



# 1 Multi-hazard risk assessment for roads: Probabilistic versus 2 deterministic approaches

3 Stefan Oberndorfer<sup>1,2</sup>, Philip Sander<sup>3</sup>, Sven Fuchs<sup>2</sup>

4 <sup>1</sup>Chartered Engineering Consultant for Mountain Risk Engineering and Risk Management, Ecking 57, 5771  
5 Leogang, Austria

6 <sup>2</sup>Institute of Mountain Risk Engineering, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Peter Jordan Straße 82,  
7 1190 Vienna, Austria

8 <sup>3</sup>Institute of Construction Management, Bundeswehr University Munich, Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39, 85577  
9 Neubiberg, Germany

10 *Correspondence to:* Stefan Oberndorfer (office@oberndorfer-zt.at)

11 **Abstract.** Mountain hazard risk analysis for transport infrastructure is regularly based on deterministic approaches.  
12 Due to a variety of variables and data needed for risk computation, a considerable degree of epistemic uncertainty  
13 results. Consequently, input data needed for risk assessment is normally processed as mean values with or without  
14 scatter, or as an individual deterministic value from expert judgement if no statistical data is available. To overcome  
15 this gap, we used a probabilistic approach to express the potential bandwidth of input data with two different  
16 distribution functions, taking a mountain road in the Eastern European Alps as case study. The risk assessment  
17 included the damage potential of road infrastructure and traffic exposed to a multi-hazard environment (torrent  
18 processes, snow avalanches, rock fall). Reliable quantiles of the calculated probability density distributions attributed  
19 to the aggregated road risk due to the impact of multiple-mountain hazards were compared to the deterministic  
20 results from the standard guidelines on road safety. The results demonstrate that with common deterministic  
21 approaches risk is underestimated in comparison to a probabilistic risk modelling setup, mainly due to epistemic  
22 uncertainties of the input data. The study provides added value to further develop standardized road safety guidelines  
23 and may therefore be of particular importance for road authorities and political decision-makers.

## 24 1 Introduction

25 Mountain roads are particularly prone to natural hazards, and consequently, risk assessment for road infrastructure  
26 focused on a range of different hazard processes, such as landslides (Benn, 2005; Schlögl et al., 2019), rockfall  
27 (Bunce et al., 1997; Hungr and Beckie, 1998; Roberds, 2005; Ferlisi et al., 2012; Michoud et al., 2012; Unterrader et  
28 al., 2018) and snow avalanches (Schaerer, 1989; Kristensen et al., 2003; Margreth et al., 2003; Zischg et al., 2005;  
29 Hendrikx and Owens, 2008; Wastl et al., 2011). These studies have in common that they exclusively address the  
30 negative interaction of individual hazards with values at risk of the built environment and/or of society and use  
31 qualitative, semi-quantitative and/or quantitative approaches. In contrast, there is still a gap in multi-hazard risk  
32 assessments for road infrastructure.

## 33 Multi-hazard risk assessment

34 According to Kappes et al. (2012a), two approaches to multi-hazard risk analysis can be distinguished, a spatially-  
35 oriented and a thematically-defined method. While the first aims to include all relevant hazards and associated loss in



36 an area, the latter deals with the influence or interaction of one hazard process on another hazard, frequently  
37 addressed as hazards chain or cascading hazards, meaning that the occurrence of one hazard is triggering one or  
38 several second-order (successive) hazards. One of the major issues in multi-hazard risk analysis – see Kappes et al.  
39 (2012a) for a comprehensive overview – lies in the different process characteristics which lead to challenges for a  
40 sound comparison of the resulting risk level among different hazard types due to different reference units.  
41 Standardization by a classification scheme for frequency and intensity thresholds of different hazard types resulting  
42 in semi-quantitative classes or ranges allows for a comparison among different hazard types, such as shown in  
43 Table 2. Therefore, the analysis of risk for transport infrastructure is often focused on an assessment of different  
44 hazard types affecting a defined road section rather than on hazard chains or cascades (Schlögl et al., 2019).  
45 Following this approach, hazard-specific vulnerability can be assessed either in terms of loss estimates (e.g.,  
46 Paphoma-Köhle et al., 2011; Fuchs et al., 2019) or in terms of other socioeconomic variables, such as limited  
47 access in case of road blockage or interruption (Schlögl et al., 2019). Focusing on the first and neglecting any type of  
48 hazard chains, our study demonstrates the application of risk to a specific road section in the Eastern European Alps  
49 and shows the sensitivity of the results using deterministic and probabilistic risk approaches.

#### 50 **Deterministic risk concept**

51 Quantitative risk analyses for natural hazards are regularly based on deterministic approaches, and the temporal and  
52 spatial occurrence probability of a hazard process with a given magnitude is multiplied by the expected  
53 consequences, the latter defined by values at risk times vulnerability (Varnes, 1984; International Organisation for  
54 Standardisation, 2009). A universal definition of risk relates the likelihood of an event with the expected  
55 consequences, thus manifests risk as a function of hazard times consequences (UNISDR, 2004; ISO, 2009).  
56 Depending on the spatial and temporal scale, values at risk include exposed elements, such as buildings (Fuchs et al.,  
57 2015), infrastructure systems (Guikema et al., 2015) and people at risk (Fuchs et al., 2013). These elements at risk  
58 are linked to potential loss using vulnerability functions, indices or indicators (Paphoma-Köhle, 2017), and can be  
59 expressed in terms of direct and indirect, as well as tangible and intangible loss (Markantonis et al., 2012; Meyer et  
60 al., 2013). While direct loss occurs immediately due to the physical impact of the hazard, indirect loss occurs with a  
61 certain time lag after an event (Merz et al., 2004, 2010). Furthermore, the distinction between tangible or intangible  
62 loss is depending on whether or not the consequences can be assessed in monetary terms. In this context,  
63 vulnerability is defined as the degree of loss given to an element of risk as a result from the occurrence of a natural  
64 phenomenon of a given intensity, ranging between 0 (no damage) and 1 (total loss) (UNDRO, 1979; Fell et al., 2008;  
65 Fuchs, 2009). This definition highlights a physical approach to vulnerability within the domain of natural sciences,  
66 neglecting any societal dimension of risk. However, the expression of vulnerability due to the impact of a threat on  
67 the element at risk considerably differs among hazard types (Paphoma-Köhle et al., 2011).  
68 Using a deterministic approach, the calculation of risk has repeatedly been conceptualised by Eq. (1) (e.g. Fuchs et  
69 al. 2007; Oberndorfer et al. 2007; Bründl et al. 2009) and is dependent on a variety of variables all of which being  
70 subject to uncertainties (Grêt-Regamey and Straub, 2006).

$$71 \quad R_{i,j} = f(p_j, p_{i,j}, A_i, v_{i,j}) \quad (1)$$



72 Where  $R_{i,j}$  = risk dependent of object  $i$  and scenario  $j$ ;  $p_j$  = probability of defined scenario  $j$ ;  $p_{i,j}$  probability of  
73 exposure of object  $i$  to scenario  $j$ ;  $A_i$  = value of the object  $i$  (the value at risk affected by scenario  $j$ );  $v_{i,j}$  =  
74 vulnerability of the object  $i$  in dependence on scenario  $j$ .

75 With respect to mountain hazard risk assessment, standardised approaches are available, such as IUGS (1997), Dai et  
76 al. (2002), Bell and Glade (2004), and Fell et al. (2008a, b) for landslides, Bründl et al. (2010) for snow avalanches,  
77 and Bründl (2009) or ASTRA (2012) for a multi-hazard environment. These approaches, however, usually neglect  
78 the inherent uncertainties of involved variables. In particular, they ignore the probability distributions of the variables  
79 (Grêt-Regamey and Straub, 2006) by obtaining the results with constant input parameters, which may lead to  
80 inconsistencies in the results. Therefore, loss assessment for natural hazard risk is associated with high uncertainty  
81 (Špačková et al., 2014 and Špačková, 2016) and studies quantifying uncertainties of the expected consequences are  
82 underrepresented (Grêt-Regamey and Straub, 2006). In our study, we bridge this gap by quantifying the potential  
83 uncertainties within road risk assessment using a stochastic risk assessment approach.

#### 84 **Uncertainties within risk assessment**

85 Since the computation of risk for roads requires a variety of auxiliary calculations, a broad range of input data are  
86 used, such as the spatial and temporal probability of occurrence of specific design events. These auxiliary  
87 calculations subsequently provide variables necessary for risk computation of the respective system under  
88 investigation. Individual contributing variables are often characterized either as the mean value of the potential  
89 spectrum from a statistical dataset or, as a consequence of incomplete data, as a single value from expert judgement.  
90 Expert information is frequently processed with semi-quantitative probability classes and therefore subjected to  
91 considerable uncertainties. Consequently, they serve as rough qualitative appraisals encompassing a high degree of  
92 uncertainty.

