

Reply to Reviewer 1

We thank the reviewer for the positive comments and the time and effort taken to review this paper. We apologise for our delayed response as we were awaiting a second review to ensure that our response and corrections are aligned, and thank both the reviewer and editor for their patience. The following are our response to the reviewer's specific comments.

L167: Although the structures are categorised based on industries, it is relevant to mention the structure/building characteristics (steel, concrete, reinforced, components, heights, shapes, etc) specific to each industry in this study. The reviewer feels that the structure/building type in each industry is not clearly described, especially the structural components and physical features that help to sustain the tsunami impact. The common structural/physical features of structures in a specific industry should be assessed as in lines 374-387.

Thank you for the highly relevant comment. We recognise and agree with the reviewer that the structural components and physical features determine the vulnerability of the industry to tsunami impacts. We have included in Table 2, some of the common infrastructure that can be found in each of these industries, as well as a brief description of common physical assets and construction types as per Lines 168-175 in the corrected manuscript. We hope our revision is satisfactory for the reviewer.

Corrected manuscript:

[Line 168-175] Buildings in port industries commonly include administrative offices, control and maintenance buildings, warehouses and cold storage. Industrial buildings are typically of steel or concrete construction. On the other hand, the types of port infrastructure are diverse - ranging from small transformers to large loading cranes. Some common infrastructure found in each industry are listed in Table 2, adapted from the descriptions provided by the AIR Construction and Occupancy Class Codes (AIR Worldwide, 2019). Because of their diversity, port infrastructure vary widely in their construction and unlike buildings, it is extremely challenging to classify them according to their construction nature. It is interesting to note, however, that several industrial infrastructure are installed in support structures or housed in buildings. In the petrochemical industry, for example, oil and gas are commonly stored in steel or concrete silos and tanks.

Refer to Table 2 in Line 178.

L175: Since this study uses the maximum inundation depth as the intensity measure, is there any evidence in the literature showing the link between damage to structures and the maximum inundation depth?

We thank you for the opportunity to consider this question. There has not been a consensus on which parameters or rather tsunami intensity measure (TIM) provides the best explanation for damage. There are a number of papers in literature that have evaluated the relative influence of different parameters on building damage (e.g. Macabuag et al., 2016; Song et al., 2017). We are aware that damage to structures are attributed to a combination of many factors and not just inundation depth alone.

Maximum inundation depths are one of the common measures of tsunami damage in literature (e.g. Leone et al., 2011; Suppasri et al., 2013) as they are more easily estimated from field survey after tsunami events as compared to simulated flow values, as pointed out in Line 175-177 [Lines 184 – 186 in corrected manuscript]. For those reasons, we have therefore chosen to work with maximum inundation depths. In this manuscript, our main intention is to create a damage database

with primary data. We welcome future users of the damage database to expand beyond using inundation depth as a measure of damage.

Should the reviewer's main concern be on using maximum values, we acknowledge the possibility of damage occurring before inundation reaches maximum depth. This was also addressed in Suppasri et al. (2019), where they found that the critical value for damage may not be at maximum inundation depths or velocities. We are currently working on a second paper which follows up on the present work, where we evaluate the use of non-maximum inundation values of depth and velocity to explain the damage observed.

L279: The distribution skewed towards the left or right?

Thank you for the question. We have clarified this in the text [Line 288 in the corrected manuscript]: distribution skewed towards the right (i.e. with a long right tail and a mean to the right of the mode).

L286: Possible reasons for the outliers?

The outliers here refer to the inundation depths. The damage data (and hence inundation depths) were collected across different ports in the Tohoku region and therefore, the most plausible explanation for the outliers is that the areas covered in our dataset did not cover the missing depth range. We have removed the description on outliers in Fig.5 caption to avoid the confusion for readers (also pointed out by Reviewer 2), because it has little relevance to the rest of the manuscript.

Corrected manuscript:

[Line 293] Fig. 5. Histograms of each damage state. Distribution of damage data indicates non-normality and DS 1 accounts for the majority of the dataset. ~~Outliers exist in DS 3 and 4, with no damage states recorded for inundation values between 6 to 7.4 metres. Outliers are not removed from the model, as they are legitimate observations and possible outcomes.~~

We hope that our responses clarify your concerns. We thank you again for your suggestions and for taking the time to review this manuscript. We are happy to address any other questions that you might have.

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Reply to Reviewer 2

We thank the reviewer for the very encouraging comments, and we appreciate the time and effort spent on providing us with a rigorous review. The insights provided were highly beneficial for improving the quality of this manuscript. Please find our responses and corrections to your suggestions below.

It is not mentioned whether tsunami damage by debris or others has been filtered or identified. This issue is particularly present at port facilities, where ships, containers, trucks and other materials relevant to port industries can impact structures. I have heard of work related that has attempted to quantify its impact (by Kentaro Kumagai, for instance).

The reason I mention this is that it could explain some of the features present in data. For instance, in Fig. 5 it is remarkable that DS4 levels can be attained by very small water depths, whilst no DS3 or DS2 states are present. This defies the "ordered" notion of damage that is the basis for the analysis.

Its clarification can also help in explaining some of the later results. The authors point in the paragraph L397-L409 to two main causes for the results: A design oriented to higher standards, that could help in explaining low damage at larger depths; and/or that there is a decorrelation with inundation depth. This is understood that damage is less dependent on water depth alone (at least it is implied in the text. The closing sentence leaves many doors opened and it is inconclusive), though it can be as well interpreted in the opposite way.

Interestingly, incorporating debris can also help in clarifying some of the other features in the data. For example: the authors analyze the variability or accuracy of their results. Typically, they observe that some industries have less data and that is the reason for the low accuracy (smaller data size, which is mentioned once or twice in the text). However, in reviewing the data, it looks to me that the industries with less accuracy are characterized by a narrow range of depths (for instance, Warehousing does not exceed 6.0m) whilst having a somewhat uniform distribution of damages. That is, the frequency count of DS1 to DS4 is relatively uniform. So, more damage can be found for a narrow range of small depths. The authors note this explicitly in Line 466, but they chose to use other explanation routes. To me, this also points to the decoupling of damage and flow depth, and could point to other sources of damage that have not been accounted for.

I would recommend the authors to expand a little bit on this regard, and explore its potential effect on their analysis. I think it is a relevant caveat of these studies, because what we see is the end result, and the chain of events that lead to the damage is often absent. It is quite the leap of faith to assume that this is only due to the tsunami hydrodynamics alone, and even from them, just to the water depth.

We thank the reviewer for bringing up an important point and providing insightful comments. Unfortunately, through our visual interpretation of spatial sources (such as Google StreetView), we did not assess and found it challenging to identify debris impact at a building level. However, we do agree with the reviewer and acknowledge that debris impact is a potential (and alternative) cause of some of the damage observed. We have looked into available work on the topic and included some of our interpretation in this regard in our revised manuscript.

Corrected manuscript:

[Lines 397 –411] **Other factors such as debris impact and proximity of the structure to the shoreline should not be discounted when considering differences in the response of each industry to tsunami**

impacts. Tsunami-borne debris can contribute significantly to structural damage. This issue is particularly present in port facilities, where ships, containers, mobile equipment, construction materials such as wood logs and concrete objects can impact on structures. Port structures are typically of more robust construction and therefore, they act as barriers in the path of debris motion for as long as inundation depth is lower than the structure height (Reese et al., 2007; Naito et al., 2014). As a result, they are more likely to be subjected to damage from debris impact (Charvet et al., 2015). While debris impact is location-specific and does not affect all areas in the same ways, some industries may be more susceptible to debris impact than others. For example, in cargo handling and construction materials industries, where mobile large objects such as containers and wood logs are stored in open yards, there is a higher concentration of potential debris and therefore, a higher debris delivery potential (Naito et al., 2014). Kumagai (2013) surveyed the post-mortem dispersal of containers after the 2011 Tohoku event and found that containers, which were not washed out to sea, were mostly dispersed within the terminals where they were located in. Many of these containers were also found to be concentrated around buildings surrounding the container yards without travelling further inland (Kumagai, 2013; Naito et al., 2014), which suggests that damage sustained to structures within these facilities are more likely a consequence of the combined effect of debris impact and tsunami flow than hydrodynamic force alone.

[Lines 445 – 455] These findings can alternatively be justified by the effects of debris impact. A couple of studies (e.g. Charvet et al., 2015; Macabuag et al., 2015) have found the inclusion/omission of debris impact to have an effect on fragility models. Macabuag et al. (2015) demonstrated that models that include regression parameters considering debris impact have a better fit (statistically more significant) than models that do not. The authors also argued that the omission of debris information will likely introduce systematic bias to the fragility models. In this study, debris impact has not been explicitly considered in the development of fragility models, though it could be a source of uncertainty in our fragility models. Intuitively, structures that were damaged by debris would fall into higher damage states and likely experienced higher tsunami intensity values (i.e. depth and velocity). By neglecting debris impact, it is unsurprising that confidence intervals tend to widen towards higher depth values for DS 3 and DS 4 (Fig. 8). Similarly, by neglecting debris information, fragility functions derived for industries, such as cargo handling and construction materials industries, that are more heavily impacted by the debris-related damage are expected to have greater uncertainties.

