical logistics. The funding to be mobilized is typically of the order of several million euros per year. In parallel, one also has to deal with vessel's availability for their work programs are often planned years in advance. However, several scientists we interviewed claim that the rapid mobilization of

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756 In September, routine satellite measurements (using Global Navigation Satellite System, 757 GNSS) Jed by the IGN revealed strong displacement anomalies affecting stations located on the 758 island. Researchers from the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS) Geoscience Lab. analyzed the 759 data, tracing the onset of surface deformation back to July 2018 (Briole, 2018). They explained it 760 by the deflation of a huge magmatic chamber located off the coast of Mayotte. The lack of geological observations offshore Mayotte was still preventing, a good understanding of the 761 762 phenomenon but the scientific community urged public authorities to fund geophysical 763 instrumentation and surveys in the region.

Phase 2: 11 November 2018 to 5 May 2019

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766 The second phase of the crisis started on 11 November 2018 with a long period 767 earthquake with peculiar characteristics (a very long trend of monochromatic seismic waves, e.g., 768 Cesca et al. 2020, Lemoine et al. 2020). The event, not felt by the population because of its long 769 period character, was recorded by global seismic networks. It was much discussed on social 770 networks and appeared to be mentioned in the international and soon national and local press 771 (see discussion in Lacassin et al., 2020). It supported the volcanic hypothesis (Cesca et al., 2020; 772 Lemoine et al., 2020). Mid-november, a meeting was, organised with representatives of the four 773 ministries, scientists and scientific institutional stakeholders like CNRS-INSU. On 29 November, 774 public authorities set up a call for projects to fund observation and research in the area. The call, 775 named "Tellus-Mayotte", was, coordinated by the CNRS-INSU and co-financed by the ministry in 776 charge of disaster risk prevention (ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire).

777 In January 2019, fishermen reported dead deep sea fishes at the surface of the ocean 778 east of Mayotte (Perzo, 2019a)⁹. On 22 January, three projects were eventually selected on the 779 Tellus Mayotte call, involving 11 laboratories and 44 scientists from CNRS, IPGP, EOST, BRGM, 780 Ifremer and IGN. On 22 February, CNRS, IPGP, BRGM and EOST announced the launch of the 781 first major monitoring missions. Between February and March 2019, 6 OBSs were, deployed at 782 sea in the frame of these Tellus-Mayotte projects, and new seismic and GNSS stations were, 783 installed on land (by OVPF-IPGP, BRGM, EOST). A team from the University of La Réunion 784 associated with OVPF-IPGP carried out field missions to consolidate knowledge of the tectonic 785 and volcanic history of Mayotte.

• Phase 3: 3 May 2019 to 5 December 2019

788 The third phase of the crisis started, with the first MAYOBS marine campaigns on the 789 scientific ship Marion Dufresne (MAYOBS 1 on 6-18 May 2019 and MAYOBS 2 on 11-17 June). 790 The campaigns were led under the auspices of the CNRS and involved scientists from BRGM, 791 IPGP, EOST, IFREMER, the University Clermont Auvergne, the University of La Rochelle with 792 the support of IGN, the national center for space studies (Centre national d'études spatiales, 793 CNES) and the service hydrographic and oceanographic marine observations (Service 794 hydrographique et océanographique de la marine, SHOM). The OBSs deployed in February were, 795 retrieved and new ones were, released. The data allowed relocating the earthquakes and

thousand euros in funding would have provided enough knowledge by the end of summer 2018 to confirm the volcanic origin of the seismicity. So there is a debate about the agility of the scientific and administrative governance in organizing the monitoring response as quickly as possible. All is the first time the existence of dead deep sea fishes were made public. a supprimé: In September 2018, Sseismic activity decreases during the summer and intensifies again in September 2018. The French scientific community starts organising to seek funding to instrument the area, notably at sea. A note is sent to the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) to attract funding agencies' attention to Mayotte's issues. As surveys have to be done mostly offshore using research vessels and heavy human and technical logistics, the funding to be mobilized is typically of the order of several million euros per year. In parallel, one also have to deal with vessel's availability for their work programs are often planned years in advance. At the same moment,

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a mis en forme : Police :9 pt, Couleur de police : Automatique 833 specifying the location of the seismic swarms (Deplus et al., 2019; Feuillet et al., 2019, 2021; B34 Jacques et al., 2019; Saurel et al., 2019). Scientists also acquired high-resolution marine geophysical data, studied, the water column and carried, out rock dredging operations on the B35 836 seafloor. An ongoing deep sea volcanic activity was, discovered with a new ~800m high B37 underwater volcanic edifice, confirming the already suspected volcanic hypothesis. The discovery 838 was, announced by an official press release signed by four ministries (e.g., ministère de la 839 Transition écologique et solidaire, ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur de la recherche et de 840 l'innovation, ministère des Outre-Mer, ministère de l'Intérieur, 2019) and relayed by the scientific 841 institutions involved in the campaign on their websites.

842 Numerous other marine campaigns followed, allowing to refine progressively the 843 understanding of the phenomenon (see Feuillet et al. (2019) to access the MAYOBS campaigns' 844 reports). On 18 June 2019, an interministerial meeting set up a scientific and technical committee 845 to monitor, the activity, and officialized, the creation of the Volcanological and Seismological 846 Monitoring Network of Mayotte (REVOSIMA) with the implementation of "a monitoring of 847 volcanological and seismological activity in real time and continuously" (IPGP, 2019b, published 848 on 27 August 2019, translation by the authors). Several phases were, envisaged for the 849 implementation of this network. In a first phase, the REVOSIMA (called REVOSIMA 1 by the 850 actors) was, supported by a 2.5 million euros fund in order to establish a monitoring network and 851 to guarantee a scientific follow-up of the phenomenon with the implementation of new oceanic 852 campaigns aiming at deploying and recovering OBS. The monitoring mission was, entrusted to 853 the IPGP, already in charge of the other French volcanological and seismic observatories. IPGP 854 decided to operate this network through the Observatoire volcanologique du Piton de la Fournaise 855 (OVFP-IPGP) in co-responsibility with the BRGM and its regional direction in Mayotte. The 856 REVOSIMA's mandate was outlined as follows to; "i) monitor the seismo-eruptive dynamics on 857 land and at sea, in particular in connection with offshore campaigns and underwater 858 instrumentation to monitor the possible migration of seismicity and volcanism, ii) monitor marine 859 deformation and submersion, iii) characterize and monitor gravitational instabilities and tsunami 860 hazard, iv) improve knowledge of the tectonics and geodynamic context of Mayotte, v) monitor 861 the geochemistry of volcanic fluids." (IPGP, 2019b, published on 27 August 2019, translation by 862 the authors). In October 2019, a "pickathon" was organised by the REVOSIMA's scientists in 863 order to speed up the process of seismicity relocation. 864

• Phase 4: 16 December 2019 to 1 April 2021

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866 The fourth phase of the crisis corresponds to the progressive development, of the B67 volcanological and seismological monitoring network which allowed the progress of research on 868 land and at sea (there has been more than eight research and monitoring campaigns since 869 december 2019). In December 2019, a new interministerial meeting ratified the perpetuation of 870 the surveillance network and the release of 4.5 million Euros funding. REVOSIMA 2 was launched 871 at the beginning of 2020. In January 2020, seismologists of BCSF-RéNass came back to Mayotte 872 to trace the evolution of damages due to the earthquakes from June 2018 and a second pickathon 873 was, organised to relocate seismicity. From March 2020 onwards, the actors had, to deal with 874 disruptions due to the international pandemic of COVID-19. A double maritime campaign 875 (MAYOBS 13-1, MAYOBS 13-2) was, nevertheless organized in May with the support of the 876 French Navy. The second campaign was remotely operated by scientists from IFREMER, IPGP,

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BRGM and CNRS located in metropolitan France. It was followed, in June, by a magnetotelluric campaign (MAY-MT) and, in October, by a seismic-refraction campaign (REFMAORE), both coordinated by BRGM. The oceanographic campaigns have continued at a steady pace since then, despite the second and third COVID-19 lock downs. The only notable change, at the end of our study period, was the improvement of the automatic earthquake location method announced by REVOSIMA in March 2021.

