

1 **Review article: Brief history of volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area (Campania,**
2 **Southern Italy): A critical review**

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7
8 **Abstract**

9 The presence of three active volcanoes (Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei and Ischia Island) along the coast
10 of Naples did not contained the huge expansion of the urbanised zones around them. On the contrary,
11 since the Greco-Roman era, volcanoes have featured among the favourite sites for people colonising
12 the Campania region. The stable settlements around Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei caldera and Ischia were
13 progressively enlarged, attaining maximum growth rate between 1950 and 1980. Between 1982 and
14 1984, Neapolitans faced the last and most dramatic volcanic crises, which occurred at Campi Flegrei
15 (Pozzuoli), without an eruption. Since that time, volcanologists have focused their attention on the
16 problem of risks associated with eruptions in the Neapolitan area, but a systematic strategy to reduce
17 the very high volcanic risk of this zone is still lacking. A brief history of volcanic risk in the
18 Neapolitan district is narrated here in an effort to provide new food for thought for the scientific
19 community that works for the mitigation of volcanic risk in this area.

20
21 **Keywords:** Neapolitan volcanoes, volcanic risk, volcanic hazard, risk mitigation, human settlements.

22
23 **1. Introduction**

24 The region surrounding Naples is one of the most-risky volcanic areas in the world, due to the
25 presence of three active volcanoes, Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei caldera and the Island of Ischia, **which**
26 **it** is inhabited by more than 1,500,000 people, directly exposed to the risk (Alberico et al., 2011;
27 Carlino, 2019) (Fig. 1). These volcanoes are capable of generating a wide range of eruptions, from
28 gentle lava flow to those triggering catastrophic effects and were active in historical times (the last
29 eruption occurring in 1944 at Vesuvius, in 1538 at Campi Flegrei and in 1302 at Ischia). Larger
30 eruptions at Vesuvius have devastated entire territories around the volcano, up to a distance of 10–20
31 km from the vent, as was observed in 79 AD (Pompei) and 1,800 BC (Avellino), respectively. At
32 least two large caldera-forming eruptions occurred at Campi Flegrei, (the Campania Ignimbrite (CI),
33 ~39 ka, and the Neapolitan Yellow Tuff (NYT), ~15 ka, which involved the entire Campania Plain,
34 such as the case of the CI event. At Ischia, a large eruption occurred about 55 ka **ago**, while the

35 subsequent activity was mostly confined within the island (de Vita et al., 2010; De Vivo et al., 2006;
36 Mastrolorenzo et al., 2006; Piochi et al., 2005). In Figure 2, a sketch of the eruptive history of
37 Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei and Ischia is presented (Piochi et al., 2005).

38 On one hand, volcanoes and their activity produced fertile soils for farming, hot waters and lakes for
39 human recreation, raw materials and natural inlets along the coast for sea navigators (Carlino et al.,
40 2010a; Scarpati et al., 2016). These features make the Neapolitan area a favourable site for human
41 settlements and the development of a local economy. However, volcanic activity has greatly
42 devastated the area and left behind many victims (Scarpati et al., 2013). The city of Naples itself
43 stands on various volcanic centres and, in particular, on the extended deposits of the NYT eruption
44 (~15 ka); this eruption triggered the collapse of the present Campi Flegrei caldera (Isaia et al., 2009;
45 Scarpati et al., 2013), the eastern rim of which is the site where an important residential area of the
46 city (the *Posillipo hill*) stands (Fig. 3). Analysing the most crucial historical moments that marked
47 the relationship between humans and Neapolitan volcanoes is fundamental to understanding why so
48 many people are nowadays residing in such a hazardous area. On the other hand, we need to also
49 analyse the development of the research in volcanology and its impact in mitigating the risk of this
50 highly inhabited area. In the long history of relations between humans and Neapolitan volcanoes, a
51 few notable milestone events must be mentioned: the Pompei 79 AD eruption, reconstructed by the
52 letters of Plinian the Younger; the eruption of Vesuvius of 1631 which, after almost 500 years of
53 quiescence, ushered a long period of continuous volcanic activity ending in 1944; the systematic
54 exploration of Pompei (buried by the 79 AD event) starting from 1748; the foundation of the
55 “Osservatorio Vesuviano” (Vesuvius Observatory) under the Bourbons domination in 1841; the
56 eruption of Vesuvius in 1944, which closed the activity of the volcano and the unrests crises at Campi
57 Flegrei caldera in 1970–72 and 1982–84 (Barberi et al., 1984; Cubellis et al., 2015; ~~Giacomelli et al.,~~
58 ~~2003;~~ Perrotta & Scarpati, 2009; ~~Scandone et al., 2008~~). Particularly, in this paper, the latter two
59 crises at Campi Flegrei will be discussed, as they occurred during a challenging time in the field of
60 earth science and when volcano-monitoring networks were being improved and policies for
61 management and prevention of the risks in the Neapolitan area altered (Carlino, 2019). Starting from
62 that time, the problem of volcanic hazard and risk in the Neapolitan area has been systematically
63 treated by several authors, trying to quantify the equation of the risk: $risk = hazard \times vulnerability \times$
64 $exposed\ value$ (see Blong, 1996 and the references therein). A larger part of the studies has been
65 aimed at assessing the hazard and, to a lesser extent, the risk (see, for instance, Mastrolorenzo et al.,
66 2006; Petrosino et al., 2004; Scandone et al., 1993) and the risk perception of communities exposed
67 to potential volcanic activity (Carlino et al., 2008; Ricci et al., 2013). On the other hand, the primary
68 drivers of vulnerability may be socio-economic, cultural and political, and so policy changes and
69 reduction of social inequality are more important than merely measuring vulnerability itself. As

70 discussed later, this topic encompasses social and policy sciences rather than volcanology. Other
71 authors have debated the criteria adopted to identify the most risked area in the Neapolitan volcanic
72 district (e.g. the red zones), criticising the emergency plan of Vesuvius or proposing an alternative
73 perspective to reduce the risk (De Natale et al., 2020; De Vivo et al., 2010; Dobran, 2000, 2007;
74 Mastrolorenzo et al., 2006; Rolandi, 2010). Although this district has been becoming increasingly
75 vulnerable for about 50 years, only in recent times (starting from early 2000) have attempts been
76 made to reduce its exposed values, though unsuccessfully. Possibly, a more general analysis, from
77 both the historical and scientific points of view, to understand the reasons why the attempts to reduce
78 the volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area have systematically failed is necessary. This paper does not
79 intend to examine such a complex issue, which deserves a wider, longer and multidisciplinary
80 discussion, but sparing a thought for this topic is essential. This paper reports a brief history of
81 volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area and an account of recent studies and policies adopted to reduce
82 the risk. As it will be shown, new proposals to mitigate the volcanic risk of this area could be
83 ineffective if we do not analyse the reasons why previous attempts have failed. Furthermore, it is
84 important to define, as clearly as possible, the role of volcanologists in facing volcanic emergency
85 and risk education policies in this highly urbanised area.

