



# 1 Towards Resilient Vital Infrastructure Systems: Challenges, 2 Opportunities, and Future Research Agenda

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15

## 16 Abstract

17 Infrastructure systems are inextricably tied to society by providing a variety of vital services. These  
18 systems play a fundamental role in reducing the vulnerability of communities and increasing their  
19 resilience to natural and human-induced hazards. While diverse definitions of the resilience engineering  
20 concept exist for the infrastructures, analysing resilience of these systems within cross sectoral and  
21 interdisciplinary perspectives remains limited and fragmented in research and practice. This review  
22 synthesizes and complements existing knowledge in designing resilient vital infrastructures with the aim  
23 to assist researchers and policy makers by identifying: (1) key conceptual tensions and challenges that  
24 arise when designing resilient infrastructure systems; (2) engineering and non-engineering based  
25 measures to enhance resilience of the vital infrastructures, including the best recent practices available;  
26 and (3) opportunities for future research in this field. Results from a systematic literature review  
27 combined with expert interviews are integrated into a conceptual framework in which infrastructures are  
28 defined as a conglomeration of interdependent social, ecological, and technical systems. Our results  
29 indicate that conceptual and practical challenges in designing resilient infrastructures continue to exist,  
30 hence these systems are still being built without taking resilience explicitly into account. A review of  
31 available measures and recent applications shows that these measures have not been widely applied in  
32 designing different systems. To advance our understanding of the resilience engineering concept for  
33 infrastructure systems, main pressing topics to address evolve around the: (i) integration of the combined  
34 social, ecological and technical resilience of infrastructure systems, focusing on cascading effects of  
35 failures and dependencies across these complex systems; and (ii) development of new technology to  
36 identify the factors that create different recovery characteristics for these socio-ecological-technical  
37 systems.

38 **Keywords:** Infrastructure, resilience, resilience engineering, hazard, socio-ecological-technical

## 39 1. Introduction

40 Vital infrastructure systems (VIS) are considered as the backbone of societies (Shrier et al., 2016) due  
41 to delivery of utilities and essential (vital) services in the areas of water, energy, transport, and  
42 telecommunication. Over time, these systems and their functioning have evolved into highly complex  
43 interdependent social/ecological/technical systems. Analysis of these interlinked systems through the  
44 lens of resilience engineering has attracted increasing attention due to the high importance of these



45 complex systems in providing sustainable services to societies. Infrastructures are affected by  
46 disruptive shocks and long-term pressures while delivering services (Hallegatte et al., 2019). The  
47 likelihood that these systems fail either by natural or human-induced hazards is increasing worldwide  
48 as a result of global pressures such as urbanization (Wamsler, 2014), population growth, and an  
49 increase in the frequency and intensity of climate-driven hazards (Tsavdaroglou et al., 2018). Since  
50 infrastructures are highly inter-connected and inter-dependent systems, any failure and disruption may  
51 quickly propagate through the network (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Bouchon, 2006; Field et al., 2012;  
52 Eidsvig and Tagg, 2015; Tsavdaroglou et al., 2018) and can have serious impacts on society and  
53 economy (EC, 2004; Tsavdaroglou et al., 2018). Estimates show that disruptive impacts on people cost  
54 at least \$90 billion per year (Koks et al., 2019; Nicolas et al., 2019). In low and middle income  
55 countries, direct damage of natural hazards to infrastructure systems such as transport and energy is  
56 estimated at about \$18 billion per year (Koks et al., 2019; Nicolas et al., 2019). Given the high levels  
57 of economic damage and social disruption of these shocks, it is widely acknowledged that urgent  
58 investments are required to design (more) resilient VIS (Meltzer, 2016; Brown et al., 2018; Meyer and  
59 Schwarze, 2019).

60

61 Over the past decades, the focus of resilience studies has shifted from single assets to systems (i.e.,  
62 natural, social, technical) and, more recently, to coupled socio-ecological and socio-technical systems  
63 (Galderisi, 2018). The generic and multi-disciplinary nature of resilience has led to a wide variety of  
64 definitions and interpretations (Meerow and Newell, 2015; Cimellaro et al., 2016; Hosseini et al.,  
65 2016; Ibanez et al., 2016; Connelly et al., 2017; Kurth et al., 2019; Patriarca et al., 2018; Xue et al.,  
66 2018; Hickford et al., 2018). A classic distinction between ‘ecological resilience’ and ‘engineering  
67 resilience’ was first made by Holling (1996) who identified a number of key differences between these  
68 two concepts. More recently, Hickford et al. (2018) associates the resilience of socio-ecological  
69 systems with issues of security, emergency response, safety, environmental and ecological aspects  
70 whereas resilience engineering focuses mainly on the system’s ability to bounce back to a steady state  
71 after a disturbance (Davoudi et al., 2012; Kim and Lim, 2016). In line with the latter definition,  
72 Hollnagel et al. (2006) relates the resilience engineering concept to the ability of a system to cope with  
73 performance variability.

74

75 The analysis of VIS from a resilience engineering perspective is an emerging discourse for both  
76 researchers and policy makers. Various studies were recently conducted to analyse the performance  
77 and reliability of different types of vital infrastructures such as transport and water systems (Frangopol  
78 and Bocchini, 2012; Guidotti et al., 2017; Gardoni, 2018). While the literature on resilience  
79 engineering has been burgeoning, existing literature either focus on defining and conceptualizing  
80 resilience, and provide little guidance for designing resilient infrastructures. Yet, relatively few studies  
81 present actual assessments of infrastructure resilience. Moreover, these studies are fragmented from a



82 research and practical perspective. As a result, concept of resilience engineering remains difficult to  
83 apply when designing VIS.

84

85 To address this issue, we aim to provide researchers and other stakeholders with new insights into the  
86 key challenges, potential measures, and future research agenda for designing (more) resilient VIS. To  
87 achieve this aim, we triangulate a systematic review of the literature and recent examples of resilience  
88 engineering in practice with expert interviews. In doing so, we focus on the resilience of four  
89 infrastructure systems: transport, power, water, and tele-communication, since these four systems are  
90 recognised as the main infrastructures which provide vital services to human.

91

92 The structure of this article is as follows; after describing the methods used for conducting this study  
93 (section 2), designing VIS is explored with the main focus on the concept of resilience engineering  
94 (section 3). In doing so, *firstly* an overview of different shocks and pressures affecting infrastructure  
95 resilience is provided. *Secondly*, current approaches in designing infrastructures are discussed,  
96 followed by the conceptualization of resilience engineering within VIS. After presenting the  
97 conceptual framework, the challenges for designing resilient VIS (both in the concepts and fields of  
98 applications) are identified and discussed in section 4. Section 5, explores potential opportunities and  
99 measures to design resilient VIS, including application of these measures with the best practices  
100 available in the recent literature. Finally, section 6 presents the main findings of this article, and  
101 highlights opportunities and pathways for the future research agenda in this field.

102

## 103 **2. Method and materials**

104 To identify key challenges, opportunities and research questions, we combine a systematic review of  
105 the academic literature and expert interviews. The reason of combining both methods is that while the  
106 literature review helps to gain a comprehensive overview of the state-of-the-art, the expert interviews  
107 allow us to go beyond the state-of-the-art (including ongoing debates and conceptual tensions and  
108 challenges in practice). Both the literature review and the interviews focused on the application of  
109 resilience engineering for the design of VIS in the four selected systems (transport, power, water, and  
110 tele-communication) and were guided by the following questions: (1) What types of shocks and  
111 pressures affect infrastructure resilience; (2) How has the resilience engineering within VIS been  
112 conceptualized in the literature and in this article; (3) What are the main conceptual tensions and  
113 challenges for application; (4) What are the key opportunities and measures for enhancing  
114 infrastructure resilience; (5) To what extent have existing measures already been applied to the  
115 selected sectors, and what are the recent developments and practices available; and (6) Where is  
116 research in this field heading to, and what are important areas for future research?



117 For the literature review, Elsevier's Scopus and Google Scholar citation databases were used to  
118 identify literature in which the concept of resilience engineering is explored for the four selected  
119 infrastructure systems. Given the rapid development of the resilience concept, we limited our search  
120 criteria to four specific keywords (i.e., resilience engineering; critical infrastructure; vital  
121 infrastructure; and resilient infrastructure) with flexible combinations (e.g., resilience engineering, and  
122 vital infrastructure). Application of these criteria resulted in finding more than 30,000 documents, and  
123 selection of about 160 literature including books, full articles and abstracts in which resilience of  
124 infrastructure systems was explored within both empirical and theoretical overview. Notably, the  
125 review was not bounded by a certain period or geography with the exception of question 5; for the  
126 identification of examples and best practices, we only selected more recent examples (2012-2019).