6. The organisation of the process of public information and its evolution

931 Table 1 lists the preferred publication format and the volume of communication issued by 932 the main actors in charge of monitoring and crisis and risk management during our period of 933 study. Figure 4 shows that the number and frequency of publications has varied greatly over time 934 and among actors, Public information was particularly intense during the first six weeks of the 935 crisis and continued, with some regularity throughout 2018. The average number of 936 communications per day was, 6,8 during the first phase of the crisis (phase 1), compared to 1,3 937 (phase 2), 1,2 (phase 3) and 1,0 (phase 4) during subsequent phases. Over 90% of all press 938 releases and scientific bulletins issued by authorities and scientists during our period of study are 939 dated from 2018 i.e., during the period qualified by Fallou et al. (2020) as an "information vacuum". 940 This finding deserves an in-depth analysis to understand the discrepancy between the initial high 941 communication rate and the perceived lack of information. Hence, hereafter, we analyze in detail 942 not only the frequency but also the content and modalities of public information and its evolution 943 over time. Three main phases are distinguished (A, B, C) that are discussed in relation to the 944 phases 1, 2, 3, 4 describing the evolution of the monitoring and risk management response. 945 (Figures 3 and 4). 946

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
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Table 1. Format and volume of the documents made public by the main actors of scientific monitoring and risk and crisis management during our period of study. As discussed in the text, we only count a report and a web article for, respectively, the BCSF-RéNass and the EMSC, and not their automatic reports. We do not count the automatic bulletins from REVOSIMA. We include the five academic articles dedicated to the 972 973 974 975 976 understanding of the phenomena occurring in Mayotte that were published during our study period.

	Scientific bulletins	Press releases	News on website	Public notes	Academic papers	TOTAL
Scientific monitoring						
BRGM	104		22			126
REVOSIMA	40	1				41
IPGP		1	15			16
IFREMER			10			10
Researchers				4	5	9
EOST			8			8
CNRS/CNRS-INSU		2	1			3
IGN			1			1
EMSC			1			1
BCSF-RéNaSS	1					1
<u>Risk management</u>						
Prefecture of Mayotte		100				100
Ministries/Governement		4				4
TOTAL	145	108	58	4	5	320



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• Phase A: from the beginning of the crisis to February 2019

Between the beginning of the seismic crisis and February 2019, the modalities of communication did, not vary much. The local stakeholders in charge of monitoring and risk and crisis management, BRGM and the prefecture of Mayotte, were, the main contributors. Other scientific actors, such as the IPGP and the EOST who were, gradually getting involved in monitoring from the first months of the crisis, were, only communicating punctually to report on the geodynamic context of the activity and/or on their involvement in the collect and treatment of data: e.g. on 11 June 2018, EOST announced, the dispatch of the macroseismic response mission

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Figure 4. Number of documents made public per week by the main actors of monitoring and risk and crisis
 management. The average number of documents published per day is indicated for each of the phases
 identified in Figure 3.

		C
1000	(GIM) to Mayotte (EOST, 2018a); on 12 June, IPGP published, an information brief on the ongoing	(a
1001	crisis in Mayotte (IPGP, 2018).	a
1002		/ (a
1003	The first communication to the public was a press release from the prefecture of Mayotte	/ /a
1004	on 14 May 2018. Referring to the monitoring undertaken by the BRGM since 10 May 2018, it	// (a
1005	mentioned, a "swarm of earthquakes", distinguished it from seismic aftershocks and recalled the	a
1006	safety instructions to be followed in case of earthquakes. Three press releases were, published	a
1007	on 15 May that listed the time and magnitude of felt earthquakes and specified that "all the	\sim >
1008	earthquakes [took] place in the same sector (around 50km off Mayotte) and, although located at	a
1009	sea, [were] too weak to generate a tsunami". Confronted with the repetition of felt earthquakes,	(8
1010	the prefect of Mayotte activated a crisis unit on 16 May 2018. From then on, the Prefecture	a
1011	publishedpress releases on a daily basis (sometimes more) while the BRGM, switching to "crisis	, n
1012	monitoring", published daily reports ¹¹ . As testified by several interviewees, during that first phase	() c
1013	of the crisis, the local branch of BRGM was, put under strong pressure "to be able to inform, almost	
1014	'day and night', the authorities on the magnitude, on the location of the earthquakes, a more	
1015	precise location than the one announced by the international networks which were not reliable	(a
1016	because of their distance" (anonymous, interview in May 2020).	\\\\ (a
1017		
1018	During the first weeks of the crisis, the scientific reports and official press releases followed	a
1019	one another within a few hours. BRGM published its bulletins on the BRGM website ¹² , while the	a
1020	prefecture sent press releases to the press and published them on Facebook. These official press	
1021	releases generally reproduced the elements communicated by the BRGM. They remained often	a
1022	very technical, recalling the number of earthquakes recorded per day, their magnitude, the time	$\langle \rangle \rangle >$
1023	at which they were detected and their distance from the island (the reports mentioned	
1024	uncertainties of the order of 10-15 km). The prefecture's press releases could contain additional	A
1025	elements about impacts (injuries, building damage) and often recalled safety instructions. They	(a
1026	also provided information about the decisions taken by the prefecture to support the inhabitants	a
1027	of the island (e.g. the setting up of a toll-free phone number and the opening of a psychological	(a
1028	support unit ; the demand for (and arrival of) a support mission of civil protection and risk	(a
1029	management in June 2018).	(8
1030		a
1031		p
1032	Mid-June 2018, the BRGM published a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on its website	t
1033	explaining the state of knowledge and the main uncertainties. But, as written a few months later	S V
1034	by the ministry in charge of civil protection (<i>ministère de l'Intérieur</i>) in its answer to the deputy of	
1035	Mayotte, "the most inventive explanations have found an echo in part of the population	
1036	(conspiracy, actions of evil spirits, etc.) and communication is proving difficult. The state has	
1037	obviously been concerned about this situation since the beginning of the event, and everything	$\langle \rangle \rangle$
1038	possible is being done to inform the population in a reliable manner" (Question à l'assemblée	A
1039	nationale n°8992, 27 November 2018, Ali, 2018). Among the incorrect explanations that had	a
1040	emerged, a popular one was that the earthquakes were caused by oil exploration off the coast of	(a
1041	Mayotte (Fallou et al., 2020; Mori, 2021). The hypothesis of a volcanic cause had also surfaced:	a
ידיקי	wayoue (rando et al., 2020, wort, 2021). The hypothesis of a volcarile cause had also suffaced.	

11 https://www.brgm.fr/fr/actualite/dossier-thematique/volcan-seismes-mayotte-brgm-fortement-implique

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	a supprimé: This unusual seismic activity surprises the local experts. In an interview given to the French national press, the director of BRGM Mayotte declareds: <i>"Unfortunately, we are in the unknown"</i> (15 June, Le Figaro, 2018b).
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	a supprimé: But, despite significant effort from all parties, a careful read shows that the communication of the first weeks wasis overall marked by a sense of surprise, uncertainty and even sometimes inaccuracy. We do not come back here on the issue of surprist [4]
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1151	From the end of june 2018, the number of communications decreased, with the decrease
1152	in seismic activity (2 BRGM bulletins per week from 29 June 2018). In September 2018, BRGM
1153	announced that "the swarm [was] still running [but that] the lull observed since the end of June
1154	[justified] the change from "crisis" monitoring to "routine" monitoring" (bulletin of 17 Sept, BRGM,
1155	2018a). From then on, BRGM published bulletins twice a month, with exceptional bulletins in case
1156	of felt earthquakes. In October 2018, analysing the routine GNSS measurements led by the IGN,
1157	a geophysicist from the Ecole Normale Supérieure suggested, that the seismicity could be related
1158	to the deflation of a deep magma chamber. These results were published in the form of notes on
1159	the public website of the laboratory in October, November and December 2018 (Briole, 2018). In
1160	the opinion of several scientists we interviewed, the "wild" (sic) publication of his results played
1161	an important role in raising awareness of the importance of this seismic crisis among the scientific
1162	community, and authorities in charge of risk management. On 7 November 2018, a press release
1163	from the prefecture of Mayotte mentioned, that the IGN measured a shift of the island eastward
1164	as well as a "slight downward shift". The risk implications were, not specified but it was the first
1165	time the volcanological component was, officially mentioned, 6 months after the hypothesis
1166	circulated among experts and in the press. The infrasound signal of November 11, 2018, which
1167	occurrence supported, the volcanic hypothesis, gave rise to intense discussions among the
1168	international scientific community (Lacassin et al., 2020). It was, mentioned by the BRGM in a
1169	news item summarizing current knowledge on the understanding of the ongoing activity published
1170	on its web site on 17 December 2018 (BRGM, 2018b).
1171	From January 2019, the frequency of BRGM bulletins continued to decrease to reach a

it was discussed on the websites of national scientific laboratories (EOST, 2018b; IPGP, 2018)

and in the local press (e.g., YD, 2018) as early as May-June 2018.

1171 From January 2019, the frequency of BRGM bulletins continued to decrease to reach a 1172 frequency of one bulletin every 20-30 days.