86

87 **2. The ~~progressive~~first human settlements of Neapolitan volcanoes**

88 The history of Neapolitan volcanoes harks back to before the birth of Christ, when the first stable
89 population settled in the plain along Vesuvius and the Campi Flegrei caldera (Pappalardo, 2007). The
90 great Greek geographer Strabo (64 B.C.–19 A.D) provided in his work “Geography” one of the first
91 descriptions of the Campania Plain and its surroundings, commenting on the splendour of these
92 places, dominated by the presence of Vesuvius and bordered by mountains extending along the sea
93 forming the Gulf of Naples (Strabone, XIV-XXIII A.D.). The first and most ancient human
94 settlements in Campania date back to the Palaeolithic period, primarily along the coasts of the
95 Sorrento Peninsula. ~~According to Mastrolorenzo et al., (2006),~~ ~~“~~The first evidence of disrupted
96 human activity due to volcanic eruption in this area dates back about 3,800 years ~~(Mastrolorenzo et~~
97 ~~al., 2006)~~. This is in fact the age of an ancient Bronze Age village near Nola, about 11 km north of
98 Mount Vesuvius, where archaeologists excavated a human village with several findings in a state of
99 excellent conservation. A massive explosion of Vesuvius (the Avellino eruption, 3,800 years ago)
100 had sealed the village beneath hot ash (Mastrolorenzo et al., 2006), in a fate similar to that of Pompeii
101 a few thousand years later. That was when the natural environment of Vesuvius showed a less friendly
102 face, and humankind was confronted with unexpected adversities. In fact, the geology and the
103 landscape of Campania were the chief attractions for the populations colonising this area, which

104 Romans later called “Campania felix” (from Latin “felix” = lucky, happy) (Montone, 2010). The
105 expression derives not only from the beauty of the place but also from its soil, made fertile by the
106 volcanic activity, the presence of streams and the gentle climate. The broad river and coastal plains,
107 the modest mountain ranges overlooking them, the steam and the various volcanic areas, the thermal
108 waters and natural coastal inlets to protect sailors – all combined together to transform the area into
109 the crossroads of different civilisations (Carlino, 2019). The Campi Flegrei area is also linked to a
110 myth, possibly due to the suggestion recalled by the continuous emission of hot steam and the boiling
111 of mud pots. It was there, along the Lake of Averno (a volcanic crater close to the city of Pozzuoli),
112 that the ancients placed the cave of the Cumaean Sibyl (mentioned in the famous literary work
113 “L’Eneide” of Virgilio) and the entrance to the afterlife (Azcuy, 2013). This crater lake exhaled
114 vapours and volcanic gases that probably kept some animals away, from which it derived its Greek
115 name, “aoèrnov”, that is, “without birds”. Following the migration of the Etruscan population, from
116 central Italy to the Campania plain from the 9th to the 5th century B.C., the first early urban centres
117 were established (Maiuri, 1957). These immigrants predominantly settled in the fertile lowlands of
118 the Campanian Plain, along the rivers or close to the river-mouths. With the arrival of the Greeks and
119 the development of maritime trade, the inhabitants of Campania migrated towards coastal areas and
120 started settling in the volcanic areas of Ischia (called “Pithecusae”) and, later, of Campi Flegrei and
121 Vesuvius (D’Ascia, 1867). The Greeks arrived between the 9th and 8th centuries B.C., from a long
122 and narrow island close to the coast of modern-day south-east Greece, namely Euboea. On the
123 Phlegrean side, ancient signs of stable habitation dating to between the 7th and 6th centuries B.C.
124 were discovered in the Rione Terra, the old town in present-day Pozzuoli (Pappalardo, 2007). The
125 historical centre of this town stands on a small volcanic promontory that, at that time, played host to
126 a modest Cumaean mooring. Between 529 and 528 B.C., some Samnite exiles, banned by the tyrant
127 Polycrates, founded a colony on the promontory named Dikaiarchia, meaning “Just Government”,
128 integrated into a territory still controlled from Cumae (Anecchino, 1996). In 194 B.C., the Romans
129 transformed this small colony into a town called Puteolis (hereafter Pozzuoli), thus named for its
130 abundance of thermal springs. The town soon became an imposing port and warehousing area for
131 large quantities of foodstuffs. Earlier, the Greeks had moved eastwards, forming the first inhabited
132 elements of the city of Naples (called Pharthenophe), between Mount Echia (Fig. 3), an upland of
133 volcanic origin, and the island of Megaride where Castel dell’Ovo stands today (Ghirelli, 2015). The
134 Greek population was faced with the hazard of volcanoes on the island of Ischia. In fact, their
135 migration from Ischia towards the coast of Campania was possibly influenced by the eruptions in the
136 western and southern parts of the island from the 5th century B.C. onwards. Amidst the lavas and the
137 ash of the 5th century B.C. eruption and close to the port of Ischia, an old ground level was excavated
138 containing potsherds and other archaeological finds from the 6th and 5th centuries B.C.,
139 demonstrating the existence of an ancient Greek settlement destroyed in the eruption (Carlino et al.,

140 2010a). Strabo bore witness to the eruptions in the Greco-Roman era, writing: “...in ancient times a
141 series of extraordinary events took place on the island of Pithecusae. [...] when Mount Epomeo, which
142 rises in the middle of the island, was shaken by earthquakes and erupted fire and (again) swept away
143 everything that lay between itself and the shore and into the sea. At the same time a part of the ground,
144 reduced to ash and thrown upwards, fell back onto the island like a maelstrom and the sea retreated
145 for a distance of three stadia (about 500 m) and, flowing back shortly afterward, flooded the island,
146 extinguishing the fire. Such was the deafening noise that the inhabitants of the mainland fled from
147 the coast to the inner regions of Campania.” The towns of Naples and Pozzuoli and the villages in
148 the Vesuvius area, such as Pompeii, were expanding rapidly, with its citizens having to deal with the
149 adverse forces generated by the volcanic nature of the area. While in historical times (starting from
150 the former civilised human settlements), the Campi Flegrei caldera and the island of Ischia generated
151 small eruptions, the Vesuvius, contrarily, demonstrated its power with the 79 A.D. eruption, which
152 seriously affected the cities of Pompei and Ercolano and the southern part of the volcano (Giacomelli
153 et al., 2003). During the longest period of expansion of the Western Roman Empire, the cities around
154 the volcanoes had expanded progressively. The volcanic activity of Ischia in the early centuries before
155 Christ and its insular nature had, however, contained its demographic expansion. On the other hand,
156 the quiescence of the Campi Flegrei in eruptive terms did not imply that the volcanic nature of these
157 places had been forgotten; the continuous puffs of steam and the hot thermal springs served as
158 haunting symbols. However, in the minds of the people at least, the hostile nature of these places,
159 sometimes sinister, was associated with the mood of the gods and not the actual nature of the area
160 itself (Carlino, 2019). In this emerged the perception of natural disasters as divine punishments for
161 humankind, a view that remained rooted in culture up to the 17th century (Cocco, 2012).

