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Vulnerability and Site Effects in Earthquake Disasters in Armenia (Colombia). II – Observed Damages and Vulnerability

by

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54 **Abstract**

55

56 Damage in Armenia, Colombia, for the 1999 (Mw6.2) event was disproportionate. We analyse the damage report as a
57 function of number of storeys and construction age. We recovered two vulnerability evaluations made in Armenia in 1993
58 and in 2004. We compare the results of the 1993 evaluation with damages observed in 1999 and show that the vulnerability
59 evaluation made in 1993 could have predicted the relative frequency of damage observed in 1999. Our results show that
60 vulnerability of the building stock was the major factor behind damage observed in 1999. Moreover, it showed no
61 significant reduction between 1999 and 2004.

62

63 Key words: earthquake damage; vulnerability; construction type; construction age; building inventory.

64

65 **1 Introduction**

66

67 Destructive earthquakes occur relatively frequently in Colombia (the first reported event dates from 1551, Espinosa,
68 2003). However, the development of earthquake engineering began only relatively recently, punctuated by several major,
69 significant events. The first building code in the country was published in 1984 (CCCSR-84, 1984), partly as a result of
70 the heavy toll caused by the Popayán earthquake in March, 1983 (Ingeominas, 1986). Increasing building requirements
71 have improved earthquake resistance, for example phasing out non engineered construction. The development of
72 earthquake engineering has led to a decrease in the vulnerability of buildings in Colombia but progress has been slow, in
73 pace with the development of building codes. In addition, as favoured construction styles evolve, additional challenges
74 appear. For example, the cost of land pushes current housing projects consisting of tall concrete structures for which there
75 is little experience regarding their seismic behaviour in that country. Instrumenting some of those buildings to analyze
76 their motion during small earthquakes would provide useful data and may eventually become a necessity (e.g., Meli
77 et al., 1998). Meanwhile, it is important to learn as much as possible from past destructive events.

78

79 Damage evaluation after large earthquakes is recognized as a primary input to understand structural response subject to
80 dynamic excitations. It offers valuable data on the behaviour of structures to actual seismic motion. In addition to very
81 significant efforts like GEER ([Geotechnical Extreme Events Reconnaissance, 2020](#)), local initiatives have contributed
82 significantly to understand damage occurrence, especially in relation to site effects (e.g., Montalva et al., 2016; Fernández
83 et al., 2019).

84

85 One seismic event that has had a long lasting impact in Colombia is the January 25, 1999, earthquake in the Quindío
86 department, close (18 km) to the city of Armenia. This relatively small (Mw6.2), normal fault earthquake had profound
87 economic and social consequences in the country. There was only one accelerograph in Armenia, and it recorded PGA of
88 518/580/448 gal in the EW/NS/Z components. Strong ground motion duration was very short (smaller than 5 s) and
89 ground motion energy peaked at periods shorter than 0.5 s. The source of the main shock and aftershocks was studied in
90 Monsalve-Jaramillo and Vargas-Jiménez (2002), while macroseismic observations were presented in Cardona (1999).
91 The city of Armenia sustained heavy damage (maximum intensity was IX in EMS-96 scale): 2000 casualties and 10,000
92 injuries due to the collapse of 15,000 houses, with a further 20,000 houses severely damaged (SIQ, 2002). Site effect
93 evaluation during this event in Armenia was addressed by Chávez-García et al. (2018). Earthquake and ambient noise
94 data were analysed with the objective of characterizing local amplification due to soft surficial layers using a variety of
95 techniques. The results showed that, while local amplification contributed significantly to destructive ground motion,
96 observed damage distribution in 1999 was incompatible with the rather small variations in dominant frequency and
97 maximum amplification throughout the city.