Phase B: from February 2019 to February 2020

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1175 On 8 February 2019, following the initiative of the STTM group of Mayotte, 140 inhabitants 1176 of Mayotte signed an open letter addressed to the prefect of Mayotte, the local administration, the 1177 BRGM and the local media. Pressing them for more information (Picard, 2019, on change.org), they wrote: "You are not unaware that, for almost 9 months, a large majority of "your" population 1178 1179 has been living in anxiety, incomprehension ... Even anguish! The most "basic" questions in terms 1180 of security of people, conduct to hold and even projection in the near future ... Are found without 1181 any answer! You are certainly convinced that you are doing the maximum so that the panic does 1182 not reach your "constituents"? BUT this is not the reality on the ground." Expectations were, 1183 particularly high toward scientists, who were expected to provide explanations and guidance with 1184 respect to risk scenarios. But, in the absence of offshore observations, the scientific advances 1185 were, still poor.

February 2019 was, an important tipping point, however, as the scientific community finally received, the funding to work in the area. On 22 February 2019, CNRS issued, a press release with the laureates of the Tellus-Mayotte call for tenders (CNRS, 2019). With the launch of the Tellus Mayotte program, communication opened, up to new scientific actors. IPGP and EOST announced their involvement in the up-coming missions on their website. BRGM scientists

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1214 published the first public catalog of the seismic data collected since the beginning of the crisis 1215 (Bertil et al., 2018; Lemoine et al., 2019).

1216 BRGM continued to publish a monthly bulletin dedicated to the monitoring of the seismicity 1217 but communication from the prefecture of Mayotte became more episodic. It focused on relaying 1218 BRGM's situation points (with the list of events - among which the felt ones - in the past months) 1219 and on announcing the arrival of Tellus Mayotte scientific campaigns. The volcanic hypothesis 1220 was eventually put forward in the official communication. The press release of 3 April 2019 1221 mentioned, a "scientific volcanological mission" aiming at "consolidating knowledge of the tectonic 1222 and volcanic history of Mayotte and at highlighting the tectonic structures of the island by means 1223 of dating of magmatic rocks, or analyses of the composition of soil gases".

1224 One year after the beginning of the seismic crisis, it was time to take stock of the situation. 1225 In a press release published on 10 May 2019, the Préfecture of Mayotte reviewed the actions 1226 undertaken, both from a scientific and risk management point of view, during the past year, and 1227 concluded that "the latest data collected by the experts and the modeling of the phenomenon 1228 suggested a volcanic origin, possibly linked to a large-scale underwater eruption, or even to an 1229 origin combining both tectonic and volcanic phenomena". When the scientists of the MAYOBS 1230 campaign arrived at the dock on 16 May 2019, they were, accompanied with an interministerial 1231 press release (e.g., ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire, ministère de l'Enseignement 1232 supérieur, de la recherche et de l'innovation, ministère des Outre-Mer, ministère de l'Intérieur, 1233 2019) announcing the discovery of a newborn volcano at the origin of the abnormal seismicity 1234 endured by the Mahorais for the past year. The government, through the voice of four of its 1235 ministries, commited to reinforce monitoring and prevention measures¹⁴. IPGP relayed the press 1236 release on its web site on the very same day (IPGP, 2019a), IFREMER, EOST and BRGM 1237 followed soon after. The announcement was relayed on Twitter, with a spectacular picture of the 1238 underwater volcanic edifice and the rising plume above it (Lacassin, 2019), which raised the 1239 interest of international scientists and of media such as National Geographic, Science, or the BBC 1240 (BBC - Science in Action, 2019; Pease, 2019; Wei-Haas, 2019). The prefecture and vice-rectorate 1241 of Mayotte launched a competition among primary and secondary schools to name the new-born 1242 volcano¹⁵

1243There were, similar surges of communication after the return of the next marine campaigns1244MAYOBS 2 to 4 in June and July 2019, but much less communication afterwards¹⁶. The effort of1245communication resumed again in May 2020 after the MAYOBS13 campaign.

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1247 From the discovery of the underwater volcanic activity, the prefecture of Mayotte and the 1248 BRGM were no longer the only two central actors regarding <u>public information</u>. On 28 May, 2019,

¹⁴ The press release indicates that the government has defined the following action plan: 1) Complete as soon as possible the monitoring system and install the scientific devices that are necessary to continuously monitor the phenomenon; 2) Complete, through appropriate missions, the scientific knowledge; 3) Immediately update the knowledge of the risks presented by this phenomenon and the potential impacts for the territory of Mayotte: 4) Strengthen without delay the planning and preparation for crisis management; 5) Regularly inform the population, in conjunction with local elected officials.

¹⁵ The name chosen for the new volcanic edifice was finally made public in December 2021. It did not match the names originally proposed by the children. It is not possible to explain the reasons for this in this paper, as it would require extending our study period. However, it can be noted that the entire process was not consistent with the need to engage people more actively in the recognition of this new source of hazard.

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a mis en forme : Police :9 pt, Couleur de police : Automatique 1270BRGM published_its latest seismic bulletin on its own and the prefecture of Mayotte published_its1271latest press release only dedicated to the seismic crisis. Monitoring falled in the hand of the newly1272born REVOSIMA. Communication was, then, discussed at a more centralised level by the1273DIRMOM who reported directly to the cabinet of the Prime Minister. The prefecture worked closely1274with the DIRMOM to elaborate new communicational tools such as information leaflets. Early1275August, the Prefect organized a press conference during which scientists presented the results1276of the last campaigns to elected officials and local dignitaries.

1277 The creation of the REVOSIMA was eventually announced one year and four months after 1278 the start of the seismic "crisis" in the end of August 2019, during a visit from the minister of the 1279 Overseas (Ministre des Outre-mer) (Journal de Mayotte, 27 August 2019). The first web news 1280 concerning the creation of REVOSIMA was, published on the IPGP website (IPGP, 2019b). 1281 Entitled "Volcanological and Seismological Monitoring Network of Mayotte", it presented the 1282 mandate of the IPGP and its partners in monitoring the seismic-volcanic crisis in Mayotte. 1283 REVOSIMA issued its first scientific bulletins at the end of August 2019. Several bulletins were 1284 issued approximately at the same time (, (one, bulletin for, July and, two for August 2019) creating 1285 an apparent surge of communication on Figure 4. From then, on, two scientific monitoring bulletins 1286 were, published every month (it was reduced to one per month in March 2020)¹⁷. 1287

1288 A scientific conference was, organized at IPGP in Paris on 15 October 2019. It aimed, to 1289 present scientific advances, and to discuss the challenges of its future monitoring. It was, followed 1290 by a public conference and a question-and-answer session in the presence of state 1291 representatives and of the media. It was, covered by national media, interested, by the 1292 unprecedented nature of the activity (e.g., Vey, 2019), and the local press, proud to see a local 1293 scientist_invited (Perzo, 2019b). In October 2019, the Préfecture set up a "stakeholder 1294 committee"18 aimed at bringing together "all the notables, heads of department, politicians, around 1295 a table" and to whom scientists would be expected to present, about every six months, "the 1296 assessment of the crisis and the scientific findings" (anonymous, interview in May 2020). In 1297 November 2019, the prefecture organised public meetings in several municipalities of Mayotte 1298 but with a sparse audience (a few tens of people, anonymous, interview in May 2020).

1800 In December 2019, the American Geophysical Union fall meeting hosted a special session 1301 dedicated to the Mayotte new volcano discovery where the scientific results from the first 1802 MAYOBS campaigns were presented (e.g., Deplus et al., 2019; Feuillet et al., 2019; Jacques et 1803 al., 2019; Saurel et al., 2019). From our interviews, we understood that some tensions emerged 1304 between the authorities and the scientists about one of the communications (Poulain et al., 2019), 1805 which mentioned, a delay of a few minutes between a triggering event due to the volcanic activity 1806 and the arrival of a tsunami on land. The authorities did, not want such information to be 1307 communicated without having thought beforehand about the protection measures to be put in 1808 place. The decision was taken to not show the poster (interview in June 2020). At the end of 2019, 1809 EOST also announced, the arrival of the second mission of the BCSF-RéNaSS macro-seismic

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a supprimé: s...its latest seismic bulletin on its own and the prefecture of Mayotte publisheds...its latest press release only dedicated to the seismic crisis. Monitoring falleds...in the hand of the newly born REVOSIMA. Communication wasis...thennow...discussed at a more centralised level by the DIRMOM who reporteds...directly to the cabinet of the Prime Minister. The prefecture workeds...closely with the DIRMOM to elaborate new communicational tools such as information leaflets. Early August, the Prefect organizeds...

