

1 **Review article: Brief history of volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area (Campania,**
2 **Southern Italy): a critical review**

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7
8 **Abstract**

9 The presence of three active volcanoes (Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei and Ischia Island) along the coast
10 of Naples did not ~~constrained~~contained the huge expansion of the ~~urbanized~~urbanised zones around
11 them. On the contrary, since ~~Greek~~the Greco-Roman era, volcanoes have ~~been~~featured among the
12 ~~favorite~~favourite sites for people ~~who colonized~~colonising the Campania region. ~~Stable~~The stable
13 settlements around Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei caldera and ~~the Island of~~ Ischia were progressively
14 enlarged, ~~reaching the~~attaining maximum growth-rate between 1950 and 1980. Between 1982 and
15 1984, ~~Neapolitan people~~Neapolitans faced the last and most dramatic volcanic crises, which occurred
16 at Campi Flegrei (Pozzuoli), without an eruption. Since that time, volcanologists have focused
17 ~~the~~their attention on the problem of ~~risk~~risks associated ~~to~~with eruptions in the Neapolitan area, but
18 a systematic strategy to reduce the very high volcanic risk of this -zone is still ~~lacks~~lacking. A brief
19 history of volcanic risk in the Neapolitan district is narrated here ~~reported,~~ trying in an effort
20 ~~obtain~~provide new food for thought for the scientific community ~~which~~that works ~~to~~for the mitigation
21 of volcanic risk ~~of~~in this area.

22
23 **Keywords:** Neapolitan volcanoes, volcanic risk, volcanic hazard, risk mitigation, human settlements.

24
25
26 **1. Introduction**

27 The ~~district around~~region surrounding Naples is one of the most-risky volcanic ~~area~~areas in the
28 ~~World~~world, due to the presence of three active volcanoes, ~~the~~ Vesuvius, ~~the~~ Campi Flegrei caldera
29 and the Island of Ischia, which ~~are~~is inhabited by more than 1,500,000 people, directly exposed to
30 the risk (Alberico et al., 2011; Carlino, 2019) (Fig. 1). These volcanoes ~~have been~~are capable ~~to~~
31 ~~generate~~of generating a wide range of eruptions, from gentlygentle lava flow to those triggering
32 catastrophic ~~event~~effects and were active in historical times (the last eruption ~~occurred~~occurring in
33 1944 at Vesuvius, in 1538 at Campi Flegrei and in 1302 at Ischia ~~Island~~). Larger eruptions at Vesuvius
34 ~~generated the devastation of~~have devastated entire ~~sectors of territory~~territories around the volcano,

35 up to a distance of 10 ~~km to~~ 20 km from the vent, ~~such as~~ was observed in ~~the case of~~ 79 AD
36 (Pompei) and 31,800 BC (Avellino) ~~events,~~, respectively. At least two large caldera-forming
37 eruptions occurred at Campi Flegrei (the Campania Ignimbrite (CI), ~39 ka, and the Neapolitan
38 Yellow Tuff (NYT), ~15 ka), which involved the ~~wholeentire~~ Campania Plain, such as the case of
39 the CI event. At Ischia, a large eruption occurred about 55 ka ago, while the subsequent activity was
40 mostly confined insidewithin the island (~~Piochide Vita~~ et al., ~~20052010~~; De Vivo et al., 2006;
41 Mastrolorenzo et al., 2006; ~~de VitaPiochi~~ et al., ~~20102005~~). In ~~figure~~Figure 2, a sketch of the eruptive
42 history of Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei and Ischia is ~~reported (from presented~~ (Piochi et al., 2005).

43 On one hand, volcanoes and their activity produced fertile soils for farming, hot waters and lakes for
44 human recreation, raw materials and natural inlets along the coast for sea navigators (Carlino et al.,
45 2010a; Scarpati et al., 2016). These features, make the Neapolitan area a ~~favorable~~favourable
46 ~~tofor~~ human settlements and ~~to~~ the development of a local economy. ~~On the other hand~~However,
47 volcanic activity ~~generated large devastations of~~has greatly devastated the area and left behind many
48 victims (Scarpati et al., 2013). The city of Naples itself stands on various volcanic ~~centers~~centres and,
49 in particular, on the extended deposits of the NYT eruption (~15 ka) ~~which generated~~; this eruption
50 triggered the collapse of the present Campi Flegrei caldera (Isaia et al., 2009; Scarpati et al., 2013),
51 the eastern rim of which is the site where an important residential area of the city (the Posillipo hill)
52 stands (Fig. 3). ~~Analyzing~~Analysing the most crucial historical moments ~~whichthat~~ marked the
53 relationship between humans and Neapolitan volcanoes, is fundamental to ~~understand~~understanding
54 why so many people are nowadays livingresiding in ~~a~~ such a hazardous area. On the other ~~side~~hand,
55 we need to also ~~to analyze~~analyse the development of the research in volcanology and its impact in
56 mitigating the risk of this highly inhabited area. ~~During~~In the long history of relations between
57 humans and Neapolitan volcanoes, a few ~~important~~notable milestone events must be mentioned: the
58 Pompei 79 AD eruption, reconstructed by the letters of Plinian the Younger; the eruption of Vesuvius
59 of ~~1631which~~1631 which, after almost 500 years of quiescence, ~~opened~~ushered a long period of
60 continuous volcanic activity ~~which ended~~ending in 1944; the systematic exploration of Pompei
61 (buried by the 79 AD event) starting from 1748; the foundation of the “Osservatorio Vesuviano”
62 (Vesuvius Observatory), ~~under the Bourbons domination,~~ in 1841; the eruption of Vesuvius in 1944,
63 which closed the activity of the volcano; and the unrests ~~erisis occurred~~crises at Campi Flegrei caldera
64 in 1970–72 and 1982–84 (Barberi et al., 1984; Cubellis et al., 2015; Giacomelli et al., 2003;
65 ~~Scandone et al., 2008~~; Perrotta ~~and~~& Scarpati, 2009; CubellisScandone et al., 2015). ~~In~~
66 particular2008). Particularly, in this paper, the latter two crises at Campi Flegrei will be discussed,
67 sineeas they occurred during an important moment of challengesa challenging time in the field of ~~the~~
68 Earth Scienceearth science and during the period of the improvement of voleanoes when volcano-
69 monitoring networks were being improved and ~~of the~~ policies for management and prevention of the

70 risks in the Neapolitan area altered (Carlino, 2019). Starting ~~form~~from that time, the problem of
71 volcanic hazard and risk in the Neapolitan area has been systematically treated by ~~many~~several
72 authors, trying to quantify the equation of the risk: $risk = hazard \times vulnerability \times exposed\ value$ (see
73 Blong, 1996 and the references therein). A larger part of the studies has been aimed ~~to assess~~at
74 assessing the hazard and, to a lesser extent, the risk (see, for instance ~~Seandone, Mastrolorenzo~~ et al.,
75 19932006; Petrosino et al., 2004; MastrolorenzoScandone et al., 20061993) and the risk perception
76 of communities exposed to potential volcanic activity (Carlino et al., 2008; Ricci et al., 2013). On the
77 other ~~side~~hand, the primary drivers of vulnerability may be socio-economic, cultural and political,
78 and so policy changes and ~~reducing~~reduction of social inequality are more important than a merely
79 measuring ~~of~~vulnerability itself. As discussed later, this topic encompasses social and policy sciences
80 rather than volcanology. Other authors have debated the criteria usedadopted to identify the most
81 risked area in the Neapolitan volcanic district (e.g. the red zones)), criticising the emergency plan of
82 Vesuvius, or proposing an alternative perspective to reduce the risk (De Natale et al., 2020; De Vivo
83 et al., 2010; Dobran, 2000, 2007; Mastrolorenzo et al., 2006; ~~De Vivo et al., 2010; Rolandi, 2010; De~~
84 Natale et al., 2020). Although the increasing of risk in this district has ~~occurred since~~been becoming
85 increasingly vulnerable for about 50 years ~~ago~~, only in recent times (starting from ~~the~~early 2000)
86 a number ofhave attempts been made to reduce its exposed values ~~has been carried on, but, though~~
87 unsuccessfully. Possibly, a more general analysis, from both the historical and scientific pointpoints
88 of view, to understand the reasons why the attempts to reduce the volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area
89 have systematically failed is necessary. ~~It is not intention of this~~This paper does not intend to
90 faceexamine such a complex issue, which deserves a wider, longer and multidisciplinary discussion,
91 but sparing a thought aboutfor this topic is required. ~~In this~~essential. This paper, ~~it is reported~~reports
92 a brief history of volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area, and an account of recent studies and policies
93 adopted to reduce the risk. As it will be showedshown, new proposals to mitigate the volcanic risk of
94 this area could be ineffective if we do not take into accountanalyse the reasons why previous attempts
95 ~~to reduce the volcanic risk in Neapolitan area~~have failed. Furthermore, it is important to define, as
96 more clearly as possible, the role of volcanologists in facing volcanic emergency and risk education
97 policies in this high urbanizedhighly urbanised area.