93 The use of vulnerability parameters or lethality values as a function of process-specific intensities is often based on  
94 incomplete or insufficient statistical data resulting from missing event documentation (Fuchs et al., 2013). As  
95 discussed in Kappes et al. (2012a), Papathoma-Köhle et al. (2011, 2017) and Ciurean et al. (2017) with respect to  
96 mountain hazards, potential sources of uncertainty in vulnerability assessment are independent of the applied  
97 assessment method. The amplitude in data is considerably high in continuous vulnerability curves or functions, but  
98 also in discrete (minimum and maximum) vulnerability values referred to as matrices (coefficients), and in indicator-  
99 /index-based methods used to calculate the cumulative probability of loss. Associated with the uncertainty in  
100 vulnerability matrices, Ciurean et al. (2017) suggested a fully probabilistic simulation in order to quantify the  
101 propagation of errors between the different stages of analysis by substituting the range of minimum-maximum values  
102 with a probability distribution for each variable in the model.

103 Grêt-Regamey and Straub (2006) listed potential sources of uncertainties in risk assessment models and classified  
104 uncertainties into aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. The first is considered as inherent to a system associated to  
105 the natural variability over space and time (Winter et al., 2018) and the variability of underlying random or stochastic  
106 processes (Merz and Thieken, 2005, 2009), which cannot be further reduced by an increase in knowledge,  
107 information or data. The latter results from incomplete knowledge and can be reduced with an increase of cognition  
108 or better information of the system under investigation (Merz and Thieken, 2004, 2009; Grêt-Regamey and Straub,  
109 2006). Particularly referring to deterministic risk analysis, epistemic uncertainty is associated with a lack of



110 knowledge about quantities of fixed but poorly known values (Merz and Thieken, 2009). Špačková (2016) pointed  
111 out the importance of interactions (correlations) between uncertainties which may affect the final results, an issue  
112 that was also discussed in the framework of multi-hazard risk assessments (Kappes, 2012a, b). Therefore,  
113 uncertainties should be included in the analysis by their upper and lower credible limits or by integrating confidence  
114 intervals reflecting the incertitude of input data, for an in-depth discussion see e.g. Apel et al. (2004), Merz and  
115 Thieken (2004, 2009), Bründl et al. (2009) and Winter et al. (2018).

#### 116 **Deterministic vs. probabilistic risk**

117 In contrast to the well-established deterministic approach for mountain hazard risk assessment, probabilistic methods  
118 are underrepresented as a standard procedure to cope with the uncertainties of complex safety-relevant surroundings.  
119 To overcome this gap, we present an probabilistic design for loss calculation in order to compute the potential  
120 spectrum of input data with simple distribution functions and further aggregate the intermediate data of exposure  
121 situations, hazard- and scenario-related modules to the probability density function (PDF) of the total collective risk  
122  $R_c$  by means of stochastic simulation (Fig. 1). Consequently, damage induced by natural hazards impact to road  
123 infrastructure as well as to traffic are represented by a range of monetary values as a prognostic distribution of the  
124 expected annual average loss instead of an individual amount.

125 Deterministic and probabilistic methods for risk analysis differ significantly in approach. Deterministic methods  
126 generally use a defined value (point value) for probability and for the impact (consequence) and consider risk by  
127 multiplying the probability of occurrence and potential consequences. The result is an “expected value” of risk. If  
128 multiple risks e.g. with varying frequencies are addressed, the total risk is expressed as the simple sum of individual  
129 risks resulting in an expected annual average loss. However, information about probability or best and/or worst-case  
130 scenarios are often excluded. In particular, the following shortcomings of deterministic approaches can be  
131 summarized (Tecklenburg 2003), which in turn leads us to a recommendation of probability-based risk approaches:

- 132 - A deterministic method gives equal weight to those risks that have a low probability of occurrence and high  
133 impact and to those risks that have a high probability of occurrence and low impact by using a simple  
134 multiplication of probability and impact.
- 135 - By multiplying the two elements of probability and impact, these values are no longer independent.  
136 Therefore, this method is not adequate for aggregation of risks where both probability and impact information  
137 need to remain available. Due to multiplication, the only information that remains is the mean value.
- 138 - The actual impact will definitely deviate from the deterministic value (i.e., the mean).
- 139 - Without the Value at Risk information, there is no way to determine how reliable the mean value is and how  
140 likely it might be exceeded.

141 In this context, deterministic systems are perfectly predictable, and the state of the parameters to describe the system  
142 behavior are fixed (single) values associated with total determinization following an entirely known rule, whereas  
143 probabilistic systems include some degree of uncertainty and the variables/parameters to describe the state of the  
144 system are therefore random (Kirchsteiger, 1999). The variables/parameters in probabilistic systems are described  
145 with probability distributions due to incomplete knowledge, rather than with a discrete single or point value which is  
146 assumed to be totally certain. Probabilistic risk modelling uses stochastic simulation with a defined distribution




147 function to generate random results within the setting of the boundary conditions. The deterministic variable is  
148 usually included within the input distribution. In Table 1 the two different methods are compared.

149 **Table 1.** Deterministic versus probabilistic method for risk analysis adjusted and compiled from Sander et al. (2015)  
150 and Kirchsteiger (1999).

|               | <b>Deterministic method</b>   | <b>Probabilistic method</b>  |
|---------------|---|--|
| Input         | Definition of a single number for consequence as descriptive statements including conservative assumptions expressed by the probability of occurrence multiplied by the impact of the particular hazard.  | The probabilistic assessment of risk requires one number for the probability of occurrence and several values for the impact (e.g., minimum, most likely and maximum) expressed as distribution functions, therefore including uncertainty.  |
| Result        | A simple mathematical addition to give the aggregated consequence for all risks (point value calculation). This results in an expected consequence for the aggregated risks but does not adequately represent the bandwidth (range) of the aggregated consequences. | Simulation methods e.g. Monte Carlo simulation produce a bandwidth (range) of aggregated natural hazards risks as probability distribution based on thousands of coincidental but realistic scenarios (depiction of realistic risk combinations). The method allows an explicit consideration and treatment of all types of reducible uncertainty. |
| Qualification | Results are displayed as a single sharp number, which, in itself, does not have an associated probability.  | Results are displayed using probability distributions, which allow Value at Risk (VaR) interpretation for each value within the bandwidth (range).   |

151 **Objective**

152 The objective of this paper is a comparison between two fundamentally different approaches to assess risks due to  
153 natural hazard impacts on roads. Using the standardized framework from ASTRA (2012) for operational risk  
154 assessment for roads and transportation networks, we supplement the well-established deterministic method with a  
155 probabilistic framework for risk calculation (Fig. 1). While the former calculates risk with constant or discrete  
156 values, ignoring the epistemic uncertainty of the variables, the latter enables the consideration of the potential range  
157 of parameter value by using different distributions to characterize the input data uncertainty. Even though the  
158 presented methodology in this study focuses on a road segment exposed to a multi-hazard environment on a local-  
159 scale, the approach can easily be transferred to other risk-oriented purposes.




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161 **Figure 1.** Flow chart for the risk assessment method following the standard approach (deterministic risk model) from  
 162 ASTRA (2012) which was supplemented with the probabilistic risk model in present study.

163 **2. Case study**

164 The study area is located in the Eastern European Alps, within the Federal State of Salzburg, Austria (Fig. 2). The  
 165 case study is a road segment of the federal highway B99 with an overall length of two kilometers ranging from  
 166 km 52.8 to km 54.8 and is endangered by multiple types of natural hazards. The road segment was chosen to  
 167 demonstrate the advantages of using probabilistic risk approaches in comparison to traditional deterministic methods.  
 168 The mountain road under examination is part of a north-south traverse over the main ridge of the Eastern European  
 169 Alps and is therefore an important regional transit route. Furthermore, the road provides access to the ski resort of  
 170 Obertauern.

171 The road is frequently used for individual traffic from both sides of the alpine pass. Hence, a mean daily traffic  
 172 (MDT) of 3,600 cars is observed. This constant frequency represents the standard situation for the potentially  
 173 exposed elements at risk. However, especially in the winter months the average daily traffic can considerably  
 174 increase up to an amount of about 7,000 cars. Thus, the traffic data underlies short-term daily and longer-term  
 175 seasonal fluctuations with peaks up to the double of the mean value. The importance of dynamic risk computation  
 176 needed for traffic corridors was also discussed earlier by Zischg et al. (2005) and Fuchs et al. (2013) with respect to  
 177 the spatial-temporal shifts in elements at risk. Besides of the use as a regional transit route, the road is also a central  
 178 bypass for one of the main transit routes through the Eastern European Alps. Hence, any closure of this main transit  
 179 route (A10 Tauern motorway) results in a significant increase of daily traffic frequency up to a total of 19,650 cars.  
 180 The evaluation of the dataset in terms of the bandwidth of the traffic data is shown in Table A6.