a supprimé: is...published on the IPGP website (IPGP, 2019b). Entitled "Volcanological and Seismological Monitoring Network of Mayotte", it presenteds...the mandate of the IPGP and its partners in monitoring the seismic-volcanic crisis in Mayotte. REVOSIMA issueds...its first scientific bulletins at the end of August 2019. Several bulletins were issued approximately at the same time (It corresponds to...(onethe...bulletin forof...July 2019 ...nd,...the ...wo bulletins ...or August 2019) follow in September ...reating an apparent surge of communication on Figure 4. From thennow...on, two scientific monitoring bulletins wereare...published every month (it waswill be

a supprimé: is...organized at IPGP in Paris on 15 October 2019. It aimeds...to present the obtained scientific advancesresults on the ongoing seismicvolcanic crisis... and to discuss the challenges of its future monitoring. It wasis...followed by a public conference and a question-and-answer session in the presence of state representatives and of the media. It wasis...covered by national media, interested which are stoned...by the unprecedented nature of the activity (e.g., Vey, 2019), and the local press, which is ...roud to see a local scientist. Said Said Hachim. ...invited (Perzo, 2019b). In October 2019, the Préfecture set up a "stakeholder committee"18 aimed at bringingthat broughtrings...together "all the notables, heads of department, politicians, around a table" and to whom scientists would be expected toshould...present, about every six months, "the assessment of the crisis and the scientific findings" (anonymous, interview in May 2020). In November 2019, the prefecture organiseds...public meetings in several communes ... [10]

a supprimé: s...a special session dedicated to the Mayotte new volcano discovery where the scientific results from the first MAYOBS campaigns wereare...presented (e.g., Deplus et al., 2019; Feuillet et al., 2019; Jacques et al., 2019; Saurel et al., 2019). From our interviews, we understooan... that some tensions emerged between the authorities and the scientists about one of the communications (Poulain et al., 2019), which mentioneds...a delay of a few minutes between a triggering event due to the volcanic activity and the arrival of a tsunami on land. The authorities diddo...not want such information to be communicated without having thought beforehand about the protection measures to be put in place. The decision was taken to not show the poster (interview in June 2020). But the case is quickly closed.

At the end of 2019, EOST also announceds (

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¹⁷ All REVOSIMA bulletins and reports are listed and accessible from the following IPGP web page: https://www.jpgp.fr/fr/revosima/actualites-reseau

¹⁸ According to our interviewees, this committee has not been very active since its creation. One or two meetings were organized

intervention group in Mayotte. The continuation of REVOSIMA decided at the December 2019
 interministerial meeting was, not really announced, at least publicly.

1416 In January 2020, a team of French and German researchers, not members of REVOSIMA, 1417 published in Nature Geoscience the first academic paper analysing the evolution in time of the 1418 seismicity and its relation with the ongoing volcanic activity (Cesca et al., 2020). This paper, 1419 mostly based on seismic data acquired by worldwide seismic networks, mentioned, the discovery 1420 of the new volcanic edifice, before its publication by the scientists directly involved in the survey 1421 campaigns and the close monitoring of the activity. The CNRS and the University of Toulouse, 1422 which hosted the second author of this paper, published a press release in French (CNRS & 1423 Université de Toulouse III, 2020) bearing a sketch section of the proposed magmatic plumbing 1424 system, which was commented by the STTM group: "So much questions !!! In particular on the 1425 position of the magma chamber [...] One or Two? 1 or 2 chambers? The island is moving east. 1426 towards the supposed chamber near the volcano??? And there's another one just below under 1427 the doormat on our front door", "Silly question, but does that portend a big disaster for us?" 1428 (excerpts from STTM Facebook group, 8 Jan 2020)

1429In January, EOST also announced, the results of the GIM mission and of a pickathon1430organized by the REVOSIMA to get help in relocating earthquakes. In February, the BRGM and1431the prefecture of Mayotte announced the future launch of seismic-refraction and magnetotelluric1432surveys (MAY-MT and REFMAROE).

Phase C: From March 2020 to April 2021

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1435 From the beginning of 2020, with the perpetuation of REVOSIMA, the number of actors 1436 communicating diminished, REVOSIMA refocused the communication effort. From March 2020, 1437 the frequency of its scientific bulletins became monthly and automatic bulletins were released 1438 every day online. The monthly bulletins, consisting of about ten to twenty pages, were particularly 1439 appreciated by the scientific community because they contained details on scientific hypotheses, 1440 instruments, methods and results as well as the related uncertainties. Despite a first summary 1441 page aimed at popularizing the contents of the bulletin, they remained nevertheless difficult for 1442 the lay public to access as it was testified of by discussions within the STTM group: "Gee a 1443 REVOSIMA bulletin of 21 pages, we didn't expect so much.....I don't understand everything, so I 1444 count on THE scientists to tell me if there is something new...", and in response, "Sorry but I can't 1445 stand these bulletins anymore! I force myself to read them ? Why : 89 % of repetitions and 1446 reminders of the facts ... I haven't read this one yet (the 25th) ! I think that the objective is reached 1447 ! To make the "average" readers like us run away ! Impossible a short, sharp and clear bulletin 1448 ??? Saying : "since the last time ... " (excerpts from STTM Facebook group, 5 Jan 2021) and again, 1449 "Silly question, but does it mean a big disaster for us? I have no knowledge on this subject..." 1450 (excerpt from STTM Facebook group, 8 Jan 2021), Shorter exceptional bulletins were, issued in 1451 case of felt earthquakes. REVOSIMA monthly and daily bulletins and exceptional press releases 1452 (in case of felt earthquake) were the main supports for information until the end of our period of 1453 study. They were, made accessible to the public on a dedicated facebook feed and were, regularly 1454 commented on, in the STTM facebook group as well as in the local press. The prefecture 1455 continued to inform the population about new scientific campaigns.

1456 The COVID 19 pandemics, the related lockdowns and travel restrictions complicated the 1457 scientific survey of the crisis. A part of it had to be remotely managed, including the MayOBS13-

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1484 2 bathymetric survey in May 2020, operated by a commercial survey vessel while the scientific 1485 team worked on it from their homes. The objectives of these missions were, announced by a press 1486 release from the Préfecture of Mayotte (2 May 2020) relayed on the websites of REVOSIMA 1487 partner institutions (IPGP, IFREMER, BRGM). The information was, backed up by a governmental 1488 press release (6 May 2020) which recalled, "the state's permanent commitment to protecting the 1489 population of Mayotte" and stated that, as such, REVOSIMA "[continued] to carry out its land and 1490 sea monitoring missions, including in the current health context, with all due precautions". Two 1491 information leaflets were, also issued that described the release and recovery of OBS (MAYOBS 1492 13-1) and the acquisition of underwater acoustic data (MAYOBS 13-2). While surprisingly, no 1493 press release followed the MayOBS 5 to 12 missions_REVOSIMA issued in May 2020 a detailed 1494 report about MayOBS13 results (REVOSIMA, 2020), which was relayed on the websites of 1495 partner institutions (IPGP, BRGM, IFREMER) on 4 June 2020. The same day, the government 1496 published a press release summarizing the main scientific results and thanking all the staff for 1497 their commitment in these missions.

1498Two more scientific papers were, published in June 2020, one on the volcanological and1499seismotectonic context of the seismo-volcanic crisis (Famin et al., 2020), the other one, led by1500BRGM scientists, analysed, the seismic and GNSS data from the first year (2018-2019) of the1501seismo-volcanic episode (Lemoine et al., 2020). A preprint preliminary version of the latter was1502publicly available in February 2019 (Lemoine et al., 2019).

1504 The following months were, marked by more scattered communications from the 1505 REVOSIMA partner institutions (in addition to the monthly REVOSIMA bulletin), aiming to 1506 summarize the knowledge acquired since the beginning of the crisis (e.g. "two years of seismic 1507 crisis and the birth of an underwater volcano in Mayotte", August 25th, Paquet, 2020). There was 1508 a new surge of communication in October 2020 with the preparation of the MAYOBS-15 1509 campaign. IPGP presented, the campaign's objectives on its website on 13 October, 2020 and 1510 published a preliminary assessment of the mission on 29 October (IPGP, 2020). The prefecture 1511 of Mayotte issued, a press release presenting MAYOBS-15 results on 28 October. Some of the 1512 scientists of the campaign remained in Mayotte to participate in the "volcano week". Organized 1513 by the prefecture of Mayotte, in close collaboration with the DIRMOM and REVOSIMA, this 1514 "volcano week" aimed to raise awareness of the volcano among the inhabitants of Mayotte. Local 1515 personalities and scientists took turns talking about the ongoing telluric crisis. The scientists 1516 presented their understanding of the ongoing volcanic activity without dwelling on the possible 1517 scenarios. Only the tsunami risk was presented in some detail. Alternative scenarios were shared 1518 to the public recalling that a working group was, already working to identify possible evacuation 1519 routes and that a program had been launched to work on a network of sirens and, in the longer 1520 term, a mass alert system by telephone operators. But the information shared during that week 1521 remained, quite light on the overall topic of risks and the reactions posted live on the facebook 1522 feed of the prefecture during the presentations were, pretty skeptical. The tsunami risk was 1523 commented in the local press as being eventually "quite limited" (Journal de Mayotte, 2 1524 November, YD, 2020). Two presentations by scientists from REVOSIMA were also organized by 1525 the education authority for high school students and 160 science teachers in Mayotte. During the 1526 same week, the prefect of Mayotte inaugurated, the first tsunami warning siren in Dembeni and 1527 scientists symbolically handed over volcanic rocks to the Museum of Mayotte. The government