98

99 2. The progressive human settlement of Neapolitan volcanoes

100 The history of ~~risk of~~Neapolitan volcanoes beginssharks back to before the birth of Christ, when the
101 first stable population settled in the plain along Vesuvius and the Campi Flegrei caldera (Pappalardo,
102 2007). The great Greek geographer Strabo (64 B.C., 19 A.D) reportedprovided in his work
103 “Geography” one of the first descriptiondescriptions of the Campania Plain and its surroundings ~~and~~

104 ~~denoted, commenting on~~ the ~~splendorsplendour~~ of these places, dominated by the presence of
105 Vesuvius and bordered by mountains ~~which extended~~extending along the sea forming the Gulf of
106 Naples (Strabone, XIV-XXIII A.D.). ~~Otherwise, it would seem that the~~The first and most ancient
107 human settlements in Campania date back to the ~~Paleolithic, mainly~~Palaeolithic period, primarily
108 along the coasts of the Sorrento Peninsula. ~~As far as we know, a~~According to Mastrolorenzo et al.,
109 (2006), , ~~the~~ first evidence of ~~the disruption of~~disrupted human activity due to volcanic eruption in
110 this area dates back about 3,800 years ~~(Mastrolorenzo et al., 2006)~~.. This is in fact the age of an
111 ancient Bronze Age village near Nola, about 11 km north of Mount Vesuvius, where ~~archaeological~~
112 ~~excavations uncovered~~archaeologists excavated a human village with ~~many~~several findings in a state
113 of excellent conservation. ~~It was a~~ massive ~~explosive eruption~~explosion of Vesuvius (the Avellino
114 eruption, 3,800 years ago) ~~that had~~ sealed the village beneath hot ash (Mastrolorenzo et al., 2006), in
115 a fate similar to ~~what happened in~~that of Pompeii a few thousand years later. That was ~~the time~~ when
116 the natural environment of Vesuvius showed a less friendly face, and humankind was confronted with
117 unexpected adversities. In fact, the geology and the landscape of Campania were the ~~main~~chief
118 attractions for the populations ~~that colonized~~colonising this area, ~~that which~~ Romans later called
119 “Campania felix” (from Latin “felix” = lucky, happy) (Montone, 2010). The expression derives not
120 only from the beauty of the ~~places,~~place but also from ~~the fertility of the~~its soil ~~coming from,~~ made
121 fertile by the volcanic activity, the presence of streams and the ~~gentleness of~~gentle climate. The broad
122 river and coastal plains, the modest mountain ranges overlooking them, the steam and the various
123 volcanic areas, the thermal waters and natural coastal inlets to protect sailors; all combined together
124 to transform the area into the crossroads of different ~~civilizations~~civilisations (Carlino, 2019). The
125 Campi Flegrei area is also linked to ~~the~~ myth, ~~possible~~possibly due to the suggestion recalled by the
126 continuous emission of hot steam and the boiling of mud pots. It was there, along the Lake of Averno
127 (a volcanic crater close to the city of Pozzuoli), ~~that the ancients placed the cave of the Cumaean~~
128 Sibyl (motioned in the famous literary work “L’Eneide” of Virgilio) and the entrance to the afterlife
129 (Azcu, 2013). This crater lake exhaled ~~vapors~~vapours and volcanic gases that probably kept some
130 animals away, from which it ~~got~~derived its Greek name, “aoèrnov;”, that is, “without birds”.
131 Following the migration of ~~the~~ Etruscan population, from central Italy to ~~the~~ Campania plain; from
132 the 9th to the 5th century B.C., the first early urban ~~centers~~centres were established (Maiuri, 1957).
133 These ~~populations~~immigrants predominantly settled in the fertile lowlands of the Campanian Plain,
134 along the rivers or close to the river-mouths. With the arrival of ~~the~~ Greeks; and the development of
135 ~~the~~ maritime trade, the inhabitants of Campania migrated towards coastal areas and ~~began to~~
136 ~~settle~~started settling in the volcanic areas of Ischia (called “Pithecusae”) and, later, of Campi Flegrei
137 and Vesuvius (D’Ascia, 1867). ~~The~~ Greeks arrived between the 9th and ~~the~~ 8th centuries B.C., from
138 a long and narrow island close to the coast of modern-day south-east Greece, namely Euboea. On the
139 Phlegrean side, ancient signs of stable habitation dating to ~~a period~~ between the 77th and 6th centuries

140 B.C. were ~~found~~discovered in the Rione Terra, the old town ~~of the~~in present-day Pozzuoli
141 (Pappalardo, 2007). The historical ~~center~~centre of this town stands on a small volcanic promontory
142 that, at that time, played host to a modest Cumaean mooring. Between 529 and 528 B.C., some
143 Samnite exiles, banned by the tyrant Polycrates, founded a colony on the promontory ~~with the rigid~~
144 ~~name of~~named Dikaiarchia, meaning ~~“Just Government”,~~Government”, integrated into a territory
145 still controlled from Cumae (Anecchino, 1996). In 194 B.C., the Romans transformed this small
146 colony into a town called Puteolis (hereafter Pozzuoli), thus named for its abundance of thermal
147 springs. The town soon became an imposing port and warehousing area for large quantities of
148 foodstuffs. ~~Before that,~~Earlier, the Greeks had moved eastwards, ~~establishing~~forming the first
149 inhabited elements of the city of Naples (called Parthenophe), between Mount Echia (Fig. 3), an
150 upland of volcanic origin, and the island of Megaride where Castel dell’Ovo stands today (Ghirelli,
151 2015). The Greek population was faced with the hazard of volcanoes ~~in~~on the island of Ischia. In fact,
152 their migration from Ischia towards the coast of Campania was possibly influenced by the eruptions
153 in the western and southern parts of the island ~~that followed~~ from the ~~5th~~5th century B.C. onwards.
154 Amidst the lavas and the ash of the ~~5th~~5th century B.C. eruption and close to the port of Ischia, an
155 old ground level was excavated containing potsherds and other archaeological finds from the ~~6th~~
156 and 5th centuries B.C., demonstrating the existence of an ancient Greek settlement destroyed in the
157 eruption (Carlino et al., 2010a). ~~It was~~ Strabo ~~to bear~~bore witness to the eruptions in the Greco-Roman
158 era, writing: ~~“.....”~~“...in ancient times a series of extraordinary events took place on the island of
159 Pithecusae. [...] when Mount Epomeo, which rises in the middle of the island, was shaken by
160 earthquakes and erupted fire and (again) swept away everything that lay between itself and the shore
161 and into the sea. At the same time a part of the ground, reduced to ash and thrown upwards, fell back
162 onto the island like a maelstrom and the sea retreated for a distance of three stadia (about 500 m)
163 and, flowing back shortly afterward, flooded the island, extinguishing the fire. Such was the deafening
164 noise that the inhabitants of the mainland fled from the coast to the inner regions of Campania.” The
165 towns of Naples and Pozzuoli, and the villages ~~of~~in the Vesuvius area, such as Pompeii, were
166 expanding rapidly, ~~knowing about the disasters of the Roman era, but rapidly~~with its citizens having
167 to deal with the adverse forces generated by the volcanic nature of the area. While in historical times
168 (starting from the former ~~civilized~~civilised human settlements), the Campi Flegrei caldera and the
169 island of Ischia generated small eruptions, the Vesuvius, ~~on the contrary~~contrarily, demonstrated its
170 power with the 79 A.D. eruption, which seriously affected the cities of Pompei and Ercolano and the
171 southern part of the volcano (Giacomelli et al., 2003). During the longest period of expansion of the
172 Western Roman Empire, the cities around the volcanoes had expanded progressively. The volcanic
173 activity of Ischia ~~of~~in the early centuries before Christ and its insular nature had, however, contained
174 its demographic expansion. On the other ~~side~~hand, the quiescence of the Campi Flegrei in eruptive
175 terms did not ~~mean~~imply that the volcanic nature of these places had been forgotten; the continuous