181

182 **Figure 2.** Overview of the case study area and location of the natural hazards along the road segment (Source base  
183 map: © BEV 2020 – Federal Office of Metrology and Surveying, Austria, with permission N2020/69708).

### 184 3. Methods

#### 185 3.1 Hazard analysis

186 The hazard analysis was conducted in technical studies undertaken for the road authority of the Federal State of  
187 Salzburg (Geoconsult, 2016; Oberndorfer, 2016). The results regarding the spatial impact of the hazard processes on  
188 the elements at risk and the corresponding hazard intensities were used for the loss assessment in this research. The  
189 hazard assessment included the steps of hazard disposition analysis to detect potential hazards within the perimeter  
190 of the road followed by a detailed numerical hazard analysis. Therefore, these analyses considered approaches for  
191 hazard-specific impact assessment according to the engineering guidelines of e.g. Bründl (2009), ASTRA (2012) and  
192 Bründl et al. (2015) and relevant engineering standards and technical regulations (Austrian Standards Organisation,  
193 2009, 2010, 2017). The physical impact parameters of the hazard processes were calculated using numerical  
194 simulation software, such as Flow-2D for flash floods and debris flows (Flow-2D Software, 2017), SamosAT for  
195 dense and powder snow avalanches (Sampl, 2007) and Rockyfor3D for rock fall (Dorren, 2012). The hazard analyses  
196 were executed without probabilistic calculations, thus the generated results were integrated as constant input in the  
197 risk analysis.



198 For the multi-hazard purpose three hazard types were evaluated, (1) hydrological hazards (torrential floods, flash  
 199 floods, debris flows), (2) geological hazards (rock fall, landslides), and (3) snow avalanches (dense and powder snow  
 200 avalanches). For each hazard type, intensity maps for the affected road segment were computed. The intensity maps  
 201 specify for a specific hazard scenario the spatial expression of a certain physical impact (e.g., pressure, velocity or  
 202 inundation depth) during a reference period (Bründl et al., 2009). In order to transfer the physical impact to object-  
 203 specific vulnerability values for further use in the risk assessment, three process-specific intensity classes were  
 204 distinguished (Table 2). These intensity classes were based on the underlying technical guidelines (Bründl, 2009;  
 205 ASTRA, 2012; Bründl et al., 2015) and were slightly adapted to comply with the regulatory framework in Austria  
 206 (Republik Österreich, 1975, 1976; BMLFUW, 2011). Table 2 represents the intensity classes which correspond to  
 207 the affiliated object-specific vulnerability and lethality values (mean damage values) in Tables A7 and A8.

208 **Table 2.** Process-specific intensity classes with  $p$  = pressure,  $h$  = height (suffix  $h_{ws}$  refers to water and solids),  $v$  =  
 209 velocity,  $d$  = depth and  $E$  = energy (compiled and adapted from Bründl (2009), ASTRA (2012) and Republik  
 210 Österreich (1975) in conjunction with Republik Österreich (1976) and BMLFUW (2011). The low intensity class for  
 211 debris flow has the same intensity indicators than for inundation because it was assumed that low intensity debris  
 212 flow events have equal characteristics than hydrological processes.

| Hazard type                  | Low intensity   | Medium intensity  | High intensity  |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Snow avalanche               | $1 < p < 3 \text{ kN/m}^2$  | $3 < p < 10 \text{ kN/m}^2$   | $p > 10 \text{ kN/m}^2$   |
| Inundation                   | $h < 0.5 \text{ m}$<br>or<br>$v \times h < 0.5 \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$      | $0.5 < h_{ws} < 1.5 \text{ m}$<br>or<br>$0.5 < v \times h < 1.5 \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$ | $h_{ws} > 1.5 \text{ m}$<br>or<br>$v \times h > 1.5 \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$ |
| Debris (bed load)<br>deposit | $h_{ws} < 0.5 \text{ m}$<br>or<br>$v \times h < 0.5 \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$ | $0.5 < h_s < 0.7 \text{ m}$<br>or<br>$v < 1 \text{ m/s}$                              | $h_s > 0.7 \text{ m}$<br>and<br>$v > 1.0 \text{ m/s}$                     |
| Erosion                      | --  | $d < 1.5 \text{ m}$<br>or top edge of the erosion                                     | $d > 1.5 \text{ m}$<br>or top edge of the erosion                         |
| Rockfall                     | $E < 30 \text{ kJ}$   | $30 < E < 300 \text{ kJ}$   | $E > 300 \text{ kJ}$  |

213 To determine the intensities of individual hazard processes, two different return periods were selected, a 1-in-10-year  
 214 and a 1-in-30-year event (probability of occurrence  $p_{10} = 0.1$  and  $p_{30} = 0.033$ ). As shown in Fig. 2, the road segment  
 215 is affected by three avalanche paths, four torrent catchments and one rockfall area. All three snow avalanches can  
 216 either develop as powder snow avalanches or as dense flow avalanches, depending on the meteorological and/or  
 217 snowpack conditions. Due to the catchment characteristics of the torrents two different indicator processes were  
 218 assigned for assessing the hazard effect, depending on the two occurrence intervals. Therefore, the occurrence  
 219 interval served as a proxy for the process type. For the frequently occurring events ( $p = 0.1$ ) flash floods with  
 220 sediment transport and for the medium scale recurrence intervals ( $p = 0.033$ ) debris flow processes were assumed.  
 221 The four torrent catchments have steep alluvial fans on the valley basin. The road segment is located at the base of  
 222 these fans or the road is slightly notched in the torrential cone and passes the channels either with bridges or with  
 223 culverts. The rockfall area is situated in the west district of the road segment (Fig. 2). Approximately two third of the  
 224 study area is affected from rock fall processes either as single blocks or by multiple blocks.



## 225 3.2 Standard guideline for risk assessment

226 The method to calculate road risk for our case study followed the deterministic standard framework of the ASTRA  
227 (2012) guideline for operational road risk assessment. The identification of elements at risk regarding their quantity,  
228 characteristics and value as well as their temporal and spatial variability was assessed through an exposure analysis.  
229 The assessment of the vulnerability of objects and the lethality of persons was carried out by a consequence analysis  
230 to characterize the extent of potential losses. The finally resulting collective risk  $R_C$  (Eqn. 2) as a sum of all hazard  
231 types over all object classes and scenarios – under the assumption that the occurrence of the individual hazards are  
232 independent from each other – was expressed in monetary terms per year as a prognostic value.  $R_C$  is therefore  
233 defined as the expected annual damage caused by certain hazards and is frequently used as a risk indicator (Merz et  
234 al., 2009; Špačková et al., 2014). Hence,  $R_C$  was calculated based on Eqn. (1) by summing up the partial risk over all  
235 scenarios  $j$  and objects  $i$  (Bründl et al., 2009, Bründl, 2009, ASTRA, 2012, Bründl et al., 2015):

$$236 \quad R_C = \sum_{j=1}^n R_{C,j} \quad (2)$$

237 Where  $R_{C,j}$  = the total collective risk of scenario  $j$  and objects  $i$ ,  $R_{C,j} = \sum_{i=1}^n r_{i,j}$ .

238 According to the ASTRA (2012) guideline, the collective risk  $R_C$  is divided into three main risk groups, (1) risk for  
239 persons  $R_P$ , (2) property or asset risk  $R_A$ , and (3) risk of non-operational availability or disposability  $R_D$ .

### 240 3.2.1 Risk for persons $R_P$

241 The risk characterization for persons in terms of the direct impact of a natural hazard on cars was distinguished in a  
242 standard situation for flowing traffic and a situation during a traffic jam, which was seen as specific situation leading  
243 to a significant increase of potentially endangered persons. Additionally, another specific case was also included  
244 representing the rear-end collision either on stagnant cars or on the process depositions on the road in case of the  
245 standard situation. The probability for a rear-end collision depends on the characteristics of the road and is  
246 influenced by a factor of e.g. the visual range, the winding and steepness of the road, the velocity, and traffic density  
247 (ASTRA, 2012). Furthermore, an additional specific scenario was explicitly considered in the case of the road  
248 closure of the main transit route (A10 Tauern motorway) due to the resulting temporal peak of the mean daily traffic.  
249 The statistical mean daily traffic (MDT) was used as mean quantity of persons  $N_p$  travelling along the road  
250 (Table A7).