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1560	issued a press release on 17 November 2020 that reviewed the results of the MAYOBS-15
1561	campaign and the outputs of the "Volcano Week."
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1563	In January 2021, IPGP announced to be the laureate of a major instrumentation project in
1564	Mayotte (Programme Investissement d'Avenir 3, MARMOR project). Led by IFREMER, the
1565	project brings together the core partners of REVOSIMA and prefigures a restructuring of the
1566	governance of research and observation in the region. This change in governance will be all the
1567	more important in the months to come as the DIRMOM's mission ended, at the beginning of May
1568	2021, leaving room for a reorganisation within the state services themselves. This reorganisation
1569	is underway at the time of writing and is therefore beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is
1570	interesting to note that our study period, which covers the first three years of the crisis,
1571	corresponds to the first major stage of volcanic risk management in Mayotte.
1572	
1573	In March 2021, the researchers involved in the first MAYOBS campaigns and in
1574	REVOSIMA publicly released a preprint of their paper submitted to Nature Geoscience (Feuillet
1575	et al., 2021). This paper was initially submitted to Nature in September 2019, then transferred to
1576	Nature Geoscience in June 2020, but remained confidential until March 2021. It was, still under
1577	review after revision at the time of writing. The preprint described the new offshore volcano and
1578	its activity, the evolution of the crisis from the initial deep fracturation processes to the upward
1570	migration of magma across the lithesphere, and discussed the goodynamic context, but did not

migration of magma across the lithosphere, and discussed the geodynamic context, but did not 1580 discuss future scenarios of evolution and related hazards. Local press summarized, its main 1581 results using a lithospheric-scale cross-section from the preprint that illustrated the processes at 1582 work and the location of the seismicity and of magma chambers (YD, 2021). On 15 March 2021, 1583 the online media from the Cité des Sciences et de l'Industrie (a science museum in Paris) 1584 published a webdoc summarizing in a popularized way all main results obtained so far on the 1585 Mayotte seismo-volcanic crisis (Minassian, 2021), providing a whole set of new visuals on the 1586 activity. Until then, according to the journalists we interviewed, the coverage of the event was 1587 indeed made very hard by the absence of direct images of the activity. Two main types of images 1588 were used in the official communication as well as in the media: pictures showing oceanographic 1589 vessels or a group of scientists at work and the image showing an underwater plume above the new volcanic edifice that was made during the first MAYOBS campaigns (Lacassin, 2019; Feuillet 590

1591 <u>et al., 2021)</u>.

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7. Examining the potential limits of the process of public information with regard to what is known of at-risk populations'

information needs

1611 The previous sections aimed at documenting and understanding the organisation and 1612 evolution in time of the official response (section 5) and, more specifically, of the process of public 1613 information (section 6). We showed that the communication strategy adopted by the local and national authorities in charge of risk and crisis management and by the scientists in charge of 1614 1615 monitoring became more structured and more centralised from the summer 2019, with the 1616 establishment of a dedicated monitoring body (REVOSIMA) and the support of an interministerial 1617 delegation dedicated to major risk reduction in overseas territories (Délégation interministérielle 1618 aux Risques majeurs en Outre-mer, DIRMOM). We also showed that the number and frequency 1619 of public communications had been significant over time, testifying of a constant commitment of 1620 these actors to, first, understand and monitor the crisis and, second, communicate their progress 1621 publicly. The question that arises then is: how to explain the reported perception of a lack of 1622 information among the population? (see sections 3 and 6; Fallou et al., 2020; Devès et al., under 1623 review? Here we attempt to answer that question by comparing what we learnt about the public information process in Mayotte with what is known, in the litterature, of at-risk populations' needs. 1624 1625

1626 The question of at-risk populations' information needs has nourished disaster research for more than 40 years. Excellent summaries of this research exist (e.g. Drabek, 1986; Mileti and 1627 Sorensen, 1990; Tierney, Lindell and Perry, 2001). Many studies have focussed on how people 1628 1629 process and respond to risk communications in emergencies, but the lessons learnt also apply to 1630 emergency preparedness efforts - which is the current issue in Mayotte. Lindell et al. (2006) 1631 provide a practical summary of what should be known by practitioners in order to design a 1632 successful communication strategy. They insist on the fact that people must, first, receive 1633 information, second, heed available information (i.e. pay attention to it) and, third, comprehend 1634 the information. They broke down information processing into eight stages corresponding to a few 1635 typical questions that people ask before making decisions. We summarize these questions below 1636 while indicating in brackets the expected outcomes to progress toward protective actions: 1) Is 1637 there a real threat that requires my attention? (expected outcome: threat belief), 2) Do I need to 1638 take protection action? (protection motivation), 3) What can I do to achieve protection? (decision 1639 set), 4) What is the best method of protection? (adaptative plan), 5) Do I need to take protective 1640 action now? (threat response), 6) What information do I need to answer my questions? (identified 1641 information need), 7) Where and how can I obtain this information (information search plan), 8) 1642 Do I need the information now? (decision information). These questions can all be found, in one 1643 form or another, on the STTM Facebook publication feed in Mayotte. The people who write on 1644 that feed have received information about the activity (they were warned by felt earthquakes and 1645 received messages from authorities, the media or peers). However, as Fallou et al. (2020) point 1646 out, they complain that the information they receive does not allow them to understand the exact

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a supprimé: This section aims at atallows drawing a few lessons by comparing what we learnt on the public information process with what is known of at-risk populations' needs. Our ultimate goal is to, which could help to improve future communication strategies. The question that arises is: why does the population of Mayotte complain about a lack of information when, objectively, the volume of documents made public by the main risk actors is significant, corresponding to a real effort to communicate on their part? We

a supprimé: by taking into account the specific issues at stake in each of the four scientific monitoring phases 1, 2, 3 and 4, the adaptation of the communication strategies between phases A, B and C and the evolution of the population's information needs.

nature and extent of the threat, and hence to make decisions to prepare or adapt to the associated risks. Of course, the large uncertainties existing about the activity itself have affected the ability of authorities and scientists to meet these expectations. But, as we will now see, the public information strategy that has developed over time has not avoided some well-known pitfalls of risk communication that would benefit from being corrected in the future.

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1684 Discussions revolve a lot around scientific knowledge and uncertainties. They are informed 1685 by publicly available scientific knowledge, in the form of official releases from local authorities, 1686 scientific reports from institutions involved in monitoring, and more generally anything that can be 1687 found on the Internet. Fallou et al. (2020) point to the absence of a professional scientist who can 1688 help the group to translate and contextualize such information. "The schools for example, which 1689 accommodate some 80,000 students, have been checked by experts (I hope everywhere in 1690 Mayotte) but there has not yet been any feedback to the general public. [...] I would like, for 1691 example, in the general interest, that according to such and such a structure, we could say to 1692 what extent it will resist to such and such a magnitude (including site effects and other local 1693 variables) and also how it will resist to the succession of moderate tremors (in swarm, which is 1694 obviously our case)" (excerpt from STTM Facebook group, 27 May 2018). 1695

1696 1697 Before to go further, it is important to recall that the inhabitants of Mayotte perceive the 1698 existence of offshore volcanic activity only indirectly, mainly through felt earthquakes and, 1699 secondarily, through stories told on social media and in the press or reported, for instance, by 1700 fishermen who observe dead fishes coming up from deep seas. Numerous studies have shown 1701 that experiencing the effects of a hazard increases the attention paid to information about that 1702 hazard (e.g., Sorensen, 2000). From this point of view, it seems reasonable to consider that the 1703 thirst for information of the inhabitants of Mayotte has also evolved during the crisis, in response 1704 to the evolution of the seismicity (Figure 3). The beginning of the crisis was marked by repeated 1705 and strongly felt earthquakes, which goes hand in hand with a strong demand for information 1706 (Fallou et al., 2020). This interest in the topic of earthquakes is further evidenced by a peak in the 1707 number of articles published in the local press at the beginning of the crisis (Devès et al., 2021). 1708 The number of felt earthquakes decreased thereafter and so did interest in earthquake-related 1709 news. This is shown by a significant drop in the number of articles in the local press. Inhabitants 1710 of Mayotte report that, today, the risks associated with the seismic or volcanic activity are barely 1711 mentioned in everyday discussions (anonymous, interview in November 2021). Indeed, people 1712 are exposed to a variety of risks, some of which are more immediate than those associated with 1713 the seismic-volcanic crisis: financial insecurity, energy insecurity, risk of being expelled from the 1714 country, daily struggle for access to water, food, and among the natural hazards, flooding, which 1715 is far more frequent. 1716

a supprimé: ¶ 75.1. Two factors determining the evolution of population's need for information¶

a supprimé: In the case of Mayotte, the evolution of the population's need for information seems to be a modulation of two main factors: 1) a need for "basic" information that is typical of all populations at risk and well known to disaster studies (see for instance Lindell et al., 2006; Mileti, 1993), and 2) a need for information that adapts to the level of perceived danger, i.e. to the evolution of the hazard.