98

99 Chávez-García et al. (2018) referred to the damage distribution observed for the 1999 earthquake but no data were
100 analysed in that paper. In this paper, we present an analysis of damage observed during the 1999 earthquake. Earthquake
101 damage data is analysed in relation to geology and to the site classes defined in the microzonation map of Armenia
102 (Asociación Colombiana de Ingeniería Sísmica, 1999). In addition, the city of Armenia offers a very uncommon
103 advantage in Latin America. Two vulnerability studies have been conducted in the city, one in 1993 and one in 2004. We
104 compare the 1999 damage distribution to vulnerability estimated in 1993 for the small downtown district of the city where
105 the two data sets overlap. The comparison of the two vulnerability studies, in 1993 and in 2004, allows an assessment of
106 the changes in vulnerability in the city as a consequence of a destructive earthquake, even if the method used was different
107 and the studied zones overlap only partially. We show that building vulnerability was the main factor behind the heavy
108 damage toll in Armenia during the 1999 earthquake. Our results substantiate the improvement of engineering practice
109 with time and provide evidence of the efficacy of simple methods to evaluate vulnerability. However, they also strike an
110 alarm bell as they show that vulnerability in Armenia remains high. Our results offer an unusually complete analysis of
111 the major factors behind seismic risk in a typical medium size city in Colombia. Seismic risk mitigation in Armenia, and
112 in similar midsize cities in Latin America, requires an increase in the number of permanent seismic stations and support
113 of additional efforts to improve our understanding of moderate size seismic events.

114

115



116 2 Colombian Building Codes and Practice Evolution

117
118 This paper will obviate a discussion of the geological setting of Armenia, as it can be found in Chávez-García et al. (2018).
119 The coffee growing region was occupied during the second half of the 19th century. For this reason, data on historical
120 earthquakes is scarce, even though it is located in a zone of high seismic hazard (the current Colombian building code
121 prescribes a PGA of 0.25 g for Armenia for a return period of 475 yr). During the 20th century, about eight earthquakes
122 occurred in the region producing intensities as large as IX (Espinoso, 2011).
123

124 Before 1960, construction in this region consisted mainly of bahareque and unreinforced masonry. In Colombia,
125 bahareque refers to structures that use guadua (a local variety of bamboo) for the skeleton elements. Walls are made using
126 a guadua-based mat, covered with mud mixed with dung as bonding agent. At about 1960, reinforced concrete frames
127 began to be used but Colombia lacked a building code until 1984, although conscientious engineers followed guidelines
128 from international codes, mostly American ones. Between 1977 and 1984 design practice for those structures shifted from
129 the elastic method to ultimate strength design. Unfortunately, this allowed construction companies to decrease the quantity
130 of steel reinforcement. Until 1984, no seismic provisions were considered.
131

132 A major milestone was the Popayán earthquake of March 31, 1983 (ML5.5). This small, shallow event caused major
133 destruction in Popayán, where important Spanish heritage sites were severely damaged. Although restricted in extension,
134 the heavy damage gave the final push for the adoption of a national building code including seismic provisions in 1984.
135 This code had been promoted since the end of 1970's by Asociación Colombiana de Ingeniería Sísmica (Colombian
136 Association for Earthquake Engineering), founded on 1975. A major consequence of the 1984 code was to eliminate new
137 construction using unreinforced masonry. This code was replaced by a new version in 1998. The effects of two events in
138 1995 (Feb 8, Mw6.6, Aug 19, Mw6.5) convinced engineers that lateral drift requirements in the 1984 code were too
139 lenient and stricter requirements were incorporated.
140

141 Only a few months passed between publication of the 1998 building code and the occurrence of the 1999, Armenia,
142 earthquake. Some of the shortcomings identified during this event were addressed in improvements to the code published
143 in 2010; requisites for irregular buildings with weak storeys, short columns, p-Δ effects, and torsion related problems
144 among others. Microzonation of cities with more than 100,000 people became mandatory. However, those studies are the
145 responsibility of local authorities and are not necessarily considered a priority. In Armenia, nine years after becoming
146 compulsory, an update of the microzonation study carried out in the wake of the 1999 earthquake is still missing.
147 Currently, discussions for a new version of the building code centre on imposing requisites on the quality control of the
148 materials used and ensuring the correspondence between drawings and the real structure.
149

150 3 Damage Observed in 1999

151
152 In the aftermath of the 1999 event, the Sociedad de Ingenieros del Quindío (Quindian Society of Engineers) organised
153 teams that made a detailed evaluation of damaged structures in Armenia (SIQ, 2002). The status of a building is
154 determined by the attributes of damage level, damage type and usage status (Tang, et al., 2020). The priority was to
155 distinguish between those buildings that did not pose a risk to occupants from those that must be evicted. The template
156 used to qualify buildings allowed to grade the damage sustained by buildings and included information on year of
157 construction, structural system, and number of storeys. SIQ (2002) classified observed damage using a colour scale:

- 158 • Grey. Very light or no damage at all.
- 159 • Green. The building can continue to be used. Although some damage is apparent in non-structural elements, it
160 poses no risk to occupants
- 161 • Yellow. Significant damage, to the point that partial occupancy restriction is required. The structure is not
162 evaluated as unsafe but access to parts of it must be restricted.
- 163 • Orange. Unusable structure. Damage to the structure implies a high risk and the building cannot be occupied.
- 164 • Red. Total collapse or danger of collapse due to severe damage to the structure or its foundation.