[Lines 514 – 515] Second-order factors beyond flow regime such as debris impact and proximity to the shoreline could also have an effect on model accuracies.

Fig 5: The caption is a bit confusing, because it mentions outliers associated with damage first, but then they are related with water depths. At this point the relation is not established.

Thank you for pointing this out. We have removed the description on outliers in Fig.5 caption to avoid the confusion for readers, as it has little to no relevance to the rest of the manuscript.

Corrected manuscript:

[Line 294-295] Fig. 5. Histograms of each damage state. Distribution of damage data indicates non-normality and DS 1 accounts for the majority of the dataset. ~~Outliers exist in DS 3 and 4, with no damage states recorded for inundation values between 6 to 7.4 metres. Outliers are not removed from the model, as they are legitimate observations and possible outcomes.~~

Figure 7: Perhaps in addition to the frequency count, use percentages. That would allow to compare more clearly among industries.

Thank you for the suggestion. The changes have been incorporated in Fig. 7 [Line 373 in corrected manuscript].

Line 411 mentions "mean value" but then L418 refers to the median. I tend to think we are referring to median. Please check for consistency throughout the text.

Thank you for pointing this out, changes have been made in Line 436 in the corrected manuscript.

Corrected manuscript:

[Line 436] ... confidence intervals around the ~~mean~~ median of the resulting probabilities.

Fig 8: Perhaps gridlines would help to compare among subplots.

Thank you for the suggestion. Gridlines have been incorporated into our subplots in Fig. 8, and accordingly in Fig. 11 [Lines 459 and 580 in the corrected manuscript].

We hope that our responses and corrections satisfy and address your concerns. We thank you again for your time and believe that your suggestions have helped improve the quality of this manuscript. We are happy to address any other questions that you might have.

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1 Tsunami damage to ports: Cataloguing damage to create fragility 2 functions from the 2011 Tohoku event

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17 **Abstract.** Modern tsunami events have highlighted the vulnerability of port structures to these high-impact but infrequent
18 occurrences. However, port planning rarely includes adaptation measures to address tsunami hazards. The 2011 Tohoku
19 tsunami presented us with an opportunity to characterise the vulnerability of port industries to tsunami impacts. Here, we
20 provide a spatial assessment and photographic interpretation of freely available data sources. Approximately 5,000 port
21 structures were assessed for damage and stored in a database. Using the newly developed damage database, tsunami damage
22 is quantified statistically for the first time, through the development of damage fragility functions for eight common port
23 industries. In contrast to tsunami damage fragility functions produced for buildings from existing damage database, our
24 fragility functions showed higher prediction accuracies (up to 75% accuracy). Pre-tsunami earthquake damage was also
25 assessed in this study, and was found to influence overall damage assessment. The damage database and fragility functions for
26 port industries can inform structural improvements and mitigation plans for ports against future events.

27

28 **1. Introduction**

29 Port assets are vulnerable to the physical damage caused by tsunamis and cascading effects such as extensive supply chain
30 disruption. For example, transoceanic waves from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami resulted in heavy damage to maritime
31 facilities across the Indian Ocean. On the west coast of Banda Aceh, Indonesia, all harbours and landing piers between Lhok
32 Nga and Meulaboh were destroyed and unusable (Janssen, 2005) and across the Indian Ocean, heavy damage to maritime
33 facilities reportedly resulted in the closure of Nagappattinam Port, India for weeks (Mahshwari et al., 2005). On the same note,
34 the 2011 Tohoku (Great East Japan) tsunami caused damage to many ports along the Pacific coast in the Tohoku region. The
35 affected ports suffered from a contraction in export and import values following the tsunami (March – May 2011) of 57.5%
36 and 61.6% respectively, relative to the preceding 5-year average for the same period (Japan Maritime Centre, 2011). Total
37 economic losses for tsunami damage to Japan’s marine vessels, ports and maritime facilities were approximated at US\$ 12
38 billion (Muhari et al., 2015). A recent study speculated that earthquakes greater than Mw 8.5 from the Manila-trench could
39 result in the loss of functions in up to five major ports including Kaohsiung and Hong Kong (Otake et al., 2019). Additionally,
40 threats from future tsunami events are expected to be exacerbated by rising sea levels (Li et al., 2018), which imply greater
41 risks for port assets located near tsunami sources.

42 With about 80% of global trade volume carried by sea, ports are critical nodes in international trade. Ports are also home to
43 industrial clusters and critical facilities such as manufacturing firms and power plants due to the convenience they provide.
44 With increased seaborne trade, globalisation of complex industrial processes and dependence on ports for economic
45 development, port areas are only expected to develop further. However, port planning rarely accounts for adaptation to natural
46 hazards and coastal protection structures are usually built to mitigate short-term hazard scenarios such as coastal flooding and
47 wave damage (Lam and Lassa, 2017).

48 Tsunamis are high-impact events but infrequent occurrences, which makes their potential impacts to ports difficult to quantify.
49 The expected increase in the exposure of port assets to coastal hazards, combined with our limited experience with tsunamis
50 in modern ports, demonstrates a clear need to better understand how port structures might respond to tsunami impacts.

51 Structural damage resulting from tsunami impacts has generated considerable interest since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
52 (e.g. Nistor et al., 2010, Leelawat et al., 2016; Song et al., 2017; Suppasri et al., 2019). Structural damage is most commonly
53 quantified in the form of tsunami damage fragility functions. First developed for tsunami events by Koshimura et al. (2009),
54 tsunami fragility functions express the probability that a structure exceeds a prescribed damage threshold for a given tsunami
55 flow characteristic or intensity measure. Pioneering work in the development of tsunami fragility functions has been largely
56 focused on damage to residential and commercial buildings (e.g. Leone et al., 2011, Reese et al., 2011; Mas et al., 2012; Gokon
57 et al., 2014). In recent years, the study of tsunami structural fragility has been extended to critical infrastructure such as roads
58 and bridges (Akiyama et al., 2014; Shoji and Nakamura, 2017; Williams et al., 2020).


59 Despite recent efforts, our understanding of tsunami impacts on ports still falls short. The coverage of tsunami-induced damage
60 on port structures in existing literature is by and large limited to qualitative assessments. To date most studies on tsunami

61 structural damage to ports are in the form of post-tsunami surveys, which document damage observations and describe the
62 failure mechanisms of harbour elements such as breakwaters, quay walls and wharves (e.g. Meneses and Arduino, 2011; Fraser
63 et al., 2012; Hazarika et al., 2013; Paulik et al., 2019; Benzair et al., 2020) and port facilities such as oil tanks, cranes and
64 equipment (e.g. Scawthorn et al., 2016; Percher et al., 2013; Sugano et al., 2014). Some studies have attempted to reconstruct
65 structural impacts to port facilities by evaluating design specifications of structures or examining specific tsunami behaviour
66 such as bore impact linked to structural damage (e.g. Nayak et al., 2014; Kihara et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2016; Huang and
67 Chen, 2020). Though recent studies attempted to quantify tsunami damage to port facilities, the focus of these standalone
68 studies are specific to certain port industries, namely warehousing (Karafagka et al., 2018) and fishery industries (Imai et al.,
69 2019), and therefore do not provide a comprehensive view of the damage sustained by different port industries. While
70 necessary for the improvement of structural design, efforts so far are not adequate in quantifying tsunami damage statistically.
71 This study serves as a starting point in characterising the vulnerability of port industries to tsunami impacts, through the
72 assessment and quantification of structural response to tsunami inundation depths. The objective of this study is two-fold – (i)
73 to develop a tsunami damage database for port structures impacted during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, and based on the damage
74 database, (ii) to construct tsunami damage fragility functions for port industries. The 2011 Tohoku tsunami presents a unique
75 opportunity to study tsunami damage to port structures due to the extent and severity of damage, and the large ensemble of
76 data collected post-tsunami (Table 1). The combination of densely recorded tsunami flow measurements, well-documented
77 surveyed damage data and high-quality photographic evidence available offers an unparalleled resource for this research.
78 In this paper, we develop the first tsunami damage database for port industries and their related structures. We also present the
79 first sets of tsunami damage fragility models for common industries found in the port hinterland. We describe the data sources
80 and methods to develop this damage database, and demonstrate in detail how the damage database addresses limitations found
81 in past studies. Fragility functions are constructed by reviewing and employing best practices in the field. Unique to this work,
82 we also evaluated the robustness of tsunami fragility functions against the influence of pre-tsunami earthquake effects. We
83 conclude by highlighting some key application opportunities of this dataset and providing recommendations for overcoming
84 current limitations found in this study. This study provides a blueprint for translating post-event damage surveys into fragility
85 functions, which can be used to forecast future tsunami-induced damage to ports.