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a supprimé: 75.2. The role of the evolving available information content

The need for information also changes according to the content of the information that is disseminated. Regarding this issue, we have identified three main phases of communication (A, B, C).

1737 7.1. The technicalist bias

1738 The public communication is overall characterized by a frequent but minimalist and 1739 technicalist discourse. This was particularly true from the beginning of the seismic crisis in May 1740 2018 to the launch of the first scientific campaigns in February/March 2019 (phase A). As 1741 expressed on STTM Facebook feed, lists of earthquakes with magnitude and location do not really 1742 help people understand the nature or the extent of the threat nor the uncertainties linked to its 1743 possible evolution (see section 3, excerpt from STTM Facebook group, 26 May 2018). The 1744 frequent use, by scientists as well as by authorities, of specialist terms such as "risk", "seismic 1745 constellation", "magnitude", "intensity", etc. is another difficulty for those who receive that 1746 information. Devès et al. (under review) show that such terms are reproduced in local newspapers 1747 without definition or explanation of context. Among the scientists we interviewed, most argue that 1748 "it's not worth worrying people about things that are still hypothetical so [given the uncertainties] 1749 we chose to remain very factual" (anonymous, interview in May 2020). But did this "factual" 1750 communication allowed people to understand "the big picture", i.e. what was happening and what 1751 could happen next? We tend to believe that it added confusion by delaying the sharing of robust 1752 information. The fact that the Préfecture mentioned the volcanic hypothesis 6 months after the local press undoubtedly contributed to the population's feeling of a lack of information, and also 1753 facilitated the emergence of complotism. The technicalist and minimalist tone adopted in official 1754 1755 communications was also at odds with the statements that were made by scientists and 1756 authorities who insisted on the unprecedented and de facto very uncertain nature of the activity 1757 (e.g. the press release of 3 June 2018 stating that "seismic activity remains abnormal and 1758 continues").

1759	A final example can be given for illustration here. As reported by Fallou et al. (2020), the
1760	fact that some of the felt earthquakes were, not reported in scientific bulletins fueled, a sense of
1761	distrust among the population. Scientists in charge of monitoring took, care to publish a note
1762	explaining the limitations of the seismic network and the difference with international networks (22
1763	May, BRGM, 2018a). This note was reproduced in part in the local press (e.g. Le Journal de
1764	Mayotte, 23 May 2018). But the efforts made to explain instrumental uncertainties were,
1765	challenged by the technicity of the note, hardly translated by the journalists who copied and pasted
1766	whole sections of the text (Devès et al., under review). Experts' efforts were also challenged by
1767	the publication of real-time data, albeit of lower quality, by web applications accessible to all. The
1768	prefecture tried to bridge the gap by communicating immediately after earthquakes of magnitude
1769	greater than 5 using the data issued by international networks while recalling that "the estimates
1770	of international measurement centers were, relayed [] [waiting for] the BRGM to refine its results"
1771	and that the latter would be "more accurate because the sensors [were] located in Mayotte and
1772	in the area" (Press release, 5 June 2018). Although this strategy seems legitimate from a scientific
1773	point of view, one can wonder if it really helped people to better understand the nature of the
1774	existing uncertainties. Indeed, it may seem paradoxical to say that the data is of poor quality when
1775	it is de facto used in official communication without waiting to be improved.
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a supprimé: The effect of surprise, and the lack of proper instrumentation to monitor and understand the seismic crisis, createds a context of strong uncertainties that ledleads to some confusion. We already illustrated that point earlier.

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1800 7.2. The reassuring bias

1801 We showed that, beyond the fact that it remained, essentially focussed on the seismic 1802 hazard, the first phase of communication was, marked by the propensity of the various actors of 1803 the risk chain (the authorities, but also the scientists and the local press) to try "reassuring" the 1804 population in order to "avoid panic". The local Journal de Mayotte reported, that "the mayor of 1805 Mamoudzou [was], calling people to calm down and not to give in to any form of panic" (Journal 1806 of Mayotte, 23 May, Perzo, 2018a). Coming back onto that stage of the crisis, a scientist explains: 1807 "At the beginning, we talked a lot about the seismic risk to minimize it in the sense that these were 1808 only moderate earthquakes, 5.8 was the larger and afterwards we stayed on moderate 1809 earthquakes, we communicated quite a lot saying that to have a lot of damage it was necessary 1810 to have high enough magnitudes, that it was, maybe, not in the functioning of the system that we 1811 knew" (anonymous scientist, interview in June 2020). After a public press briefing with civil 1812 protection experts and seismologists (Perzo, 2018b), the prefecture posted on Facebook and 1813 Twitter that "there will be no earthquake of a higher magnitude than what we have already known". 1814 And thus, in the local press, one could read that "Mayotte [was] indeed in a seismic zone, but the 1815 tremors [were] not of a nature to worry the scientists" (Journal de Mayotte, 2 June, Perzo, 2018b), 1816 This attempt to reassure the public by emphasizing the moderate intensity of the threat 1817 had negative side effects when it came to talking about the tsunami threat. The first public 1818 scientific bulletin, published on 16 May 2018, indicated that "in all rigor and given the limited 1819 knowledge in the region, a tremor of magnitude greater than those already observed [could not] 1820 be excluded" and outlined that "these earthquakes [did] not produce damage and, although at 1821 sea, [were] too weak to generate tsunamis" (bulletin of 16 May, BRGM, 2018a). This was taken 1822 up word for word by the officials and the Minister responsible for the administration of overseas 1823 territories declared the same day that "there [was] no risk of damage on land, nor a tsunami at 1824 sea" (quote from the Ministre des Outre-mer in L'express de Madagascar, 16 May 2018). A few days later, one could read in national newspapers that: "there [were] no risk of subduction, 1825 1826 therefore there [were] no risk of a tsunami", although "emergency teams [were] ready to be 1827 dispatched from Paris and from Reunion Island where tents and medication [were] stocked", the 1828 journalist outlining that "the watchword [was] to reassure the population." (Le Figaro, 21 May 1829 2018). This press excerpt outlines the paradox of a communication that adopts the tone of 1830 certainty ("there is no risk") and, at the same time, recognizes implicitly the existence of unknowns 1831 (emergency teams are still making ready!). And, a year later, tsunami risk reduction became one 1832 of the priorities of risk management authorities focussing part of the latest communication 1833 efforts19. 1834

Communication in the context of large uncertainties has proven to be challenging as
 contradictions cannot fail to emerge when awareness about the situation becomes more precise.
 Devès et al., (under review) point out that news accounts, because of the way they are
 constructed (by juxtaposition of remarks made by different actors) tend to highlight these
 contradictions. Nevertheless, it remains crucial that authorities and scientists express themselves
 promptly so as not to allow space for rumor to gather (see Fallou et al., 2020 on Mayotte's case;

¹⁹ The tsunami is one of the first hazards to have given rise to a precise assessment and to the development of concrete preparedness measures (installation of new sirens, definition of evacuation trajectories). Tsunami risk reduction is at the heart of the prevention campaign organized by the DIRMOM in 2021 with videos explaining how to evacuate to higher ground.

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1848 Lagadec, 1993 or Scanlon, 2007 for general views on the topic). The pitfall here lies in the 1849 willingness, often shared by all the actors (authorities, scientists, and in the case of Mayotte even 1850 local journalists as shown by Devès et al., under review), to "reassure" a supposedly "panicked" 1851 and "irrational" population²⁰. This desire to reassure the population in order to avoid disturbances 1852 of public order is not specific to the case of Mayotte. It has led risk managers' decision making in 1853 many other crises - a famous case is that of Katrina in the United States (Rodriguez, Trainor and 1854 Quarantelli, 2006) but examples were also discussed in France (e.g., Borraz, 2019) and about 1855 telluric phenomena such as earthquake sequences (e.g., L'Aquila, see discussion in Cocco et al., 1856 2015; Jordan, 2013). However, the representations of "officials [who] must be careful about 1857 issuing warnings because of the danger of panic" and "victims [who] will be dazed and confused, 1858 perhaps in shock, and must be cared for by others" (Scanlon, 2007: p. 416) have been shown to 1859 be "inaccurate, biased and often exaggerated" (Rodriguez et al., 2007: p. 482). They corroborate 1860 certain myths circulating in society, largely deconstructed by the social sciences (Mileti, 1999). 1861 The populations facing extreme situations, rather than becoming confused, passive and irrational, 1862 are on the contrary extremely pragmatic and proactive and tend to react by reinforcing social 1863 control mechanisms to face danger (Quarantelli, 2008; Solnit, 2010).