127  
128 Beside the literature review, orienting interviews were conducted individually with 16 academic  
129 experts and researchers who are active in diverse domains related to the resilience of infrastructures.  
130 Their different disciplinary backgrounds mainly include: disaster risk management and post disaster  
131 recovery, urban planning, infrastructuring urban future, flood risk management, transport systems,  
132 construction management, risk management in high-tech systems, climate resilient cities, and  
133 resilience engineering and human factors. Notably, there was a limited number of interviewees who  
134 were mainly involved in the field of tele-communication and power infrastructures. Thus, most of the  
135 inputs provided for this review on these two sectors were derived from the literature. In addition,  
136 diversity of the backgrounds and expertise among the experts helped us to explore the resilience  
137 engineering concept in a broader perspective. However, this wide range of attitudes has led to have  
138 some different interpretations of the resilience concept within infrastructures as reflected in this article  
139 (e.g., section 4).

140

### 141 **3. Designing VIS – Concept of resilience engineering**

#### 142 **3.1 Shocks and pressures affecting infrastructure resilience**

143 Infrastructures are affected by many unexpected shocks and pressures caused by different natural or  
144 human-induced factors. Hallegatte et al. (2019) classified these causes into four categories: (1)  
145 Accidents as manmade external shocks; (2) System failures due to any reason such as equipment  
146 failure; (3) Attacks such as vandalism and cyber-attacks; and (4) Natural hazards. Infrastructure  
147 resilience is also affected by concurrent global pressures such as urbanization, population growth,  
148 climate change impacts, as well as the growing tendency for lack of underspending in upkeep and  
149 maintenance (mainly due to lack of funding at the level of responsible government). The  
150 aforementioned causes can affect e.g., transport systems in which accidents or any other human  
151 failures may lead to a disruption in road traffic or railways system. In addition, cyber physical systems  
152 (e.g., flood barriers, power plants, tele-communication systems, etc.) which are controlled and



153 operated by high-tech technologies, can be disrupted by cyber-attacks and vandalism. Other examples  
154 include failure of infrastructures due to a wide range of natural hazards (i.e., earthquakes and  
155 landslides, storms, and floods) that can affect e.g., the energy industry by disconnecting the energy  
156 transformers in sub-stations. Such disturbances can be exacerbated within urban infrastructures due to  
157 high population density and considerable inter-connection between infrastructures (Peters et al., 2004;  
158 McPhearson et al., 2015).

159

### 160 **3.2 Current approaches in designing VIS**

161 There are two distinguished approaches in designing infrastructures: (1) Performance-oriented  
162 approach; and (2) Capacity-oriented approach. Performance-based engineering is a widely explored  
163 discourse in the literature (see Anderies et al., 2007; Filiatrault and Sullivan, 2014; Spence and  
164 Kareem, 2014; Restemeyer et al., 2017) representing one of the approaches in designing  
165 infrastructures that has emerged from an architectural context (Oxman, 2008; Mosalam et al., 2018;  
166 Hickford et al., 2018). This approach is broadly applied at the design stage (Hickford et al., 2018), and  
167 is based on capability of infrastructures to function and perform well in response to an expected  
168 pressure or disturbance. The performance-oriented approach, which is also referred to as “control  
169 approach” (Hoekstra et al., 2018) or “robust control” (Anderies et al., 2007; Rodriguez et al., 2011),  
170 focuses on a system’s performance to provide benefits for economic functions. More details on this  
171 approach and its application within infrastructure systems is beyond the scope of this study, since this  
172 review is grounded on the capacity-oriented (resilience) approach as a different rationale in designing  
173 infrastructure systems.

174

175 Capacity-based approach focuses on a system’s capacity to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or  
176 following changes and disturbances. This approach that has become the dominant discourse in the  
177 study of complex systems (Underwood and Waterson, 2013) refers to the resilience approach that  
178 examines the capability of systems to recognize and sustainably adapt to unexpected changes (Leveson  
179 et al., 2006; Madni and Jackson, 2009; Siegel and Schraagen, 2014; Woods, 2015). Therefore, in the  
180 resilience approach the focus is on maximizing capacity of the system to be able to cope with, and  
181 adapt to changes and disturbances (Berkes et al., 2003; Folke, 2006).

182

### 183 **3.3 Conceptualization of resilience engineering within VIS**

184 The emerging concept of resilience engineering within infrastructures (originated from the capacity-  
185 oriented approach) is one of the main concerns in managing these systems (LRF, 2014; 2015) in which  
186 complex mechanisms are involved for planning, financing, designing and operating systems (Hickford  
187 et al., 2018). There is a wide range of definitions available in the recent literature for the concept of  
188 resilience engineering (e.g., Woods, 2015; Sharma et al., 2017; Hollnagel, 2017; Hickford et al., 2018;



189 Gardoni and Murphy, 2018; Bene and Doyen, 2018). These definitions are varied, depending on which  
190 aspect of the infrastructure system is under consideration. According to Hickford et al. (2018), while  
191 some definitions focused on the ability of the organisations to anticipate the threat and rapidly recover  
192 (e.g., Hale and Heijer, 2006), some other studies define the resilience engineering as the ability of the  
193 socio-ecological system to absorb changes, and still keep the same function (e.g., Meerow et al.,  
194 2016). Among the available definitions, and in line with previous studies (i.e., Woods, 2015;  
195 Hollnagel, 2011; 2017; Connelly et al., 2017; Hickford et al., 2018), we distinguish between five  
196 principles that are commonly shared within most of the definitions. These principles relate resilience  
197 engineering to the ability of the system to: (1) anticipate; (2) absorb; (3) adapt/transform; (4) recover;  
198 and (5) learn from prior unforeseen events. These five principles are translated for the infrastructure  
199 systems as the system's ability to (i) monitor and anticipate the disruptive events; (ii) function at  
200 thresholds of service delivery; (iii) cope with unexpected changes either by its adaptive or  
201 transformative capacity; (iv) either return to its normal (steady) condition or re-organize after a  
202 disruption occurred; and (v) learn from what has happened to improve system behaviour in facing  
203 future unforeseen events.

204

205 Many studies have been conducted to assess resilience of infrastructure systems either as socio-  
206 ecological systems (Fischer et al., 2015; Muneeppeerakul and Anderies, 2017; Walker et al., 2018) or as  
207 socio-technical systems (Bolton and Foxon, 2015; Eisenberg et al., 2017). Within *socio-technical*  
208 approach, Salinas Rodriguez et al. (2014) stated that resilience of the flood protection structures  
209 depends on how human actors play a role in managing and adapting physical components of the  
210 system such as the structure of dikes or embankments. Thus, resilience of the flood protection system  
211 relies on the degree to which the system is able to be self-organizing (social resilience), and is capable  
212 of increasing its capacity for adapting to changes. Notably, within the social resilience perspective,  
213 sustainable governance of the infrastructure systems either through adaptive or transformative  
214 approaches plays a pivotal role in enhancing the system's resilience. More details of these two  
215 approaches are provided in sections 4 and 5.

216

217 In addition to interaction between social and technical systems, there is also an interplay between  
218 physical and ecological systems. From a *technical-ecological* perspective, infrastructure systems  
219 encompass the surrounding built environment (Wolch et al., 2014), and therefore a physical systems'  
220 resilience is also related to the natural systems' resilience. Such an interaction with nature highlights  
221 the degree to which natural assets (e.g., wetlands ecosystems such as mangroves and urban green  
222 areas) can increase the capacity of the whole system to cope with shocks and stresses (ecological  
223 resilience). From a *socio-ecological* perspective, social and ecological systems are also interlinked  
224 systems (Adger, 2000). Ecosystems as natural resources, also referred to as "natural infrastructures",  
225 provide a variety of services and goods (e.g., flood protection, food provision) that directly or




226 indirectly contribute to human well-being (Mehvar et al., 2019a; b) and, therefore, contribute to the  
227 resilience of societies.

228

229 In this article, we define vital infrastructures as a conglomeration of interdependent social, ecological,  
230 and technical systems. Within this perspective, a conceptual framework is developed, indicating that  
231 resilience of the infrastructures to disturbances depends on the resilience level of each sub-system and  
232 the mutual interactions therein (see Figure 1). Notably, applying the resilience engineering concept for  
233 designing VIS here does not mean to “engineer” the social and ecological sub-systems, therefore, the  
234 socio-ecological aspects are not separately considered than the technical one. This implies that the  
235 infrastructure systems are integrated socio-ecological-technical systems, the performance of each sub-  
236 system has effects on the other one. Thus, this perspective is different than the engineering one in  
237 which infrastructures are first of all defined as technical systems.

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**Figure 1.** Conceptual framework considered in this study showing that resilience of the infrastructure systems affected by shocks and pressures is dependent on the resilience level of the interlinked social, ecological, and technical sub-systems.