86 **2. Study site**

87 The northeast coast of Japan, also known as the Tohoku region, was severely impacted by the Tohoku tsunami on 11 March
88 2011 (Fig. 1). Port operations along the Pacific Coast in Tohoku and eastern Kanto regions were disrupted due to debris and
89 severe damage to buildings, loading facilities, wharfs, fuel facilities and seawalls (Takano et al., 2012). Damage patterns varied
90 along the Tohoku coastline. The Tohoku coastline is mainly coastal plains and ria coasts. Coastal plains are extensive areas of
91 low-lying flat terrain, while ria coasts, formed by submergence of former river valleys, typically have limited flat terrain. Ria
92 coasts are characterised by narrow funnel-shaped coastal inlets bounded by steep slopes such as mountains. In coastal plains,


93 damage severity transitioned gradually with distance inland, decreasing as inundation depths decrease with distance inland
 94 (De Risi et al., 2017). In ria coasts, the spatial distribution of damage was uneven because flow characteristics i.e. velocity and
 95 hydrodynamic force, which influence damage severity, varied significantly for different points at the same distance inland or
 96 with similar inundation depths (Suppasri et al., 2013; De Risi et al., 2017). This was due to the differences in local topography
 97 (Tsuji et al., 2014). Coastal topography influences tsunami behaviour on land, and therefore influences tsunami flow dynamics
 98 and inundation characteristics (Suppasri et al., 2015). Previous studies have highlighted the importance of separating the two
 99 types of coastlines when assessing tsunami damage (Suppasri et al., 2013; Tsuji et al., 2014; De Risi et al., 2017). This study
 100 focuses on ports located in coastal plains, due to the (i) difficulty of accounting for complexity of flow processes in ria coasts
 101 as well as (ii) significantly less port activity found in the narrow strips of ria coasts. Affected ports, namely Hachinohe, Kuji,
 102 Ishinomaki, Sendai, Soma and Onahama, located in coastal plains were selected as study sites for our damage assessment (Fig.
 103 1).
 104



105
 106 **Fig. 1.** Six of the affected ports (circled dots) were selected in this study due to similarities in their coastal morphologies –
 107 they are located in coastal plains. Tsunami inundation heights were measured and collected by the Tohoku Tsunami Joint
 108 Survey (TTJS, 2011) team. Inundation heights refer to the maximum height of tsunami inundation above the mean sea level
 109 in Tokyo Bay (the Tokyo Peil datum). The generalized 2011 fault-rupture area (in light blue) was inferred from GPS data
 110 adapted from Ozawa et al. (2011).

111 **3. Workflow and data sources**

112 A goal of this study was to produce tsunami damage fragility functions for industries commonly found in ports and their
113 hinterlands, such as chemical and energy-related industries. The components required to derive fragility functions include the
114 explanatory variable (hazard intensity measure), response variable (damage data) and a statistical linking model (Charvet et
115 al., 2017). At present, a consolidated data source for tsunami damage to port structures has yet to exist. This data gap presents
116 us with an opportunity to develop a damage database for port structures, and to use the damage data for the construction of
117 fragility functions. We developed a framework (Fig. 2) for collecting and processing damage data within a database and using
118 a machine learning workflow to evaluate those data and provide robust fragility functions; more details on our approaches are
119 provided over the following subsections. We used freely available data where possible to illustrate how our methods can also
120 be reproduced in other locations. A synopsis of the data used in this study and their sources are presented in Table 1.
121



122
123 **Fig. 2.** The framework of this study follows the approach of a machine learning workflow. A damage database for port
124 structures is constructed through data collection and processing. The consolidated data is then randomly split into training and
125 test sets for model building and evaluation. This process is usually iterated until a satisfactory model is selected for the
126 development of fragility functions. This is usually the case where are more than one model or parameter to choose from,
127 whereas in our case, only inundation depth was considered as an explanatory variable.
128

129 **Table 1.** Data used in this study, their sources and the reference period from which data are taken.

Data	Source	Data observation/ acquisition period	Citation
Tsunami inundation depths	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism (MLIT)	Mar 2011 – Dec 2012	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism (2014)
Building database	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism (MLIT)	Mar 2011 – Dec 2012	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism (2014)
Port structure footprint for digitisation	GSI Interactive Web: Map/Aerial Photo Browsing Service;	-	Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (2013)
	Google Earth engine	Mar 2009 – Sep 2010	© Google Earth 2020
Aerial images for damage assessment	Google Earth engine;	Mar 2009 – Sep 2010 + Mar 2011 – May 2011 ++ Feb 2012 +++	© Google Earth 2020
	GSI Map: Aerial Photo of Affected Area	Mar 2011 – May 2011 ++ Apr 2012 +++	Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (2012a)
Oblique images for damage assessment	GSI Map: Oblique Photo of Affected Area	May 2011 ++	Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (2012b)
Street view images for damage assessment	Google Street View	Jul 2011 – Aug 2011 ++ Aug 2013 +++	© Google Street View 2020
Landuse (industry) classification	Google Maps	-	© Google Maps 2020

+Pre-tsunami, ++Immediate phase after tsunami and +++One to two years after tsunami (Intermediate phase) for damage assessment

131 **4. Data collection**

132 **4.1 Establishing a damage database**

133 The port structures referred to in this study collectively consist of a mixture of buildings and industry-related non-building
134 structures (henceforth referred to as port infrastructure). Detailed building damage data have been collected by Ministry of
135 Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism (MLIT, 2014) post-tsunami. However, the MLIT database predominantly
136 consists of residential, commercial and some industrial buildings. Buildings within the port area are mostly missing from the
137 database, and infrastructure such as silos, cranes and towers were not identified in the MLIT database.

138 To develop our own database of port structures, we extended the MLIT database, which already consisted of outlines of 3,057
139 buildings. To build the new database, port structure outlines (n = 2,173) were digitised into a Geographic Information System
140 (ArcMap 10.5) using building footprints from the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan Interactive Map platform (GSI,
141 2013) as well as pre-tsunami aerial images from Google Earth Engine (Table 1). We identified 3,343 buildings and 1,887
142 infrastructure (5,230 total). The database is stored in the form of a Geographic Information System (GIS) attribute table. For
143 each structure, we collected information on

- 144 (1) the type of industry
- 145 (2) the name of port
- 146 (3) the name of company at the time of tsunami (where available)
- 147 (4) maximum inundation depth values
- 148 (5) assigned damage state and,
- 149 (6) structure type (building or infrastructure)

150 **4.2 Attributes of port structures and industry**

151 Unique to this work, damaged structures were classified according to their industry type (Table 2). As with the construction
152 of any fragility function, a key assumption is that structures under the same taxonomy are likely to perform similarly when
153 exposed to a given hazard intensity (Pitilakis et al., 2014). For that reason, the classification of structures determines the
154 robustness of the fragility functions developed. It was therefore important to create a suitable taxonomy for the types of
155 structures being studied. Conventionally, building damage has been assessed by separating the buildings into their various
156 construction types (e.g. masonry, wood, steel, unreinforced and reinforced concrete). Charvet et al. (2014) noted differences
157 in the performance of buildings with different construction types to tsunami impacts following the Tohoku event. However,
158 port structures consist of both buildings and infrastructure, with the infrastructure of a highly specialised nature where the
159 design and construction criteria are industry-specific. A more suitable approach then would be to classify port structures
160 according to their industry.

161 Different types of port activities occupy the port area. Aside from the core business of terminal operations, the port is also host
 162 to distribution centres and non-maritime activities. To the best of our knowledge, there is no standard industrial classification
 163 for port activities. We therefore proposed a broad classification for the port activities found in Tohoku ports, according to the
 164 general industry that they fall into (Table 2). Classification for non-maritime port industries was adapted from the terminologies
 165 used by European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO, 2016) for the various industrial sectors found in European ports. We used
 166 Google Maps and Google Street View to identify the business nature of each company (industry type), commonly through the
 167 name of the company at the time of the tsunami. We identified eight main port industries based on our proposed taxonomy.
 168 Buildings in port industries commonly include administrative offices, control and maintenance buildings, warehouses and cold
 169 storage. Industrial buildings are typically of steel or concrete construction. On the other hand, the types of port infrastructure
 170 are diverse - ranging from small transformers to large loading cranes. Some common infrastructure found in each industry are
 171 listed in Table 2, adapted from the descriptions provided by the AIR Construction and Occupancy Class Codes (AIR
 172 Worldwide, 2019). Because of their diversity, port infrastructure vary widely in their construction and unlike buildings, it is
 173 extremely challenging to classify them according to their construction nature. It is interesting to note, however, that several
 174 industrial infrastructure are installed in support structures or housed in buildings. In the petrochemical industry, for example,
 175 oil and gas are commonly stored in steel or concrete silos and tanks.

176
177
178 **Table 2.** Proposed classification for port activities found in the Tohoku region.