251 In order to compute  $R_P$ , the expected annual losses of a person  $i$  traveling along the road segment under a defined  
252 hazard scenario  $j$  was calculated as a combination of the specific damage potential or potential damage extent of a  
253 person  $i$  and the damage probability of the exposure situation  $k$  for persons using the road under investigation. The  
254 potential losses for persons were monetized by the cost for a statistical human life as published by the Austrian  
255 Federal Ministry of Transportation, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT, 2014). Thus, road risk for persons was  
256 calculated with three road-specific exposure situations  $k$  (Bründl et al., 2009):

- 257 1. Direct impact of the hazard event – standard situation (Eqn. 1A; Table A1)
- 258 2. Direct impact of the hazard event – specific situation due to traffic jam (Eqn. 2A; Table A2)
- 259 3. Indirect effect – Rear-end collision (Eqn. 3A; Table A3)

260 The risk variables to assess  $R_P$  are stated in Table A6 for the exposure situations and in Table A7 in the Appendix.



261 **3.2.2 Property risk  $R_A$**

262 The property risk due to the direct impacts of the hazard process on physical assets of the road infrastructure was  
263 calculated for each object  $i$  and scenario  $j$  using Eqn. (4A) with Table A4 under consideration of risk variables in  
264 Table A8. The damage probability was assumed to be equal to the frequency of the scenario  $j$ .

265 With respect to the potential direct tangible losses within the study area, the physical assets including e.g. the road  
266 decking of the street segment, culverts and bridges were expressed by the building costs of the assets calculated from  
267 a reference price per unit (Table A8). The physical assets of affected cars were not addressed as this damage type is  
268 not included in the standard guideline due to the assumption of an obligatory insurance coverage. The monetized  
269 costs refer to replacement costs and reconstruction costs, respectively, instead of depreciated values, which is  
270 strongly recommended in risk analysis by Merz et al. (2010) due to the fact that replacement cost systematically  
271 overestimates the damage. Since there is a limitation of reliable or even available data on replacement costs, the  
272 usage of reconstruction costs is a pragmatic procedure to calculate damage.

273 **3.2.3 Risk due to non-operational availability  $R_D$**

274 The risk due to non-operational availability can be generally separated into economic losses due to (1) road closure  
275 after a hazard event or (2) as a result of precautionary measures for road blockage. The former addresses the  
276 mandatory reconditioning of the road and interruption time is depending on the severity of the damage. For our case  
277 study, only the precautionary non-operational availability was calculated with Eqn. (5A), Table A5 and variables in  
278 Table A9 because the village of Obertauern can be accessed from both directions of the mountain passroad.  
279 Therefore, a general accessibility of the village was supposed because it was assumed that events only lead to a road  
280 closure on one site of the pass. Potential costs resulting from time delays for necessary detours or e.g. from an  
281 increase of environmental or other stresses were neglected. The maximum intensity of the process served as a proxy  
282 for the duration of the road closure.

283 The direct intangible costs for non-operational availability of the road were approximated from statistical data  
284 accounting for the business interruption and the loss of profits of the tourism sector in the village of Obertauern due  
285 to road closure (see Table A9). The village of Obertauern is a major regional tourism hot spot and therefore the  
286 predominant income revenues are based on tourism, thus other business divisions have been neglected. Regarding  
287 the precautionary expected losses only snow avalanches were included, due to the obligatory legal implementation of  
288 a monitoring of a regional avalanche commission. Thus, a reliable procedure for a road closure could be assumed.

289 **3.3 Risk computation**

290 For purpose of computing road risk, the risk Equations 1A to 5A from the standard guideline (ASTRA, 2012), stated  
291 in the Appendix in conjunction with Tables A1 to A5, were used without further modification both for the  
292 deterministic and for the probabilistic calculation. Hence, the probabilistic setup is based on the same equations as  
293 the standard approach, but the variables were addressed with probability distributions instead of single values. In a  
294 first step, the deterministic result was computed as a base value for comparison with the results (probability density  
295 functions PDFs) of the two diverging probabilistic setups. In a second step, a probabilistic model was integrated into  
296 the same calculation setup to consider the band width of the risk-contributing variables. Using this probabilistic



297 model, the individual risk variables were addressed with two separate probability distributions. The flow chart in  
298 Fig. 1 illustrates the risk assessment method and distinguishes between the deterministic and the probabilistic risk  
299 model. The diagram exemplarily demonstrates the calculation steps for both model setups. Whereas only the single  
300 value of the input data was processed within the standard (deterministic) setup, the probabilistic risk model utilized  
301 the bandwidth of each variable denoted in Tables A6 to A9 in the Appendix. These values were either defined from  
302 statistical data, expert judgement or from existing literature. The range represents the expected potential scatter of the  
303 variables including a minimum (lower bound  $l$ ), an expected or most likely value ( $m$ ) and a maximum value (upper  
304 bound  $u$ ). The deterministic setup was calculated with the expected value, which corresponds in most cases to the  
305 recommended input value of the guideline.

### 306 3.3.1 Probabilistic framework

307 Within the probabilistic risk modelling setup, the contributing variables for computing the prognostic annual loss  
308 were calculated in a stochastic way using their potential range. The probabilistic risk calculation was conducted with  
309 the software package RIAAT – Risk Administration and Analysis Tool (RiskConsult, 2016). The probabilistic setup  
310 comprised two different and independent calculation runs each with two different distribution functions to  
311 characterize the uncertainty of the input variables. Hence, each variable was modelled using either (1) a triangular or  
312 three-point distribution (TPD) or (2) a beta-PERT distribution (BPD) within the probabilistic model, which generated  
313 two independent probabilistic setups and results. The discrete risk calculation with two different approaches of  
314 probability distributions facilitated a comparison of the applicability and the sensitivity of the simple distribution  
315 functions on the results. The expected annual monetary losses induced by the three hazard types were aggregated and  
316 further compacted to the probability density function (PDF) of the total risk caused by multi-hazard impact. Finally,  
317 the two different PDFs from the stochastic risk assessment were compared with the result from the deterministic  
318 method to show the potential dynamics in the results.

#### 319 1. Triangular distribution (TPD)

320 The triangular distribution derives its statistical properties from the geometry: it is defined by three parameters  $l$  for  
321 lower bound,  $m$  for most likely value (the mode) and  $u$  for upper bound. Whereas lower and upper bounds define  
322 on both edges the limited bandwidth, the most likely value indicates that values in the middle are more probable  
323 than the boundary values, and also allows for the representation of skewness. The TPD is a popular distribution in  
324 the risk analysis field (Cottin and Döhler, 2013) for example to reproduce expert estimates. Especially if little or no  
325 information about the actual distribution of the parameter or only an estimate of the additional variables to fit the  
326 theoretical distribution is feasible, a best possible approximation can be achieved using the TPD. If there is no  
327 representative empirical data available as a basis for risk prediction, complex analytical (theoretical) distributions,  
328 which are harder to model and communicate, may not represent the reality better than a simple triangular  
329 distribution (Sander, 2012).

#### 330 2. Beta-PERT distribution (BPD)

331 The beta-PERT distribution (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) is a simplification of the Beta  
332 distribution with the advantage of an easier modelling and application (Sander, 2012). It requires the same three



333 parameters as a triangular distribution:  $l$  for lower bound,  $m$  for most likely value (mode) and  $u$  for upper bound. In  
334 contrast to the two parametric normal distribution  $N(\mu, \sigma)$  –  $\mu$  for average and  $\sigma$  for standard deviation – the beta-  
335 PERT distribution is limited on the edges and it allows for modelling asymmetric situations. In reality, risk  
336 parameters commonly have a natural boundary. Therefore, estimating min/max values instead of standard deviation  
337 is more realistic or feasible as there is in most cases no data available to express the mean variation. Moreover,  
338 BPD allows for smoother shapes, making it suitable to model a distribution that is actually an aggregation of  
339 several other distributions.


340 For a given number of risks, each with a probability of occurrence and an individual probability distribution, the  
341 potential number of combinations (scenarios) escalates nonlinear. Especially if dependencies or correlations between  
342 different risks are included and/or numerous partial risks are aggregated to an overall risk the application of  
343 analytical methods have computational restrictions. Stochastic simulations are better suited to work on such complex  
344 models (Tecklenburg, 2003). Therefore, the aggregation of the distributions were calculated by means of Latin  
345 Hypercube sampling (LHS) which is a comparable stochastic simulation technique to Monte-Carlo simulation  
346 (MCS) with the advantage of a faster data processing, a better fitting on the theoretical input distribution and a more  
347 efficiently calculation as fewer iterations are needed to get equally good results (Sander, 2012). LHS consistently  
348 produces values for the distribution's statistics that are nearer to the theoretical values of the input distribution than  
349 MCS. These advantages are possible because the real random numbers used to select samples for the MCS tend to  
350 have local clusters, which are only averaged out for a very large number of draws. Addressing this issue using LHS  
351 can immediately improve the quality of the result by splitting the probability distribution into  $n$  intervals of equal  
352 probability, where  $n$  is the number of iterations that are to be performed on the model. In the present study, 1,000,000  
353 iterations were performed for every single simulation to get consistent results.