165 This scale is quite standard and very similar to that proposed by the European Seismological Commission (Xin et al.,
166 2020). For our purpose, we have simplified this scale. We use light damage to refer to structures classified in grey or
167 green. Moderate damage in this paper is used for buildings classified as yellow. Finally, severe damage corresponds to
168 structures classified as orange or red. The SIQ (2002) report presents an inventory of 43,023 structures classified as a
169 function of damage sustained. From this total, data for 1,946 sites could not be used due to incomplete information that
170 made it impossible to locate them on a map. This number suggests a lower limit for the uncertainties in our database,
171 inevitable in any post-earthquake damage survey and which we have no means to evaluate. However, the number of
172 samples is large enough to justify our confidence in average values. Our final database for Armenia includes 41,077
173 buildings. Data is available only for damaged structures and it is not possible to normalize the results relative to the
174 number of existing buildings in the city.
175

176 Five categories were used to classify the buildings structuring type, following CCCSR-84 (1984). In order of decreasing
177 seismic performance, the first four categories are: frame structures, confined masonry, unreinforced masonry, and
178 bahareque structures (wooden structures are included here). The fifth category, as written in the template used by SIQ



179 (2002), is “none of the preceding”, named as “other” in the following. This last category was used to refer to buildings
180 using hybrid structuring systems, a mix of different materials, and unstructured houses mixing wood with other elements.
181 Such precarious houses are non-engineered structures and are common in illegal settlements.

182
183 Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 6,467 structures classified as severely damaged in Armenia. The background of the
184 figure shows the geological formations that can be found in the city (AIS, 1999). No correlation is observed between
185 geology and severe damage distribution. The same observation can be made for moderate and light damage. Site geology
186 seems irrelevant to explain damage distribution for this event, which shows no clear pattern. It may be argued that the
187 geological classification cannot reflect site effects caused by mostly thin layers. That site effects in Armenia are related
188 to thin layers is suggested by the values of dominant frequencies in the city, shown to be comprised between 2 and 3 Hz
189 by Chávez-García et al. (2018). Figure 2 shows the depth to the base of ash deposits in Armenia (Ingeominas, 1999),
190 determined from the inversion of 36 vertical electrical soundings. Dominant frequencies computed for the thicknesses
191 shown in Figure 2 using the average shear-wave velocities for the topmost sedimentary layers (Chávez-García et al.,
192 2018) are comprised between 2 and 3 Hz, similar to those observed. Shallow soils in Armenia were mapped in the
193 microzonation study of the city, carried out in the wake of the 1999 earthquake (AIS, 1999). The final microzonation map
194 proposed by AIS (1999) proposed four different soil types: ash deposits (zone A), thin sedimentary fill deposits (zone B),
195 alluvial terraces, residual soils and ancient volcanic flows (zone C), and soils that have undergone shearing as they are
196 located close to Armenia fault that cuts through the city (zone D). The seismic coefficients proposed by AIS (1999)
197 decrease from zones A to C, implying similarly decreasing site amplification. Zone D was declared inapt for construction.
198 Figure 3 shows histograms of damage distribution for the city as a function of structuring type, damage level, and soil
199 class. Bahareque structures suffered the largest proportion of severe damage, followed by structures in the category
200 “other” and unreinforced masonry. Figure 3 shows clearly that damage distribution is independent of soil type as classified
201 by the seismic microzonation study. This result supports the conclusions of Chávez-García et al. (2018). They observed
202 that, while local amplification is far from being negligible, it does not vary greatly within Armenia.