176 puffs of steam and the hot thermal springs ~~being a clear sign of that. But~~ served as haunting symbols.
177 ~~However~~, in the minds of ~~the~~ people at least, the hostile nature of these places, sometimes sinister,
178 was associated with the mood of ~~the~~ gods, and not the actual nature of the area itself (Carlino, 2019).
179 In this ~~emerge~~ emerged the ~~vision~~ perception of ~~the~~ natural ~~disaster~~ disasters as a ~~divine~~
180 ~~punishment~~ punishments for humankind, a ~~vision which~~ view that remained rooted in ~~the~~ culture of
181 ~~people~~ up to the 17th century (Cocco, 2012). ~~Starting from~~ With Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) era, ~~),~~
182 a gradual change ~~of~~ in the approach to the study of ~~the Earth Science~~ earth science and the risk related
183 to natural phenomena ~~took place~~ occurred.

184 A crucial moment in the history of volcanic risk in ~~the~~ Neapolitan area ~~took place~~ came in 1631 when,
185 after a long ~~period of~~ quiescence, Vesuvius awoke with an explosive (sub-plinian) eruption,
186 beginning an almost continuous eruptive activity that ~~only~~ ceased ~~only~~ in 1944 at the end of World
187 War II (Cocco, 2012; Kilburn & McGuire, 2001; Rosi et al., 1993; ~~Kilburn and McGuire, 2001;~~
188 ~~Cocco, 2012~~). However, here too a theological meaning was attributed to this calamitous event, as an
189 expiation of punishments ~~and, in.~~ In this sense, the eruption of 1631 ~~represented a~~
190 ~~symbolies~~ symbolised an event, ~~which affected that,~~ in the coming centuries, ~~affected~~ not only
191 volcanology but also other political, sociological, literary, and, above all, religious disciplines (Scarth,
192 2009). Although ~~the 17th century was~~ Aristotelian science still dominated by ~~Aristotelian culture in the~~
193 ~~17th century~~, it was also the beginning of its end as a result of the works of the Galileans and
194 Cartesians (Fiorentino, 2015). ~~It was a~~ The period of ~~great~~ witnessed immense cultural
195 transformations, with new impulses in the field of scientific research ~~coming from~~ with the
196 introduction of the experimental method by Galileo Galilei (Rossi, 2020). ~~A further~~ Further support
197 and impetus to the scientific revolution ~~was provided~~ were lent by the foundation of the Royal Society
198 of London in 1662 and of Académie Royale des Sciences in Paris.

199 Actually, the ~~Vesuvius~~ eruption of 1631 ~~of Vesuvius~~ was the first event ~~which that~~ focused ~~the~~
200 attention on the problem of volcanic risk. In fact, the suggestion to mitigate the volcanic risk at
201 Vesuvius was ~~first~~ formally proposed ~~for the first time~~ by the viceroy of Naples, Emmanuele Fonseca,
202 in 1632. The viceroy placed an epigraph in the town of Portici (in the Granatello area), inviting the
203 local population to abandon the Vesuvius area and recalling the catastrophic effects of the 1631
204 eruption. Many years later, for this inscription, the expression “*the paradox of Granatello*” was
205 coined by Nazzaro (2001). ~~It refers), referring~~ to the ~~attitude~~ reluctance of ~~Vesuvius residents~~
206 ~~not~~ Vesuvians to consider the risk (Nazzaro, 2001; Gugg, 2018).

207 The continuous activity of Vesuvius pushed many scholars and artists to visit the volcano (during the
208 famous Grand Tour epoch) and, at the urging of few intellectuals, the idea of ~~founding~~ a volcano
209 observatory ~~was born~~ gradually ~~was born~~ (Luongo, 1997). ~~In particular~~ Particularly, an important

210 ~~incentive to this idea~~impetus came from Sir William Hamilton (1730–1803), who arrived in Naples
211 in 1764 as the British “Envoy Extraordinary to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies”. Hamilton’s amateur
212 activity inspired the intuition of active volcano surveillance and later, in 1841 (under the Bourbon
213 Kingdom), the first volcanological observatory in the world was founded, the Vesuvius Observatory
214 (Cubellis et al., 2015). It was a great moment for the Neapolitan School of Volcanology. ~~In that~~
215 ~~period~~Then, the interest of this new institution was mainly devoted to the observation of the eruptive
216 activity and to the development of new instruments to monitor the volcano dynamic, such as the
217 electromagnetic seismograph designed by Luigi Palmieri (1855–1896) (Palmieri, 1880). Thus, the
218 attention was mainly ~~posed on~~directed at the volcanic hazard.

219 Later on, with the increase of population, the problem of volcanic risk ~~became~~grew critical, because
220 of the exponential increase of the exposed value. The increase of population ~~which experienced in~~
221 Neapolitan volcanic district was possibly sustainable, ~~in~~with respect to volcanic risk, up to the
222 economic boom of Italy, ~~which followed following~~ the Second World War (Carlino, 2019).
223 Immediately after this war, western ~~civilization faced~~civilisation suffered a long ~~period of~~ economic
224 crisis. A global-scale response to the crisis was the activation of the Marshall Plan (the European
225 Recovery Program, lasting from April 1948 to December 1951), whose aim was the creation of stable
226 economic conditions ~~in order~~ to guarantee the survival of democratic institutions. The plan
227 contributed to the renewal of the western European chemical, engineering, and steel industries and to
228 a rise in gross national products ~~of~~ between 15 and 25% (The Marshal ~~Plan~~Plan;
229 <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/marshall-plan-1>). The demographic increase in the
230 province of Naples and the consequent expansion of urban areas since the end of the Second World
231 War have been largely influenced by the country’s economic choices following the Industrial
232 Revolution, a process ~~that began~~beginning in the 19th century. For instance, the first mechanical
233 plants began in Pozzuoli in Campi Flegrei where, in 1885, a factory for the construction of naval
234 artillery was ~~opened~~set up. The increase of population and postwar industrial activity mainly involved
235 the Vesuvius area, ~~and~~ in conjunction with the volcano’s quiescent state following its most recent
236 eruption in 1944 (Carlino, 2019). The Campi Flegrei were also affected by a migratory flow (albeit
237 to a lesser extent) particularly in the districts of Fuorigrotta and Bagnoli (located inside the caldera),
238 ~~where there was~~reflecting a strong phase of urban growth, especially following the expansion of the
239 Bagnoli industrial area in 1954 (Andriello et al., 1991). The social and environmental change within
240 the Campi Flegrei area had been drastic and often sudden, but the area around Vesuvius was even
241 more badly affected. This latter came under attack from ~~wild~~dramant “cementification” not following
242 any town planning criteria, especially concerning the volcanic risk. In the westernmost sector of the
243 volcano, at the border with the eastern outskirts of Naples, oil refineries and various mechanical
244 industries were developed along the coastal strip, while between Portici and Torre Annunziata,

245 residential areas ~~increased~~expanded enormously (D'Aprile, 2014). Agricultural land in many areas
246 was converted into construction sites so that the landscape of farming and forestry use was
247 transformed into a typically urban, densely populated environment, ~~elating~~strongly contrasting
248 sharply with Vesuvius in the background ~~of Vesuvius~~. Between ~~1950~~the 1950s and ~~the~~ 1990s, the
249 entire Vesuvius area witnessed uncontrolled speculative building with an exponential increase in
250 residential areas, so as to make ~~unrecognizable~~unrecognisable the boundaries between the towns that,
251 especially in the coastal sector, became merely an expanse of housing and villas (~~Luongo, 1997;~~
252 Carlino, 2019; Luongo, 1997). In the whole metropolitan area belonging to Naples, an increase of
253 1,000,000 residents occurred between 1950 and 1980 (Censimento Popolazione Città Metropolitana
254 Napoli, 1861–2001). In this chaotic growth, the architectural beauties around Vesuvius ~~left~~
255 ~~over~~leftover from the time of the Grand Tour, the historic villas, were engulfed and new buildings
256 covered the lava flows arising from Vesuvius's most recent activity (Lancaster, 2008). This was a
257 bad sign of the decline of local culture and of the corruption of the political establishment (Berdini,
258 2010; Curci et al., 2018).