Apart from the inter-relations between the socio-ecological-technical sub-systems, there is also a cross sectoral inter-dependency between different types of VIS (see Figure 2). This cross sectoral relation refers to the mutual effects that function/malfunction of a specific type of VIS may have on other types. Such an inter-dependency is also called “cascading effects” of failure between infrastructures in different sectors. For example, power outage can considerably affect function of transport systems, and other infrastructures, e.g., in the tele-communication sector. This inter-relation is also seen in the




251 flood protection structures as any failure in these systems may result in sever damages to roads or any  
252 other types of infrastructure systems (more details on cascading effects of failure are provided in  
253 section 4.2-i).

254

255 The inter/cross-sectoral dependencies considered within VIS here are in line with emerging  
256 approaches in analysis of VIS resilience such as “system-of-systems” perspective. Such an integrated  
257 approach has been used in the recent years to explore the relation between different components of an  
258 infrastructure system (e.g., user, physical asset, and network). Using these approaches can also help to  
259 explore propagation of failure across VIS in different sectors (more details of the system-of-systems  
260 approach are presented in section 5.1.2-a).

261



262

263 **Figure 2.** Schematic representation of different types of VIS, showing the cross sectoral dependencies between  
264 the four types of infrastructures, as well as the inter-relations within each system between Technical (T),  
265 Ecological (E), and Social (S) sub-systems.

266

#### 267 **4. Identifying main challenges in designing resilient VIS**

268 In this section, the main challenges related to the design of VIS within the concept of resilience  
269 engineering are identified and divided into two categories: (1) Conceptual tensions; and (2) Challenges  
270 in the fields of applications. This sub-division is considered here to better understand and distinguish  
271 what the different types of current challenges and limitations in designing VIS are, arising from the





272 concept of resilience engineering, as well as the applications in which this concept is applied. Table 1  
 273 summarizes these challenges which are further discussed in the sections 4.1 and 4.2.

274

275 **Table 1.** Summary of the main challenges and limitations related to the resilience engineering concept in  
 276 designing vital infrastructure systems.

277

Type of challenge	Challenge / limitation / debate	
Conceptual tensions	a	Bouncing back versus bouncing forward
	b	Resilient versus robust systems
	c	Adaptive versus transformative capacity
	d	Temporal and spatial scales
	e	Unit of analysis
	f	Risk versus resilience
Challenges related to the fields of applications	g	Design with minimum/maximum capacity
	h	Predicting long term pressures
	i	Predicting cascading effects of failure
	j	Challenges with new technology / initiative
	k	Quantification of resilience
	l	Multi-functionality of infrastructures
	m	Long timescales
	n	Insufficient trust in the government

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
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289 The conceptual and practical challenges indicated in Table 1 arise from different components of  
 290 infrastructure systems, including physical asset, environment, and actor/user, referring to the technical,  
 291 ecological, and social aspects, respectively (i.e., sub-systems in Figure 1). Figure 3 illustrates the  
 292 relation of these challenges within these components. This relation is shown through positioning these  
 293 challenges in the figure depending on whether the challenge arises mostly from a particular  
 294 component, or is it related to the two/three components. In particular, physical asset here refers to the  
 295 physical and technical characteristics of the system, environment refers to the natural settings and  
 296 surrounding of the systems in which a system functions and provides services, and actors/users refers  
 297 to the policy makers (e.g., government) and users of the infrastructure services (i.e., people). Figure 3  
 298 shows that most of the challenges are pertaining rather equally to the integration of the three  
 299 components, while some of them arise mostly from the actors/users of the systems (e.g., units of  
 300 analysis), or from coupled inter-connections between asset/environment and actor/user (e.g.,  
 301 predicting long term pressures).



302

303 **Figure 3.** Challenges in designing resilient vital infrastructures and their relevance to the system's components

304

#### 305 **4.1 Conceptual tensions**

306 In designing resilient infrastructure systems there are a number of conceptual tensions arising from the  
307 multidisciplinary concept of resilience engineering. These challenges and associated ongoing debates  
308 in the resilience literature are briefly described and discussed below.

309

##### 310 ***a) Bouncing back versus bouncing forward***

311 Within the various academic communities, the resilience concept is perceived both positively and  
312 neutrally/negatively (Brown et al., 2012; McEvoy et al., 2013; Meerow et al., 2016, Sharma et al.,  
313 2017). According to Meerow et al. (2016), different connotation is due to the evolution of the  
314 resilience concept, in which resilience is represented as a characteristic of a system that can be  
315 positive, negative, to more of a normative vision (Cote and Nightingale, 2011). Desirability or non-  
316 desirability of the resilience concept is dependent on the question of resilience of what, to what, and  
317 for whom (EC, 2015). For example, Meerow et al. (2016) indicated that within the equilibrium  
318 focused approach, resilience is perceived as the ability of a system to return to its normal (steady)  
319 condition after a disturbance (Coaffee, 2013), representing the resilience concept positively (assuming  
320 that the normal condition of the system is steady and desirable). However, a system can be resilient,  
321 but yet undesirable (Scheffer et al., 2001; Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Wu and Wu, 2013).

322

323 Within such different interpretations, there is also a challenge arising from the resilience engineering  
324 concept which is related to the idea of bouncing back (returning to the pre-disaster state). This is in  
325 contradiction with the resilience goal of promoting justice among societies (Nagenborg, 2019).

326 According to Nagenborg (2019), understanding resilience and the recovery process as a window of



327 opportunity (bouncing forward) would promote justice. Of particular relevance here is that poor  
328 communities are more vulnerable to shocks, and therefore likely to be less resilient. However, there  
329 are cases such as slum areas in which communities have very strong social networks and ties that  
330 increase resilience of these groups. Yet, calling communities or individuals “resilient” may be an  
331 excuse of not changing anything in the environment. In such a context, resilience can become a  
332 concept that promotes conservative, bouncing back-oriented policies (maintaining status quo is the  
333 epitome of conservatism).

334

335 ***b) Resilient versus robust systems***

336 Within the infrastructure systems robustness refers to the ability of a system to remain functioning  
337 under variable magnitudes of disruptions and pressures (Mens et al., 2011). Thus, it refers to the  
338 tolerance capacity of the system (Ganjurjav et al., 2019) and persistence characteristic of the system  
339 reflecting the engineering principle of resisting to disturbances (Chelleri, 2012). Notably, robustness  
340 and resilience are related characteristics if infrastructure performance continues its functioning after a  
341 disruption (Anderies et al., 2013; Meerow et al., 2016).

342

343 From a different perspective, robustness (referring to resistance capacity) may not similarly be  
344 interpreted and equated with resilience. Martinez et al. (2017) point out that resistance is the ability of  
345 systems to hold a pressure without modification, while resilience is the ability of responding to  
346 disturbances and returning to the original status. In line with this definition, Hoekstra et al. (2018)  
347 stated that robustness is a characteristic of the control approach that aims to increase safety of the  
348 system by resisting to changes and eliminating risks; therefore, it contradicts the resilience approach  
349 which refers to responding (adapting) to unexpected changes. Markolf et al. (2018) state that  
350 effectiveness of the robustness (also named as control) approach can be reduced due to the current  
351 infrastructure-related challenges and pressures such as climate variability and unpredictability, as well  
352 as interdependency between the systems. Another reason why robustness cannot be equated with  
353 resilience is that robustness only works in situations where disturbances are well-modelled, whereas  
354 resilience applies to a set of disturbances that is not well-modelled and that changes (Woods, 2015).

355

356 ***c) Adaptive versus transformative capacity***

357 There are different governance strategies embedded in the resilience concept. Some studies define  
358 resilience as the adaptive capacity of a system (Batty, 2008), referring to the flexibility of the system  
359 that allows changes while controlling disruptions (Hoekstra et al., 2018). Similarly, Woods (2015) and  
360 Clark et al. (2018) point out that extensibility or adaptive capacity of a system is of importance in  
361 maintaining functionality to unexpected changes. According to Brian et al. (2016), while adaptive  
362 governance aims to build resilience through adaptive management in a favourable system regime,  
363 transformative governance aims to shift the system to an alternative and desirable structure. Notably,



364 transformative capacity of a system can be considered in different scales, ranging from personal to  
365 organizational (O'Brien, 2012; Chaffin et al., 2016). Despite the separate nature of these two  
366 approaches mentioned above, McPhearson et al. (2015) referred to other studies conducted by Holling  
367 (2001); Walker et al. (2004); and Biggs et al. (2012) in which resilience was defined as a  
368 multidisciplinary concept including both adaptive and transformative capacities of a system.