203
204 Consider now the role of two additional variables on damage distribution: number of storeys and building age. In order
205 to compare these results with the vulnerability study made in 1993 in Armenia, we restrict this analysis to the small
206 downtown district shown in Figure 2, where the 1993 study was carried out. In this sector, the damage database includes
207 3,697 records corresponding to 470 bahareque, 884 unreinforced masonry, 195 confined masonry, and 745 frame
208 structures. We dropped the data for 1,403 structures classified as “other”. Figure 4 shows damage distribution as a function
209 of number of storeys and structuring type. The diagram for all types of structures combined shows an apparent decrease
210 in severe damage and increase in light damage with increasing number of storeys. The diagrams for each structure type
211 do not show such progression. The reason for that apparent trend is that buildings smaller than five storeys are
212 overrepresented (90% of our sample) in the downtown district. One- to two-storey high bahareque structures are 95%
213 of the total. The tallest unreinforced masonry structures were one 6-storey and one 10-storey buildings. With this caveat, it
214 is clear that number of storeys was not a major factor in damage distribution during the 1999 earthquake in Armenia.

215
216 Figure 5 shows damage distribution as a function of structuring type and construction period, again for the small
217 downtown district. Our division of time corresponds to the evolution of construction practice in Colombia, as discussed
218 above. Severe damage in bahareque structures do not show a clear trend with time; it is larger than 60% for all periods,
219 except for the period 1985-1997. The period later than 1998 is not representative for bahareque structures as there is only
220 one light, zero moderate, and two severely damaged structures. In contrast, severe damage for frame and unreinforced
221 masonry structures shows a steady decrease with time (and the number of structures is significant). The relative number
222 of structures suffering light damage increases with decreasing age of the structure, while the relative frequency of severe
223 damage decreases significantly, showing the benefit of building code improvements. The number of confined masonry
224 structures built before 1959 was very small (10 buildings in our sample) making the histograms for that period unreliable.
225 For later periods, confined masonry shows an increase in the percentage of light damage and a stable or decreasing
226 percentage for moderate and severe damage.

227 228 **4 Vulnerability and Damage Distribution**

229
230 Earthquake damage is the result of strong ground motion and building vulnerability. Vulnerability of the building stock
231 has always been a key factor in seismic risk evaluations (e.g., Dolce et al., 2006; Vicente et al., 2014; Fikri et al., 2019),
232 or post-earthquake evaluations (e.g., Marotta et al., 2017). A review of current challenges has been presented in Silva et
233 al. (2019). A major problem is the large number of buildings for which a vulnerability estimate is required in a city. When
234 the number of structures is limited to a few hundreds, simple methods are often used, which usually consist in simple
235 evaluations of a limited number of parameters (e.g., Fikri et al., 2019). Larger building populations have to be dealt with
236 using probabilistic methods (e.g., Noh et al., 2017) or extremely indirect techniques (Geiß et al., 2014).

237
238 In Latin America, vulnerability studies of the building stock are not often made outside capital cities. However, in the
239 case of Armenia, we are fortunate to have available two vulnerability studies: one performed in 1993 (López et al., 1993),
240 six years prior to the 1999 event, and one made in 2004 (Cano-Saldaña et al., 2005). Those two studies followed different
241 procedures and the area coverage overlaps only partially (Figure 2). In this section, we will compare the results of the



242 1993 vulnerability study with damage distribution observed in 1999. Then, we will compare the two vulnerability
243 evaluations between them.

244
245 In 1993, different sectors of the city were sampled but not all of the data were preserved. We analyse the results for the
246 downtown sector presented in López et al. (1993), shown in Figure 2. A census was made to count the number of structures
247 of each type. In the downtown sector, 3,364 buildings were counted and assigned to one of three categories: bahareque
248 structures (908), unreinforced masonry structures (1,877), and frame structures (579). It was not possible to evaluate,
249 even in a simplified way, all those structures. For this reason, a small sample of 84 buildings was designed, assuming
250 normal distribution and choosing a 95% confidence level of the extrapolation of the results to the total population. The
251 84 buildings were randomly selected in the field and the vulnerability of each of them was evaluated using the procedure
252 described in Tassios (1989), which is very similar to that described in Inel et al. (2008) or Alam et al. (2013). Each selected
253 building was visited by a team of students of civil engineering and a detailed template was completed with information
254 on the structure. The compiled information consisted of: structuring type, relation with neighbouring structures (possible
255 interaction problems), year of construction, maintenance, vertical and horizontal configuration, and roofing material.
256 These factors were assigned numerical values and combined with arbitrary weights based on expert opinions to compute
257 a vulnerability index (VI) for each building. VI was made to vary between 0 and 100, where 0 corresponds to an absolutely
258 safe structure and 100 to a totally vulnerable structure. Finally, the vulnerability indexes determined for the sample were
259 extrapolated to the complete population in the downtown district.