#### 354 4. Results and discussion

355 In Table 3 the results for each risk group ( $R_P$ ,  $R_A$ ,  $R_D$ ) as well as for the total multi-hazard risk  $R_C$  calculated with the  
356 standard deterministic risk approach are shown and compared to those obtained by the two probabilistic setups using  
357 two different probability distributions (TPD and BPD). The results associated with the two distribution functions are  
358 displayed as median value of the PDF to show their deviation to the outcome of the standard approach. Based on our  
359 case study, the road risk over all hazards types and scenarios (multi-hazard risk) with the deterministic approach  
360 results in 76.0 k€/y. The results with the probabilistic approach referring to the median of the PDFs amounts to a  
361 monetary risk of 105.6 k€/y (TPD) and 90.9 k€/y (BPD), respectively. Compared to the standard approach the  
362 median of the PDFs equals an increase of 38 % (BPD) and 19 % (TPD), depending on the choice of probability  
363 distribution to model the uncertainties of the input variables. Focusing on the 95% percentile (P95) of the results –  
364 non-exceedance probability of 95%, shown in Fig. 3 – an increase of 79 % (TPD) and 46 % (BPD) to the  
365 deterministic result can be observed. Fig. 3 illustrates, based on the Lorenz curves for the two distributions (TPD and  
366 BPD), the scale of deviation of the total multi-hazard risk  $R_C$  within the probabilistic risk modelling and compared to  
367 the standard outcome. The graphs show the potential uncertainties of the risk computation, which can be covered by  
368 a suitable choice of a Value at Risk (VaR) level. For example, with a benchmark of the 95 % quantile (P95), 95 % of  
369 the potential uncertainties within the risk calculation can be covered by using a probabilistic risk assessment



370 approach. However, a suitable VaR level is depended on the general safety requirement of the system as well as on  
 371 the degree of uncertainty of the input variables.



372  
 373 **Figure 3.** Lorenz curves for (A) triangular distribution and (B) beta-PERT distribution showing the scale of  
 374 deviation of the total multi-hazard risk  $R_C$  within the probabilistic risk modelling and compared to the deterministic  
 375 result in k€/y.

376 Geological hazards (rockfall) contribute with a fraction of 7.8 % to the total risk (or, in absolute numbers, 5.9 k€, see  
 377 Table 3) based on the deterministic model, which can be attributed to the relatively small importance in comparison  
 378 to the other hazard types in the study area. Hydrological hazards pose the highest risk (50.5 %, or, in absolute  
 379 numbers, 38.4 k€/y) previous to avalanche hazards (41.7 %, or, in absolute numbers, 31.7 k€/y). Overall,  $R_P$  (44.9 %;  
 380 34.1 k€/y) has the highest share on the total multi-hazard risk narrowly followed by  $R_A$  (38.9 %; 29.6 k€/y), both  
 381 associated to direct damage. The hydrological hazards (predominantly debris flow processes) with a portion of  
 382 76.5 % or 26.1 k€/y have a disproportionate high share on  $R_P$  due to the high-intensity hazard impact. Similarly, the  
 383 semi-empirical lethality factors shown in Table A7 have high values ( $\lambda_D = 0.8$ ) just like the impact of rock fall on  
 384 cars with a probability of death of  $\lambda_R = 1.0$ . Thus, these event types yield in high monetary losses in contrast to snow  
 385 avalanches with a lethality factor for high intensity of  $\lambda_A = 0.2$ . By modelling the hazard-specific lethality with  
 386 probability functions a wider scatter can be achieved but the effect still remains due to the heavy weight around the



387 most likely value  $m$ . The indirect losses related to  $R_D$  with a fraction of 16.3 %, or, in absolute numbers 12.4 k€/y has  
 388 a minor portion because this risk group is only relevant for snow avalanches.


389 **Table 3.** Comparison of the deterministic versus probabilistic results for the three risk categories depending on the  
 390 three hazard types and the total collective risk with  $R_P$  = risk for persons,  $R_A$  asset risk,  $R_D$  = disposability risk and  $R_C$   
 391 = total collective risk with absolute values in k€/y in the first row and as percentage in the second row. For the  
 392 probabilistic data the median value of the triangular  $\Delta$  and the beta-PERT  $\wedge$  distribution functions are displayed.  
 393 Note that, risk-based aggregated losses do not equal the sum of the sub-components because probabilistic metrics  
 394 such as P50 are not additive.

| Risk category        |      | $R_P$       |             |             | $R_A$       |             |             | $R_D$       |             |             | $R_C$       |              |             |
|----------------------|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| Hazard type          | Unit | Det.        | $\Delta$    | $\wedge$    | Det.        | $\Delta$    | $\wedge$    | Det.        | $\Delta$    | $\wedge$    | Det.        | $\Delta$     | $\wedge$    |
| Geological hazards   | k€/y | 5.4         | 10.5        | 7.8         | 0.47        | 0.43        | 0.44        | 0           | 0           | 0           | 5.9         | 10.9         | 8.3         |
|                      | %    | 15.8        | 17.0        | 16.3        | 1.6         | 1.4         | 1.5         | 0           | 0           | 0           | 7.8         | 10.3         | 9.1         |
| Hydrological hazards | k€/y | 26.1        | 42.3        | 34.5        | 12.3        | 13.9        | 13.1        | 0           | 0           | 0           | 38.4        | 56.2         | 47.6        |
|                      | %    | 76.5        | 68.3        | 71.9        | 41.6        | 45.6        | 43.5        | 0           | 0           | 0           | 50.5        | 53.2         | 52.4        |
| Avalanche hazards    | k€/y | 2.6         | 8.4         | 5.3         | 16.8        | 16.2        | 16.6        | 12.4        | 13.1        | 12.7        | 31.7        | 37.9         | 34.7        |
|                      | %    | 7.6         | 13.6        | 11.0        | 56.8        | 53.1        | 55.1        | 100         | 100         | 100         | 41.7        | 35.9         | 38.2        |
| <b>Total</b>         | k€/y | <b>34.1</b> | <b>61.9</b> | <b>48.0</b> | <b>29.6</b> | <b>30.5</b> | <b>30.1</b> | <b>12.4</b> | <b>13.1</b> | <b>12.7</b> | <b>76.0</b> | <b>105.6</b> | <b>90.9</b> |
|                      | %    | <b>44.9</b> | <b>58.6</b> | <b>52.8</b> | <b>38.9</b> | <b>28.9</b> | <b>33.1</b> | <b>16.3</b> | <b>12.4</b> | <b>14.0</b> | <b>100</b>  | <b>100</b>   | <b>100</b>  |

395 The results related to our case study (Table 3 and Fig. 4) show that due to the shape and the mathematical definition  
 396 of the distribution the TPD leads to the highest variation in the monetary losses. The boxplots in Fig. 4 display the  
 397 results from the probabilistic simulation for the three risk categories ( $R_P$ ,  $R_A$ ,  $R_D$ ) and for the total hazard-specific risk  
 398 ( $R_C$ ) relating to the three hazard types (Figs. 3 A – C) and for the total multi-hazard collective risk (Fig. 4 D) in  
 399 respect of the measures of the central tendency of the PDF. The boxplot diagrams are thereby plotted against the  
 400 deterministic value to show its position. The wide range of the distribution in  $R_C$  is markedly caused by  $R_P$ , which  
 401 exhibits a broad bandwidth and a right-skewed distribution. Hence, unlike to  $R_A$  and  $R_D$ , the physical injuries  
 402 expressed as the economic losses of persons ( $R_P$ ) are responsible for the highest divergence to the standard approach  
 403 and show a considerable scatter. The main causes for the striking deviations can be associated to the relatively high  
 404 monetary value of persons which was modeled as discrete point value in combination with the fluctuations of the  
 405 MDT and the variations of the hazard specific lethality. The monetized costs for a statistical human life equal 3 M€  
 406 (Table A7) and is based on a statistical survey of the economic expenses for a road accident in Austria (BMVIT,  
 407 2014). Although we ascribe this value to a high degree of uncertainty the valuation of the expenses for a statistical  
 408 human life was not attributed to a probability distribution due to the case study-specific fixed governmental  
 409 requirements in Austria. The discussion of a monetarily evaluation of a human life is still ongoing across scientific  
 410 disciplines using different economic approaches (e.g. Hood, 2017). Furthermore, the lethality factors also correspond  
 411 to the high variation of  $R_P$  which are seen as very sensitive parameters. Therefore, we encourage further research on  
 412 hazard-specific lethality functions for road risk management either based on comprehensive empirical datasets or on




413 representative hazard impact modelling. Due to the strong effect of  $R_P$  on  $R_C$  the results have to be carefully  
414 interpreted as they are sensitive to the input variables. Therefore, the values on our case study especially the cost for  
415 human life cannot be directly transferred to other application without a detailed validation and verification of  
416 national regulations.