162 **3. Towards a modern view of volcanoes**

163 With Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), a gradual change in the approach to the study of earth science and
164 the risk related to natural phenomena occurred. A crucial moment in the history of volcanic risk in
165 the Neapolitan area came in 1631 when, after a long quiescence, Vesuvius awoke with an explosive
166 (sub-plinian) eruption, beginning an almost continuous eruptive activity that ceased only in 1944 at
167 the end of World War II (Cocco, 2012; Kilburn & McGuire, 2001; Rosi et al., 1993). However, here
168 too a theological meaning was attributed to this calamitous event, as an expiation of punishments. In
169 this sense, the eruption of 1631 symbolised an event that, in the coming centuries, affected not only
170 volcanology but also other political, sociological, literary and, above all, religious disciplines (Scarth,
171 2009). Although Aristotelian science still dominated in the 17th century, it was also the beginning of
172 its end as a result of the works of the Galileans and Cartesians (Fiorentino, 2015).

173 The period witnessed immense cultural transformations, with new impulses in the field of scientific
174 research with the introduction of the experimental method by Galileo (Rossi, 2020). Further support
175 and impetus to the scientific revolution were lent by the foundation of the Royal Society of London
176 in 1662 and of Académie Royale des Sciences in Paris. Although this revolution determined a new
177 perspective that views losses as resulting from the effects of extreme natural events, religious terms
178 of reference remain a vital element for a significant portion of Neapolitan people in the perception of
179 volcanic eruptions (Chester et al., 2008, 2015).

180 Actually, the Vesuvius eruption of 1631 was the first event that focused attention on the problem of
181 volcanic risk. In fact, the suggestion to mitigate the volcanic risk at Vesuvius was first formally
182 proposed by the viceroy of Naples, Emmanuele Fonseca, in 1632. The viceroy placed an epigraph in
183 the town of Portici (in the Granatello area), inviting the local population to abandon the Vesuvius
184 area and recalling the catastrophic effects of the 1631 eruption. Many years later, for this inscription,
185 the expression “*the paradox of Granatello*” was coined by Nazzaro (2001), referring to the reluctance
186 of Vesuvians to consider the risk (Nazzaro, 2001; Gugg, 2018).

187 The continuous activity of Vesuvius pushed many scholars and artists to visit the volcano (during the
188 famous Grand Tour epoch) and, at the urging of few intellectuals, the idea of a volcano observatory
189 was born gradually (Luongo, 1997). Particularly, an important impetus came from Sir William
190 Hamilton (1730–1803), who arrived in Naples in 1764 as the British “Envoy Extraordinary to the
191 Kingdom of the Two Sicilies”. Hamilton’s amateur activity inspired the intuition of active volcano
192 surveillance and later, in 1841 (under the Bourbon Kingdom), the first volcanological observatory in
193 the world was founded, the Vesuvius Observatory (Cubellis et al., 2015). It was a great moment for
194 the Neapolitan School of Volcanology. Then, the interest of this new institution was mainly devoted
195 to the observation of the eruptive activity and to the development of new instruments to monitor the
196 volcano dynamic, such as the electromagnetic seismograph designed by Luigi Palmieri (1855–1896)
197 (Palmieri, 1880). Thus, the attention was mainly directed at the volcanic hazard.

198 4. Volcanic risk increase

199 ~~Later on, w~~With the increase of population in Neapolitan area, the problem of volcanic risk grew
200 critical, because of the exponential ~~increaserise~~ rise of the exposed value. The increase of population in
201 the Neapolitan volcanic district was possibly sustainable, with respect to volcanic risk, up to the
202 economic boom of Italy following the Second World War (Carlino, 2019). Immediately after this
203 war, western civilisation suffered a long economic crisis. A global-scale response to the crisis was
204 the activation of the Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Program, lasting from April 1948 to
205 December 1951), whose aim was the creation of stable economic conditions to guarantee the survival

206 of democratic institutions. The plan contributed to the renewal of the western European chemical,
207 engineering and steel industries and to a rise in gross national products between 15 and 25% (The
208 Marshal Plan; <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/marshall-plan-1>). The demographic
209 increase in the province of Naples and the consequent expansion of urban areas since the end of the
210 Second World War have been largely influenced by the country's economic choices following the
211 Industrial Revolution, a process beginning in the 19th century. For instance, the first mechanical
212 plants began in Pozzuoli in Campi Flegrei where, in 1885, a factory for the construction of naval
213 artillery was set up. The increase of population and postwar industrial activity mainly involved the
214 Vesuvius area in conjunction with the volcano's quiescent state following its most recent eruption in
215 1944 (Carlino, 2019). The Campi Flegrei were also affected by a migratory flow (albeit to a lesser
216 extent) particularly in the districts of Fuorigrotta and Bagnoli (located inside the caldera), reflecting
217 a strong phase of urban growth, especially following the expansion of the Bagnoli industrial area in
218 1954 (Andriello et al., 1991). The social and environmental change within the Campi Flegrei area
219 had been drastic and often sudden, but the area around Vesuvius was even more badly affected. This
220 latter came under attack from rampant "cementification" not following any town planning criteria,
221 especially concerning the volcanic risk. In the westernmost sector of the volcano, at the border with
222 the eastern outskirts of Naples, oil refineries and various mechanical industries were developed along
223 the coastal strip, while between Portici and Torre Annunziata, residential areas expanded enormously
224 (D'Aprile, 2014). Agricultural land in many areas was converted into construction sites so that the
225 landscape of farming and forestry use was transformed into a typically urban, densely populated
226 environment, contrasting sharply with Vesuvius in the background. Between the 1950s and 1990s,
227 the entire Vesuvius area witnessed uncontrolled speculative building with an exponential increase in
228 residential areas, so as to make unrecognisable the boundaries between the towns that, especially in
229 the coastal sector, became merely an expanse of housing and villas (Carlino, 2019; Luongo, 1997).
230 In the whole metropolitan area belonging to Naples, an increase of 1,000,000 residents occurred
231 between 1950 and 1980 (Censimento Popolazione Città Metropolitana Napoli, 1861–2001). In this
232 chaotic growth, the architectural beauties around Vesuvius leftover from the time of the Grand Tour,
233 the historic villas, were engulfed and new buildings covered the lava flows arising from Vesuvius's
234 most recent activity (Lancaster, 2008). This was a bad sign of the decline of local culture and of the
235 corruption of the political establishment (Berdini, 2010; Curci et al., 2018).