1864 Sharing experiences, emotions and information on a Facebook publication feed is an 1865 interesting way to collectively manage stressful situations. But, when scientific knowledge is 1866 concerned, the ability to select and comprehend information soon becomes a crucial issue (see 1867 the excerpt from STTM Facebook group, 8 Jan 2021, section 6). Fallou et al. (2020) report that 1868 the members of the STTM Facebook group worked very rigorously at describing the phenomenon 1869 as accurately as possible (following the group, you could know whenever an earthquake was felt, 1870 with which intensity and what impact from place to place) and at bringing together all the 1871 information they could find (sources were official releases from local authorities, scientific reports 1872 from scientific organisations involved in monitoring, and more generally anything that can be 1873 found on the Internet, see Fallou et al., 2020). Fallou et al. (2020) also point to the absence of a 1874 professional scientist who could help the group to translate and contextualize this information. 1875 The question arises of the role to be played here by the scientific community. It is true that, given 1876 the uncertainties, some questions could not be answered but, as suggested by Lindell et al. 1877 (2006), one might have explained earlier what was known and not known, and what could be 1878 done to address that lack of knowledge. As noted by Sharma & Patt (2012), recent empirical 1879 studies tend to show that "lay people do understand uncertainty and, under conditions of good 1880 communication, even understand probabilistic forecasts. Therefore, there may be value in 1881 communicating uncertainty from the point of view of improving the credibility of the message." 1882 This is particularly important as many studies have shown that the experience about the credibility 1883 of the message affects the response to warning in the next future event (Lindell et al., 2006; 1884 Sorensen and Sorensen, 2018). The recent development in research about uncertainty 1885 communication can help designing communication strategies in this respect (see Doyle et al., 1886 2019 for an overview). This requires scientists to adapt their practices because, as concluded by 1887 Doyle et al. (2019), "scientists must first understand decision-maker needs [and we add here that

²⁰ Devès et al. (under review) analyse the representation of authorities, scientists and inhabitants in media accounts and show that the place they are ascribed to echoes disaster myths (Quarantelli, 2008). This is well illustrated in the following press excerpt: "Many irrational reactions, faced with which the BRGM explains..." (Le Journal de Mayotte, 23 May 2018) a supprimé: will

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1889 at-risk populations are not the least of the decision-makers in case of emergencies], and then
 1890 concentrate efforts on evaluating and communicating the decision-relevant uncertainties."

7.3. The hazard bias and the lack of risk scenarios

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1894 We showed that, from the launch of the first scientific campaigns in February/March 2019 1895 to the creation and perpetuation of the REVOSIMA (phase B), the format and the nature of 1896 communication changed. At first, it was distributed among much more actors and then changed, 1897 scale with a resumption of communication by national actors (major scientific institutions, CNRS, 1898 ministries and government through the DIRMOM). But it remained, relatively coherent as each of 1899 these actors were referring to the joint Tellus Mayotte work program in their communications. The 1900 discoveries made during the MAYOBS1-2 and MAYOBS 3-4 missions constituted an important 1901 turning point in the content of the information that was shared. From May 2019, communications 1902 no longer focussed only on seismic hazard but started drawing a more general explanatory 1903 framework attributing earthquakes to an offshore, and unexpected, volcanic activity. But despite 1904 this important change, the communication remained, centered on hazards rather than on risks, 1905 which still does not allow answering the population information needs. Reading the press and the 1906 STTM facebook feed, one realizes that people were, very excited by the unprecedented scientific 1907 mobilisation around their island and expected to learn a lot from scientists. But after the first 1908 campaigns, given the extent of the discovery that made, fear of potentially high associated risks, 1909 the authorities became very cautious about communication. They asked the scientists to refine 1910 their scenarios before sharing openly information about risks with the population (we mentioned 1911 earlier some tensions in AGU). A scientist reports that "today [a year after the discovery of the 1912 volcano] we are starting to talk about all the risks. But we are talking about it with frilosity. But it 1913 is not the scientists who talk about it with frilosity, I think that the authorities have locked up this subject a little." (anonymous, interview in May 2020). Some of the scientists actually share the 1914 1915 frilosity of the risk managers pointing out that "I prefer to publish, and to get a peer-to-peer 1916 validation of my hypotheses, before sharing them publicly [...] I don't want to panic people" 1917 (anonymous, interview in July 2020). Hence, public information tended to settle for highlighting 1918 the unprecedented nature of volcanic activity and the prowess scientists had to deploy to study it. 1919 Little was said about the possible evolution of the hazard although, as recalled by another 1920 scientist, "we identified [coarsely] the possible scenarios probably from May-June 2019" 1921 (anonymous, interview in May 2020). On STTM Facebook Publication feed, the feeling prevailed 1922 that communication did not answer the important questions; "[...] The state gives up a lot of money 1923 and resources... But no respect for the population! No info (the same for 2 years! True!) No 1924 listening to people and their requests! No explanation in the villages [...] And when they give a 1925 conference (scientific or press) it is to repeat the same information over and over!" (excerpt from 1926 STTM Facebook group, 5 Jan 2021).

So far, i.e. three years after the beginning of the seismic crisis, scenarios have only been communicated orally, in the form of a listing of potential hazards, indicating that scientists are still working to refine their assessment of the associated risks. But this strategy is debated among scientists. Some argue that *"these are still scenarios, so we must be very careful [in communicating] [...] I understand that some scientists are a little confused because a lot of work has been done and not all the information has been passed on to the general public, but I think*

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1956 that the general public does not need to know certain information either, because it is all just 1957 hypotheses and then you take a sentence out of context and it's panic. I understand that" (anonymous, interview in May 2020). Others respond: "I think it's better [...] that people are aware 1958 1959 that one day there could be a mudslide in their garden or a tsunami than not to know. I know that 1960 Mayotte is maybe more complicated because, I don't know, they have other problems but it's not 1961 a reason to hide it from [people]..." (anonymous, interview in June 2020). Between the supporters 1962 of a communication based on certainties and quantitative assessment, which is structurally close 1963 to the strategy adopted by the authorities, and the supporters of a certain level of academic 1964 freedom in communicating hypotheses at work and not just confirmed results, the debate is still 1965 open.

1966 Both strategies have advantages and caveats. Davies et al. (2015) argue that "quantitative risk assessment and risk management processes" are "of value at regional or larger scales by 1967 governments and insurance companies" but do not provide "a rational basis for reducing the 1968 1969 impacts at the local (community) level because in any given locality disaster events occur too 1970 infrequently for their future occurrence in a realistic timeframe to be accurately predicted by 1971 statistics". They suggest, instead, that "communities, local government officials, civil society 1972 organisations and scientists could form teams to co-develop local hazard event and effects 1973 scenarios, around which the teams can then develop realistic long-term plans for building local 1974 resilience". As outlined by earlier studies, as providers of the primary information about the 1975 hazards, scientists are - whether they like it or not - at the heart of the risk reduction process (e.g. 1976 Rodriguez et al., 2017; Donovan, 2021). They cannot wait for the very last quantitative results to 1977 share their knowledge, i.e. their hypothesis, their methods and their results (that can be negative 1978 ones proving that an hypothesis does not hold). They have a moral, when not legal, responsibility 1979 to respond to the demand for information from different audiences (authorities, people likely to be 1980 affected, journalists, etc.) and at all times (times of larger or smaller uncertainties). Jasanoff 1981 (2005) speaks about "civic epistemology" as "the institutionalized practices by which members of 1982 a given society test knowledge claims used as a basis for making collective choices". Scientists' 1983 role is indeed all the more central as their opinions not only inform, but also legitimize the 1984 decisions taken by the authorities in charge of civil protection. Of course, such a posture is not 1985 easy to adopt, notably because there is a bounded understanding of the scientific approach in our 1986 societies (e.g., Bromme & Goldman, 2014). During our interviews, we were said that the 1987 comments posted on STTM hurted some scientists. Referring to the criticisms read on the 1988 Facebook of the STTM group, one of them says: "What they did not understand is that we did not 1989 understand what was happening either [...] Because there is no analog [...] We started from an 1990 area considered as [inactive]. We find ourselves in an unknown zone to manage a phenomenon 1991 without analogue while having to organize missions involving unprecedented means [i.e. large scientific boats that should be booked months in advance] [...] Our role is to make scientific reports 1992 1993 [but] I think these have a limited impact [because] there is no one on the ground [who can translate 1994 what we doj." (anonymous, Interview in July 2020). That such knowledge "translation" has to be 1995 done by concerned scientists actively engaged in science communication and in answering 1996 people's concerns, or by professional "knowledge brokers" (Hering, 2016), is an open question.