369

#### 370 *d) Temporal and spatial scales*

371 In designing infrastructure systems, one of the challenging issues is to determine a proper time scale of  
372 action in face of disturbances. The question is whether the focus should be on short term and rapidly  
373 occurring disasters (hurricanes), or more on gradual changes such as climate change-induced hazards  
374 (Wardekker et al., 2010; Meerow et al., 2016). However, Pearson et al. (2018) pointed out that  
375 designing infrastructures within the resilience thinking needs to evolve faster than the actual demand  
376 for services, since the timescale of the system realisation is comparable with changes of environmental  
377 scenarios and, therefore, does not allow for quick response. There is also an issue of determining the  
378 spatial boundary, while incorporating the resilience concept in designing infrastructure systems. This  
379 highlights the question of “resilience for where”, referring to the boundary of the system in which  
380 there might be a complex set of networks connected in different spatial scales (Meerow et al., 2016).

381

#### 382 *e) Unit of analysis*

383 Infrastructure systems as coupled socio-ecological-technical systems are designed and managed by  
384 different organizational levels. This different unit of analysis can and perhaps should be considered  
385 when analysing the resilience of an infrastructure system. Depending on the extent of the services  
386 provided by an infrastructure system, analysing the system resilience can be done, for example, for an  
387 individual (person), team, organization (e.g., company), or society as a whole. Notably, the complexity  
388 level increases from a lower (i.e., individual) to a higher (i.e., society) level, and the main challenge is  
389 how to connect these levels within a resilient system, given that a system is constrained by a level  
390 above and below.

391

#### 392 *f) Risk versus resilience*

393 In general, risk and resilience concepts are viewed differently. One may consider resilience as a  
394 distinct concept from the traditional risk management approach that is used to mitigate or even avoid  
395 likely risks. Within this perspective, in resilience engineering, the aim is to become less risk-averse,  
396 implying that a certain level of risk is accepted; however, the big question is: what is the acceptable  
397 risk? On some accounts, resilience engineering is considered as a related concept to risk management,  
398 reflecting the idea that if there is no risk, there is no need to be resilient. Resilience is a function of the  
399 present hazard type(s) and their magnitude (which it has in common with risk). Within this  
400 perspective, risk assessment including risk identification, prioritization, and mitigation processes is a



401 basis for designing resilient infrastructure systems, representing risk as an exponent of resilience.  
402 However, with respect to the risk and resilience related studies, there is a shift in some terminologies  
403 used. For example, in the current literature, the term “resilience” sounds more positive than the  
404 traditional term “fault tolerance”.

405

406 From a risk assessment perspective, a key question is whether priority should be given to reducing  
407 hazard impacts or hazard risks. This dilemma is particularly relevant for infrastructures that aim to  
408 protect people against natural hazards. For example, investments in flood protection structures (e.g.,  
409 dikes, seawalls) in vulnerable coastal areas may help to reduce hazard impacts. However, protective  
410 measures may also be counterproductive since they may allude people to move and live closer to the  
411 sea and, as a result increase risk. Such risks can potentially be reduced by increasing flood risk  
412 awareness among coastal communities through, e.g., personal experience, risk communication, and  
413 financial insurances (Filatova et al., 2011). In addition, society’s attitude towards risk is not well  
414 included in current decision making strategies, given that the concept of risk that is currently accepted  
415 by people, changes more rapidly than climate or other ongoing pressures. De Koning et al. (2019)  
416 conducted a study on behavioural motives of property buyers and sellers in eight coastal states in the  
417 US, showing that households’ choices to retreat from flood zones are dependent on two factors:  
418 information that stimulates their feeling of fear, and hazardous events.

419

#### 420 **4.2 Challenges related to the application of resilience engineering**

421 Apart from the above-mentioned tensions within the resilience engineering concept, there are also  
422 limitations and barriers to design resilient infrastructure systems in the fields of applications. These  
423 challenges which are indicated in Table 1 are explored and discussed below.

424

##### 425 *g) Design with minimum/maximum capacity*

426 Infrastructures are often constructed to their minimum limit/capacity. For example, loading capacity of  
427 bridges needs to cope another 100 years, but the systems are frequently designed and constructed to  
428 cope to the current load traffic. On the one hand, there is a need to expand roads by using all traffic  
429 management approaches to accommodate more cars on the roads; while using the maximum capacity  
430 of roads may result in losing natural buffering capacity of the system at the time of a  
431 disaster/disruption. As a result, a small disruption in such systems that function with top capacity can  
432 propagate immediately throughout the entire system. Therefore, one of the challenges in increasing  
433 resilience of VIS is often trade-off between resilience and efficiency of the system as especially  
434 prominent in the transport systems.

435

436

437



438 ***h) Predicting long term pressures***

439 Appropriate data are a necessity to design and manage resilient infrastructures. For example,  
440 strengthening infrastructures against natural hazards is pragmatic if there were appropriate data on the  
441 spatial distribution of extreme events (Hallegatte et al., 2019). However, there are many uncertainties to  
442 predict the impacts of extreme events and climate change impacts on infrastructures. Troccoli et al.  
443 (2014) stated that the limits between resistance and resilience of the current infrastructures are determined  
444 based on the prior climate data, thus there is a need to redefine these limits by understanding the current  
445 meteorological variables under climate change. Majithia (2014) conducted a study highlighting the  
446 information gap in analysis of future climate driven changes to the energy industry. According to Majithia  
447 (2014), there are no data on future changes of wind frequency and intensity, neither for probabilistic  
448 projection of wind speed, frequency and intensity of lightning, snow, etc. This lack of information is also  
449 seen among disaster response organizations resulting in insufficient data exchange and poor performance  
450 in responding to occurrence of a disaster. In particular, such an absence in data is problematic when there  
451 is a failure in the communication system, preventing organizations from an effective response and relief  
452 operation (Shittu et al., 2018). These uncertainties are extended to other long-term pressures such as  
453 urbanization and population growth, making it difficult to forecast the future demand for infrastructure  
454 services.

456 ***i) Predicting cascading effects of failure***

457 Infrastructures are highly networked and inter-connected systems (Markolf et al., 2018) with  
458 cascading effects of failures within different systems, implying that a disruptive event in one  
459 infrastructure can lead to further consequences in other infrastructures (Birkmann et al., 2017;  
460 Hickford et al., 2018). According to Markolf et al. (2018), this inter-connection can be either physical  
461 (output of one system is the input required for other systems, such as electricity needed for  
462 transportation and water related infrastructures), or geographical, referring to a shared common  
463 location for a set of infrastructure systems (e.g., underground pipelines and electric transmission  
464 cables). Capturing the dependencies among infrastructure systems is needed for analysing  
465 functionality of the systems and identifying the hazard impacts on different systems components.  
466 Understanding the interdependency between VIS can also help to develop recovery measures  
467 (Gardoni, 2018), the aspect which has not been well included in current designing and decision  
468 making procedures. Lack of sufficient data on cascading effects has resulted to assume that these  
469 effects grow linearly between different types of infrastructures, while in reality this evolution may not  
470 be similar for all the inter-connections (Tsavdaroglou et al., 2018). Notably, such cascading effects of  
471 failures are not only cross sectoral, but also can be within a particular sector. For example, in transport  
472 systems, failure in one mode of transport may considerably affect resilience of the other modes.

473

474



475 ***j) Challenges with new technology / initiative***

476 The incorporation of new technologies and innovative solutions in designing infrastructures may  
477 contribute to a better understanding of the interconnections amongst different vital infrastructures,  
478 promoting the resilience at the time of shocks and disruptions. However, this is not always the case;  
479 new technologies may also increase interdependency between infrastructures (Birkmann et al., 2017;  
480 Hickford et al., 2018) leading to considerable service interruptions (e.g., high dependency of energy  
481 and transport systems on information technology). Designing infrastructure systems with much  
482 reliance on the technological advances may result in over-estimation of the protection level and under-  
483 estimation of the variability of the system to changes, causing over-confidence in the robustness of  
484 systems (Markolf et al., 2018). Therefore, there might be a case that no expert can immediately  
485 respond to the failures because of too much reliability on digital technology, and this may eventually  
486 lead to a decrease in system resilience.

487

488 There might also be controversies within social and technical aspects. For example, in the “smart city”  
489 initiative which is designed to increase the security of urban areas, it is proposed to place security  
490 cameras. But this proposal has its own disadvantages, since such a monitoring system affects people’s  
491 privacy as they are continuously traced. Therefore, equipping new infrastructures with such tools may,  
492 on the one hand, create extra functionality, but, on the other hand, cause controversies. Such debates  
493 are also seen in designing flood protection structures in which, for example, a seawall may block the  
494 ocean view, and cause damages to coastal ecosystems, becoming a source of conflict between coastal  
495 zone managers, ecologists, and tourists.