236 With the onset of globalisation and the expansion of international markets, the industrial activities in
237 the areas of Campi Flegrei went bankrupt. This definitively closed Bagnoli's industrial district in
238 1992 leading to an attempt to reclaim the area, with numerous halts and course changes, taking place
239 in the sector east of the city of Naples closer to Vesuvius. Meanwhile, the unbroken quiescence of
240 Vesuvius since 1944 gradually transformed the volcano from a perceived risk to a "passive" actor in

241 the landscape. This step resulted in inevitable demographic growth that did not take the security
242 implications into account while the boom in the construction industry extended the cities around the
243 volcano with increasingly invasive settlements. Between 1950 and 1981, the town of Portici alone,
244 now one of the most densely populated places in the world, saw the population rise from just over
245 30,000 to about 84,000 (ISTAT Censimento popolazione e abitazioni). The cities around Vesuvius
246 extended centripetally, approaching more and more frequently the areas repeatedly affected by recent
247 eruptions. If the quiescence of Vesuvius has caused a progressive decline in the perception of volcanic
248 risk, the territorial management policies until the end of the last century have continuously postponed
249 to posterity the issue of the risks involved in spite of the continual efforts of the scientific community
250 (Carlino et al., 2008). Only relatively recently, following the unrest in the Campi Flegrei caldera in
251 1982–84, scientists, local authorities and the Civil Protection faced the problem of excessive
252 anthropic pressure in the Neapolitan volcanic area, but an organic plan for decongesting one of the
253 areas of the greatest volcanic risk is still lacking.

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256 **3.5. The last experience of volcanic emergency in the Neapolitan district: Pozzuoli 1970–1984**

257 A fundamental moment in the history of volcano emergency in Campania was the episode of volcanic
258 unrest of Campi Flegrei caldera affecting the town of Pozzuoli in 1970–72 and 1982–84, respectively.
259 During those years, the ground of the town experienced the maximum cumulative uplift of about 3
260 meters, forcing the local authorities to evacuate the town during both episodes (Barberi et al., 1984).
261 By the beginning of the 1970s, the phenomenon of *bradyseism* (a Greek origin word which describes
262 the up and down movement of the ground) was largely forgotten, since the last time it had occurred
263 was more than 400 years before when an uplift of about 20 m culminated in the eruption of Monte
264 Nuovo in 1538, the most recent volcanic event at Campi Flegrei (Di Vito et al., 2016). In 1970,
265 monitoring networks for volcano surveillance did not exist in the area. In fact, the inversion in the
266 movement of the ground was signalled by fishermen, who suddenly managed to pass with their small
267 boats beneath an arch at the entrance of the small harbour of Pozzuoli while standing, while it had
268 normally been necessary to bend down (Carlino, 2019). The uplift, in the first phase, was almost
269 aseismic, while the Vesuvius Observatory decided to undertake a new elevation survey performed by
270 the engineers of the Genio Civile to estimate the real amount of the ground uplift. The results
271 indicated that the floor of the Serapeum of Pozzuoli (a ruin of an ancient Roman market) had risen
272 by about 0.70 m since the last surveys and that the area affected by this phenomenon included the
273 entire town (Longo, 2019; Luongo, 2013). The concern about the volcano uplift focused the attention

274 on the hazard related to a possible eruption. There was no consensus among scientists; thus, scientific
275 meetings took place to understand the possible evolution of the phenomenon might and the associated
276 volcanic risk. Experts such as the volcanologists Alfred Rittman and Izumi Yokoyama participated
277 in the debate together with the researchers of Vesuvius Observatory. However, the physical model
278 adopted by the Japanese researchers associated the observed uplift with a high probability of an
279 eruption. In 1972, the centre of Pozzuoli was evacuated, although the unrest was characterised by a
280 modest seismic activity, while the maximum uplift was about 1.7 m and ended without eruption
281 (Yokoyama, 1970). The evacuees were placed in the new Toiano district, whose construction was
282 accelerated during the final stages of the bradyseismic episode. The 1970–72 bradyseism crisis,
283 possibly was not handled in a transparent way, and this experience was complicated by the lack of
284 sufficient knowledge about the physics of the volcano phenomenon (Longo, 2019). This last fact,
285 along with the virtual absence of a monitoring network, determined the decision to evacuate the centre
286 of Pozzuoli, although the perceptible signs of a possible eruption were low, and all the local residents
287 criticised this decision. Nonetheless, it was during that period that earth science experienced new
288 important studies and projects, also strengthening the monitoring networks and the assessment of
289 seismic and volcanic hazards in the world.

290 Following the Campi Flegrei caldera unrest of 1970–72, the Italian peninsula was severely tested
291 with the devastating earthquakes of Friuli in 1976 (leaving about 1,000 people dead and more than
292 100,000 displaced) and the one in Campania-Basilicata in 1980 (with about 3,000 deaths and 280,000
293 dis- placed) (Boschi & Bordieri, 1998). Subsequently, a National Civil Protection service was
294 established in Italy. Thus, when a new bradyseismic crisis occurred in Pozzuoli in 1982, the scientific
295 community and the national and local authorities were better prepared to handle the emergency
296 (Luongo, 2013). The Vesuvius Observatory had strengthened its surveillance network so that,
297 throughout 1972–1981, it was possible to record a tendency to ground subsidence and a new uplift in
298 1982. In the summer of that year, it became clear that a new episode of bradyseism was underway
299 (Cannatelli et al., 2020). It was most dramatic compared to the previous one. Continuous and
300 significant seismic activity was recorded since spring 1983. Pozzuoli was shaken by hundreds of
301 seismic events a day, while the population was frightened by the roars accompanying the earthquakes
302 and the continued ground movements which wrought widespread damage on the city's ancient
303 buildings. A further increase of seismic activity occurred between September and October 1983,
304 peaking on 4th October with a shallow magnitude 4.0 earthquake, spreading panic among the
305 population, damaging several buildings in the historic centre of Pozzuoli and being clearly felt in
306 Naples (Branno et al., 1984). The ground uplift in the Pozzuoli area reached a maximum rate of the
307 order of centimetres per day. The main concern about the situation was primarily related to the
308 damage to the buildings caused by the shallow earthquakes (2–3 km in depth). Accordingly, the

309 Vesuvius Observatory and the National Group for Volcanology, responsible for surveillance,
310 presented a seismic hazard map of the Phlegraean area, demonstrating that the level of risk in the
311 historical centre of Pozzuoli had become very high, especially because of the high vulnerability of
312 the buildings at risk (Luongo, 2013). A further concern related to the possibility of an eruption, for
313 which the recorded uplift and the seismic activity appeared as clear precursors, although the
314 likelihood of an eruption was considered low by the director of the Vesuvius Observatory. On 1st
315 April 1984, a new dramatic seismic crisis, with continuous swarms throughout the morning, hit the
316 town of Pozzuoli. At this stage, the problem of the evacuation was faced, also considering the
317 possibility of an eruption inside the caldera of Campi Flegrei. In collaboration with the Central
318 Government, the evacuation plan was drawn up and, following the meetings between monitoring staff
319 and civil defence authorities it was decided to evacuate about 25,000 people from the centre of
320 Pozzuoli. The evacuees were relocated to the new settlement area of Monteruscello, which was built
321 in a few years, a few kilometres north-west of the centre of Pozzuoli, considered a safer area than the
322 coastal strip.