260
261 Figure 6 compares the VI values determined in 1993 with damage observed during the 1999 earthquake inside the
262 downtown district (solid line polygon in Figure 2). Percentages for VI values were extrapolated from the numbers
263 determined for the 84 building sample. In this figure, we counted together moderate and severe damage, while VI was
264 classified in two groups: larger and smaller than 20. We observe a very good correlation between VI estimated in 1993
265 and damage observed during the 1999 earthquake, six years later. Thus, the approximate procedure used to estimate VI
266 in 1993 was effective to predict dynamic behaviour during that earthquake.

267
268 In addition to comparing extrapolated VI with damages for the downtown district, we may ask another question. How did
269 each one of the 84 buildings, whose VI was evaluated, fare during the 1999 earthquake? This question has no simple
270 answer due to different georeferencing systems for the two surveys (vulnerability and damage) and incomplete data. Only
271 28 out of the 84 could be confidently identified. The unidentified buildings could be absent from the damaged buildings
272 database because they suffered no damage or because their recorded location was inaccurate. Figure 7 shows a whisker
273 plot of the observed VI values against observed damage for the 28 buildings that could be identified in both databases.
274 VI values are well correlated with observed damage. Figure 7 shows that severe damage may be associated with an
275 average VI of 44, moderate damage with an average VI of 32, while light damage corresponds to an average VI of 16.

276
277 Consider finally the vulnerability study made in 2004 (Cano-Saldaña et al., 2005). The procedure used was very different
278 and followed that of Velásquez and Jaramillo (1993). Cano-Saldaña et al. (2005) computed expected losses for three
279 different events, considered to pose the largest seismic hazard for Armenia. A required input for them was an estimate of
280 the vulnerability for the building stock, and this is the data we recuperated from that study. Cano-Saldaña et al. (2005)
281 selected a sector of the downtown district that overlaps only partially with the district sampled in 1993. It is shown with
282 dot-dashed line in Figure 2. They tallied every building in that sector, a total of 2,525 land plots. For each one of them, a
283 template simpler than that of 1993 was completed including data on structuring type, number of storeys, roofing type,
284 and construction quality. The simplified nature of the template made it possible to complete it for the 2,525 land plots, in
285 contrast to the more detailed template used in 1993. We recuperated the 2004 building database and estimated
286 vulnerability using the same procedure used in 1993; i.e., assigning numerical values to each factor and combining them
287 with arbitrary weights based on expert opinions to compute a vulnerability index for each building in the sample. The
288 weights used to estimate a vulnerability index had to be modified from those used in 1993 given that less information on
289 each structure was available. The VI results for the 2004 study may thus have a constant bias. We could assign a
290 vulnerability index to 1,217 buildings, out of the 2,525 counted in 2004. The building categories that could be identify
291 between the two studies were bahareque, unconfined masonry and frame structures. VI values were grouped in three
292 categories: low (VI between 0 and 20), medium (VI between 20 and 40), and high (VI larger than 40). The results in
293 Figure 8 show that the relative proportions are maintained between 1993 and 2004: most buildings in that sector have still
294 high vulnerability in 2004 and less than 20% have low VI. Our results suggest that significant improvements in the relative
295 vulnerability occurred in the 11-year period between 1993 and 2004. High vulnerabilities are still predominant in
296 downtown Armenia, in spite of the destruction of weak buildings in the 1999 earthquake and the reinforcement carried
297 out during the reconstruction of the city. It may be hoped that this result will prompt local authorities to take decisive
298 actions to mitigate seismic risk in Armenia. A starting point could be to replicate the use of simplified procedures to
299 estimate vulnerability to evaluate possible changes in the 16-year period since 2004.

300 301 5 Conclusions

302
303 Colombia, and in particular the coffee growing region, has been historically affected by large earthquakes, with the 1999
304 event being the most recent destructive event. The consequences of that earthquake significantly changed society in



305 Armenia and forced important improvements in engineering practice. The large economic consequences led the
306 government to add a new tax to pay for reconstruction: a levy of 2‰ was imposed on every bank transaction in the
307 country. Earthquake disasters occur rarely and therefore seismic risk is seldom a priority. In Armenia region, the first two
308 accelerographs were installed in 1994: in the campus of Universidad del Quindío, and in Calarcá (a neighbouring town,
309 10 km to the SE of Armenia). To date, they continue to be the only accelerographs in operation. As mentioned above, the
310 mandatory microzonation study of Armenia is still due.