1997The publication of an article by REVOSIMA researchers on EarthArxiv (Feuillet et al.,19982021) in march 2021 gave, rise to mixed feelings in the STTM feed. The fact that the publication1999was, not associated with a document in French and addressed to the lay public was, not much

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2007 appreciated: "they are seriously starting to get on my nerves! A choice to address only peers! And 2008 damn for a minimum of popularization and "simple" explanations. Afterwards, they are surprised 2009 that some and others tell everything, anything! or blame them for their "Height"" (excerpt from 2010 STTM Facebook group, 17 March 2021). The intuitive interpretations they made of the article, 2011 from the point of view of risks, was, rather accurate: "I learn from this cross-section that the 2012 volcano's chimney is 15km from Mamoudzou and not 50, where the underwater volcano is 2013 formed. Not reassuring. Moreover, the last activities mentioned are in the main volcano, so very 2014 close to us." (excerpt from STTM Facebook group, 17 March 2021). People have clearly 2015 understood that it is not the new volcanic edifice, that poses a significant risk to them. They are 2016 very concerned about the seismicity located closer to the island, especially since the publication 2017 of the cross-sectional diagrams of Cesca et al. (2020) and Feuillet et al. (2021). They ask 2018 themselves questions about a future eruption very close, and/or collapse on the outer-reef slope 2019 generating tsunamis, which corresponds more or less to the scenarios considered by scientists. 2020 To this respect, it seems rather vain not to communicate on scenarios, 2021

7,4. The complexity of multiculturalism

2024 To conclude this discussion, it is important to come back to an essential fact about risk 2025 reduction in Mayotte in its communication aspect. Lindell et al. (2006) emphasize that for 2026 individuals to effectively adapt their response to a risky situation, they must not only receive 2027 information, but also consider and understand it. It is clear that individuals comprehend 2028 information only if it is provided in a language they understand, at a time and in a format they are 2029 accustomed to use. The above discussion shows that even if information is shared publicly, it is 2030 not properly formatted to be understood even by the educated part of the population. Risk 2031 communication in multicultural contexts, and on a small island, poses specific challenges (e.g. 2032 Lindell and Perry, 2004 or more recently Bolin, 2018 about race, ethnicity and vulnerability; e.g. 2033 Koromowski et al., 2018 on the challenges of risk communication on small islands). The fact that 2034 written communication to date has been primarily in French, an official language but one that is 2035 far from being well understood by the majority of the population, is a major problem. Efforts have 2036 been made to translate some of the communication materials, including the seismic safety 2037 guidelines, into Shimaoré in May 2020, but this is far from sufficient. Identifying the various habits 2038 of the population with respect to communication (not only language but also practices, who listens 2039 to who?) would also be important to adapt both format and contents. As pointed out by the Senator 2040 of Mayotte, Thani Mohamed Soilihi, orality plays an important role in Mayotte and written formats 2041 would gain to be accompanied orally (radio, animated movies but also neighborhood meetings 2042 and informal discussions with prominent members of the various social groups composing 2043 Mayotte (associations, cadis), etc.) (interview excerpt in the Report of activity of the DIRMOM, 2044 May 2019 - July 2020).

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2055 8. Conclusions

2056 As pointed out by Stewart and Lewis (2017), "scientists' attention to technical accuracy 2057 and their emphasis on professional consensus may do little to influence multiple publics whose 2058 worries instead root into their sense of place, trust and governance, as well as equity and ethics." The work done on the circulation of information from its place of production (the laboratory, the 2059 boat, the field) to different publics (authorities, media, population) during the first three years of 2060 2061 the Mayotte seismo-volcanic crisis supports this observation (also see Devès et al., under review). 2062 As outlined by many earlier studies, there are cultural differences between scientists, authorities, 2063 and at-risk populations (e.g. Newhall, 2017; Haynes et al., 2008 for discussion on volcanic cases). 2064 We can only agree with Newhall (2017) when he writes that "trying to understand and accept the 2065 cultural differences among the various groups, and involving users in the scientific process 2066 whenever feasible, are the best ways ... to develop this thrust" which "is essential if that 2067 information is to be accepted and used".

2068 The efforts made by the risk chain actors to share information are undeniable, as well as 2069 the knowledge built up over time at the cost of a high level of commitment (from the Prime 2070 Minister's office to ship technicians). This is reflected in a significant volume of publications that 2071 take various forms, from press releases to scientific bulletins, web news or communication events. 2072 But the effort is insufficient insofar as it does not allow to reach "the last mile" (e.g., Shah, 2006) 2073 towards the populations. Many factors come into play here, some of which are well known to the 2074 social sciences, and some of which have to do with the complicated relations between 2075 metropolitan France and the overseas territories.

2076 In terms of communication there are several leads, to gain efficiency. The first consists in 2077 establishing a real strategy of research and expertise dedicated not only to hazard monitoring but 2078 more broadly to the reduction of risks, the latter being considered in their technical dimension but 2079 also in their human and social aspects. The second lever is to work on the content and formats 2080 of information sharing. As emphasized by Oreskes (2015) about seismic risk, "earthquake safety 2081 has never been simply a matter of geophysics, but most earthquake scientists, acting qua 2082 scientists, have traditionally understood their job to be to study how, when, and why earthquakes 2083 happen, and only to a lesser extent (if at all) how to communicate that knowledge to engineers 2084 and officials responsible for mitigation, or to the general public [...] But in the contemporary world, 2085 the inter-relationship between knowledge and safety is not easily disentangled. Seismology is no 2086 longer simply a matter of geophysics, if it ever was. It involves consideration of ethics, values, 2087 and monetary and social costs. [The trial of] L'Aquila shows that scientists can no longer ignore 2088 the social factors that affect and even control how damaging a particular earthquake may be. 2089 Earthquake prediction is a social science." The reasoning applies to the assessment of other 2090 "natural" risks. If scientists' main job is not to communicate, they are nevertheless the only ones 2091 able to appreciate the robustness of the science-based information. As such, they are expected 2092 to take the time to present it in a way that can help risk managers, elected officials, but also 2093 journalists and the wider population to act effectively. From this point of view, it seems important 2094 to work at clarifying the frontier between the communication of scientific advances on hazard 2095 understanding, and the communication of operational risk management measures. That frontier 2096 seems particularly blurry in the case of Mayotte. The advantage of this clarification would be 2097 twofold. Allowing scientists to explain their hypotheses, results and uncertainties would lead to an

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2110 improvement of the population's scientific culture while reinforcing the credibility of the scientific 2111 expertise. The latter is a pillar of any science-based risk governance process, as one may adhere 2112 to decisions made by authorities only if he/she believes their scientific basis to be credible. The 2113 adhesion to the scientific approach is thus a prerequisite to the adhesion to the risk reduction 2114 approach carried out by the other actors of the chain. The third lever is the association of local 2115 personalities, elected officials, local NGOs, to the reflection on the risk scenarios and adaptation 2116 strategies. The international Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction calls for a more 2117 integrated practice. The signatory countries reckon that, in order to reduce efficiently the risk of 2118 disasters, "there is a need for the public and private sectors and civil society organisations, as 2119 well as academia and scientific and research institutions, to work more closely together and to 2120 create opportunities for collaboration [...]" (Sendai framework page 7 - UNISDR, 2015). Following 2121 Ismail-Zadeh et al. (2017), Stewart, Ickert and Lacassin (2018) emphasize that the willingness for 2122 greater integration defines a "new social contract between hazard scientists and the wider public 2123 [...] that encourages the scientific community to endeavour, alongside their existing technical 2124 expertise, to '... support action by local communities and authorities; and support the interface 2125 between policy and science for decision-making' (Sendai framework page 22 - UNISDR, 2015)". 2126 As shown in this paper, this change of expectations creates new challenges for scientists, notably 2127 on the issue of communication. We hope that this work will contribute to open new avenues for 2128 transdisciplinary research drawing on geosciences, social sciences and humanities that can 2129 improve the effectiveness of the science-society nexus for disaster risk reduction.

2130 Data availability

EMSC data on the felt seismicity are available from https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4734032. Instrumental seismicity plotted on Figure 1 is from Lemoine et al. (2020) dataset, and from REVOSIMA catalog (not yet available for distribution, these data will be included in Saurel et al., 2021). Press releases from the prefecture de Mayotte and French ministries are given in supplementary dataset. French version of STTM post excerpts are also given in supplementary dataset. Full verbatim of interviews from which we extracted cited excerpts are not public for confidentiality. All other data used in this paper are available from cited references.

2138 Author contribution

MHD was responsible for the conceptualization of the study, project administration, methodology
and writing the original draft of the paper. MHD and RL undertook the revision and editing of the
final paper in concert with all co-authors. MHD and GR were responsible for data curation and
investigation. RL curated the STTM Facebook threads and selected relevant excerpts. MHD and
GR conducted and transcribed the interviews. MHD, RL and GR undertook the formal analysis.
MHD and RL carried out the validation. HP, RL and MHD were responsible for the figures.

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2161 Competing interests

2162 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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