323 During the 1984 emergency, an effective communication system was established between the
324 monitors, the Civil Protection Service and the citizenry, and the crisis was handled with maximum
325 transparency, especially in light of the 1970 experience (Luongo, 2013). Particularly, the monitoring
326 info-centre, close to Pozzuoli, was activated to ensure the correct management and spreading of
327 information about the ongoing events. Meanwhile, as the plan was actualised the unrest seemed to
328 decrease in intensity, and in December 1984 the uplifting and seismic activity ceased, marking the
329 end of the crisis (Barberi & Carapezza, 1996). Pozzuoli remained for few years like a “ghost town”
330 while local and central governments were deciding on the future of the city. Pozzuoli was later rebuilt
331 without limiting the anthropic pressure that should have been contained within thresholds that would
332 make the volcanic risk acceptable. Today, the municipality of Pozzuoli has about 82,000 residents,
333 representing a coveted residential site for Neapolitan people.

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337 **4.6. The debate about the volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area**

338 The subject of volcanic risk and its mitigation in the Neapolitan area has very important implications
339 because this zone involves at least 1,500,000 people who are potentially exposed to a very large
340 eruption (Mastrolorenzo et al., 2006). Otherwise, given the long history of volcanic risk in the

341 Neapolitan area and the current very high risk of the area, two preliminary inquiries are required: i)
342 can we find a new paradigm or an alternative plan to reduce the high risk? and ii) how feasible is it
343 in the Neapolitan area? We do not have a unique response to the questions, but to analyse the issue,
344 we have to revert to the last Campi Flegrei caldera unrest between 1982 and 1984, culminating in the
345 evacuation of the town of Pozzuoli (Barberi & Carapezza, 1996). After this event, a strong debate
346 ensued (among scientists, citizens and politicians) about the possible solutions to reduce the volcanic
347 risk in the densely inhabited Neapolitan area.

348 Between 1980 and 1990, the problem of volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area was considered by the
349 National Group of Volcanology (GNV) (see De Vivo et al., 2010 and references therein), while the
350 one of territorial planning was discussed during several Italian workshops, and the few solutions
351 focused primarily on two actions (Leone, 1987; Ulisse, 1984): i) the short-term one with the
352 preparation of the evacuation plans, ii) the long-term one, which provided the actions and methods,
353 aimed to reduce the demographic pressure in the riskiest areas. ~~As highlighted by Leone (1987), t~~
354 ~~latter is not simple, because it cannot be forced, while developing a new organisational set-up of the~~
355 ~~whole Campania Region would be necessary by planning a “new geography” (Leone, 1987) of the~~
356 ~~services industry and the productive activities, allowing a spontaneous relocation of the residents~~
357 ~~from the risk areas.~~

358 After the last Campi Flegrei caldera unrest ended in 1984, the volcano rested again (up to 2005), but
359 not the debate about volcanic risk. Later, responding to the solicitations and concerns emanating from
360 the scientific and institutional world, and following the foundation of the Italian Civil Protection, the
361 attention was mainly focused on Vesuvius, the most inhabited volcano of the district. The volcanic
362 risk in this area was evaluated by Scandone et al., (1993), in terms of human losses, and according to
363 the equation: $Risk = Exposed\ Value \times Vulnerability \times Hazard$ (Blong, 1996). The authors evaluated
364 the hazard based on the entire history of the volcano and identified the events likely to cause loss of
365 human lives as those with Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) $> \sim 3$. Later on, the first evacuation plan
366 for the Vesuvius area was released by the Civil Protection in 1995.

367 After its foundation in 1999, the Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV) became the
368 reference scientific institution for the Civil Protection, to assess the volcanic hazard and continuously
369 update it for Neapolitan volcanoes. As regards Vesuvius, the extension of the most hazardous zone
370 (i.e. the Red Zone) involves about 600,000 inhabitants, who must be evacuated in case of eruption
371 (Protezione Civile: Update of the National Emergency Plan for Vesuvius). The extension of the Red
372 Zone was obtained considering a medium energy scenario for the next eruption (a sub-plinian
373 eruption) such as the one in 1631. The emergency plan for Vesuvius foresees a part of the population
374 spontaneously moving away from the Red Zone during the pre-alarm phase (Fig. 1). Depending on

375 the state of the volcano, the actions to be taken are defined within the emergency plan by the different
376 levels of alertness in which the scientific and monitoring activities are decided upon depending on
377 the assessment of the hazard. The lowest level (a “green” alert level) corresponds to the quiescence
378 of the volcano, during which there are no significant changes in the parameters being monitored. If
379 these changes are detected, however, the protocol provides for a transition to a level of attention
380 (“yellow”), during which there is an intensification of monitoring activities and a more frequent
381 assessment of the condition of the volcano by the Civil Protection agency and the Italian
382 Commissione Grandi Rischi (Major Risks Commission). The levels above this are those of pre-alarm
383 (“orange”) and alarm (“red”), which, for the latter, involve the evacuation of the population from the
384 Red Zone. The Vesuvius evacuation plan has been updated and modified during the time. At present,
385 at least three days (compared to the previous three weeks) would be required to effectively evacuate
386 600,000 inhabitants. This should correspond to the actual possibility of forecasting the eruption with
387 this level of forewarning. The last choice was also based on the forecasting experiences of the 1980
388 Mt. Saint Helens (USA) and 1991 Pinatubo (Philippine) eruptions (Pinatubo Volcano Observatory
389 Team, 1991; Swanson et al, 1983). The plan posed, among the scientific community, a number of
390 concerns and criticisms about the actual possibility of forecasting the next eruption in advance and
391 evacuating at least 600,000 people at risk. In the framework of this debate, an alternative plan to
392 mitigate the volcanic risk of Vesuvius area was proposed by Flavio Dobran (*Vesuvius 2000 plan*,
393 Dobran 2006, 2007). Although the first work of Flavio Dobran was published in 2006, the
394 dissemination of his plan took place a few years earlier, with an intense information campaign around
395 the Vesuvius area. More than an emergency or evacuation plan, *Vesuvius 2000* proposed a new
396 paradigm of development to reduce the risk of the area. The main intention of this proposal was “...to
397 produce guidelines for transforming high-risk areas around Vesuvius into safe and prosperous
398 communities. This would be accomplished through interdisciplinary projects involving engineers,
399 environmentalists, urban planners, economists, educators, geologists, sociologists, historians, and
400 the public” (Dobran, 2007). Among the general aims of *Vesuvius 2000* plan, the decreasing of the
401 resident population density in the most-risky areas was proposed, as well as improving the resistance
402 of the buildings to seismic shaking, the quality of infrastructure and the resilience of urban centres.
403 Furthermore, Dobran (2006, 2007) showed that given the strong historical and social connection
404 between “Vesuvius people” and their land, the diminishing of urban pressure in most of the risky
405 zones represented a very long-term aim, needing a complete social, cultural, urbanistic and economic
406 reconsideration of the Vesuvius area and surroundings. This long-term action will minimise the
407 economic and social costs of the evacuation of people from the red zone in case of an eruption. The
408 great challenge of the ambitious *Vesuvius 2000* plan was therefore that people around the volcano
409 acquired the awareness of the environment in which they lived and participated in the solution of this
410 difficult conundrum (Dobran, 2006).