Industry type		Description of port activities
Maritime industries	Cargo handling industry	Cargo handling services such as loading and unloading of ships (stevedoring) as well as the handling of cargo on shore. <u>Typical infrastructure: Loading and gantry cranes, storage yards, storage sheds, silos, chillers and warehouses (buildings).</u>
	Warehousing and distribution	Cold storage, warehousing and logistics support. <u>Typical infrastructure: Storage sheds, tanks and silos.</u>
Non-maritime port-related industries	Chemical industry	Bulk chemical production e.g. alkane, propane and fertilisers. <u>Typical infrastructure: Distillation towers, tanks, silos, conveyors, pipes, pumps, compressors, reactors, vessels,</u>

	<u>wastewater treatment systems, chemical separation columns, substations and open frame structures.</u>
Construction materials industry	Concrete and cement manufacturing. Asphalt and wood processing. <u>Typical infrastructure: Rotary kiln/furnace, coal storage, grinders, mills, pre-heating towers, coolers, tanks, silos, conveyors, sorters and stackers.</u>
Energy-related industry	Coal power generation. Electric power generation and distribution. <u>Typical infrastructure: Mills, power plants, substations, transformers, chimneys, boilers, generators, cooling towers, turbines, condensers, pumps and electricity transmission towers.</u>
Food industry	Seafood processing and food packaging. Feed manufacturing. <u>Typical infrastructure: Ovens, cold storage (buildings), freeze dryers, tanks, mixers, conveyors, boilers and vessels.</u>
Manufacturing industry	Metal and alloy products. Plywood and paper products. <u>Typical infrastructure: Grinders/refiners, chimneys, furnaces, silos, tanks, screens, conveyors, cranes, mills and rollers.</u>
Petrochemical industry	Oil depots, reserves and refineries. <u>Typical infrastructure: Furnaces, distillation towers, crackers, compressors, condensers, vessels, tanks, silos and pipelines.</u>

180 **4.3 Maximum inundation depths**








181 Various tsunami hazard intensity measures (e.g. inundation depth, flow velocity and force) have been used in literature to
182 estimate structural fragility to tsunami impacts. Past studies ([Macabaug-Macabuag et al., 2016](#); Park et al., 2017; Attary et al.,
183 2019) have shown that no single measure can fully characterise structural fragility to tsunami impacts as it is impossible to
184 explain a complex phenomenon through a sole parameter. For the purpose of this study, observed maximum inundation depth
185 was chosen as the representative intensity measure manifesting damage since depth is more easily estimated from field survey
186 after tsunami events as compared to other flow values, which typically have to be simulated. Using observational data also
187 minimises the uncertainty in intensity measure as compared to using simulated data (e.g. velocity and force).

188 Inundation characteristics were recorded and collected from a number of sources, namely tsunami trace heights by the Tohoku
189 Tsunami Joint Survey Group (TTJS, 2011), MLIT survey, photographs, videos, eyewitness accounts and other reports
190 (Leelawatt et al., 2014). The MLIT (2014) compiled all the maximum inundation depth values and building data into a single
191 database. Inundation depth refers to the depth of floodwater above ground. Each building surveyed in the MLIT database is
192 pegged with maximum inundation depth values, and where values were not available for some buildings (e.g. those that were
193 washed away), they were interpolated from nearby buildings with inundation depth values (De Risi et al., 2017). Similarly, for
194 buildings and infrastructure that were identified in this study, we interpolated inundation depth values from neighbouring
195 surveyed buildings.

196 **4.4 Proposed damage classification scheme**

197 For the first time, a damage classification scheme for tsunami damage to port structures is being proposed (Fig. 3). The MLIT
198 adopted a damage classification scheme for building damage assessment following the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (see Leelawatt
199 et al., 2014). Naturally, subsequent studies that used the MLIT damage database to analyse damage and derive fragility
200 functions followed the same classification scheme. The pitfalls of adopting the MLIT damage classification have been
201 highlighted in several studies (Leelawat et al., 2014; Charvet et al., 2015; Charvet et al., 2017). Firstly, the MLIT classification
202 consists of six damage states, which were found to have overlaps in their definitions (Leelawat et al., 2014; Charvet et al.,
203 2015). The overlapping definitions might have resulted in buildings being wrongly classified when performing damage
204 assessment. Ideally, damage states should be presented in a mutually exclusive and consecutive order (Charvet et al., 2015).
205 Secondly, descriptions in the MLIT classification scheme do not distinguish between structural and non-structural damage.
206 Therefore, the structural response of the buildings assessed is not being explicitly assessed. Additionally, by specifying the
207 range of inundation depths associated with each damage state, such definitions allude to inundation depths being a condition
208 of damage. This contradicts the objective of developing fragility functions as predictive models of damage. Over and above
209 the limitations outlined, the MLIT damage classification solely describes damage to buildings, which is otherwise unsuitable
210 for port structures.

211 To address the limitations of the existing damage classification of MLIT, we proposed a new damage classification for port
 212 structures. This new classification scheme provides damage descriptions for both buildings and infrastructure. Degrees of
 213 damage are classified into four levels (with damage state DS 0 being no damage), ensuring that the descriptions for each
 214 damage state are mutually exclusive and in increasing order. Descriptions also include the expected serviceability of the
 215 structure at each damage state. Pitalakis et al. (2014) argued that physical damages would reflect the expected serviceability
 216 of the structure (condition for use) and its corresponding functionality (i.e. can its functions still be fulfilled?). The structural
 217 integrity of port structures is also being considered. For instance, between DS 2 and DS 3, damage is distinguished by whether
 218 it only affected non-structural components and/or roof (DS 2), or structural components such as columns and beams (DS 3).
 219 We assumed that when the structural integrity of a structure is compromised, the structure would be removed.
 220

Damage State	Damage Description	
	Buildings (B)	Infrastructure (I)
DS 0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Little to no water penetration. Non-structural components (windows and door) and roof remain intact. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No floodwater impacts on infrastructure. 
	<i>Serviceability:</i> Ready for immediate use	
DS 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Water penetration. Non-structural components and roof remain intact. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No visible damage from outside of infrastructure. 
	<i>Serviceability:</i> Ready for immediate use but requires interior restoration, such as drying of floors and walls, repainting, repairs to plumbing and electric systems.	
DS 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Non-structural components and/or roof have sustained damage. Structural components are intact. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some damage to infrastructure, while foundation or base remains intact. 
	<i>Serviceability:</i> Obvious repair works in the intermediate period after the tsunami. Operational only after repairs.	
DS 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structural components (columns and beams) have sustained damage, or rackings have buckled and folded. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foundation or base of infrastructure has folded or buckled. 
	<i>Serviceability:</i> Not repairable. Replacement or removal of building in the intermediate period after the tsunami.	
DS 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Total structural failure. Building has either overturned or slid from original position. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Infrastructure has overturned or slid from original position. 
	<i>Serviceability:</i> Not operational.	

221


222 **Fig. 3.** Proposed new damage classification for port industries. Descriptions for damage to both buildings and non-building
223 infrastructure are provided in the classification table. DS 1 and DS 2 are considered as non-structural damages, while DS 3
224 and DS 4 are structural damages.

225 **4.5 Damage assessment through spatio-temporal analysis**

226 A combination of free-to-use sources were used to inform our classification decisions when assigning damage states to
227 individual port structures (Table 1). Port structures were assessed through the analysis of satellite imagery, using pre- and post-
228 tsunami images from Google Earth engine and Geospatial Information Authority (2012a), as well as photographic
229 interpretations of post-tsunami oblique images from Geospatial Information Authority (2012b). Pre- and post-tsunami images
230 refer to observations made before 11 March 2011, and on and after 11 March 2011 respectively (Table 1). Apart from aerial
231 and oblique images, we visually assessed the conditions of port structures through Google Street View images. Google Street
232 View, a service available on Google Maps web, provides panoramic view of the landscape at a street level. An example of
233 how a building or infrastructure was being assessed is illustrated in Fig. 4.

234 The three types of images (aerial, oblique and street view) provided different, yet complimentary, types of information. Aerial
235 images were particularly useful in assessing washed away and collapsed structures (DS 4). Street View images were used to
236 identify damage from façade level, which supplemented as “ground truth surveys”. The high-resolution imagery provided by
237 Google Street View allowed us to pick up finer details such as structural and non-structural damage to port structures, which
238 would otherwise be missing from aerial imagery. However, because Street View imagery was captured through vehicle-
239 mounted cameras, the availability of these images are constrained by the accessibility of roads by the vehicle at the time of
240 survey. Where imagery was not captured by Google Street View due to such constraints, we capitalised on the alternative
241 views provided by GSI oblique images.

242 Advances in mapping technologies mean that temporal changes are also being captured and documented in these mapping
243 applications. The time-slider functions on Google Earth engine and Google Street View web, as well as the date stamps on
244 GSI images, allowed us to review temporal changes in the built environment. For images in Google Earth and Google Street
245 View, different phases of the tsunami, i.e. pre-tsunami (before March 2011), immediately after the tsunami (up to 6 months
246 after the tsunami) and the intermediate recovery phase (1 – 2 years), were all captured in the same point locations. With
247 coordinates being embedded in the aforementioned data sources, we were also able to reference GSI aerial and oblique post-
248 tsunami images to the same locations. The large amount of high-quality data provided by these image databases and mapping
249 applications have been a large driver of our data collection in this study.



250

251 **Fig. 4.** A building (circled in red) in Ishinomaki Port has been selected to demonstrate how spatiotemporal damage assessment
 252 had been conducted in this study. For every port structure, we reviewed four main sources of data (©Google Earth 2020,
 253 ©Google Street View 2020, GSI Aerial and Oblique images) to estimate the level of damage sustained during the tsunami.