417

418 **Figure 4.** Probabilistic results for the three risk categories per hazard type (A = torrent processes, B = snow  
419 avalanches, C = rockfall) and for the total collective risk (D) based on the distribution functions triangular or  
420 three-point distribution (TPD) and the beta-PERT distribution (BPD) with  $R_P$  = risk for persons,  $R_A$  asset risk,  $R_D$  =  
421 disposability risk and  $R_C$  = total collective risk in k€/year.

422 Apart from  $R_P$  where the deterministic result is located below or near the 5 % percentile of both PDFs,  $R_A$  and  $R_D$  are  
423 mostly within the interquartile range between the 25 % quartile and the median compared to the standard approach  
424 (Fig. 4). In this context,  $R_A$  for snow avalanche exceeds the median and is situated between the median and the 75 %  
425 quartile. The effect can be traced back to the left-skewed distribution of the vulnerability factor  $v_{B,A}$  for medium  
426 avalanche hazard intensities regarding the object class structures (bridges and culverts) in Table A8. In general, due  
427 to the shape and the mathematical characteristics of the distribution, the BPD leads to a stronger compaction around  
428 the median than the TPD which can be well explained by the properties of the BPD which has, in comparison to the  
429 TPD, a larger weight around the most likely value  $m$ .



430

431 **Figure 5.** Probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) for (A) triangular  
432 distribution, (B) beta-PERT distribution in k€/y.

433 In Fig. 5, the PDF and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) are shown for  $R_C$  with the two probabilistic model  
434 results and the deterministic result. In both cases (TPD and BPD), the deterministic result is situated at the lower  
435 edge of the PDF near or under the 5 % percentile. Thus, the deterministic result of our case study covers  
436 approximately less than 5 % of the potential band-width of the probability distribution. The TPD has a wide range,  
437 whereas the BPD is considerably flattened on the boundary of the amplitude. The results of the two distributions  
438 have in common that they are allocated right-skewed. In contrast to the location of the median, the deterministic  
439 result is on the far-left side of both distribution and is exceeded of more than 95 % of the potential outcome.

#### 440 **5 Conclusion**

441 The results based on our case study provide evidence that the monetary risk calculated with a standard deterministic  
442 method following the conventional guidelines is lower than applying a probabilistic approach. Thus, without  
443 consideration of uncertainty of the input variables risk might be underestimated using the operational standard risk  
444 assessment approach for road infrastructure. The mathematical product of the frequency of occurrence and the  
445 potential consequences and, in a narrower sense, the multiplication of the partial risk factors in the second part of the



446 risk equation may lead to a bias in the risk magnitude because the multiplication of the ancillary calculations  
447 generates a theoretical value ignoring the full scope of the total risk. The deterministic risk value is expressed as a  
448 theoretical mean value neglecting the potential distribution functions of the input data. Thus, the compression of the  
449 input values to a single deterministic risk value with total determination prevents an actual prognosis of reliability  
450 that would have been achieved by specifying bandwidths (Sander, 2012). Furthermore, the simple summation of the  
451 scenario related and the object-based risk to receive the cumulative risk level instead of using probabilistic risk  
452 aggregation leads to an underestimation of the final risk. Hence, the full spectrum of risk cannot be represented with  
453 deterministic risk assessment, which may further lead to biased decisions on risk mitigation. The Value at Risk  
454 (VaR) approach by considering a reliable percentile of the non-exceedance probability e.g. P95 as shown in Fig. 3 –  
455 depending on the desired covering of the risk potential form society, authorities or organizations – might be an  
456 appropriate concept to tackle this challenge. However, within a probabilistic approach the scale of deviation is  
457 dependent on the choice of distribution for modelling the bandwidth of the variables and the results are sensitive to  
458 the defined spectrum of input information stated in Tables A6 - A9. These variables are case study specific and  
459 cannot be directly transferred to other road risk assessments without careful validation. However, probabilistic risk  
460 assessment (PRA) enables a transparent representation of potential losses due to the explicit consideration of the  
461 entire potential bandwidth of the variables contributing to risk. Since comparable results can be achieved based on  
462 predefined values (Bründl et al., 2009), we still recommend the consideration of the deterministic value as a  
463 comparative value to the probabilistic method.

464 Road risk assessment is usually afflicted to data scarcity; thus, risk operators and practitioners are often dependent on  
465 expert appraisals, which are subject to uncertainties. In order to improve data quality, upper and lower values and the  
466 expected value can be easily estimated for fitting a simple distribution of the input variables. Even though empirical  
467 values such as statistical data are available, a certain degree of uncertainty remains. Therefore, simple distribution  
468 functions such as TPD or BPD can adjust the shape of the distribution more conveniently than complex probability  
469 distributions, since the required additional parameters to adjust a complex distribution are simple not available.  
470 Hence, for a prognostic prediction, risk modelling with complex distributions in contrast to simple techniques cannot  
471 be justified if there is a lack of empirical data.

472 A limitation of our study is that the performance of the probabilistic approach cannot be verified and validated with  
473 empirical data, but the results show that the explicit inclusion of epistemic uncertainty leads to a bias in risk  
474 magnitude. The probabilistic approach allows quantification of uncertainty, and thus enables decision makers to  
475 better assess the quality and validity of the results from road risk assessments. This can facilitate the improvement of  
476 road-safety guidelines, and thus is of particular importance for authorities responsible for operational road-safety, for  
477 design engineers and for policy makers due to a general increase of information for optimal decision-making under  
478 budget constraints. Furthermore, the paper addresses the second part of the risk concept in terms of the consequence  
479 analysis. The results of the hazard analysis serve thereby as a constant input using the physical modelling of the  
480 hazard processes without the consideration of probabilistic methods. Therefore, we expect a considerable source of  
481 epistemic uncertainty within the hazard analysis which emphasises the necessity for an additional inclusion of  
482 probabilistic based hazard analyses in a holistic multi-hazard risk environment.



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486 provided the hazard data for the risk analysis.

487 *Competing interests:* Sven Fuchs is member of the Editorial Board of Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences.

488 *Author contribution:* SO initiated the research, was responsible for data collection, literature research, preparation of  
489 the manuscript, visualization of the results and performed the risk simulations with additional contribution by PS. PS  
490 contributed to additional information on probabilistic risk calculation. SF compiled the background on risk  
491 assessment and helped to shape the research, analysis and the manuscript. All authors discussed the results and  
492 contributed to the final manuscript.

493 *Data availability:* All risk related data are publicly available (see references throughout the paper as well as in the  
494 Appendix).

495



496 **Appendix**

497 **Risk equations according to ASTRA (2012) guideline:**

498 A. Risk for persons  $R_P$

499 1. Direct impact of the hazard event – standard situation

500 
$$r_{(DI)NS,j} = p_j \times (1 - p_{Rb}) \times (1 - p_{RbE}) \times p_N \times N_P \times \lambda \times p_{So,j} \times f_L \quad (1A)$$

501 **Table A1.** Risk variables and their derivation for the calculation of  $R_P$  – direct impact standard situation.

| Variable       | Description  | Derivation  |
|----------------|--|---|
| $r_{(DI)NS,j}$ | risk of a person $i$ in scenario $j$ (normal situation)  |   |
| $p_j$          | probability of occurrence of an event (frequency of a scenario $j$ )   | $p_j = f_j - f_{j+1}; f_j = \frac{1}{T_j}$<br>$p_j$ = probability of occurrence of scenario $j$<br>$f_j$ = frequency of occurrence<br>$T_j$ = return period of scenario $j$   |
| $p_{Rb}$       | probability of precautionary road blockage   |   |
| $p_{RbE}$      | probability of a road blockage due to an event (road closure due to a previous event of the same hazard type along the road) | $p_{RbE} = \alpha \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{n_H}\right)$<br>$\alpha$ = reduction factor <sup>1</sup><br>$n_H$ = number of hazard areas with the same <sup>2</sup> hazard process and triggering mechanism   |
| $p_N$          | probability of the standard (normal) situation   | $p_N = 1 - p_C$   |
| $p_C$          | probability of a traffic jam (congestion)  | $p_C = \left(\frac{n}{365}\right) \times \left(\frac{D}{24}\right)$<br>$n$ = number of traffic jams per year<br>$D$ = average duration of a traffic jam [ $h$ ]   |
| $N_P$          | number of affected persons   | $N_P = N_V \times \beta$<br>$N_{VN} = \frac{MDT}{v \times 24000} \times l$ = number of vehicles in the standard situation<br>$N_{VS} = \frac{(\rho_{max} \times l)}{1000}$ = number of vehicles in case of a traffic jam<br>$MDT$ = mean daily traffic<br>$v$ = signalized velocity for cars [km/h]<br>$l$ = length of the street segment [m] <sup>3</sup><br>$\rho_{max}$ = maximum traffic density per lane and kilometer in case of a traffic jam<br>$\beta$ = mean degree of passengers |
| $\lambda$      | lethality factor   | Hazard-process and intensity related variable ( $\lambda_D, \lambda_F, \lambda_R, \lambda_A$ in table A6)   |

<sup>1</sup> The reduction factor considers that not all hazard areas get simultaneously released by the same triggering event.