259 With the onset of ~~globalization~~globalisation and the expansion of international markets, the industrial
260 activities in the areas of Campi Flegrei ~~proved~~went bankrupt. This ~~led to the definitive closure~~
261 ~~of~~definitively closed Bagnoli's industrial district in 1992 ~~and~~leading to an attempt to reclaim the area,
262 with numerous halts and course changes ~~in course, but also,~~ taking place in the sector east of the city
263 of Naples, closer to Vesuvius. Meanwhile, the unbroken quiescence of Vesuvius, ~~which has continued~~
264 ~~unbroken~~ since 1944, gradually transformed the volcano from a perceived ~~condition of~~ risk to ~~that~~
265 ~~of~~ a "passive" actor in the landscape. This step resulted in inevitable demographic growth that did
266 not take the security implications into account while the boom in the construction industry ~~produced~~
267 ~~the extension of~~extended the cities around the volcano with increasingly invasive settlements.
268 Between 1950 and 1981, ~~in~~ the town of Portici alone, now one of the most densely ~~populated~~ places
269 in the world, saw the population ~~rose~~rise from just over 30,000 to about 84,000 (ISTAT Censimento
270 popolazione e abitazioni). The ~~extension of the~~ cities around Vesuvius ~~took place~~extended
271 centripetally, approaching more and more frequently the areas ~~that have been~~ repeatedly affected by
272 recent eruptions. If the quiescence of Vesuvius has caused a progressive decline in the perception of
273 volcanic risk, the territorial management policies until the end of the last century, ~~have~~ continuously
274 postponed to posterity the issue of the risks involved in spite of the continual efforts of the scientific
275 community (Carlino et al., 2008). Only ~~in~~ relatively ~~recent time~~recently, following the unrest ~~which~~
276 ~~affected in~~ the Campi Flegrei caldera in 1982–84, scientists, local authorities and the Civil Protection
277 faced the problem of excessive anthropic pressure in the Neapolitan volcanic area, but an organic
278 plan for ~~the decongestion~~decongesting one of the ~~most~~ areas of the greatest volcanic risk is still
279 lacking.

3. The last experience of volcanic emergency in the Neapolitan district: Pozzuoli 1970–1984

A fundamental moment in the history of volcano emergency in Campania ~~is was~~ the episode of volcanic unrest of Campi Flegrei caldera ~~which affected~~ affecting the town of Pozzuoli in 1970–72 and 1982–84, respectively. During those years, the ground of the town experienced the maximum cumulative uplift of about 3 meters, ~~pushing forcing~~ the local authorities to evacuate the town, during both ~~the~~ episodes (Barberi et al., 1984). By the beginning of the 1970s, the phenomenon of *bradyseism* (a Greek origin word which describes the up and down movement of the ground) was largely forgotten, since the last time it had occurred ~~was~~ more than 400 years before, when an uplift of about 20 m culminated in the eruption of Monte Nuovo in 1538, the most recent volcanic event at Campi Flegrei (Di Vito et al., 2016). In 1970, monitoring networks for volcano surveillance did not exist in the area, ~~and the onset of the uplift was initially observed by local fishermen.~~ In fact, the inversion in the movement of the ground, was ~~signaled~~ signalled by fishermen, who suddenly managed to pass with their small boats beneath an arch at the entrance of the small ~~harbor~~ harbour of Pozzuoli while standing, while it had normally been necessary to bend down (Carlino, 2019). The uplift, in the first phase, was almost aseismic, while the Vesuvius Observatory, decided to undertake a new elevation survey, ~~which was~~ performed by the engineers of the Genio Civile, to estimate the real amount of the ground uplift. The results ~~showed~~ indicated that the floor of the Serapeum of Pozzuoli (a ruin of an ancient Roman market) had risen by about 0.70 m since the last surveys, and that the area affected by this phenomenon included the entire town (Longo, 2019; Luongo, 2013; Longo, 2019). The concern about the volcano uplift focused the attention on the hazard related to a possible eruption. ~~There was not a common opinion~~ no consensus among scientists; thus, scientific meetings took place to understand the ~~way in which~~ possible evolution of the phenomenon might ~~evolve~~ and the associated volcanic risk. Experts ~~likesuch as~~ the volcanologists Alfred Rittman and Izumi Yokoyama participated in the debate together with the researchers of Vesuvius Observatory. However, the physical model adopted by the Japanese researchers associated the observed uplift with a high probability of an eruption. In 1972, the ~~center~~ centre of Pozzuoli was evacuated, although the unrest was ~~characterized~~ characterised by a modest seismic activity, while the maximum uplift was about 1.7 m and ended without eruption (Yokoyama, 1970). The evacuees were placed in the new Toiano district, whose construction was accelerated during the final stages of ~~the~~ bradyseismic episode. The 1970–72 bradyseism crisis, possibly was not handled in a transparent way, and this experience was ~~made more complex~~ complicated by the lack of sufficient knowledge about the

314 physics of the volcano phenomenon (Longo, 2019). ~~This last fact, joined along~~ with the virtual
315 ~~absence of a monitoring network,~~ determined the decision to evacuate the ~~center~~centre of Pozzuoli,
316 ~~although the perceptible signs of a possible eruption were low, while and~~ all the local residents
317 ~~criticized~~criticised this decision. Nonetheless, it was during that period that ~~the Earth Science~~earth
318 ~~science~~ experienced new important studies and projects ~~which,~~ also ~~strengthened~~strengthening the
319 ~~monitoring networks and the assessment of seismic and volcanic hazard~~hazards in the ~~World~~world.

320 Following the Campi Flegrei caldera unrest of 1970–72, the Italian peninsula was severely tested
321 with the devastating earthquakes of Friuli in 1976 (leaving about 1,000 people dead and more than
322 100,000 displaced) and the one in Campania-Basilicata in 1980 (with about 3,000 deaths and 280,000
323 dis- placed) (Boschi ~~and~~& Bordieri, 1998). ~~Subsequent to these events~~Subsequently, a National Civil
324 Protection service was established in Italy. Thus, when a new bradyseismic crisis occurred in Pozzuoli
325 in 1982, the scientific community and the national and local authorities were better prepared to
326 ~~face~~handle the emergency (Luongo, 2013). The Vesuvius Observatory had strengthened its
327 surveillance network so that, ~~over the course of~~throughout 1972–1981, it was possible to record a
328 tendency to ground subsidence, and a new uplift in 1982. In the summer of that year, it became clear
329 that a new episode of bradyseism was underway (Cannatelli et al., 2020). ~~This episode~~It was most
330 dramatic compared to the previous one. Continuous and significant seismic activity was recorded
331 since spring 1983. Pozzuoli was shaken by hundreds of seismic events a day, while the population
332 was frightened by the roars ~~that accompanied~~accompanying the earthquakes and the continued
333 ground movements which wrought widespread damage on the city's ancient buildings. A further
334 ~~increasing~~increase of seismic activity occurred between September and October 1983, ~~reaching its~~
335 ~~peak~~peaking on 4th October with a shallow magnitude 4.0 earthquake, ~~causing~~spreading panic among
336 the population, damaging several buildings in the historic ~~center~~centre of Pozzuoli and being clearly
337 felt in Naples (Branno et al., 1984). The ground uplift in the Pozzuoli area reached a maximum rate
338 of the order of centimetres per day. The main concern about the situation was primarily related to the
339 ~~building's damages~~damage to the buildings caused by the shallow earthquakes (2–3 km in depth).
340 Accordingly, the Vesuvius Observatory and the National Group for Volcanology, responsible for
341 surveillance, presented a seismic hazard map of the Phlegraean area, ~~showing~~demonstrating that the
342 level of risk in the historical ~~center~~centre of Pozzuoli had become very high, especially because of
343 the high vulnerability of the buildings at risk (Luongo, 2013). A further concern ~~was~~ related to the
344 possibility of an eruption, for which the recorded uplift and the seismic activity appeared as clear
345 precursors, although the likelihood of an eruption was considered low by the director of the Vesuvius
346 Observatory. On 1st April 1984, a new dramatic seismic crisis, with continuous swarms throughout
347 the morning, hit the town of Pozzuoli. At this stage, the problem of the evacuation was faced, also
348 considering the possibility of an eruption ~~occurrence~~—inside the caldera of Campi Flegrei. In

349 collaboration with the Central Government, the evacuation plan was drawn up and, following the
350 meetings between monitoring staff and civil ~~defensed~~defence authorities it was decided to evacuate
351 about 25,000 people from the ~~center~~centre of Pozzuoli. The evacuees were relocated ~~into~~ the new
352 settlement area of Monteruscello, which was built in a few years, a few ~~kilometers~~kilometres north-
353 west of the centre of Pozzuoli, considered a safer area than the coastal strip.