254 5. Model building

255 Fragility functions describe the probabilities of damage exceedance for a given intensity measure or flow characteristic. The
 256 probability of damage exceedance can simply be expressed as:

257

$$PDS = P(ds \geq DS | IM)$$

258 , where ds is the observed damage state of a structure, DS the classification provided by the damage scale and IM the intensity
 259 measure (Charvet et al., 2017). In the case of this study, tsunami inundation depth was used as an explanatory variable in the
 260 prediction of structural damage probability. Typically, empirical tsunami fragility functions are constructed by fitting an
 261 appropriate statistical model to post-tsunami damage data.

262 5.1 Evaluation of statistical models available


263 In recent years, a number of studies evaluated the suitability of various statistical models in representing tsunami damage to
264 structures (Charvet et al., 2014; [Macabaug-Macabuag](#) et al., 2016; Charvet et al., 2017). Parametric (e.g. Ordinary Least Square
265 regression, Generalised Linear Model or ordinal logistic regression models), semi-parametric (e.g. Generalised Additive
266 Model) and non-parametric (e.g. Kernel Smoother) statistical model types are amongst the most commonly used. These
267 statistical models are extensively reviewed in Rosetto et al. (2014), Lallemand et al. (2015), [Macabaug-Macabuag](#) et al. (2016)
268 and Charvet et al. (2017), and readers are referred to these studies for a more comprehensive understanding of the advantages
269 and disadvantages of using the various types of statistical models.

270 Generalised Linear Models (GLM), an extension of classical linear regression models, have been recommended as more
271 reliable forms of fragility functions for the following reasons:

- 272 • Discrete probability distributions can be used to predict discrete responses (Charvet et al., 2017). This is especially
273 important for categorical data (such as damage states), because it is statistically incorrect to assume that the difference
274 between categories is linear/continuous, e.g. the difference between DS 1 and DS 2 holds the same meaning for the
275 difference between DS 2 and DS 3 (Guisan and Harrell, 2000).
- 276 • Unlike classical linear regression models (e.g. ordinary least square regression) which assume either a normal or
277 lognormal distribution, the response variable need not be normally distributed and can take on any of the exponential
278 family distributions.
- 279 • It does not assume a linear relationship between the explanatory variable and response variable, but a linear
280 relationship is assumed between the transformed response through a link function and the explanatory variables.
- 281 • Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is used rather than ordinary least squares to estimate the parameters. MLE
282 has the advantage of explicitly reflecting the probability distribution of the random variable of interest.
- 283 • Overfitting of data can be avoided by using cross-validation analysis to determine optimal model parameter values.
- 284 • Model uncertainty can be quantified by supplementing the median of the response with confidence or prediction
285 intervals.

286 5.2 Data exploratory analysis

287 The response variable is ordinal (in the sense that $DS\ 0 < DS\ 1 < DS\ 2 < DS\ 3 < DS\ 4$). A visual inspection of the distribution
288 of depth given damage data (Fig. 5) indicates non-normality, with the distribution skewed towards the right, indicating a
289 lognormal transformation of inundation depth variable would be appropriate. Frequency counts of the damage data show that
290 damage state (DS 1) makes up the majority of the dataset ($n = 2710$), and DS 3 and 4 a much smaller proportion ($n = 576$ and
291 $n = 605$ respectively).



292

293 **Fig. 5.** Histograms of each damage state. Distribution of damage data indicates non-normality and DS 1 accounts for the
 294 majority of the dataset. ~~Outliers exist in DS 3 and 4, with no damage states recorded for inundation values between 6 to 7.4~~
 295 ~~metres. Outliers are not removed from the model, as they are legitimate observations and possible outcomes.~~

296 **5.3 Selection of a suitable statistical model**

297 An ordinal logistic regression model, an ordinal and logistic recourse of GLMs, is adopted. It has the additional advantage of
 298 accounting for and maintaining the ordered nature of damage-state data. As this model recognises the ordered nature of the
 299 damage states, overlapping pathways of the fragility functions can be avoided (Charvet et al., 2017). Overlapping fragility
 300 functions, as is common when fitting separate GLMs, may unwittingly imply that the probability of a higher damage state (e.g.
 301 DS 4) being exceeded is higher than that of a lower damage state (e.g. DS 3) as inundation depth increases. Ordinal models
 302 also make full use of the ranked data rather than simplifying it into binary exceedance and non-exceedance, and therefore
 303 preventing the loss of information (Ananth and Kleinbaum, 1997).

304 The dependence of the response variable DS on predictor variable X can then be represented as follows

305
$$P_{DS} = P(ds \geq DS_i | X_j)$$

306 , where DS_i refers to the i_{th} damage state, j the specified predictor (IM) or combination of predictors. The model relates the
 307 probability of the outcome, P_{DS} , to all explanatory variables (X_1, X_2, \dots, X_j) through a linear predictor. There are three basic
 308 components to any GLM, and Table 3 describes the components in the context of the ordinal logistic model used in this study.

309

Random Component	<i>The probability distribution of the response variable.</i>
	A multinomial distribution is assumed for the cumulative probabilities in an ordinal logistic regression model.
Systematic Component	<i>The explanatory variable (X_j) or the linear combination of the explanatory variables (X_1, X_2, \dots, X_j) in creating the linear predictor e.g. $\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1, \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_j X_j$, where β_0 and $\beta_{1,j}$ are transformed constant and regression coefficients through maximum likelihood estimation.</i>
Link function	<i>The link between random and systematic components.</i>

Describes how the cumulative probability P_{DS_i} of the expected outcome for any damage state DS_i relates to the linear predictor of explanatory variables X_j . In this instance, the link function chosen takes on a logit form g where

$$g(P_{DS_i}) = \log\left(\frac{P_{DS_i}}{1 - P_{DS_i}}\right)$$

, with

$$P_{DS_i} = P(ds \geq DS_i | X_j) \quad \forall i \in (1, \dots, I)$$

Therefore, the dependence of the response variable DS on the linear predictor can be re-expressed as

$$\log\left(\frac{P_{DS_i}}{1 - P_{DS_i}}\right) = \beta_{0,i} + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_j X_j$$

$$\log\left(\frac{P_{DS_i}}{1 - P_{DS_i}}\right) = \beta_{0,i} + \sum_{j=1}^J \beta_j X_j$$

The corresponding regression coefficients $\beta_{1,j}$ in the link function are fixed across every damage state except for the intercept, so as to maintain the order of the response categories.

312 The conditional probability $P(ds \geq DS_i | X_j)$ is a common vector of regression coefficients β , which connects probabilities for
 313 varying levels of damage. When expressing the cumulative probabilities of each damage state as separate curves, the
 314 relationships between damage states in increasing order of severity are defined as follows:

$$315 \quad P_{DS} = P(ds = DS_i | IM = X_j) = \begin{cases} 1 - P(ds \geq DS_i | X_j) & i = 0 \\ P(ds \geq DS_i | X_j) - P(ds \geq DS_{i+1} | X_j) & 0 \leq i \leq N_{DS} \\ P(ds \geq DS_i | X_j) & i = N_{DS} \end{cases}$$

316

317 , where N_{DS} refers to the number of damage states, including DS 0 (Macabaug-Macabuag et al., 2016).

318 6. Model evaluation

319 6.1. 10-fold cross-validation

320 Model accuracy was used as a quantitative indicator of the performance of our models. We wanted to assess the goodness-of-
 321 fit of the models and determine its predictive ability. It was difficult to test the predictive ability of our models where there
 322 were no further samples to test with. In order to optimise model design while preventing overfitting, the cross-validation
 323 method was applied to evaluate the prediction accuracy of our models. Cross-validation techniques make use of the available
 324 dataset by dividing them into two subsamples – one to train the model and the other to predict the model on.

325 One cross-validation technique is K-fold, where the dataset is divided into K number of approximately equal-sized subsets as
 326 illustrated in Fig. 6a. One subset is taken out as a test set for validation, and the remaining $K - 1$ subsets are then used to train
 327 a model. This hold-out method is then repeated for K number of times, with a new subset being used as a test set in each
 328 iteration. Only after all K models are fitted, statistics of the model performance are tabulated. For the purpose of this study, a
 329 10-fold cross-validation approach was taken.

330 The accuracy of a model is determined by the proportion of correctly classified responses. When applied to the k-fold
 331 technique, the fitted model is used to predict response on the held-out k^{th} subset in each iteration. The recorded response is
 332 tabulated against actual observations in the k^{th} subset and a confusion matrix is constructed as demonstrated in Fig. 6b. The
 333 diagonal of the confusion matrix represents the sum of correctly predicted response, the proportion of correctly classified
 334 response is then calculated by

$$335 \quad Accuracy = \frac{\text{Sum of correctly predicted response}}{\text{Sum of total observations}}$$

336

337 Accuracies are recorded in each iteration of the K-fold, and the mean and standard-deviation of the tabulated accuracies are
 338 taken to assess the predictive ability of the model. All statistical analyses and modelling in this study were carried out using
 339 the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2020).

a) K-fold cross-validation



b) Confusion matrix for accuracy

		Predicted			
		DS 1	DS 2	DS 3	DS 4
Actual	DS 1	30			
	DS 2		20		
	DS 3			8	
	DS 4				9

Example of k^{th} in K number of folds

340

341 **Fig. 6.** (a) An example of a 5-fold cross-validation technique for the purpose of illustration. The same dataset can be folded
 342 into 5 equal sizes, and one fold is held-out for testing and the remaining 4 folds are used to develop a training model to predict
 343 the accuracy of the training model. This is repeated 5 times, with accuracies being tabulated in each iteration. (b) Accuracy
 344 table (confusion matrix) is produced in each iteration of the k-folds. The sum of the diagonal in the table is divided by the sum
 345 of observations to get the percentage of accuracy in the k^{th} fold.