496

497 ***k) Quantification of resilience***

498 Quantifying resilience of the infrastructure systems is a challenging issue (de Regt et al., 2016).  
499 Knowing the infrastructure’s resilience in quantitative metrics (e.g., recovery speed) can facilitate  
500 disaster risk assessment and decision making procedure in the sustainable management of these  
501 systems. Hickford et al. (2018) pointed out that different approaches including probabilistic graph  
502 theory, and analytical methods have been used to measure a system’s resilience (see for example  
503 Ibanez et al., 2016; Zimmerman et al., 2016; Nan and Sansavini, 2017; Ouyang, 2017; Zhang et al.,  
504 2018). A variety of metrics are identified and applied to a range of quantifiable impacts depending on  
505 disruptive effects and resulting losses of functionality of the infrastructures (Hickford et al., 2018).

506

507 ***l) Multi-functionality of infrastructures***

508 Multi-functionality of the infrastructure systems may increase or decrease the resilience of the system.  
509 On the one hand, multi-functionality may decrease resilience of a system, since this characteristic  
510 decreases the adaptability of the system to changes because of difficulty of some functions to change  
511 in a long run. For example, with respect to the flood protection structures, repairing, re-constructing,



512 and raising dikes decreases the system's resilience. On the other hand, if an infrastructure system still  
513 provides multi-functions after a failure/damage occurs, but different ones than initially aimed for, this  
514 system still represents an example of resilient infrastructure, since it adapted to changes while  
515 providing different functions. For instance, closure dikes in the Netherlands initially aimed at  
516 poldering to create farming area, however the structure led to protection against floods, as well as a  
517 fast road transport connecting North Holland and Friesland provinces. Therefore, there might be some  
518 resilience hidden anyhow in constructing the infrastructures, since the system might be more resilient  
519 in the future than it was initially considered to be. The Multifunctional Flood Defences program  
520 (MFFD) is also another good example emphasizing multi-functionality of infrastructures in water  
521 sector in the Netherlands which focuses on the interplay between the primary function of flood  
522 defences, and other societal needs such as housing, renewable energy, recreation, etc (Kothuis and  
523 Kok, 2017).

524

#### 525 *m) Long timescales*

526 From a recovery perspective, enhancing resilience of infrastructure systems is often a long procedure  
527 including: 1) analyzing the situation after a disaster/shock; 2) drawing lessons from the analysis; 3)  
528 turning the lessons into planning and policy making; and 4) implementing the plans. For instance, the  
529 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) is an example of wide-reaching policy  
530 frameworks for a period of 15 years (2015-2030). This framework aims to mainstream and integrate  
531 disaster risk reduction plans within different sectors including health, which requires an integrative  
532 collaborations across local, national, regional, and international levels (Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2015). In  
533 many cases there is no time to wait for recovery plans. For example, poor communities in developing  
534 countries cannot wait for years to have a master plan. This dilemma typically results in re-building the  
535 houses and lives (by local communities) in the similar way as they were built before the disaster  
536 occurs. This results in retaining the same level of vulnerability, and being (again) less resilient to  
537 future shocks/hazards representing an example in which resilience as 'bouncing back to an initial  
538 state' is clearly undesirable.

539

#### 540 *n) Insufficient trust in the government*

541 Trust between stakeholders plays a key role in the success of collaborative decision making  
542 procedures, e.g., in the context of the resilience of natural resource management institutions (Stern and  
543 Baird, 2015). For different reasons, there might be communities which do not fully trust their  
544 government for implementing the recovery processes. This lack of trust is especially seen within  
545 communities who are likely to suffer the most from disasters while often do not receive enough  
546 support from the government. Conversely, high levels of faith and trust from societies to the  
547 government can result in a better recovery plan. This can be seen by, e.g., an immediate evacuation by  
548 the residents of an exposed area to a disaster when an early public alert is announced from the





549 government. For instance, in terms of preparedness to natural hazards and controlling disturbances,  
550 Wei et al. (2019) found that households in Taiwan with a higher degree of trust in the government and  
551 authorities are more likely to accept preparedness activities.

552

### 553 *Other limitations*

554 In addition to the challenges highlighted above there are other limitations in designing resilient  
555 infrastructures. These limitations include: 1) discontinuity between technical, ecological and social  
556 disciplines (Ahlborg et al., 2019); 2) changes in government, which often leads to change in policies,  
557 plans, and infrastructure design; and 3) lack of a proper coordination for governance of infrastructures,  
558 and less opportunity for benchmarking and practice-based learning due to the absence of large scale  
559 implementations of resilience approaches (Hickford et al., 2018). It should also be noted that recovery  
560 of infrastructure or considering adaptive alternatives at the time of a disaster is not often feasible in  
561 practice. For example, in designing flood protection structures the adaptive alternatives/options  
562 addressed in the design manuals are often costly, leading to excluding these options from being  
563 implemented in reality.

564

## 565 **5. Towards resilient VIS**

### 566 **5.1 Opportunities and measures to enhance resilience**

567 In this section, potential opportunities and measures to enhance resilience of VIS are identified. These  
568 measures are divided in two categories: (1) Engineering; and 2) Non-engineering, given that proper  
569 governance plays a key role in parallel to these measures to ensure that infrastructure services are  
570 constantly available to users. Figure 4 shows these opportunities and their linkage to the five main  
571 system's capabilities required for a resilient VIS as previously mentioned in section 3.3.

572


#### 573 **5.1.1 Engineering-based measures**

##### 574 *a) Emerging techniques in pre/post disaster anticipation/identification*

575 With respect to the pre-disaster anticipation, and preparedness to potential hazards, early warning  
576 systems play a pivotal role in raising social awareness, quick evacuation and much lower social  
577 disruptions after a disaster occurs. Also remote sensing-based methods that support every aspect of  
578 risk assessment, routine surveillance, early warning and event monitoring, have been developed  
579 (Kerle, 2015). In terms of post-disaster recovery, automatic and accurate damage identification can be  
580 done by first obtaining actionable, accurate, and timely disaster data/information, which is a necessity  
581 at the time of disaster. The term “timely” depends on the location and type of devastating event, and  
582 can be interpreted in different time scales (e.g., in case of an earthquake in Japan, there are hourly  
583 data/information updates). The required data can also be obtained by using space-borne remote  
584 sensing, providing satellite images that serve as a basis for an inventory to show the extent of the



585 affected area and critical hotspots. However, in particular satellite images have been shown to have  
 586 severe limitations in damage mapping (Kerle, 2010), mainly due to their comparatively limited spatial  
 587 detail (resolution is at best 30 cm for commercial imagery), but also their vertical perspective that  
 588 severely limits the damage evidence that can be detected. Damage data can also be provided by  
 589 drones, which yield more local observations that can be incorporated further in 3D modelling of the  
 590 areas (Nex et al., 2019; Kerle et al., 2019a; b). In particular, advances in machine learning have led to  
 591 methods for accurate damage identification from drone data (Nex et al., 2019; Kerle et al., 2019a).  
 592 Using remote sensing techniques, the system’s recovery can be detected in terms of: 1) physical re-  
 593 construction; and 2) residual functionality of the infrastructure.



594

595 **Figure 4.** Main engineering and non-engineering based opportunities and measures to improve the five main  
 596 system’s capabilities required for a resilient vital infrastructure.



597 Remote sensing data have also been used to assess post-disaster physical and functional recovery,  
598 which has been considered a proxy of resilience. Sheykhmousa et al. (2019) used multi-temporal  
599 satellite images to assess recovery via a quantification of land-cover and land-use classes following  
600 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, identifying spatially highly variable recovery patterns.  
601 However, the image-based approach relies on accurate identification of damage as the benchmark  
602 against which recovery is measured. Since much of the Haiyan damage was actually caused by a storm  
603 surge that littered vast areas with a blanket of debris and rubble, this assessment was error-prone  
604 (Ghaffarian and Kerle, 2019; Chaffarian et al., 2019). A later correlation of observed recovery with  
605 detailed field data from about 6,000 household interviews also raised doubts about the common  
606 assumption that a resilient community will recover the quickest (Kerle et al., 2019b). Remote sensing  
607 data have also been shown to be useful in updating databases of buildings and other infrastructure after  
608 a disaster (Chaffarian et al., 2019), which is useful to recalculate the changed risk.

609

610 ***b) Nature-based solutions - combined green and grey infrastructures***

611 Infrastructure systems are categorized into two different types: (1) Grey infrastructure; and (2) Green  
612 infrastructure. Grey infrastructure refers to the traditional (hard) engineering systems that are often  
613 built from steel or concrete, such as those in water management and flood protection systems (e.g., sea  
614 walls, break waters, pipes, pumps, etc). Green infrastructure is the natural and semi-natural system that  
615 is designed and managed to provide ecosystem services to people (EC, 2013), such as mangroves,  
616 coastal dunes, storm water ponds, green roofs, and urban forest. Green infrastructure thus plays an  
617 important role in enhancing the resilience of the system, through for instance, limiting extreme  
618 temperatures in urban areas, or increasing the capability of the coastal communities to withstand sea  
619 level rise through adaptive coastal ecosystems (EC, 2015). Grey infrastructures are costly projects that  
620 have little flexibility to adapt to changes, or to transform to a new structure at a disruptive event.  
621 Therefore, nature-based solutions either by themselves or combined with grey infrastructures can  
622 provide a more sustained and cost-benefit opportunity in increasing resilience of the infrastructures  
623 (Browder et al., 2019; Hallegatte et al., 2019).