354 During the 1984 emergency, an effective communication system was established between the
355 monitors, the Civil Protection Service and the citizenry, and the crisis was handled with maximum
356 transparency, especially in light of the 1970 experience (Luongo, 2013). ~~In particular~~Particularly, the
357 ~~activation of a~~ monitoring info-~~center~~centre, close to Pozzuoli, was ~~opened~~activated to ensure ~~at~~the
358 correct management and spreading of information about the ongoing events. Meanwhile, ~~while~~as the
359 plan was ~~actualized~~actualised the unrest seemed to decrease in intensity, and in December 1984 the
360 uplifting and seismic activity ceased, marking the end of the crisis (Barberi ~~and~~& Carapezza, 1996).
361 Pozzuoli remained for few years like a “ghost town”, ~~meanwhile~~ while local and central
362 ~~government~~governments were deciding ~~about~~on the future of the city. Pozzuoli was later rebuilt
363 without limiting the anthropic pressure that should have been contained within thresholds that would
364 make the volcanic risk acceptable. Today, the municipality of Pozzuoli has about 82,000 residents,
365 ~~and it represents~~representing a coveted residential site for Neapolitan people.

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369 **4. The debate about the volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area**

370 The subject of volcanic risk, and its mitigation, in the Neapolitan area has very important implications
371 because this zone involves at least 1,500,000 people who are potentially exposed to a very large
372 eruption (Mastrolorenzo et al., 2006). Otherwise, ~~giving~~given the long history of volcanic risk in the
373 Neapolitan area and the ~~present~~current very high risk of the area, two preliminary inquiries are
374 required: i) can we find a new paradigm or an alternative plan to reduce the high risk ~~of the area~~? and
375 ii) how ~~is it~~ feasible is it in the Neapolitan area? We ~~don't~~do not have a unique response to the
376 questions, but, to ~~analyze~~analyse the issue, we have to ~~go back~~again ~~revert~~revert to the last Campi Flegrei
377 caldera unrest ~~occurred~~ between 1982 and 1984, ~~and culminated~~culminating in the evacuation of the
378 town of Pozzuoli (Barberi ~~and~~& Carapezza, 1996). After this event, a strong debate ensued (among
379 scientists, citizens and politicians) about the possible solutions to reduce the volcanic risk in the
380 densely inhabited Neapolitan area ~~took place~~.

381 Between 1980 and 1990, the problem of volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area was ~~faeed~~considered by
382 the National Group of Volcanology (GNV) (see De Vivo et al., 2010 and references therein), while
383 the one of territorial planning was discussed during several Italian workshops, and the few solutions
384 ~~were~~ focused primarily on two ~~main~~ actions (Leone, 1987; Ulisse, 1984): i) the short-term one with
385 the preparation of the evacuation plans, ii) the long-~~term~~ one, which provided the actions and
386 methods, aimed to reduce the demographic pressure in the riskiest areas. As highlighted by Leone
387 (1987), the latter is not ~~a simply actions~~simple, because it ~~doesn't represent a~~cannot be forced ~~action~~,
388 while ~~it would be necessary to develop~~developing a new ~~organizational~~organisational set-up of the
389 whole Campania Region would be necessary by planning a “new geography” of the services industry
390 and ~~of~~ the productive activities, allowing a spontaneous relocation of the residents from the risk areas.

391 After the last Campi Flegrei caldera unrest, ended in 1984, the volcano ~~became rests~~rested again (up
392 to 2005), but not the debate about volcanic risk. Later, ~~to respond~~responding to the solicitations and
393 concerns ~~coming~~emanating from the scientific and institutional world, and following the foundation
394 of the Italian Civil Protection, the attention was mainly ~~posed~~focused on ~~the~~ Vesuvius, ~~which is~~ the
395 most inhabited volcano of the district. The volcanic risk in this area was evaluated by Scandone et
396 al., (1993), in terms of human losses, and according to the equation: $Risk = Exposed\ Value \times$
397 $Vulnerability \times Hazard$ (Blong, 1996). The authors evaluated the hazard based on the entire history
398 of the volcano and identified the events likely to cause loss of human lives as those with Volcanic
399 Explosivity Index (VEI) $> \sim 3$. Later on, the first evacuation plan for the Vesuvius area was released
400 by the Civil Protection in 1995.

401 After its foundation in 1999, the Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV) became the
402 reference scientific institution for the Civil Protection, to ~~provide~~assess the ~~assessment of~~ volcanic
403 hazard and ~~its continuous updating~~continuously update it for Neapolitan volcanoes. As ~~regard~~
404 theregards Vesuvius, the extension of the most hazardous zone (i.e. the Red Zone) involves about
405 600,000 inhabitants ~~which, who~~ must be evacuated in case of eruption (Protezione Civile: Update of
406 the National Emergency Plan for Vesuvius). The extension of the Red Zone was obtained considering
407 a medium energy scenario for the next eruption (a sub-plinian eruption) ~~like that occurred~~such as the
408 one in 1631. -The emergency plan for Vesuvius foresees, ~~that~~ a part of the population spontaneously
409 ~~moves~~moving away from the Red Zone during the pre-alarm phase (Fig. 1). Depending on the state
410 of the volcano, the actions to be taken are defined within the emergency plan by the different levels
411 of ~~alert~~alertness in which the scientific and monitoring activities are decided upon depending on the
412 assessment of the hazard. The lowest level (a “green” alert level) corresponds to the quiescence of
413 the volcano, during which there are no significant changes in the parameters being monitored. If these
414 changes are detected, however, the protocol provides for a transition to a level of attention (“yellow”),

415 during which there is an intensification of monitoring activities and a more frequent assessment of
416 the condition of the volcano by the Civil Protection agency and the Italian Commissione Grandi
417 Rischi (Major Risks Commission). The levels above this are those of pre-alarm (“orange”) and alarm
418 (“red”), which, for the latter, ~~involves~~involve the evacuation of the population from the Red Zone.
419 The Vesuvius evacuation plan has been updated and modified during the time. At ~~the~~ present, at least
420 three days (compared to the previous three weeks) would be required to ~~allow the effective evacuation~~
421 ~~of~~effectively evacuate 600,000 inhabitants. This should correspond to the actual possibility of
422 forecasting the eruption with this level of forewarning. The last choice was also based on the
423 forecasting experiences of the 1980 Mt. Saint Helens (USA) and 1991 Pinatubo (Philippine) eruptions
424 (~~Swanson et al, 1983~~; Pinatubo Volcano Observatory Team, 1991; Swanson et al, 1983). The plan
425 posed, among the scientific community, a number of concerns and criticisms about the actual
426 possibility of forecasting the next eruption in advance and ~~evacuate~~evacuating at least 600,000 people
427 at risk. In the framework of this debate, an alternative plan to mitigate the volcanic risk of Vesuvius
428 area was proposed by Flavio Dobran (*Vesuvius 2000 plan*, Dobran 2006, 2007). Although the first
429 work of Flavio Dobran was published in 2006, the dissemination of his plan took place a few years
430 earlier, with an intense information campaign around the Vesuvius area. More than an emergency or
431 evacuation plan, *Vesuvius 2000* ~~was a proposal of~~proposed a new paradigm of development to reduce
432 the risk of the area. The main intention of this proposal was “...to produce guidelines for transforming
433 high-risk areas around Vesuvius into safe and prosperous communities. This would be accomplished
434 through interdisciplinary projects involving engineers, environmentalists, urban planners,
435 economists, educators, geologists, sociologists, historians, and the public” (Dobran, 2007). Among
436 the general ~~aim~~aims of *Vesuvius 2000* ~~plan~~plan, the decreasing of the resident population density in
437 the most-risky areas was proposed, as well as improving ~~of~~ the resistance of the buildings to seismic
438 shaking, the quality of infrastructure and the resilience of urban ~~centers~~centres. Furthermore, Dobran
439 (2006, 2007) showed that, ~~giving~~given the strong historical and social connection between “Vesuvius
440 people” and their land, the ~~lightening~~diminishing of urban pressure in most of the risky zones
441 represented a very long-term aim, ~~which needs~~needing a complete social, cultural, urbanistic and
442 economic reconsideration of the Vesuvius area and surroundings. This long-term action will
443 ~~minimize~~minimise the economic and social costs ~~due to~~of the evacuation of people from the red zone
444 in case of an eruption. The great challenge of the ambitious *Vesuvius 2000* plan, was therefore that
445 people ~~living~~ around the volcano acquired the awareness of the environment in which they ~~live~~lived
446 and participated in the solution of this difficult ~~situation~~conundrum (Dobran, 2006).