346 6.2 Quantification of uncertainty

347 The fragility functions, when presented as curves or plots, represent the expected value of the response variable. Therefore,
 348 they represent only a sample estimate of the population values. Statistical variations of the fragility functions can be accounted
 349 for by estimating the confidence intervals. In this study, we adopted bootstrap-based confidence intervals to estimate the
 350 uncertainty in estimation or prediction. The bootstrap method treats the original dataset of values as a realised sample from the
 351 true population and does not make any assumptions about the underlying distribution of the population parameters (Yung and
 352 Bentler, 1996). Values from the original dataset are resampled repeatedly, with replacement. This was done for 1000 iterations,
 353 with the predicted logit computed in each iteration. To derive a 95% confidence band, the 2.5th and 97.5th quantiles of the 1000
 354 estimates were drawn at each inundation depth interval (0.01m).

355 7. Results

356 7.1. Damage database for port structures

357 To characterise the vulnerability of assets in various port industries, damage assessment was performed for buildings and
 358 infrastructure in the Tohoku region. We compiled damage information on port structures into a database, which is available
 359 online through an unrestricted data repository (DR-NTU) hosted by Nanyang Technological University
 360 (<https://doi.org/10.21979/N9/OTZMT1>) (Chua et al., 2020).


361 The port damage database consists of 5,230 port structures, of which 3,343 are buildings and 1887 are infrastructure. The port
 362 structures were identified in six case study ports, across eight port industries. The damage dataset show that most port structures

363 sustained minimal structural damage classified as damage state DS 1 (Table 4). Consistently for all port industries, the majority
 364 of the observed damage corresponds to DS 1 (Fig. 7.) Notably, many industries such as chemical, petrochemical and energy-
 365 related industries sustained minimal structural damage mainly due to flooding at DS 1, which only required some clean up and
 366 interior restoration and remained mostly operational after restoration. On the other hand, cargo handling and food industries
 367 sustained a wide range of damage from minimal damage (DS 1) to total damage (DS 4), corresponding to nearly all damage
 368 states. Tsunami floodwaters at depths of less than 5 metres inundated most port structures. In extreme cases, inundation depths
 369 affecting port structures reached as high as 7.5 metres. The minimum recorded inundation depth was 0.1 m.

370

371 **Table 4.** Summary of port structures identified in the various ports, sorted according to their industries.

	North Tohoku		South Tohoku				Total
	Hachinohe	Kuji	Ishinomaki	Sendai	Soma	Onahama	
Cargo Handling Industry	31	9	31	32	25	62	190
Warehousing and Distribution	111	16	175	105	39	17	463
Chemical Industry	236	-	208	27	85	-	556
Construction Materials Industry	29	20	20	99	9	37	214
Energy-related Industry	125	-	-	104	134	50	413
Food Industry	12	37	430	151	-	-	630
Manufacturing Industry	1010	60	587	279	144	-	2080
Petrochemical Industry	202	41	38	324	-	79	684
Total							5230



372

373 Fig. 7. Data attributes of the port industries affected by the 2011 Great East Japan tsunami.

374 7.2 Damage fragility functions for port industries

375 Damage fragility functions were produced for eight major port industries as depicted in Fig. 8. Individual fragility curves were
376 plotted for each damage state and the solid lines represent the probabilities of a structure exceeding each damage state given a
377 range of inundation depths and the shaded regions their corresponding 95% confidence intervals.

378 The fragility functions (Fig. 8) suggest that chemical, cargo handling, and construction materials industries are more
379 vulnerable. Higher probabilities of damage exceedance are reached at a more rapid rate as compared to other industries. In
380 contrast, energy-related industry and warehousing and distribution are showing a gentler incline in damage probability for
381 higher levels of damage (DS 3 and DS 4), indicating a greater resistance to tsunami impacts. A key assumption of fragility
382 studies and of this study is that damage is directly related to the properties of the elements at risk. Thus, aside from tsunami
383 intensity measures, the composition and structural design of each industry could determine the differences in vulnerabilities.
384 For example, power plants (energy-related industries) and warehouses are structurally robust by design. Most heavy equipment
385 found in power plants is normally supported in large reinforced concrete foundations or housed in large steel structure buildings
386 (Cruz and Valdivia, 2011) and is therefore more resistant to tsunami loads. Likewise, many warehouses in the studied ports
387 were reinforced concrete buildings with their warehouse floor raised above road levels, which increased the height of non-
388 structural elements (e.g. docks and doors) relative to tsunami inundation. Comparatively, chemical facilities typically consist
389 of more fragile components which are not part of the primary load resisting systems such as pipelines, pumps, compressors
390 and tanks, and they are extremely vulnerable to damage from tsunami inundation and forces. As observed in the 2011 event,
391 hydrodynamic and hydrostatic forces from the tsunami resulted in the breaking of pipe connections, floating tanks and
392 overturning of unanchored infrastructure (Krausmann and Cruz, 2013). Meanwhile in cargo handling facilities, loading and
393 unloading infrastructure were ~~creas~~ mostly anchored, but instances of cracked pavements and damaged crane rail foundations by
394 the earthquake and tsunami were reported to result in the derailment and collapse of cranes (Technical Council on Lifeline
395 Earthquake Engineering, 2017). ~~Nonetheless, other factors such as debris impact and proximity to shoreline should not be
396 discounted when considering the differences in the response of each industry to tsunami impacts.~~

397 Other factors such as debris impact and proximity of the structure to the shoreline should not be discounted when considering
398 differences in the response of each industry to tsunami impacts. Tsunami-borne debris can contribute significantly to structural
399 damage. This issue is particularly present in port facilities, where ships, containers, mobile equipment, construction materials
400 such as wood logs and concrete objects can impact on structures. Port structures are typically of more robust construction and
401 therefore, they act as barriers in the path of debris motion for as long as inundation depth is lower than the structure height
402 (Reese et al., 2007; Naito et al., 2014). As a result, they are more likely to be subjected to damage from debris impact (Charvet
403 et. al., 2015). While debris impact is location-specific and does not affect all areas in the same ways, some industries may be
404 more susceptible to debris impact than others. For example, in cargo handling and construction materials industries, where
405 mobile large objects such as containers and wood logs are stored in open yards, there is a higher concentration of potential
406 debris and therefore, a higher debris delivery potential (Naito et al., 2014). Kumagai (2013) surveyed the post-mortem dispersal

407 of containers after the 2011 Tohoku event and found that containers, which were not washed out to sea, were mostly dispersed
408 within the terminals where they were located in. Many of these containers were also found to be concentrated around buildings
409 surrounding the container yards without travelling further inland (Kumagai, 2013; Naito et al., 2014), which suggests that
410 damage sustained to structures within these facilities are more likely a consequence of the combined effect of debris impact
411 and tsunami flow than hydrodynamic force alone.

412

413 For each damage state, we considered the minimum depths where damage exceedance probability reaches near 1 or becomes
414 nearly certain. Minimum damage (DS 1) is almost certain at 2.5 m consistently for all industries except energy-related industry.
415 DS 1 occurs when there is water penetration into the building and interior restoration is required (Fig. 3). Logically, water
416 penetration into buildings would be expected from 0.45 m since buildings are required to be constructed 0.45 m above road
417 level as specified by the Building Standard Law of Japan (Building Centre of Japan, 2013). Threshold depths for DS 1 might
418 have occurred at 2.5 m because of the aggregation of data for both infrastructure and buildings. We observed that there were
419 many buildings (especially warehouse) and infrastructure such as storage tanks and silos that were elevated above ground and
420 therefore, the number of exposed assets at lower inundation depths were reduced. The trend for other damage states is however
421 not obvious and it is difficult to pinpoint minimum depth values where damage becomes certain.

422 A threshold value is said to be reached when damage curves from all states of damage converge at the probability of near
423 100%. Key threshold value can be defined as the parameter (in this case, inundation depth) criteria at which DS 4 (collapse)
424 becomes certain. Earlier studies of the 2011 Great East Japan tsunami (Suppasri et al., 2013; Charvet et al., 2014) examined
425 the key threshold values for buildings, using damage data provided by MLIT. Suppasri et al. (2013) identified 2 m to be the
426 key threshold value for all building types. More recent analysis found inundation depth thresholds to differ between
427 construction types: from 2 m for wooden buildings (Charvet et al., 2014) to more than 10 m (Charvet et al., 2015) for steel and
428 reinforced concrete construction types. Similar patterns have emerged in the present analysis. The near 100% probability of
429 collapse occur at inundation depth exceeding 10 m for all industries. As such we were unable to quantify the key threshold
430 values for collapse for port industries. There are several possible reasons for this observation. Two likely explanations stand
431 out. The first being port structures are structurally much more resistant to tsunami loads than regular low-rise buildings because
432 industrial buildings and structures are designed to withstand greater loads, including but not limited to dead loads, live loads,
433 wind and earthquake loads. Therefore, greater tsunami inundation depths are required to overcome the resistance of port
434 structures. A second possible explanation is that inundation depth alone is insufficient to explain damage, although it provides
435 a first indication.