311
312 We have presented an analysis of observed damage and vulnerability in Armenia during the 1999 earthquake. Our results
313 are based on databases that had remained as unpublished reports. The severity of damage is uncorrelated either with
314 geology or with the zones identified in the microzonation map. Damage distribution is uncorrelated with structure height
315 but we do observe a decrease in the severity of damage for younger structures. The data on observed damages were
316 contrasted against two vulnerability evaluations, one in 1993 and one in 2004. In the 1993 study, 84 buildings were visited
317 and their vulnerability was evaluated using a detailed template. The comparison of the results with observed damage in
318 the city six year later strongly supports this method.

319
320 Our results indicate that building vulnerability was the main factor behind the large damage caused by the 1999
321 earthquake. The comparison between the vulnerability studies of 1993 and 2004 show no significant improvements in the
322 relative vulnerability in that 11-year period. Unfortunately, it is possible that the money allocated to house owners for
323 repairs may not have been used to that purpose. Seismic risk mitigation in Armenia, and in similar midsize cities in Latin
324 America, requires more decisive support to increase the number of permanent seismic stations. This is especially
325 important given that current practice fosters tall concrete structures for which there is little experience regarding their
326 seismic behavior. This paper strives to ring an alarm bell to the current risk in Armenia through a better understanding of
327 a significant past destructive event.

328
329
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331 maps and processed the statistics of the data. FJCG wrote the first draft and prepared the figures. All three authors revised
332 the manuscript and made final corrections.

333
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337
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
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


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
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
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Figura 2 Contornos de la profundidad de la interfaz (en m) en la base de los depósitos de ceniza que cubren la ciudad de Armenia. Los símbolos muestran la ubicación de los 36 sondeos verticales eléctricos donde se midió la profundidad de esa interfaz. La gruesa línea sólida que cruza la ciudad de norte a sur indica el rastro de la falla de Armenia. El polígono de línea sólida dentro de la ciudad muestra la extensión del distrito del centro cubierto en el estudio de vulnerabilidad de 1993. El esquema de línea pequeña y salpicada de puntos muestra el área cubierta por el estudio de vulnerabilidad realizado en 2004. [Modificado de Ingeominas, 1999.]




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Figure 3 Histograms of observed damage in Armenia for the January 25, 1999, earthquake. Each diagram corresponds to the given structuring type and shows the relative incidence of light, moderate, and severe damage as a function of the four soil types defined in the microzonation map of AIS (1999) (A, B, C, and D). The last diagram shows data for all structuring types together.




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Figure 4 Histograms of observed damage in Armenia for the January 25, 1999, earthquake. Each diagram corresponds to the given structuring type and shows the relative incidence of light, moderate, and severe damage for groups of buildings of similar number of storeys. The last diagram shows data for all structuring types together.




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Figure 5 Histograms of observed damage in Armenia for the January 25, 1999, earthquake. Each diagram corresponds to the given structuring type and shows the relative incidence of light, moderate, and severe damage as a function of the time period where the structure was built (before 1959, between 1960 and 1984, between 1985 and 1997, and later than 1998). The data shown corresponds to the downtown district whose outline is shown in Figure 2.




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Figure 6 Comparison between vulnerability values estimated in 1993 and damages observed in 1999. This comparison was only possible for the three structuring types shown. Moderate and severe damages were counted together. Vulnerability indexes (VI) are separated in two groups, below and above a value of 20. Both damages and vulnerabilities correspond to the complete building population inside the polygon drawn with solid line in Figure 2.



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Figure 7 Whisker plot comparing the vulnerability index for 28 buildings evaluated in 1993 against their actual behavior observed during the 1999 earthquake. The cross inside each symbol indicates the location of average values.



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Figure 8 Comparison between percentages of buildings classified as low, medium and high vulnerability between the evaluation made in 1993 and that of 2004 in Armenia. The values for 2004 used ad-hoc weights in an effort to get a vulnerability estimate compatible with the scale used in 1993. Values for 2004 may thus have a constant bias.