624

625 Within the green infrastructure systems the concept of building with nature (nature-based solutions)  
626 has been developed to utilize natural processes, providing opportunity for the natural environment as  
627 part of the infrastructure development process (de Vriend and van Koningsveld, 2012). Such nature-  
628 based solutions may involve restoration plans of degraded ecosystem services (Sapkota et al., 2018;  
629 Mostert et al., 2018) and also enhancement of healthy ecosystem services, such as supporting the  
630 natural storm recovery potential of dunes that function as flood protection (Keijsers et al., 2015).  
631 Nature-based solutions can be functional by themselves or can be developed to improve the  
632 performance of grey infrastructure (WWAP, 2018).

633



634 As an example, the “Sand-motor” mega nourishment (Stive et al., 2013; de Schipper et al., 2016),  
635 located near the most densely populated region in the Netherlands is an innovative way to promote  
636 resilience of the coastal communities to climate change-driven hazards, by not only increasing the area  
637 available for recreation and creating new opportunities for the beach tourism industry, but also by  
638 improving coastal safety in the long term due to increased dune growth. Such a solution improves the  
639 system’s ability to absorb storm events, as wider beaches dissipate more wave energy, hence reduce  
640 erosion of the dunes (natural flood defense), and support recovery of the dunes by windblown sand  
641 transport (Galiforni Silva et al., 2019). At the longer time scale it allows the flood defense system to  
642 flexibly adapt to changes in rates of sea level rise.

643

644 “Room for rivers” (Klijn et al., 2018) represents another form of “building with nature” suggesting to  
645 widen the embankments and create side channels, so there would be more room for rivers to enable to  
646 managing higher water levels during floods. However, in flood protection systems, to reach an  
647 optimum resilience there should be a trade-off between this approach (increasing the absorbing and  
648 adaptive capacity of the system), and robust solutions such as raising dikes. In line with robust  
649 solutions, “tough dikes” as an emerging concept in the Netherlands can also be considered as  
650 examples of resilient flood defenses that would keep their functionality if parts of the structure are  
651 breached due to extreme events. This type of dikes that have residual strength after the occurrence of a  
652 failure, does not allow the failure to quickly propagate throughout the whole structure. As a result, a  
653 longer time is available for damage recovery, thus promoting resilience of the system against  
654 unforeseen hazards.

655

656 “Vegetated foreshore” presents another example of nature-based solutions by which wave loads on  
657 coastal dikes can be reduced considerably (see Vuik et al., 2016). Such combined green and grey  
658 systems are also used to reinforce coastal protection structures while inundation occurs during storms.  
659 Within a similar approach, ecosystem engineering species (e.g., mussel and oyster beds,  
660 willow floodplains and marram grass) can also trap sediment and damp waves (Borsje et al., 2011).

661

### 662 *c) Redundancy creation*

663 Redundancy creation is one of the key measures in resilience thinking (Hoekstra et al., 2018), aiming  
664 to increase resilience of the infrastructure systems. Because of the redundancy and spare management,  
665 a system is not failed due to the component failure (Ruijters and Stoelinga, 2015), making a redundant  
666 system more flexible to disruptions (Birkmann et al., 2017). However, redundancy creation does not  
667 necessarily mean that the key components of the infrastructure systems are doubled or tripled, since it  
668 can be more effective to create ringed or meshed networks (Hallegatte et al., 2019). One of the  
669 examples of making a system redundant is seen in the transport systems in which back-up trains and  
670 gradual fleet introduction over a long period (years) can increase the resilience of the network.



671 ***d) Diversification***

672 Diversifying the infrastructure components can increase the resilience of the system through having a  
673 variety in elements (e.g., people, strategies, institutions, physical aspects) that contribute to the same  
674 function (Hoekstra et al., 2018). For example, in transport systems different modes of transport create  
675 more options and flexibility for the users to use alternative transportation modes in case a disruption  
676 has occurred in the network. In addition, development of re-scheduling scenarios for trains helps to  
677 recover quickly at the time of disruption by which the train service can be continued in a proper way.  
678 Within the power sector, diversifying generation sources can maintain a certain level of service during  
679 a disruptive event, such as nuclear power which can function at high capacity (Hallegatte et al., 2019).

680

681 ***e) De-centralization***

682 De-centralization and detaching physical components of a networked infrastructure is another way of  
683 creating resilience for these systems. This measure is often applicable for power supply, thanks to the  
684 widespread introduction of renewable energy sources such as wind, solar and biomass (Birkmann et  
685 al., 2017). De-centralization is also a solution to promote resilience of the water infrastructures  
686 referring to small and medium-sized systems (e.g., wastewater recycling, and rainwater harvesting  
687 infrastructure), which rely on locally available water sources (Leigh and Lee, 2019). Notably, all three  
688 measures of “redundancy creation”, “diversification”, and “de-centralization” can contribute to the  
689 three system’s abilities of absorbing, responding, and recovering.

690

691 ***Other measures***

692 Available literature provides a number of modelling approaches used in resilience engineering. For  
693 example, Kiel et al. (2016) conducted a study in which resilience of transport systems exposed to  
694 extreme weather events was assessed by using a decision support system. Siegel and Schraagen (2014)  
695 analysed possible degradation of a railway system’s resilience by developing a weak resilience signal  
696 model. Within the same sector, Román-De La Sancha et al. (2019) conducted a study of the accuracy  
697 of damage identification models (i.e., fragility curves) for the urban bridges, tunnels, main roads, and  
698 metro stations affected by earthquakes to provide a better insight on applicability of these models in  
699 seismic vulnerability and resilience assessments. Such damage identification models are extended to  
700 damage recovery scenarios to explore the resilience of VIS for a given post-disaster recovery scenario  
701 (see Do and Jung, 2018). Enhancing the resilience of the VIS can also be achieved in other ways, e.g.,  
702 by improving the information flow across organizational levels (from individual to society) and  
703 adapting new technology such as social media in order to coordinate data for use (Shittu et al., 2018).

704

705 Reducing exposure and vulnerabilities of the infrastructure to natural hazards can also be regarded as a  
706 helpful measure in increasing system resilience. Some of the examples include: building power  
707 systems far away from low-lying flooding areas, excavation of deeper foundations for power and



708 water treatment plants, or elevating infrastructure and protecting it by higher flood protection  
709 structures (Hallegatte et al., 2019). In addition, enhancing resilience of the infrastructures can be done  
710 by minimizing the likely disturbances and failures through down-scaling of the assets in terms of their  
711 functionalities and services provided (e.g., constructing dike rings smaller, or down-scaling drinking  
712 water systems).

713

### 714 **5.1.2 Non-Engineering measures**

#### 715 *a) Systems thinking – System of systems approach*

716 In order to improve infrastructure resilience, a whole system view is required which includes the  
717 physical assets, the users and stakeholders (Pearson et al., 2018). Therefore, there should be a holistic  
718 approach focusing on the ways that the system's constituent parts interrelate and work over time  
719 within larger systems. Infrastructure resilience might be neglected or sacrificed among the users due  
720 to lack of having a systems view, which may highlight more immediately recognizable system  
721 properties such as sustainability or productivity (Meadows, 2008). Analysis of the infrastructures  
722 through a lens of systems thinking/approach provides a better insight towards understanding the  
723 system's complexity and interconnectivity which is required to enhance its resilience  
724 comprehensively and coherently (Field and Look, 2018). This approach can improve the  
725 infrastructure system's ability in terms of better anticipating, absorbing, responding, and recovering  
726 from changes at disruptive events.

727

728 The systems thinking perspective is similarly represented by “system-of-systems” approach which  
729 describes the infrastructure systems and multiple interconnections among different operational scales,  
730 both from the demand and supply sides (Thacker et al., 2017). Within the “system-of-systems”  
731 perspective, there are different levels of representation in a multi-scale structure. Thacker et al. (2017)  
732 defined these levels as: (1) *customers* or consumers who receive the infrastructure services (the lowest  
733 level from the demand side); (2) physical *asset* performing a specific function (the lowest level from  
734 the supply side); (3) *sub-system* representing different networks within a particular infrastructure  
735 system that fulfil a specific function; (4) *system* as a collection of sub-systems presenting a set of  
736 connected assets with a collective function in order to facilitate flow of the services to the customers;  
737 (5) *system-of-systems* as the top level which refers to the inter-connected systems in different sectors.