447 ~~Behind~~After the solution proposed by Dobran (2006, 2007), a wide literature about the methods and
448 the actions devoted to reduction and management of volcanic risk, and also of natural risks in general,
449 was proposed by different authors, and in which most detailed descriptions of the limits of each

450 solution and the ~~cases~~ history ~~are~~ reported (~~Peterson~~~~Barcklay~~ et al., 1993; ~~Newhall and~~
451 ~~Punongbayan, 1996~~, 2008, 2015; Chester et al., 2000; ~~Fearnley et al., 2017; Jenkins & Haynes, 2011;~~
452 ~~Hansjürgens et al., 2008; Hicks et al., 2014; Hossain et al., Small and Naumann, 2001; 2017; Newhall~~
453 ~~& Punongbayan, 1996; Papale, 2017; Peterson et al, 1993; Petrazzuoli and~~ Zuccaro, 2004; ~~Wisner,~~
454 ~~2003;~~ Petrosino et al., 2004; ~~Small & Naumann, 2001;~~ Spence et al., 2007; ~~Hansjürgens et al., 2008;~~
455 ~~Bareklay et al., 2008; 2015; Jenkins and Haynes, 2011; Usamah and~~ Haynes, 2012; ~~Hicks et al.,~~
456 ~~Wisner, 2003~~2014; ~~Hossain et al., 2017; Fearnley et al., 2017; Papale, 2017~~). Furthermore, some of
457 the above researches also demonstrate that a volcanic resettlement program must be directed by
458 meaningful consultation with the impacted community, as also suggested by Dobran (2006),
459 ~~whowhich~~ also shares in the decision making.

460 What happened in the period following the first releasing of the Vesuvius emergency plan and of the
461 alternative paradigm ~~Vesuvius2000~~Vesuvius 2000 proposed by Flavio Dobran? The latter was not
462 welcomed ~~to~~by the political establishment and remained a mere proposal. On the other hand, the
463 former (the institutional one) only partially guaranteed the restraint or decreasing of anthropic
464 pressure around the volcano. To deal with this problem, a new plan called *Vesuvia*
465 (<https://www.viveretraivulcani.it/il-progetto-vesuvia/>) was approved in 2003 by the Campania
466 Region (Legge regionale n. 21/2003, “Legge del Vesuvio”,
467 http://www.sito.regione.campania.it/leggi_regionali2003/lr21_2003.htm). The intent of this project
468 was to lighten the demographic pressure around the Vesuvius volcano. This intent would be promoted
469 by offering economic incentives (up to 30 thousand euros) to the population (living in the red zone)
470 willing to relocate themselves outside the dangerous areas. The project ~~expected~~expects to reduce the
471 number of people living in the red zone over a period of about 20 years by ~~removing~~evacuating at
472 least 100,000 people from this zone (Gugg, 2018). A further aim of *Vesuvia* was also the reconversion
473 of available buildings into tourist reception facilities, ~~in order~~ to create an opportunity of
474 ~~valorization~~valorisation of the great cultural and natural heritage of the Vesuvius volcano.
475 ([http://www.cngeologi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Casa-Italia_Rapporto-sicurezza-rischi](http://www.cngeologi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Casa-Italia_Rapporto-sicurezza-rischi-naturali-patrimonio-abitativo.pdf)
476 ~~naturali-patrimonio-abitativo.pdf~~). ~~After three~~Three years from the launch of the project, there was a
477 reduction of residents in the red zone of only 0.1%, ~~moving~~prompting the promoters of the project to
478 ~~leave~~abandon the ~~endeavor~~. ~~Actually, it~~endeavour. It was a ~~resounding~~ flop. The reasons ~~offor~~ the
479 failure were described by Gugg (2018). Among the reasons reported ~~by the author~~, the lack of
480 involvement of the majors and the local communities in the development of the project was probably
481 the most critical ~~for its flop~~. Additionally, as also described by the *Vesuvius 2000* plan (Dobran 2006,
482 2007), a relocation of people from the red zone outside the Vesuvius volcano is very unlikely ~~laeking~~
483 ~~a~~without long-term economic and social policies ~~which stimulate~~stimulating Vesuvius people to
484 move ~~into~~ safer zones. It is clear that in a complex social, cultural and urban context ~~like~~such as that

485 of Naples and surroundings, the choice to reduce the volcanic risk by relocating a part of people ~~living~~
486 in the red zones (Campi Flegrei and Vesuvius) outside the most-risky areas and by increasing the
487 volcanic perception is a very ~~grueling~~~~gruelling~~ challenge (Carlino, 2019). Furthermore, the policies
488 to improve the vulnerability of edifices against disasters (and reduce the risk) have ~~been~~-rarely been
489 adopted in Italy, as demonstrated for instance by heavy damages suffered by many cities after
490 moderate earthquakes ~~occurred in recent times~~recently (Valensise et al., 2017). The main issues, in
491 this case, are related to the actual perception of risk in general (as well as of volcanic risk in
492 particular), but mainly to the morals and personal profit of politicians in ~~doing~~taking specific actions
493 to reduce the risk and to other social and political problems of the Neapolitan area (~~Luongo, 1997;~~
494 Carlino et al., 2008; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2015; Donovan, 2019; Luongo, 1997). For instance,
495 political timescales generally limit the amount of capital ~~that is~~ invested in the volcanic risk reduction.
496 Basically; as reported by Donovan (2019), “*if a politician is only in power for 4 years*” (and this time
497 is the best case in Italy!) “*the probability of an eruption at a particular volcano within that timeframe*
498 *is usually very low, and so, the personal-political cost-benefit analysis indicates that there are more*
499 *socially acceptable policies to invest in*”. This is possibly one of the main reasons why a long-term
500 plan for ~~the~~-risk reduction such as ~~the one of Vesuvius~~2000 was ~~refused~~rejected by the political
501 establishment. The example reported by Donovan (2019) appears particularly true for the Neapolitan
502 area, where the volcanic risk increased exponentially during the last 50 years, and no policies ~~actions~~
503 have contained this trend. This aspect was also debated by De Vivo et al., (2010) who stated that
504 while the Italian Civil Protection tries to convince people to dislocate from the risk zone, ~~at the same~~
505 ~~time~~-it does not take a stand against the illegal buildings in the red zone. Otherwise, from the
506 institutional point of view, the latter problem does not involve ~~the~~-Civil Protection, because the
507 management control of illegal buildings and their compliance ~~in respect to~~with the seismic risk
508 primarily involves the municipalities (*Decreto Legislativo 18 agosto 2000, n. 267; Testo unico delle*
509 *disposizioni legislative e regolamentari in materia edilizia, d.P.R. n. 380/2001*). In this regard, the
510 seismic risk associated ~~to~~with the volcano-tectonics earthquakes is not neglectable as well, at least
511 for Campi Flegrei and Ischia. A representative case is the Island of Ischia. In 1883, the island was hit
512 by a moderate and shallow earthquake (with magnitude around 4.5, Cubellis and Luongo, 1998),
513 which devastated its northern sector (Casamicciola town) and ~~caused~~had more than 2300 victims
514 (Carlino et al., 2010b). This event was followed by an almost seismic silence, up to 2017. At least
515 during the last 25 years, the scientific community ~~stimulated~~urged the island local authorities and the
516 municipality of Casamicciola to take actions ~~in favor of~~favouring the mitigation of seismic risk in the
517 island (Cubellis and Luongo, 1998; Luongo et al., 2012). ~~But~~However, this message went unnoticed,
518 up to ~~the~~-21 August 2017, when ~~an~~ M_L4.0 ~~earthquake~~earthquake occurred in Casamicciola town
519 and caused 2two victims, tens of injuries and heavy damage in the upper part of the municipality (De
520 Novellis et al., 2018). ~~From~~From the above considerations, it appears that conciliating the emergency