<sup>2</sup> The number of hazard areas for the three hazard types was calculated as discrete values based on field surveys according to the release probability as a function of the event frequency (avalanches  $n_{A10} = 6, n_{A30} = 7$ ; torrent processes  $n_{T10} = 7, n_{T30} = 8$ ; rockfall  $p_{RbE} = 0$  not relevant).

<sup>3</sup> The length of the affected street segment is a discrete (single) value according to the results of the hazard analyses.



|            |   |   |
|------------|---|---|
| $p_{So,j}$ | spatial occurrence probability of the process in the scenario $j$ as proportion of the mean width or area of the process domain in scenario $j$ to the maximum width or area of the potential hazard domain | for rockfall processes $p_{So,j} = ET \times \frac{d}{w_{HD}}$<br>$ET$ = event type<br>$d$ = mean diameter of the block [m]<br>$w_{HD}$ = width or amplitude of the hazard domain in scenario $j$ |
| $f_L$      | factor to differentiate the affected lane   | 0,5 = one lane affected<br>1 = whole road (both lanes) affected   |

502 2. Direct impact of the hazard event – special situation due to traffic jam

503 
$$r_{(DI)SS,j} = p_j \times (1 - p_{Rb}) \times (1 - p_{RbE}) \times p_C \times N_P \times \lambda \times p_{So,j} \times f_L \quad (2A)$$

504 **Table A2.** Risk of a person  $i$  in scenario  $j$  for the calculation of  $R_P$ – direct impact traffic jam. The calculation of the  
 505 variables is according to Table A1.

| Variable       | Description   |
|----------------|---|
| $r_{(DI)SS,j}$ | risk of a person $i$ in scenario $j$ in case of a traffic jam (special situation) |

506 3. Indirect effect – Rear-end collision

507 
$$r_{(RC)NS,j} = p_j \times (1 - p_{Rb}) \times (1 - p_{RbE}) \times p_{Rc} \times f_L \times (1 - p_C) \times N_P \times \lambda_{RC} \quad (3A)$$

508 **Table A3.** Risk variables and their description for the calculation of  $R_P$  – rear-end collision. The calculation of the  
 509 residual variables is according to Table A1.

| Variable       | Description  |
|----------------|--|
| $r_{(RC)NS,j}$ | risk of a person $i$ in scenario $j$ for a rear-end collision in the normal situation <sup>4</sup> |
| $p_{Rc}$       | probability of rear-end collision  |
| $\lambda_{RC}$ | probability of fatality in the case of a rear-end collision  |

510 B. Property risk  $R_A$

511 
$$r_{(DI)i,j} = p_j \times l \times A_i \times v_{i,j} \times p_{So,j} \times f_L \quad (4A)$$

512 **Table A4.** Risk variables and their description for the calculation of  $R_A$  – direct impact. The calculation of the  
 513 residual variables is according to Table A1.

| Variable      | Description  |
|---------------|--|
| $r_{(DI)i,j}$ | risk of object $i$ in scenario $j$ in terms of a direct impact of the hazard |
| $A_i$         | asset value  |
| $v_{i,j}$     | hazard-specific vulnerability of object $i$ in scenario $j$ (in table A7)    |

514

<sup>4</sup> A rear-end collision is only valid in case of a standard situation (no traffic jam). The scenario is not relevant for low intensity hazard events with deposition heights < 0,15 m.



515 C. Risk due to non-operational availability  $R_D$

$$516 \quad r_{Rb,j} = \left( p_i \times f_{Rb} \times \frac{1}{n_H} \right) \times D_{Rb} \times C_{Rb} \quad (5A)$$

517 **Table A5.** Risk variables and their description for the calculation of  $R_D$ . The calculation of the residual variables is  
 518 according to Table A1.

| Variable   | Description   |
|------------|---|
| $r_{Rb,j}$ | risk of a roadblock in scenario $j$                           |
| $f_{Rb}$   | frequency of road blockage                                    |
| $D_{Rb}$   | duration of road blockage depended on the hazard type         |
| $C_{Rb}$   | costs of a road blockage                                      |
| $n_H$      | number of hazard areas which are responsible for road closure |

519 **Risk variables:**

520 A. Probability of loss – exposure

521 **Table A6.** Band width (credible intervals with  $l$  - lower bound,  $m$  – most likely value and  $u$  – upper bound) of the  
 522 variables within the probabilistic risk analysis for calculating exposure situations.

| Variable  | Description                           | Specific-<br>ation | Unit | $l$ lower<br>bound | $m$ – most<br>likely value | $u$ –<br>upper<br>bound | Source  |
|-----------|---------------------------------------|--------------------|------|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| $p_{Rb}$  | probability of<br>a roadblock         | not probable       | -    | 0                  |                            |                         | ASTRA (2012)  |
|           |                                       | sparse<br>probable |      | 0.05               | 0.1                        | 0.5                     |   |
|           |                                       | probable           |      | 0.1                | 0.5                        | 0.9                     |   |
|           |                                       | most likely        |      | 0.5                | 0.9                        | 0.95                    |   |
| $\alpha$  | reduction<br>factor for<br>$p_{RbE}$  | --                 | -    | 0.5                | 0.75                       | 1                       | ASTRA (2012)  |
| $n_{B99}$ | number of<br>traffic jams<br>per year | --                 | n/y  | 0                  | 1                          | 2                       | Expert judgement<br>icw. surveyor of<br>highways (Federal<br>State of Salzburg) |
| D         | duration of a<br>traffic jam          | --                 | h    | 0.083              | 0.5                        | 2.0                     | Expert judgement<br>icw. surveyor of<br>highways (Federal<br>State of Salzburg) |



|           |   |                 |     |       |      |                  |  |
|-----------|---|-----------------|-----|-------|------|------------------|--|
| $f_{A10}$ | frequency of occurrence special situation A10             | --              | n/y | 5     | 22   | 30               | Statistical evaluation traffic jam database ASFINAG for the year 2015          |
| $D_{A10}$ | duration of special situation A10                         | --              | h   | 0.5   | 2.65 | 5.0 <sup>5</sup> | Statistical evaluation traffic jam database ASFINAG for the year 2015          |
| $n_{SS}$  | number of traffic jams in case of a special situation A10 | --              | n   | 0     | 4    | 11 <sup>6</sup>  | Statistical evaluation traffic jam database ASFINAG for the year 2015 n > 0.5h |
| $D_{A10}$ | duration of traffic jam special situation A10             | --              | h   | 0.083 | 1    | 2                | Statistical evaluation traffic jam database ASFINAG for the year 2015          |
| $p_{RC}$  | Probability of a rear-end collision                       | improbable      | -   | 0     | 0.05 | 0.15             | ASTRA (2012)   |
|           |   | medium probable |     | 0.05  | 0.15 | 0.25             |  |
|           |   | frequent        |     | 0.15  | 0.25 | 0.35             |  |
| ET        | event type of rock fall <sup>7</sup>                      | --              | -   | 1     | 5    | 5                | ASTRA (2012)   |

523 D. Degree of damage – Risk for persons  $R_p$

524 **Table A7.** Band width (credible intervals  $l$  - lower bound,  $m$  – most likely value and  $u$  – upper bound) of the  
 525 variables within the probabilistic risk analysis for calculating  $R_p$ .

| Variable       | Description   | Specific-<br>ation | Unit | $l$ lower<br>bound | $m$ – most<br>likely value | $u$ –<br>upper<br>bound | Source                         |
|----------------|---|--------------------|------|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| $\lambda_{RC}$ | probability of fatality in the case of a rear-end collision | --                 | -    | 0                  | 0.0066                     | 0.05                    | ASTRA (2012)                   |
| $\lambda_D$    | lethality for debris flow                                   | low intensity      | -    | 0                  |                            |                         | ASTRA (2012) and Bründl (2009) |
|                |   | medium intensity   |      | 0                  | 0.5005                     | 0.7995                  |                                |
|                |   | strong intensity   |      | 0.5005             | 0.7995                     | 1                       |                                |
| $\lambda_F$    | lethality for dynamic                                       | low intensity      | -    | 0                  |                            |                         | ASTRA (2012) and Bründl (2009) |