738

#### 739 *b) Cognitive approach*

740 A cognitive approach helps to determine how system controllers think, perceive, behave and decide at  
741 the time of failure or disruption. This approach provides a better insight to learn from the previous  
742 failures (fifth ability in Figure 4), supporting the systems engineers to be aware of what/why failures  
743 have occurred, so that they can control or avoid future similar failures (Pearson et al., 2018).

744



745 ***c) Team reflection and knowledge-sharing***

746 A resilient infrastructure system should depend on a network of connections, enabling it to incorporate  
747 other sources/information through connections with other organisations at the time of disruptions. In  
748 doing so, team reflection helps to make resilience-related knowledge explicit (Siegel and Schraagen,  
749 2017a), and to better learn from the previous events. Resilience knowledge-sharing, education and  
750 guidance among the users and stakeholders are the foundation for designing, operating and functioning  
751 of the resilient infrastructure such as flood resilient integrated systems (Pearson et al., 2018).  
752 According to Hickford et al. (2018), knowledge-sharing improves the effectiveness and adaptability of  
753 responses (referring to the “responding” ability of a system) to natural and human-induced hazards  
754 through developing and sharing resilience policies and guidelines among stakeholders. Such  
755 collaborations can help to develop the concept of resilience engineering in infrastructure design and  
756 operation, feeding back into the planning and adaptation procedures (Schippers et al., 2014).

757

758 ***d) Risk assessment***

759 Risk assessment is a necessity for designing infrastructure systems within the context of resilience  
760 engineering, however opinions are different in terms of the inter-connection between these two  
761 concepts (as referred to in section 4.1-f). Risk assessment can be done by using different methods and  
762 analysis including fault trees, four-eyes principle, and safe-fail mechanism. These methods provide  
763 qualitative metrics highlighting the root causes of the system failure, and quantitative metrics dealing  
764 with probability, cost, and impact of a disruption (Kumar and Stoelinga, 2017). For example, the fault  
765 tree is a graphical method that models the propagation of failures through the system, investigating the  
766 dependability of all components failures, to find out whether or not all failures lead to a system failure  
767 (Ruijters and Stoelinga, 2015). Such risk-related methods can improve the ability of a system in  
768 monitoring, anticipating, and absorbing disturbances. Risk assessment is more applicable for assessing  
769 the high-tech infrastructure systems that are at risk of self-failure, cyber-attacks and human errors  
770 (e.g., flood protection systems, power plants, tele-communication equipment).

771

772 ***e) “Human-centred design” approach***

773 Human-centeredness is a core quality of systems design (van der Bijl-Brouwer and Dorst, 2017).  
774 Human-centred design approach presents a framework which aims to empower all the actors, people,  
775 stakeholders of an integrated system, by actively involving those who can interact with changes and  
776 development processes. Applying this approach as a design and management framework to the  
777 infrastructure systems, the technical and social aspects of the system can be integrated with a focus on  
778 two goals: 1) To make sure that the human needs are addressed; and 2) To make sure that the  
779 framework fulfils its purpose by continuously addressing the human needs in a changing environment.  
780 Therefore, using this framework, the system has to adapt to changes and to recover addressing the  
781 needs of people (contributing to the system’s abilities “respond”, and “recover”). Considering this



782 objective, the resilience concept is already incorporated (as a goal) within this context, while also  
783 being linked to the processes to ensure that all stakeholders are involved to achieve the goal. For  
784 example, in the transport sector, van den Beukel and van der Voort (2017) conducted a study to assess  
785 driver's interaction with partially automated driving systems. This was done by proposing an  
786 assessment framework that allows designers to analyse driver-support within different simulated  
787 traffic scenarios.

788

### 789 **5.1.3 Governance**

790 Governance is a key element of the infrastructure resilience which includes decision making  
791 procedures, tools, and monitoring used by governmental organisations and the associated partners to  
792 ensure that infrastructure services are available to people (OECD, 2015). For example, preparedness is  
793 one of the important approaches to ensure that systems are able to cope with sudden shocks and future  
794 pressures (Majithia, 2014). Hallegatte et al. (2019) suggested that the first step in making  
795 infrastructures resilient should be to make them reliable in normal conditions through having a proper  
796 governance in infrastructure design, operation, maintenance, and financing phases. According to this  
797 suggestion, substantial investments in the regular maintenance of the current systems is of utmost  
798 importance, given that such investments in planning, in the initial stage of the projects and in the  
799 maintenance phase is considerably greater than the repairs or reconstruction costs after a disruptive  
800 event. In line with this perspective, Shittu et al. (2018) also highlighted the role of sustained  
801 investment, continuous monitoring, and data collection to have an effective emergency response after  
802 a disaster occurs. In addition, Hallegatte et al. (2019) pointed out that reducing the exposure and  
803 vulnerability of the systems to hazards is another way of promoting resilience of infrastructures.

804

### 805 **5.2 Recent applications in literature**

806 To identify to what extent the presented measures are applied in practice, here the recent literature are  
807 reviewed with a focus on the application of resilience engineering in the domains of transport, water,  
808 power, and tele-communication. In doing so, we include both studies that focus on initial phases of a  
809 design process (e.g., assessment or analysis of resilience) as well as studies that design, analyse or  
810 evaluate interventions to enhance or increase resilience. Table 2 provides an overview of the selected  
811 examples, highlighting aims, approaches used and type of shocks/pressures considered in these 50  
812 studies. According to Table 2, transport and water infrastructures are generally among the most  
813 commonly (recent) analysed systems, compared to the studies related to enhancing resilience of the  
814 tele-communication infrastructures that appear to be rather limited in the recent literature. In addition,  
815 studies have been conducted to analyse and improve resilience of the entire network of infrastructures  
816 (combined systems) that are affected by varied natural and human induced shocks and pressures.

817





818 With respect to the methods and approaches used, knowledge sharing is a method applied among the  
819 four VIS. For example, Siegel and Schraagen (2017a; b) conducted an observational study on how a  
820 team of rail signallers can contribute to the resilience of rail infrastructures by providing valuable team  
821 reflection and collaborative sense making in making resilience-related knowledge explicit. This  
822 knowledge was made explicit by a tool that provided weak resilience signals to the team, such that the  
823 team members could reflect on those signals and make implicit knowledge explicit and shared.  
824 Similarly, Majithia (2014), and Giovinazzi et al. (2017) conducted studies within the power and tele-  
825 communication systems, respectively, in which improvement of the infrastructure's resilience was  
826 analysed through sharing knowledge and collaborations among different stakeholders. As another  
827 method of increasing infrastructure resilience, risk assessment has been commonly used in the studies  
828 conducted by Ruijters and Stoelinga (2016); Hall et al. (2016); Do and Jung (2018); Mao et al. (2018);  
829 Wang et al. (2019); and Tsavdaroglou et al. (2018). The selected studies also highlight that within the  
830 water sector, combining green and grey infrastructures (nature-based solutions) is the most frequently  
831 used approach to increase system's resilience (e.g., Hulscher et al., 2014; Augustijn et al., 2014;  
832 Demuzere et al., 2014; Borsje et al., 2017; Augustijn et al., 2018; Beery, 2018; Vuik et al., 2019).  
833  
834 While knowledge sharing, risk assessment, and nature-based solutions present the commonly used  
835 approaches in recent applications, a little appears to be known about increasing resilience of VIS using  
836 other measures, such as diversification, de-centralisation, cognitive approaches, and human-centred  
837 design framework. Field and Look (2018) and Bakhshipour et al. (2019) presented two of the few  
838 examples in which systems thinking, and de-centralization approaches were applied to quantify  
839 infrastructure resilience, and to optimize drainage systems performance, respectively.

**Table 2.** Selected recent studies that were conducted to analyse and enhance resilience of the vital infrastructure systems.