521 plans, ~~the drawing of~~ the red zones of volcanoes, and ~~the regulations regulating~~ for the seismic risk,
522 with the actual economic and land-use planning policies in the Neapolitan area ~~is~~are a hard purpose
523 to attain.

524 Recently, in August 2016, the emergency planning for the volcanic risk of the Campi Flegrei was
525 updated (Protezione Civile: Update of the National Emergency Plan for Campi Flegrei), and the area
526 of the new Red Zone to be evacuated as a precautionary measure in case of an eruption, was defined,
527 together with the Yellow Zone, ~~that~~which is potentially exposed to a high concentration of falling ash
528 (Fig. 1). As for Vesuvius, the Red Zone and the Yellow Zone were defined by the Civil Protection,
529 in agreement with the Campania Region, and based on the indications provided by the scientific
530 community. As a whole, and considering that ~~the~~an emergency plan for the island of Ischia (Gulf of
531 Naples) is still lacking, about 1,000,000 ~~of~~ people could be directly affected by a moderate to large
532 eruption (VEI 3–4) in the red zones of Campi Flegrei and Vesuvius, respectively. The high number
533 of people exposed to the risk, and the uncertainty in eruptions forecasting (Sparks, 2003), ~~pushed~~
534 motivated some authors to ~~criticize~~criticise the evacuation plans and the ~~policies of~~ risk reduction
535 policies in the Neapolitan district (~~Rolandi, 2010;~~ De Natale et al., 2020). ~~In particular;~~ Rolandi,
536 2010). Particularly and recently, De Natale et al., (2020) have questioned ~~about~~ how the very high
537 volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area can be effectively mitigated. The authors focused the attention
538 on two ~~problems related to the~~ evacuation-related problems: i) the extremely high number of people
539 to evacuate in case of an impending eruption; ii) the lack of plans today to ~~reallocate~~rehabilitate such
540 a high number of evacuated people (600,000 and 700,000 for Campi Flegrei Caldera and Vesuvius,
541 respectively). The analysis of De Natale et al., (2020) is not new, since their main conclusions, as
542 well as ~~and the~~ weak pointsweaknesses they highlighted in respect to the present emergency plans,
543 were already stated by other authors, and in particular by Dobran (2006, 2007, *Vesuvius 2000* plan).
544 It is important to highlight that some works ~~criticizing~~criticising the evacuation plans (~~Dobran 2006;~~
545 ~~De Natale et al., 2020);~~ Dobran 2006) do not exclude their effectiveness if a number of actions to
546 mitigate the risk ~~is~~are carried on. Unfortunately, what we have seen during the last 40 years of
547 volcanic risk management in the Neapolitan area, is a predominance of ~~the~~ emergency policies in ~~the~~
548 respect to that of prevention. The result is that the present volcanic risk, givinggiven the current high
549 values of society, appears non-acceptable.

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5. The role of volcanologists

In the framework of the discussed topics, a fundamental issue is the role ~~that of~~ volcanologists ~~must have~~ in managing volcanic risk and ~~volcanic~~ crises. It was, in many cases, misinterpreted by people living in ~~the~~ Neapolitan area. The role and responsibilities of volcanologists in volcanic hazard evaluation, risk mitigation, and crisis response have been ~~treated~~ outlined by the International Association for Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior (IAVCEI). Their main responsibility is to improve the scientific knowledge of volcanoes to better understand how they work and provide ~~the~~ most robust eruption forecasts, and to educate the local and global community (mainly exposed to eruptions) to the volcanic risk, making people more perceptive ~~against of~~ the risk itself. The latter is fundamental to ~~get a good~~ evoke an amenable response from people to an evacuation (IAVCEI, 2016). Anyway, the main task of volcanologists ~~remains is~~ to provide as robust a forecast ~~as more robust as possible~~ of an eruption as possible. It is well-known how problematic it is to obtain a clear picture ~~about of~~ the progression of volcano processes during unrests and to understand ~~which is what~~ the actual state of the volcano is (critical state or not). In general (but not always), as the eruption ~~is approaching~~ approaches the number and ~~the~~ amplitude (or energy) of geophysical and geochemical signals increases ~~and~~, the uncertainty in the forecast should decrease (Carlino, 2019; Decker, 1986; Kilburn, 2003; Sparks, 2003; Robertson et al., 2016; Sparks, 2003; Sparks and Cashman, 2017; Carlino, 2019;) (Fig. 4). An unsolved question is whether, and ~~in~~ ~~which at what~~ moment, the volcano approaches the critical state during an unrest; that is the moment ~~in which when~~ the physical processes occurring within the volcano are irreversible; and the volcano ~~will erupt~~ erupts (Fig. 4). This is the most critical issue, because the promulgation of a false alarm or a missed alarm, will adversely affect 600,000 ~~to~~ 1,500,000 ~~of~~ people ~~leaving~~ living in ~~the~~ Neapolitan area (De Natale et al., 2020). During the last 20 years, the monitoring networks for the surveillance of ~~the~~ Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei and Ischia volcanoes have been greatly improved, reaching one of the best ~~standard~~ standards worldwide (www.ov.ingv.it). This effort should correspond to a reduction of the uncertainty in forecasting the next eruption, although it depends on the capacity of volcanologists to correctly decipher the volcano signals. Beyond the efforts of scientists to improve their understanding of volcanic processes and ~~providing~~ provide more robust forecasts, ~~it is~~ fundamental to communicate communicating the systemic uncertainty of the forecast to the public. is fundamental. This can be done ~~in an effective fashion~~ effectively only ~~if with~~ a proficient direct communication network between volcanologists and the media ~~is provided~~ (Haynes et al, 2008). This is also a very important topic, particularly when the communication of an ongoing volcanic crisis involves large ~~metropolitans'~~ metropolitan areas like Naples and ~~its~~ surroundings. The example of what occurred during the 1982–84 unrest is emblematic ~~in of~~ this view. During that crisis, a unique channel of communication was established between the ~~direction of~~ Vesuvius Observatory and the