411 After the solution proposed by Dobran (2006, 2007), a wide literature about the methods and the
412 actions devoted to reduction and management of volcanic risk, and also of natural risks in general,
413 was proposed by different authors, and in which most detailed descriptions of the limits of each
414 solution and the case history were reported (Barcklay et al., 2008, 2015; Chester et al., 2000; [Donovan](#)
415 [and Oppenheimer, 2016](#); Fearnley et al., 2017; Jenkins & Haynes, 2011; Hansjürgens et al., 2008;
416 Hicks et al., 2014; Hossain et al., 2017; Newhall & Punongbayan, 1996; Papale, 2017; Peterson et al.,
417 1993; Petrazzuoli & Zuccaro, 2004; Petrosino et al., 2004; Small & Naumann, 2001; Spence et al.,
418 2007; Usamah & Haynes, 2012; Wisner, 2003). Furthermore, some of the above researches also
419 demonstrate that a volcanic resettlement program must be directed by meaningful consultation with
420 the impacted community, as also suggested by Dobran (2006), which also shares in the decision
421 making.

422 What happened in the period following the first releasing of the Vesuvius emergency plan and of the
423 alternative paradigm *Vesuvius 2000* proposed by Flavio Dobran? The latter was not welcomed by the
424 political establishment and remained a mere proposal. On the other hand, the former (the institutional
425 one) only partially guaranteed the restraint or decreasing of anthropic pressure around the volcano.
426 To deal with this problem, a new plan called *Vesuvia* ([https://www.viveretraivulcani.it/il-progetto-
427 vesuvia/](https://www.viveretraivulcani.it/il-progetto-vesuvia/)) was approved in 2003 by the Campania Region (Legge regionale n. 21/2003, “Legge del
428 Vesuvio”, http://www.sito.regione.campania.it/leggi_regionali2003/lr21_2003.htm). The intent of
429 this project was to lighten the demographic pressure around the Vesuvius volcano. This intent would
430 be promoted by offering economic incentives (up to 30 thousand euros) to the population (living in
431 the red zone) willing to relocate themselves outside the dangerous areas. The project expects to reduce
432 the number of people living in the red zone over a period of about 20 years by evacuating at least
433 100,000 people from this zone (Gugg, 2018). A further aim of *Vesuvia* was also the reconversion of
434 available buildings into tourist reception facilities, to create an opportunity of valorisation of the great
435 cultural and natural heritage of the Vesuvius volcano. ([http://www.cngeologi.it/wp-
436 content/uploads/2017/08/Casa-Italia_Rapporto-sicurezza-rischi_naturali-patrimonio-abitativo.pdf](http://www.cngeologi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Casa-Italia_Rapporto-sicurezza-rischi_naturali-patrimonio-abitativo.pdf)).
437 Three years from the launch of the project, there was a reduction of residents in the red zone of only
438 0.1%, prompting the promoters of the project to abandon the endeavour. It was a resounding flop.
439 The reasons for the failure were described by Gugg (2018). Among the reasons reported, the lack of
440 involvement of the mayjors and the local communities in the development of the project was probably
441 the most critical. Additionally, as also described by the *Vesuvius 2000* plan (Dobran 2006, 2007), a
442 relocation of people from the red zone outside the Vesuvius volcano is very unlikely without long-
443 term economic and social policies stimulating Vesuvius people to move to safer zones. It is clear that
444 in a complex social, cultural and urban context such as that of Naples and surroundings, the choice
445 to reduce the volcanic risk by relocating a part of people in the red zones (Campi Flegrei and

446 Vesuvius) outside the most-risky areas and by increasing the volcanic perception is a very gruelling
447 challenge (Carlino, 2019). Furthermore, the policies to improve the vulnerability of edifices against
448 disasters (and reduce the risk) have rarely been adopted in Italy, as demonstrated for instance by
449 heavy damages suffered by many cities after moderate earthquakes recently (Valensise et al., 2017).
450 The main issues, in this case, are related to the actual perception of risk in general (as well as of
451 volcanic risk in particular), but mainly to the morals and personal profit of politicians in taking
452 specific actions to reduce the risk and to other social and political problems of the Neapolitan area
453 (Carlino et al., 2008; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2015; Donovan, 2019; Luongo, 1997). For instance,
454 political timescales generally limit the amount of capital invested in the volcanic risk reduction.
455 Basically; as reported by Donovan (2019), “*if a politician is only in power for 4 years*” (and this time
456 is the best case in Italy!) “*the probability of an eruption at a particular volcano within that timeframe*
457 *is usually very low, and so, the personal-political cost-benefit analysis indicates that there are more*
458 *socially acceptable policies to invest in*”. This is possibly one of the main reasons why a long-term
459 plan for risk reduction such as *Vesuvius2000* was rejected by the political establishment. The example
460 reported by Donovan (2019) appears particularly true for the Neapolitan area, where the volcanic risk
461 increased exponentially during the last 50 years, and no policies have contained this trend. This aspect
462 was also debated by De Vivo et al., (2010) who stated that while the Italian Civil Protection tries to
463 convince people to dislocate from the risk zone, it does not take a stand against the illegal buildings
464 in the red zone. Otherwise, from the institutional point of view, the latter problem does not involve
465 Civil Protection, because the management control of illegal buildings and their compliance with the
466 seismic risk primarily involves the municipalities (*Decreto Legislativo 18 agosto 2000, n. 267; Testo*
467 *unico delle disposizioni legislative e regolamentari in materia edilizia, d.P.R. n. 380/2001*). In this
468 regard, the seismic risk associated with the volcano-tectonics earthquakes is not neglectable as well,
469 at least for Campi Flegrei and Ischia. A representative case is the Island of Ischia. In 1883, the island
470 was hit by a moderate and shallow earthquake (with magnitude around 4.5, Cubellis and Luongo,
471 1998), which devastated its northern sector (Casamicciola town) and had more than 2300 victims
472 (Carlino et al., 2010b). This event was followed by an almost seismic silence, up to 2017. At least
473 during the last 25 years, the scientific community urged the island local authorities and the
474 municipality of Casamicciola to take actions favouring the mitigation of seismic risk in the island
475 (Cubellis and Luongo, 1998; Luongo et al., 2012). However, this message went unnoticed, up to 21
476 August 2017, when an $M_L4.0$ earthquake occurred in Casamicciola town and caused two
477 [victimsdeaths](#), tens of injuries and heavy damage in the upper part of the municipality (De Novellis
478 et al., 2018). From the above considerations, it appears that conciliating the emergency plans, drawing
479 the red zones of volcanoes, and regulating for the seismic risk, with the actual economic and land-
480 use planning policies in the Neapolitan area are a hard purpose to attain.