436 The effects of uncertainty were quantified through the construction of confidence intervals around the mean-median of the
437 resulting probabilities. Confidence intervals around DS 1 are consistently narrow in width for all industries (Fig. 8), which
438 could be associated with its large sample size. Contrastingly, for higher levels of damage (DS 3 and DS 4), confidence intervals
439 tend to widen towards higher inundation depths. An observation made in the process of damage data collection through
440 photographic interpretations was that many structures sustained very little damage despite high inundation depth values, which

441 explains the smaller sample sizes and therefore wider confidence intervals for DS 3 and DS 4 at higher depth values. In the
442 same way, industries with the widest confidence intervals such as cargo handling industry and construction materials industry
443 tend to have smaller sample sizes. By contrast, variabilities around the median curves tend to be smaller for the manufacturing
444 industry, food industry, warehousing and distribution and petrochemical industry due to their larger sample sizes.

445 These findings can alternatively be justified by the effects of debris impact. A couple of studies (e.g. Charvet et al., 2015;
446 Macabuag et al., 2015) have found the inclusion/omission of debris impact to have an effect on fragility models. Macabuag et
447 al. (2015) demonstrated that models that include regression parameters considering debris impact have a better fit (statistically
448 more significant) than models that do not. The authors also argued that the omission of debris information will likely introduce
449 systematic bias to the fragility models. In this study, debris impact has not been explicitly considered in the development of
450 fragility models, though it could be a source of uncertainty in our fragility models. Intuitively, structures that were damaged
451 by debris would fall into higher damage states and likely experienced higher tsunami intensity values (i.e. depth and velocity).
452 By neglecting debris impact, it is unsurprising that confidence intervals tend to widen towards higher depth values for DS 3
453 and DS 4 (Fig. 8). Similarly, by neglecting debris information, fragility functions derived for industries, such as cargo handling
454 and construction materials industries, that are more heavily impacted by the debris-related damage are expected to have greater
455 uncertainties.

456

457



458

459 **Fig. 8.** Fragility curves with 95% confidence bands for port industries identified in this study. Chemical, cargo handling and
 460 construction materials industries appear to be more vulnerable to tsunami inundation depths, while petrochemical and
 461 warehousing and distribution industries have lower damage probabilities for the same inundation depths. Wider confidence
 462 bands imply greater variability in uncertainty and could be results of smaller sample sizes.

463 8. Discussion


464 8.1 Comparison of damage dataset with functionality of port industries post-tsunami

465 We compared the damage database with existing literature to validate our observations. Most of the existing literature are
466 either limited to descriptive analysis of damage to port facilities or are not available in English. We found only one study to
467 be comparable with this study, in terms of the quantification of damage to port industries. A post-2011 tsunami survey was
468 carried out by the Tohoku Regional Development Bureau (MLIT, 2011) between October and November, 2011. We considered
469 the survey period as the intermediate period for reconstruction after the tsunami. The survey is a questionnaire survey on the
470 recovery status of companies in tsunami-affected ports, including ports outside of our study sites. 226 of the 233 companies
471 found in the affected ports responded to the survey. Findings from the survey were adapted from MLIT (2011) and we have
472 translated them into English (Fig. 9).

473 We drew comparisons between the recovery status of the companies affected (MLIT survey) and the serviceability of port
474 structures at each damage state (this study). It is difficult to make a direct comparison between the two. While port structures
475 are the physical components of these companies, port structures and companies are inherently different entities. Therefore, an
476 assumption made here is that the serviceability of port industries is indicative of the recovery status of the companies surveyed
477 in the MLIT survey.

478 13% of the companies were found to be unaffected by the tsunami (Fig. 9), which marks a good agreement with our study
479 where port structures sustaining no damage (DS 0) makes up 9% of the dataset (Fig. 4). In addition, approximately 12% of the
480 companies found to be unrecoverable, which we assume to correspond to damage state DS 4 (11%) in our study. The MLIT
481 survey found 72% of the companies to be in various stages of recovery during the survey and a majority (46.8%) of the
482 companies were almost fully recovered (> 80% recovery) in the intermediate phase. Similarly, a large proportion (52%) of our
483 damage data falls into DS 1 where port structures can be operational almost immediately after tsunami (Fig. 3). It is
484 challenging, however, to draw parallel between the degrees of recovery with the damage states presented in this study. We
485 stress that this approach is a relative measure of the validity of our dataset and damage assessment. Nonetheless, we can infer
486 that damage observations made from photographic interpretations in this study are rather similar to actual observations.

487



488

489 **Fig. 9.** Damage conditions and degrees of recovery of companies in the tsunami-affected ports of Hachinohe, Kuji, Miyako,
 490 Kaimaishi, Ofunato, Ishinomaki, Sendai-Shiogama, Soma and Onahama. 65% of the recovering companies were almost close
 491 to full recovery (>80%) at the time of the survey. Adapted and translated from MLIT (2011).

492 8.2 Fragility models and their classification accuracies

493 Using the 10-fold cross validation technique, we evaluated the prediction accuracies of our models. Mean accuracies and their
 494 standard deviations for each industry are illustrated in Table 5. Port structures have an overall accuracy of 59%. The
 495 petrochemical industry, energy-related industry, chemical industry and manufacturing industry display higher accuracies –
 496 75%, 70%, 69% and 64% respectively. In contrast, warehousing and distribution industry, cargo handling industry and food
 497 industry display lower prediction accuracies – 40%, 38% and 28% respectively.

498 We looked at the underlying nature of our datasets to better understand the differences in accuracies. The petrochemical
 499 industry, energy-related industry, chemical industry and manufacturing industry display higher accuracies and are represented
 500 by large sample sizes (Fig. 7). On the contrary, the cargo handling industry is represented by only 190 data points. However,
 501 because the food industry is represented by a large sample size but seemingly displays very low accuracy, we were unable to
 502 conclude that sample size has an influence on the accuracies of the fragility models. In addition, the three industries
 503 (warehousing and distribution, cargo handling and food industries) which display low accuracies are well represented across
 504 all damage states.

505 The intrinsic differences between industries could have an effect on reducing accuracies. The composition of buildings and
 506 infrastructure differ from industries to industries. For instance, cargo handling industry, which displays lower accuracy,
 507 typically consists of mobile equipment such as cranes and conveyors as well as temporary transitional storage and components
 508 such as chillers and tanks. Damage to transient port structures as such may be reflected in the damage data as part of the overall

509 assessment and introduce noise to the damage data, thus reducing model accuracy. In addition, the structural design of port
 510 structures may vary between facilities of the same industry. For example, warehouses in the studied ports were mostly
 511 reinforced concrete buildings, but some were made of mixed materials such as reinforced concrete foundations with light metal
 512 or masonry walls. Whereas power plants (energy-related industry) and petrochemical industry are consistent in construction
 513 material and more robust by design, which perhaps explain their higher accuracies. Thus, variability between port structures
 514 of the same industries can also impact accuracy if those variables are not accounted for in the models. Second-order factors
 515 beyond flow regime such as debris impact and proximity to the shoreline could also have an effect on model accuracies.
 516


517 Another possible explanation is that many assets might have sustained extensive damage from earthquake activities such as
 518 ground motion and liquefaction prior to the tsunami, as was observed by Kazama and Noda (2012). A preliminary inspection
 519 of the damage dataset indicated a greater representation of data from ports that have experienced stronger ground motion for
 520 the following industries – food, cargo handling and warehousing and distribution (Table 4). On the other hand, industries that
 521 display higher accuracies have a greater data representation from ports that were not as severely affected by ground motion.
 522 The significance of this relationship between the effects of the preceding earthquake and the damage observed is further
 523 investigated in the proceeding section.

524 For most industries, our models performed better in terms of their classification accuracies as compared to fragility models
 525 developed for buildings using the MLIT damage classification, which were found to have an accuracy of 52% (Leelawat et
 526 al., 2014). As this is the first time tsunami damage is being quantified as a response of inundation depth for port industries, we
 527 have no other models that we could use for comparison.
 528

529 **Table 5.** Mean accuracies and standard deviations of accuracies of the various port industries.

Industry Type	Mean Accuracy	SD Accuracy
Cargo Handling Industry	0.374	0.221
Warehousing and Distribution	0.397	0.198
Chemical Industry	0.687	0.300
Construction Materials Industry	0.502	0.285
Energy-related Industry	0.707	0.245
Food Industry	0.283	0.204
Manufacturing Industry	0.638	0.249
Petrochemical Industry	0.746	0.218
All Industries (Whole Tohoku)	0.587	0.203

530



532

533 **Fig. 10.** Mercalli intensities (MI) recorded by United States Geological Survey (USGS, 2020) for the Great East Japan
 534 earthquake and tsunami. Earthquake intensities differ between the northern (MI VI) and southern (MI VII - VIII) regions of
 535 Tohoku. North Tohoku experience less effects from ground shaking than in the South.