588 press, while the observatory was continuously ~~in communication~~communicating with the Minister
589 for the Coordination of the Civil Protection (Luongo, 2013). The activation of the information
590 ~~center~~centre for the citizens of Pozzuoli and the straight link between the latter and the direction of
591 the Vesuvius Observatory, generated ~~more~~confidence among people. How would it have ~~gone~~returned
592 ~~out~~ if the same crisis had happened today? The unrest and the evacuation at Pozzuoli occurred in ~~a~~
593 ~~period~~an era without ~~the~~ internet and social media (~~like~~Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp) which,
594 nowadays, represent the main ~~and quicker~~rapid dissemination channels of news and information. ~~The~~
595 ~~social~~Social media ~~platforms~~ are ~~a disruptor~~disruptors of traditional communication, opening up new
596 opportunities for scientists to communicate (Dong et al., 2020) but, on the other ~~side, giving~~hand,
597 ~~bestowing~~ the right to evaluate or ~~criticize~~criticise scientific decisions ~~to~~on everyone. This could lead
598 to misinterpretations or distortions of scientific broadcasts and information and, consequently, to false
599 alarms or unjustified panic among the population, in case of a volcanic crisis. This circumstance,
600 albeit not related to a volcanic crisis, occurred ~~in recent time,~~recently before the
601 ~~starting~~commencement of the Campi Flegrei Deep Drilling Project, at Campi Flegrei, a project aimed
602 ~~to~~ scientifically ~~investigate~~investigating the caldera (Carlino, 2019). The project worried many local
603 residents about the possible disturbance ~~which~~that the scientific drilling would ~~cause on~~unleash in
604 the volcanic system. Just before the onset of the drilling, the declarations ~~that continued to~~
605 ~~spread~~spreading on social networks and newspapers ~~became~~assumed an increasingly
606 ~~catastrophic~~alarming tone (sometimes ~~at~~to the limit of the paradoxical) such as to seriously worry the
607 municipal administration of Naples, which had ~~issued clearance for~~cleared the drilling. The climax
608 was reached ~~on~~in October 2010, when the national newspaper “Il Mattino” led with the front-page
609 title: “If you touch the volcano, Naples will explode” (Carlino, 2019, page 265). The project was
610 temporarily suspended by the ~~Naples~~ administration of Naples to further clarify its aim and associated
611 risk. This fact highlights that the position of ~~volcanologist~~volcanologists in communicating the hazard
612 and the risk in densely inhabited ~~areas~~regions like Naples, is very tricky because the communication
613 occurs within a complex social system where many people exposed to the risk are involved.
614 Furthermore, a number of studies ~~demonstrates~~demonstrate that ~~Neapolitan people~~Neapolitans have
615 a low perception of risk and a low level of risk education (Carlino et al., 2010b; Ricci et al., 2013).

616 As a whole, beyond the effort that scientists are ~~sinking~~expending to improve the robustness of ~~the~~
617 volcanic eruptions forecast, a further effort is necessary to promulgate the culture of volcanic risk and
618 promote open debates with the local population and authorities. In other words, volcanologists should
619 be more present on the territory (not only during an ongoing volcanic unrest) and they should be an
620 open book, not an acquired skill (~~Goodstain, 2010;~~Fearnley et al., 2017; Goodstain, 2010). This
621 approach is fundamental to ~~improve~~improving the confidence of people in a scientific institution such
622 ~~that of~~as INGV.

623

624 6. Conclusions

625 The past experiences concerning the management of volcanic risk in the Neapolitan area reveal ~~how~~
626 ~~complex is to devise~~ the complexity of devising a collaboration around the active volcanoes of
627 Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei caldera and Ischia Island to reduce the risk in such densely inhabited areas.
628 The history of volcanic risk in this area demonstrates the ~~leaning~~ tendency to not ~~to~~ consider, or to
629 underestimate, the risk (which otherwise is ~~ana human~~ attitude-of human-being). Nonetheless, we
630 cannot ~~constraint~~ reduce the problem of the high volcanic risk of the Neapolitan area to this latter
631 consideration only. The present development of the ~~urbanized~~ urbanised areas around the volcanoes
632 of Naples is the result of a very long history and stratification of different cultures and population
633 ~~which~~ populations that settled the Neapolitan area and its surroundings as a ~~nie~~ mesenic and useful
634 place to live, since the Bronze Age. This history left a huge cultural heritage in its wake but also a
635 ~~difficult~~ demanding socio-~~economy~~ economic condition, especially around Vesuvius. Thus, as also
636 highlighted by Galliard (2008), in many cases the historical and cultural heritage and political-
637 economy remain of much greater importance and may ~~overcome~~ override the choice of people in the
638 face of volcanic hazards. This fact ~~emphasizes~~ emphasises the importance of understanding the
639 complex contexts of the Neapolitan area in proposing ~~the~~ policies to reduce ~~the~~ volcanic risk. It
640 appears evident, for instance, that the choice of people not to relocate themselves outside the red zone
641 of Vesuvius, and to remain in their native towns, despite the perceived threats, has little to do with
642 volcanic activity. This point, already discussed by Galliard (2008), suggests that, in such a complex
643 social context, the policies for volcanic risk mitigation need to go far beyond ~~the~~ only prevention of
644 relatively rare events. A different and more general approach is thus required, and ~~it should be aimed~~
645 ~~to a~~ rational access and the use of resources ~~in order~~ to adapt the social and economic development
646 of the area to its natural vocation: should be aimed at. This is a long-term objective ~~which~~
647 ~~conflicts~~ conflicting with the short-~~lived (and not forward thinking)~~ sighted policies adopted by the
648 Campania Region and the Central Government. Consequently, the proposals to re-convert the riskiest
649 areas of Neapolitan volcanoes into lower-~~risk~~ zones using a different (and long-term) paradigm of
650 development (e.g. Dobran, 2006, 2007) are struggling ~~taking to take~~ off. ~~At the same~~
651 ~~time~~ Simultaneously, the proposed economic-~~incentives~~ (*Vesuvia* project) to relocate people from the
652 red zone (at Vesuvius) towards ~~more safety~~ safer areas was a failure as well. Accordingly, these
653 failures first have to do with a wrong territorial policy, and secondly with the volcanology.

654 Furthermore, at least during the last 25 years, the policies for the reduction of volcanic risk in the
655 Neapolitan area have been disconnected from their natural, social and politico-economic context.
656 This is ~~possible~~ possibly the result of a not so holistic approach to the problem of volcanic risk

657 reduction which, ~~in particular~~particularly in this area, is unavoidable and, on the contrary, requires an
658 openly ~~discuss~~discussed method between academics of all disciplines, policymakers, and
659 stakeholders (Donovan, 2019). Finally, after about 40 years of debates around the volcanic risk in the
660 Neapolitan area, an analysis of the reasons why the strategies aimed to reduce the risk in this area
661 ~~were~~ systematically failed is required. This step is necessary to propose more reliable solutions for
662 the risk reduction in a -very large and ~~urbanized~~urbanised territory ~~like~~such as that of Neapolitan
663 volcanoes. A further effort is also required by Neapolitan scientists to connect the territorial
664 governance structures and local (at risk) communities ~~with~~to the scientific network. In this
665 framework, ~~scientists must pay~~ further attention ~~of scientists must be addressed~~ to avoid ~~to politicize~~
666 ~~the politicisation of~~ volcanology ~~in~~when advising the authorities (Donovan, 2019).

667 **Data availability:** No datasets were used in this article.

668 **Competing interests of interest:** The author declares that he has no conflict.

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671 the handling of the paper.

672

673 Figure captions

674 Fig. 1. The Neapolitan volcanic area with the three active volcanoes, Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei caldera
675 and the Island of Ischia. The limits of the red zones of the evacuation plans for Vesuvius and Campi
676 Flegrei caldera are reported, respectively (from www.protezionecivile.gov). More than 1,000,000 of
677 people are living in both the red zones. A plan for the island of Ischia is currently in progress (base
678 map is from Google Earth).

679 Fig. 2. A timeline of the volcanic activity history at Vesuvius, Campi Flegrei and Ischia Island. The
680 most known eruptions are reported. Red and blue color indicates increasing and decreasing of
681 volcanic activity, respectively.

682 Fig. 3. The city of Naples with the location of the eruptive vents associated with different eruptive
683 periods. The dotted line represents the eastern boundary of the caldera of Campi Flegrei (modified
684 after Scarpati et al., 2013 and Carlino, 2019; base map is from Google Earth).

685 Fig. 4. A qualitative sketch describing the possible state of a volcano approaching an eruption and its
686 forecast reliability. For a quiescent volcano the reawakening is generally associated with the onset of

687 seismic activity indicating the variation of stress field within the volcano. The latter is generally due
688 to circulation of pressurized fluids in the crust and, eventually, to magma migration at shallow level.
689 This dynamic is accompanied by others precursors (ground deformations and variation of fluids
690 emission) which make the forecast more reliable as the eruption is approached. The point at which
691 the volcano overcomes the critical state, is the moment (t_c) in which the physical processes occurring
692 within the volcano are irreversible, that is to say the volcano will erupt. Volcanologists cannot predict
693 the time (t_c) because the processes are chaotic and the forecast has a probabilistic nature (after,
694 Carlino, 2019).

695

696 **Figures**



697

698 **Fig.1**

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
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
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


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Fig.2



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Fig. 3



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Fig.4

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