481 Recently, in August 2016, the emergency planning for the volcanic risk of the Campi Flegrei was
482 updated (Protezione Civile: Update of the National Emergency Plan for Campi Flegrei), and the area
483 of the new Red Zone to be evacuated as a precautionary measure in case of an eruption, was defined,
484 together with the Yellow Zone, which is potentially exposed to a high concentration of falling ash
485 (Fig. 1). As for Vesuvius, the Red Zone and the Yellow Zone were defined by the Civil Protection in
486 agreement with the Campania Region and based on the indications provided by the scientific
487 community. As a whole, and considering that an emergency plan for the island of Ischia (Gulf of
488 Naples) is still lacking, about 1,000,000 people could be directly affected by a moderate to large
489 eruption (VEI 3–4) in the red zones of Campi Flegrei and Vesuvius, respectively. The high number
490 of people exposed to the risk and the uncertainty in eruptions forecasting (Sparks, 2003) motivated
491 some authors to criticise the evacuation plans and the risk reduction policies in the Neapolitan district
492 (De Natale et al., 2020; Rolandi, 2010). Particularly and recently, De Natale et al. (2020) have
493 questioned how the very high volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area can be effectively mitigated. The
494 authors focused the attention on two evacuation-related problems: i) the extremely high number of
495 people to evacuate in case of an impending eruption; ii) the lack of plans today to rehabilitate such a
496 high number of evacuated people (600,000 and 700,000 for Campi Flegrei Caldera and Vesuvius,
497 respectively). ~~The analysis of De Natale et al. (2020) is not new, since their main conclusions, as well~~
498 ~~as the weaknesses they highlighted in respect to the present emergency plans, were already stated by~~
499 ~~other authors, and in particular by Dobran (2006, 2007, Vesuvius 2000 plan).~~ It is important to
500 highlight that some works criticising the evacuation plans (De Natale et al., 2020; Dobran 2006) do
501 not exclude their effectiveness if a number of actions to mitigate the risk are carried on. Unfortunately,
502 what we have seen during the last 40 years of volcanic risk management in the Neapolitan area is a
503 predominance of emergency policies in respect to that of prevention. The result is that the present
504 volcanic risk, given the current high values of society, appears ~~non-acceptable~~unacceptable.

505 **5.7. The role of volcanologists**

506 In the framework of the discussed topics, a fundamental issue is the role of volcanologists in
507 managing volcanic risk and crises. It was, in many cases, misinterpreted by people living in the
508 Neapolitan area. The role and responsibilities of volcanologists in volcanic hazard evaluation, risk
509 mitigation and crisis response have been outlined by the International Association for Volcanology
510 and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior (IAVCEI). Their main responsibility is to improve the scientific
511 knowledge of volcanoes to better understand how they work and provide the most robust eruption
512 forecasts, and to educate the local and global community (mainly exposed to eruptions) to the
513 volcanic risk, making people more perceptive of the risk itself. The latter is fundamental to evoking
514 an amenable response from people to an evacuation (IAVCEI, 2016). Anyway, the main task of

515 volcanologists is to provide as robust a forecast of an eruption as possible. It is well-known how
516 problematic it is to obtain a clear picture of the progression of volcano processes during unrests and
517 to understand what the actual state of the volcano is (critical state or not). In general (but not always),
518 as the eruption approaches the number and the amplitude (or energy) of geophysical and geochemical
519 signals increases, the uncertainty in the forecast should decrease (Carlino, 2019; Decker, 1986;
520 Kilburn, 2003; Robertson et al., 2016; Sparks, 2003; Sparks & Cashman, 2017;) (Fig. 4). An unsolved
521 question is whether, and at what moment, the volcano approaches the critical state during an unrest;
522 that is the moment when the physical processes occurring within the volcano are irreversible and the
523 volcano erupts (Fig. 4). This is the most critical issue because the promulgation of a false alarm or a
524 missed alarm will adversely affect 600,000–1,500,000 people living in the Neapolitan area (De Natale
525 et al., 2020). The problem of false alarms and of uncertainty in volcano forecast is chronic in
526 volcanology and also relates to communications and managing the expectations that a population
527 have of scientific capacity over long term. The uncertainty in anticipating eruptions may reflect the
528 complexity of volcanic systems, the level of monitoring networks and the complex multidisciplinary
529 decision-making process during a volcanic crisis (Winson et al., 2014; Harris, 2015b). During the last
530 20 years, the monitoring networks for the surveillance of the Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei and Ischia
531 volcanoes have been greatly improved, reaching one of the best standards worldwide
532 (www.ov.ingv.it). This effort should correspond to a reduction of the uncertainty in forecasting the
533 next eruption although it depends on the capacity of volcanologists to correctly decipher the volcano
534 signals. Beyond the efforts of scientists to improve their understanding of volcanic processes and
535 provide more robust forecasts, communicating the systemic uncertainty of the forecast to the public
536 is fundamental. This can be done effectively only with a proficient direct communication network
537 between volcanologists and the media (Haynes et al, 2008; Winson et al., 2014).

538 7.1 Volcanologists and media

539 The relationship between volcanologists and media This is also a very important topic, particularly
540 when the communication of an ongoing volcanic crisis involves large metropolitan areas like Naples
541 and its surroundings. The example of what occurred during the 1982–84 unrest is emblematic of this
542 view. During that crisis, a unique channel of communication was established between the Vesuvius
543 Observatory and the press while the observatory was continuously communicating with the Minister
544 for the Coordination of the Civil Protection (Luongo, 2013). The activation of the information centre
545 for the citizens of Pozzuoli and the straight link between the latter and the direction of the Vesuvius
546 Observatory generated confidence among people. How would it have turned out if the same crisis
547 had happened today? The unrest and the evacuation at Pozzuoli occurred in an era without the internet
548 and social media (Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp) which, nowadays, represent the main rapid

549 dissemination channels of news and information. Furthermore, the “tabloidization” of the news has
550 also resulted in the use of strong, exaggerated words, headlines and images to support a particular
551 frame (Harris, 2015a). Social media platforms are disruptors of traditional communication, opening
552 up new opportunities for scientists to communicate (Dong et al., 2020) but, on the other hand,
553 bestowing the right to evaluate or criticise scientific decisions on everyone. This could lead to
554 misinterpretations or distortions of scientific broadcasts and information and, consequently, to false
555 alarms or unjustified panic among the population, in case of a volcanic crisis (Harris, 2015a). This
556 circumstance, albeit not related to a volcanic crisis, occurred recently before the commencement of
557 the Campi Flegrei Deep Drilling Project, at Campi Flegrei, a project aimed at scientifically
558 investigating the caldera (Carlino, 2019). The project worried many local residents about the possible
559 disturbance that the scientific drilling would unleash in the volcanic system. Just before the onset of
560 the drilling, the declarations spreading on social networks and newspapers assumed an increasingly
561 alarming tone (sometimes to the limit of the paradoxical) such as to seriously worry the municipal
562 administration of Naples, which had cleared the drilling. The climax was reached in October 2010
563 when the national newspaper “Il Mattino” led with the front-page title: “If you touch the volcano,
564 Naples will explode” (Carlino, 2019, page 265). The project was temporarily suspended by the Naples
565 administration to further clarify its aim and associated risk. This fact highlights that the position of
566 volcanologists in communicating the hazard and the risk in densely inhabited regions like Naples is
567 very tricky because the communication occurs within a complex social system where many people
568 exposed to the risk are involved. Furthermore, a number of studies demonstrate that Neapolitans have
569 a low perception of risk and a low level of risk education (Carlino et al., 2010b; Ricci et al., 2013).