536


537 One of the concerns raised in the process of this research was the effect of ground motion, which preceded the arrival of the
 538 tsunami, on asset damage. The effect of ground motion on damage to coastal structures was studied by Sugano et al. (2014).
 539 The authors noted that in the northern Tohoku region, only little damage was sustained due to ground motion and the damage
 540 observed was to a greater effect due to tsunami inundation. On the other hand, damage due to ground motion was substantially
 541 greater in southern Tohoku region, more specifically coastal areas south of Miyagi Prefecture. Similar observations were made
 542 by Okazaki et al. (2013), whom conducted surveys in Ishinomaki and Sendai ports and found that the two sites were exposed
 543 to both severe ground motions and great tsunami wave heights. Kazama and Noda (2012) have also highlighted the possibilities
 544 of liquefaction prior to the arrival of the tsunami but noted the impossibility of identifying locations of which liquefaction had
 545 occurred after the tsunami.

546 To assess if ground motion-induced damage affects the accuracies of our models, we separated the damage data according to
547 the locations of ports (between northern Tohoku and southern Tohoku regions). The ports of Hachinohe and Kuji fall within
548 the northern region, and the ports of Ishinomaki, Sendai, Soma and Onahama are located within the southern region (Fig. 10).
549 We selected two industries to capture the effect of ground motion, instead of using the entire dataset since it has the effect of
550 aggregating data from different industries and hence neglect differences in their physical characteristics. The manufacturing
551 industry was considered because of its high prediction accuracy and its large sample size. The food industry was also
552 considered due to its poor prediction accuracy – we wanted to examine if pre-earthquake activities might explain the poor
553 prediction ability of the fitted model.

554 Damage data for both industries was split into two sites (North and South Tohoku). For each dataset, an ordinal regression
555 model was fitted and its response was captured in a 10-fold cross-validation. The resulting fragility models and their mean
556 accuracies are shown in Fig. 11. We observe that port structures in South Tohoku tend to reach high probabilities of non-
557 structural (DS 1 and DS 2) damage at lower inundation depths than structures in North Tohoku. This suggests that earthquake
558 damage might have weakened structures prior to the tsunami, leading to a steeper incline in damage probabilities as compared
559 to structures in North Tohoku. However, at higher levels of damage (DS 3 and DS 4), ground shaking appears to have had less
560 influence on damage. For both industries in the northern region, models depict a smaller initial increase in damage for higher
561 levels of damage DS 3 and DS 4 but probabilities incline more rapidly at higher inundation depths. The opposite holds true for
562 both industries in the southern region, i.e. damage probability for DS 3 and DS 4 incline at a slower rate at higher inundation
563 depths implying that a larger depth is required to induce structural damage (DS 3) and collapse (DS 4). Ground shaking
564 therefore only influenced lower levels of damage, tsunami inundation and flow characteristics still had a greater influence on
565 higher levels of damage.

566 The mean accuracies of using only datasets from North Tohoku are significantly higher than those of South Tohoku datasets.
567 It appears that the aggregation of datasets from the two environments has the effect of averaging the mean accuracies for the
568 whole region (Table 5, Fig. 11). It suggests that damage sustained by port structures in the Southern Tohoku region was
569 influenced by the compound effects of earthquake and tsunami loads. Inundation depth alone is not sufficient to explain the
570 damage observed. However, as Charvet et al. (2014) pointed out, it is difficult to distinguish the extent to which buildings had
571 already been affected by earthquake damage prior to the arrival of the tsunami. Therefore, it was difficult to separate the effects
572 of ground motion and liquefaction when we developed our fragility models.

573 There are other factors such as debris impact, the effect of shielding and local characteristics of the built environment that may
574 have influenced the results observed (Tarbotton et al., 2015). Regardless, we note that while the fragility model developed for
575 food industry using only data from the North has an improved mean accuracy, there is a substantial increase in the uncertainty
576 of the model (Fig. 11). It is not surprising as wider confidence intervals are a reflection of a limited sample size. An unbiased
577 sample is not representative of the whole population, and therefore, it is prudent that all available samples are used to fit the
578 fragility functions.



579

580 **Fig. 11.** Fragility functions developed for manufacturing industry in (a) North Tohoku, (b) South Tohoku as well as food
 581 industry in (c) North Tohoku and (d) South Tohoku. To evaluate the effects of preceding earthquake damage on overall damage
 582 assessment, datasets for each industry were divided into North and South regions. Mean accuracies for each dataset were
 583 derived using a 10-fold cross-validation to determine if the accuracies of the fragility models are affected by the compound
 584 effect of earthquake and tsunami.

585 9. Conclusions

586 9.1 Main findings and limitations

587 We presented a first attempt to quantifying structural vulnerability of port industries to tsunami impacts by developing a
 588 damage database for port structures and constructing damage fragility functions for various port industries. We were able to
 589 collect damage data for more than 5000 port structures and produce damage fragility functions for eight main port industries.
 590 Through the interpretations of our damage assessment and statistical analyses of our fragility model, a number of significant
 591 findings have emerged from this study:

- 592 1. Energy-related and warehousing and distribution industries showed relatively higher resistance to tsunami loads,
593 whereas chemical, cargo handling and construction materials industry appeared to be more vulnerable.
- 594 2. Using our proposed damage classification scheme, our fragility models were able to reproduce damage with
595 prediction accuracies of up to 75%, which outperforms models created using aggregated building damage data from
596 MLIT (Leelawat et al., 2014).
- 597 3. Pre-tsunami earthquake activities have an influence on port structural damage. It is unavoidable that the compound
598 effects of ground shaking and liquefaction are captured in the damage data, and unaccounted for in the process of
599 developing fragility functions. However, ground shaking appears to influence building damage at lower damage
600 states.

601 We are also aware of other limitations of this study. One of the limitations which has repeatedly surfaced in our findings is
602 that inundation depth alone is not sufficient to explain the damage observed in port industries. Key threshold depths were
603 difficult to capture for all industries which suggests that by only using inundation depth as a predictor, the fragility models
604 may underestimate the levels of damage sustained by port structures. The models can be further refined by considering other
605 measures of damage such as other tsunami flow characteristics (e.g. velocity, hydrodynamic force), debris impacts or the
606 effects of shielding.

607 **9.2 Future use of damage database and recommendations**

608 This study presents an array of potential applications in future port damage studies. First and foremost, a new damage
609 classification scheme was proposed to characterise damage to port structures. This scheme is transferable to other study sites
610 for damage assessment and can be applied to damage assessments through ground survey, photographic interpretation, remote
611 sensing and machine learning techniques. Secondly, we outlined a reproducible method for damage assessment in place of an
612 actual ground survey, especially since this assessment was performed years after the event. The manual assessment allowed
613 us to capture damage details from a side-profile, which otherwise would have been missing from automated techniques such
614 as change detection in remote sensing imagery. In addition, the damage database can also be used in future work to investigate
615 the influence of different parameters such as tsunami flow characteristics, construction characteristics and etcetera on the
616 damage observed. Last but not least, our findings, quantified through the development of fragility functions, can be used to
617 estimate damage to port structures in future tsunami events. They can also be used to motivate improvement in structural
618 designs, tsunami mitigation measures as well as current methods of damage assessment. However, caution must be exercised
619 when applying these models outside of Japan as structural integrity differs from place to place, though we expect that there
620 would be less regional variability for port industries as compared to building codes in houses and commercial buildings.
621 We invite and provide recommendations for potential users to expand the database and improve the predictive ability of the
622 existing fragility models:

- 623 1. Expand the database by collecting damage data from other events and improve the quality of the database by providing
624 more details on the (i) origin of tsunami, (ii) coastal morphological setting, and (iii) method of data collection.

- 625 2. Perform tsunami simulation to collect other intensity measures such as velocity and hydrodynamic force.
- 626 3. Study the performance of buildings and port infrastructure separately. This would, however, require a larger dataset
- 627 than presented in this study because fragility models built on smaller sample sizes tend to have greater uncertainty.
- 628

629 **Data availability**

630 The database provides a comprehensive inventory of port structures and their associated damage in the 2011 Great East Japan
631 tsunami. The database is available through an unrestricted data repository (DR-NTU) hosted by Nanyang Technological
632 University (<https://doi.org/10.21979/N9/OTZMT1>) (Chua et al., 2020). A database guide is provided in the supplementary.

633

634 **Author contribution**

635 CTC designed the study, collected all data and information, performed all statistical analysis and prepared the manuscript.
636 ADS provided direction for conceptualisation and advice on paper structure. AS provided the original MLIT damage data and
637 provided guidance on the development of fragility functions. LL and KP provided advice on structural response and tsunami
638 behaviour. DL provided advice for statistical analysis and development of fragility functions. IC provided advice on building
639 damage assessment and development of damage database. TC provided advice for statistical analysis and developed code for
640 bootstrapping techniques. AC assisted in the development of the damage database. SJ and NW provided general direction of
641 paper. All authors contributed to the scientific discussion of the methods and results, as well as the editing of the manuscript.

642

643 **Competing interests**

644 The authors declare no competing interests.

645

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657

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