<sup>5</sup> Max. value according to traffic jam database from ASFINAG 2015

<sup>6</sup> Traffic jam database from ASFINAG 2015 - traffic jam events > 0.5 h

<sup>7</sup> Event type 1|5|10 equates to single stone| multiple stones | small scale rockslide



|              |   |                             |      |                        |         |        |   |
|--------------|---|-----------------------------|------|------------------------|---------|--------|---|
|              | flooding  | medium intensity            |      | 0                      | 0.0025  | 0.108  |   |
|              |   | strong intensity            |      | 0.025                  | 0.108   | 0.20   |   |
| $\lambda_R$  | lethality for rock fall   | low intensity               | -    | 0                      | 0.1     | 0.8    | ASTRA (2012) and Bründl (2009)  |
|              |   | medium intensity            |      | 0.1                    | 0.8     | 1      |   |
|              |   | strong intensity            |      | 0.8                    | 1       | 1      |   |
| $\lambda_A$  | lethality for avalanche   | low intensity               | -    | 0                      | 0.00025 | 0.1    | ASTRA (2012) and Bründl (2009)  |
|              |   | medium intensity            |      | 0.00025                | 0.1     | 0.2    |   |
|              |   | strong intensity            |      | 0.1                    | 0.2     | 1      |   |
| $MDT_{B99}$  | Average daily traffic B99   | --                          | n    | 3.000                  | 3.600   | 7.000  | Traffic counting for the year 2016 (Federal State of Salzburg)        |
| $MDT_{A10}$  | average daily traffic A10   | --                          | n    | 10.000                 | 19.638  | 62.000 | Permanent automatic traffic counting ASFINAG for the year 2016        |
| $v$          | signalized velocity for cars  | free land zone              | km/h | 80                     | 100     | 120    | Expert judgement iev. surveyor of highway (Federal State of Salzburg) |
|              |   | municipality zone           | km/h | 45                     | 50      | 60     |   |
|              |   | acceleration / deceleration | km/h | 70                     | 80      | 110    |   |
| $\rho_{max}$ | maximum traffic density per lane and kilometer in case of a traffic jam | --                          | n    | 120                    | 140     | 145    | ASTRA (2012)  |
| $\beta$      | mean degree of passengers   | --                          | n    | 1                      | 1.76    | 5      | ASTRA (2012)  |
| $C_p$        | value (cost) of a person  | --                          | €    | 3,016,194 <sup>8</sup> |         |        | BMVIT (2014) for the period 2014-2016                                 |

<sup>8</sup> The monetary value of person was used as single (point) value as this value is recommended from the Austrian government.



527 E. Extent of damage – Risk for material assets  $R_A$

528 **Table A8.** Band width (credible intervals  $l$  - lower bound,  $m$  – most likely value and  $u$  – upper bound) of the  
 529 variables within the probabilistic risk analysis for calculating  $R_A$ .

| Variable  | Description  | Specific-<br>ation  | Unit             | $l$ lower<br>bound | $m$ – most<br>likely value | $u$ –<br>upper<br>bound | Source  |
|-----------|--|---------------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| $A_R$     | asset value–<br>construction<br>costs road                             | --                  | €/m              | 800                | 850                        | 1,000                   | Statistical data<br>from Federal<br>State of Salzburg |
| $A_B$     | asset value–<br>construction<br>costs bridges<br>(span with 8-<br>10m) | --                  | €/m <sup>2</sup> | 1,350              | 2,200                      | 2,400                   | Statistical data<br>from Federal<br>State of Salzburg |
| $A_C$     | asset value–<br>construction<br>costs pipe<br>culverts DN<br>500-1200  | --                  | k€               | 52                 | 65                         | 71.5 <sup>9</sup>       | Statistical data<br>from Federal<br>State of Salzburg |
| $v_{R,F}$ | vulnerability<br>road dynamic<br>flooding                              | low<br>intensity    | -                | 0                  | 0.05                       | 0.1                     | ASTRA (2012)  |
|           |  | medium<br>intensity |                  | 0.05               | 0.1                        | 0.45                    |   |
|           |  | strong<br>intensity |                  | 0.1                | 0.45                       | 0.80                    |   |
| $v_{B,F}$ | vulnerability<br>structures<br>(bridges)<br>dynamic                    | low<br>intensity    | -                | 0                  | 0.025                      | 0.05                    | ASTRA (2012)<br>and Bründl (2009)                     |
|           |  | medium<br>intensity |                  | 0.025              | 0.05                       | 0.65                    |   |
|           |  | strong<br>intensity |                  | 0.05               | 0.65                       | 1                       |   |
| $v_{R,D}$ | vulnerability<br>road debris<br>flow                                   | low<br>intensity    | -                | 0                  | 0.05                       | 0.35                    | ASTRA (2012)<br>and Bründl (2009)                     |
|           |  | medium<br>intensity |                  | 0.05               | 0.35                       | 0.65                    |   |
|           |  | strong<br>intensity |                  | 0.35               | 0.65                       | 1                       |   |
| $v_{B,D}$ | vulnerability<br>structures<br>(bridges,<br>culvert) debris<br>flow    | low<br>intensity    | -                | 0                  | 0.025                      | 0.25                    | ASTRA (2012)<br>and Bründl (2009)                     |
|           |  | medium<br>intensity |                  | 0.025              | 0.25                       | 0.95                    |   |
|           |  | strong<br>intensity |                  | 0.25               | 0.95                       | 1                       |   |
| $v_{R,A}$ | vulnerability<br>road<br>avalanche                                     | low<br>intensity    | -                | 0                  | 0.005                      | 0.1                     | ASTRA (2012)<br>and Bründl (2009)                     |
|           |  | medium<br>intensity |                  | 0.005              | 0.1                        | 0.2                     |   |
|           |  | strong<br>intensity |                  | 0.1                | 0.2                        | 0.30                    |   |

<sup>9</sup> Base value according to the Federal State of Salzburg – min – -20% / max + 10% (right-skewed distribution)



|           |   |                  |   |       |       |     |                                |
|-----------|---|------------------|---|-------|-------|-----|--------------------------------|
| $v_{B,A}$ | vulnerability structures (bridges, culvert) avalanche | low intensity    | - | 0     | 0.005 | 0.7 | ASTRA (2012) and Bründl (2009) |
|           |   | medium intensity |   | 0.005 | 0.7   | 1   |                                |
|           |   | strong intensity |   | 0.7   | 1     | 1   |                                |
| $v_{R,R}$ | vulnerability road rock fall                          | low intensity    | - | 0     | 0.1   | 0.5 | ASTRA (2012) and Bründl (2009) |
|           |   | medium intensity |   | 0.1   | 0.5   | 1   |                                |
|           |   | strong intensity |   | 0.5   | 1     | 1   |                                |
| $v_{B,R}$ | vulnerability structures (bridges, culvert) rock fall | low intensity    | - | 0     | 0.1   | 0.5 | ASTRA (2012) and Bründl (2009) |
|           |   | medium intensity |   | 0.1   | 0.5   | 1   |                                |
|           |   | strong intensity |   | 0.5   | 1     | 1   |                                |

530 B. Degree of damage – Risk for operational availability  $R_D$

531 **Table A9.** Band width (credible intervals  $l$  - lower bound,  $m$  – most likely value and  $u$  – upper bound) of the  
 532 variables within the probabilistic risk analysis for calculating  $R_D$ .

| Variable     | Description  | Specific-<br>ation | Unit | $l$ lower<br>bound | $m$ – most<br>likely<br>value | $u$ –<br>upper<br>bound | Source                                   |
|--------------|--|--------------------|------|--------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| $f_{Rb}$     | frequency of road blockage   | --                 | n/y  | 1                  | 2                             | 4                       | ASTRA (2012)<br>icw. expert<br>judgement |
| $D_{Rb,A10}$ | duration of a precautionary roadblock for avalanche with return interval $T_{10}$  | --                 | d    | 0.33               | 1                             | 2                       | ASTRA (2012)<br>icw. expert<br>judgement |
| $D_{Rb,A30}$ | duration of a precautionary roadblock for avalanches with return interval $T_{30}$ | --                 | d    | 1                  | 2                             | 3                       | ASTRA (2012)<br>icw. expert<br>judgement |
| $C_{Rb,W}$   | expanses of a roadblock during winter season                                       | --                 | ME   | 1.245              | 1.557                         | 1.868 <sup>10</sup>     | BMNT (2015)                              |
| $C_{Rb,S}$   | expanses of a roadblock during summer season                                       | --                 | k€   | 200                | 343.4                         | 500                     | BMNT (2015)                              |

533

<sup>10</sup> Range of fluctuation +/- 20%



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