570 As a whole, beyond the effort that scientists are expending to improve the robustness of the volcanic
571 eruptions forecast, a further effort is necessary to promulgate the culture of volcanic risk and promote
572 open debates with the local population and authorities. In other words, volcanologists should be more
573 present on the territory (not only during an ongoing volcanic unrest) and they should be an open book,
574 not an acquired skill (Fearnley et al., 2017; Goodstain, 2010). This approach is fundamental to
575 improving the confidence of people in a scientific institution such as INGV.

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577 **6.8. Conclusions**

578 The past experiences concerning the management of volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area reveal the
579 complexity of devising a collaboration around the active volcanoes of Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei
580 caldera and Ischia Island to reduce the risk in such densely inhabited areas. The history of volcanic
581 risk in this area demonstrates the tendency to not consider, or to underestimate, the risk (which

582 otherwise is a human attitude). Nonetheless, we cannot reduce the problem of the high volcanic risk
583 of the Neapolitan area to this latter consideration only. The present development of the urbanised
584 areas around the volcanoes of Naples is the result of a very long history and stratification of different
585 cultures and populations that settled the Neapolitan area and its surroundings as a scenic and useful
586 place to live, since the Bronze Age. This history left a huge cultural heritage in its wake but also a
587 demanding socio-economic condition, especially around Vesuvius. Thus, as also highlighted by
588 Galliard (2008), in many cases the historical and cultural heritage and political economy remain of
589 much greater importance and may override the choice of people in the face of volcanic hazards. This
590 fact emphasises the importance of understanding the complex contexts of the Neapolitan area in
591 proposing policies to reduce volcanic risk. It appears evident, for instance, that the choice of people
592 not to relocate themselves outside the red zone of Vesuvius and to remain in their native towns,
593 despite the perceived threats, has little to do with volcanic activity. This point, already discussed by
594 Galliard (2008), suggests that, in such a complex social context, the policies for volcanic risk
595 mitigation need to go far beyond only prevention of relatively rare events. A different and more
596 general approach is thus required, and rational access and the use of resources to adapt the social and
597 economic development of the area to its natural vocation should be aimed at. This is a long-term
598 objective conflicting with the short-sighted policies adopted by the Campania Region and the Central
599 Government. Consequently, the proposals to re-convert the riskiest areas of Neapolitan volcanoes
600 into lower-risk zones using a different (and long-term) paradigm of development (e.g. Dobran, 2006,
601 2007) are struggling to take off. Simultaneously, the proposed economic incentives (*Vesuvia* project)
602 to relocate people from the red zone (at Vesuvius) towards safer areas was a failure as well.
603 Accordingly, these failures first have to do with a wrong territorial policy, and secondly with the
604 volcanology.

605 Furthermore, at least during the last 25 years, the policies for the reduction of volcanic risk in the
606 Neapolitan area have been disconnected from their natural, social and politico-economic context.
607 This is possibly the result of a not so holistic approach to the problem of volcanic risk reduction
608 which, particularly in this area, is unavoidable and, on the contrary, requires an openly discussed
609 method between academics of all disciplines, policymakers and stakeholders (Donovan, 2019). The
610 most recent history of Neapolitan volcanoes is also interesting for disaster development trajectories
611 in other countries. Actually, the mistakes – particularly those of not linking risk with development
612 practice – are being repeated all over the world in hazard-prone areas. This fact highlights the
613 importance of risk-sensitive development practices, that incorporate scientific advice, urban planning,
614 social study and so on (Barclay et al., 2008; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2014).

615 -Finally, after about 40 years of debates around the volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area, an analysis
616 of the reasons why the strategies aimed to reduce the risk in this area systematically failed is required.
617 This step is necessary to propose more reliable solutions for the risk reduction in a very large and
618 urbanised territory such as that of Neapolitan volcanoes. A further effort is also required by
619 Neapolitan scientists to connect the territorial governance structures and local (at risk) communities
620 to the scientific network. In this framework, scientists must pay further attention to avoid
621 politicisation of volcanology when advising the authorities (Donovan, 2019).

622 **Data availability:** No datasets were used in this article.

623 **Competing interests of interest:** The author declares that he has no conflict.

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627

628 **Figure captions**

629 Fig. 1. The Neapolitan volcanic area with the three active volcanoes, Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei caldera
630 and the Island of Ischia. The limits of the red zones of the evacuation plans for Vesuvius and Campi
631 Flegrei caldera are reported, respectively (from www.protezionecivile.gov). ~~More than~~ About
632 1,000,000 of people are living in both the red zones. A plan for the island of Ischia is currently in
633 progress (base map is from Google Earth). The box below shows the inhabitants density map of the
634 Neapolitan area (from regione.campania.it)

635 Fig. 2. A timeline of volcanic activity history at Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei and Ischia Island. The most
636 important eruptions are reported. Red and blue color indicates increasing and decreasing of volcanic
637 activity, respectively (after Piochi et al., 2005).

638 Fig. 3. The city of Naples with the location of the eruptive vents associated with different eruptive
639 periods. The dotted line represents the eastern boundary of the caldera of Campi Flegrei (modified
640 after Scarpati et al., 2013 and Carlino, 2019; base map is from Google Earth).

641 Fig. 4. A qualitative sketch describing the possible state of a volcano approaching an eruption and its
642 forecast reliability. For a quiescent volcano the reawakening is generally associated with the onset of
643 seismic activity indicating the variation of stress field within the volcano. The latter is generally due
644 to circulation of pressurized fluids in the crust and, eventually, to magma migration at shallow level.

645 This dynamic is accompanied by others precursors (ground deformations and variation of fluids
646 emission) which make the forecast more reliable as the eruption is approached. The point at which
647 the volcano overcomes the critical state, is the moment (t_c) in which the physical processes occurring
648 within the volcano are irreversible, that is to say the volcano will erupt. Volcanologists cannot predict
649 the time (t_c) because the processes are chaotic and the forecast has a probabilistic nature (after,
650 Carlino, 2019).

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
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
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
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
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