Type of system	Method / Approach	Aim	Shock / Pressure	Reference		
Transport	Resilience-state model	To measure workload weak resilience signals	Multiple causes	Siegel and Schraegen, 2014		
	Team reflection, knowledge sharing	To enhance resilience in a rail control	Accident	Siegel and Schraegen, 2017a		
	Risk assessment (fault trees)	To quantify system reliability and expected cost	Multiple failure modes	Siegel and Schraegen, 2017b		
	Using social media data	To quantify human mobility resilience	Extreme weather events	Ruijters and Stoeltinga, 2016		
	Risk assessment (failure model)	To analyse resilience of road network	Flooding	Roy et al., 2019		
	Governance (decision-making framework)	To maximize the expected resilience improvement	Urban traffic congestion	Wang et al., 2019		
	Damage identification model	For damage and fragility assessment	Earthquake	Zou and Chen, 2019		
	Knowledge sharing (data exchange)	To improve decision making in disaster recovery	Earthquake	Ronán-De La Sancha et al., 2019		
	Damage recovery scenario	To enhance road network resilience	Extreme event	Blake et al., 2019		
	Water	Nature-based solutions / Combined green and grey infrastructures	To improve resilience of urban/coastal communities	Pluvial flooding	Do and Jung, 2018	
Pluvial flooding				Dai et al., 2018a		
Natural/human induced				Hulscher et al., 2014		
Natural/human induced				Augustijn et al., 2014		
Natural/human induced				Augustijn et al., 2017		
Coastal hazards				Borsje et al., 2018		
Coastal hazards				Borsje et al., 2018		
Natural/human induced				Augustijn et al., 2018		
CC impacts				Demuzere et al., 2014		
Coastal hazards				McPherson et al., 2015		
Flooding				WWAP, 2018		
Natural hazards				Staddon et al., 2018		
Urbanization				Herslund et al., 2018		
Storms and flooding				Venkataraman et al., 2019		
Extreme rainfall				Beery, 2018		
Storms				Bakshinpour et al., 2019		
Flooding				Pearson et al., 2018		
Flooding				Ramsey et al., 2019		
Power	Governance (investment prioritization)	To improve reliability of wastewater systems	Flooding	Karamouz et al., 2018		
			CC impacts	Mosafavi, 2018		
			CC impacts	Mähtilä, 2014		
			CC impacts	Hall et al., 2016		
			CC impacts	Sridharan et al., 2019		
			CC impacts	Zhang et al., 2018		
			Natural hazards	Zhang et al., 2018		
			Extreme weather events	Paul and Rahter, 2018		
			System-of-systems framework	To analyse CC impacts on a water system	CC impacts	Mosafavi, 2018
			Knowledge sharing	To increase resilience of energy infrastructures	CC impacts	Mähtilä, 2014
Risk assessment	To analyse CC impacts on vulnerability of networks	CC impacts	Hall et al., 2016			
Long-term governance models	To assess resilience of the electricity sector	CC impacts	Sridharan et al., 2019			
Model-based resilience assessment	To evaluate the hurricane impact on the power system	Natural hazards	Zhang et al., 2018			
Monte Carlo simulation model	To quantify wind farm operational resilience	Extreme weather events	Paul and Rahter, 2018			





	Model-based approach	To identify blackouts cascading effects in transmission systems	Extreme events	Carreras et al., 2012
	Redundancy scheme	To explore the optimization of energy consumption	Content-based cloud data	Wu et al., 2018
	System-based models of performance	To model resilience	Extreme weather events	Reed et al., 2015
	“Resilient communication service”	To introduce techniques and services providing end-user applications with resilient connectivity	Natural/human-induced	Rak et al., 2016
<b>Tele – communic.</b>	Knowledge sharing, collaboration of service providers, Back-up cables	To assess resilience of the tele-communication network	Earthquake	Gioviazzi et al., 2017
	Software-defined network	For resilience management	Natural/human-induced	Gunkel et al., 2016
	Knowledge sharing	To improve adaptability of responses to hazards	Natural/human-induced	Darwin, 2018
	Risk assessment	To analyse risks to infrastructures	Extreme weather events	Tsardaroglou et al., 2018
	Maintenance	To increase resilience of systems	Natural/human-induced	Rozenberg and Fay, 2019
	Systems thinking	To measure resilience	Natural/human-induced	Field and Look, 2018
	Sustained investment, communication, data and knowledge sharing	To achieve effective disaster relief operations	Natural hazards	Shitu et al., 2018
	Governance (decision support framework)	To improve infrastructure performance/resilience	Earthquake, Tsunami	Kameshwar et al., 2019
	System-of-systems framework	To analyse potential CC impacts and identifying adaptation options for a set of infrastructures	CC impacts	Bollinger et al., 2013
	System-of-systems framework	To analyse disruption effects for multi-scale critical infrastructures; electricity and the flight networks	System failure	Thacker et al., 2017
Automated post-disaster damage assessment	To identify and document damage	Natural hazards	Mao et al., 2018	
Model-based resilience assessment	To model the direct effects of seismic events on water distribution network, and resulting cascading effects	Seismic events	Guidotti et al., 2016	

842



843 **6. Concluding remarks**

844 **6.1 General observations and main findings of this article**

845 This article aimed at providing a systematic review on designing resilient VIS by combining a  
846 coherent review of the literature with experts' interviews and analysis of the recent examples of  
847 resilience engineering in practice. In doing so, *firstly*, two different approaches in designing  
848 infrastructure systems (i.e., performance and capacity-oriented) were discussed providing the basis to  
849 conceptualize the resilience engineering for VIS. This conceptualization was done by defining VIS as  
850 an integrated socio-ecological-technical system, highlighting the inter-sectoral, as well as cross-  
851 sectoral dependencies within these systems. The inter-sectoral dependency indicated that infrastructure  
852 resilience is not only dependent on the technical resilience and engineering characteristics of the  
853 system, but also relies considerably on the resilience level of the two other sub-systems (i.e.,  
854 ecological, and social) and their mutual interactions. The cross-sectoral dependency refers to the  
855 mutual effects that function of a specific type of VIS may have effects on other types (as also referred  
856 to as cascading effects).

857  
858 *Secondly*, two types of challenges (i.e., conceptual tensions and challenges in the fields of  
859 applications) related to the design of resilient VIS were identified and explored, providing a relation to  
860 the three components of the system: technical (physical asset); ecological (environment); and social  
861 (actor/user). This analysis revealed that most of the challenges arise equally from the three  
862 components; however, some of the debates such as positive or neutral attitude to the resilience concept  
863 have mainly resulted from the different connotation, and interpretations of the resilience engineering  
864 concept among users and actors. The inputs from the conducted experts' interviews, in line with the  
865 results of literature review also show that the infrastructure systems are often being built with poorly-  
866 applied concept of resilience engineering that is not explicitly and practically incorporated in design  
867 and management procedures.

868  
869 *Thirdly*, the engineering and non-engineering measures to increase resilience of VIS were identified  
870 and analyzed in relation to the five main abilities required for a resilient system (i.e., anticipate and  
871 monitor, absorb, respond, recover and learn from the past). This analysis showed that: (1) engineering-  
872 based measures (e.g., nature-based, redundancy creation, remote sensing techniques) contribute mostly  
873 to the three system's capabilities; absorption, response, and recovery; (2) non-engineering methods  
874 (e.g., systems thinking, knowledge sharing and team reflection, human-centered design) highlight  
875 mostly the importance of the social aspects of the system, playing an important role in improving  
876 system's ability especially in terms of anticipating and monitoring, responding and learning from the  
877 previous experiences. Notably, governance and sustained investment can considerably facilitate better  
878 implementation of both types of measures, and provide effective measures in promoting all the five  
879 system's abilities mentioned above.



880 *Finally*, analysis of the selected 50 recent studies on improving infrastructure resilience resulted in the  
881 following main observations: (1) transport systems (often with one mode of transport) and water  
882 infrastructures are the most commonly studied systems; (2) knowledge sharing, risk assessment,  
883 system-of-systems approach, and nature-based solutions constitute the approaches that are frequently  
884 used in the recent applications; (3) natural hazards and climate change impacts represent the major  
885 sources of shocks and pressures that have been studied. However, analysis of system resilience due to  
886 the disruptions caused by human errors (e.g., accident in transport systems), cyber-attacks, terrorism,  
887 and urbanization appears to be less-explored in current literature.

888

## 889 **6.2 Future developments and research agenda**

890 This review article highlights the need for further assessment of the integration between socio-  
891 ecological-technical aspects of infrastructures, and analysis of how the resilience of the entire VIS  
892 depends on the resilience of each sub-system. The findings of this review also point to the necessity of  
893 developing studies on understanding the complex cascading effects of failures and disturbances among  
894 the network of infrastructures, and strong dependencies of systems on each other's functionality.  
895 However, recent applications show the popularity of the emerging approaches (e.g., system-of-  
896 systems) in understanding the interdependencies of small scale systems in one or two specific sectors.  
897 Within this topical area, more studies should be conducted on development of such integrated  
898 approaches for improving resilience of the large scale VIS by analyzing the interlinked networks  
899 across different sectors. Addressing this need is of utmost importance, since the technological  
900 evolution of the systems together with increasing uncertainties related to the global pressures such as  
901 urbanization and climate change impacts, seem to introduce more complexity and inter-dependencies  
902 between the VIS.

903

904 It is expected that future standards for designing infrastructures (e.g., flood defences) will become less  
905 conservative as soon as resilience thinking and post-disaster recovery of the infrastructures are  
906 explicitly considered in the design regulations and decision making procedure. More inclusion of the  
907 recovery process in designing and decision making procedure may result in replacing the long-term  
908 standards (that may not be well applicable for a sudden shock) into short-term and urgent agreements  
909 that can be accepted by both policy makers and stakeholders for better management of a very sudden  
910 change/failure in the system.

911

912 There should also be more emphasis on the role of regular maintenance and understanding the  
913 performance of the current infrastructure systems, especially the ones that are not supposed to work  
914 well (due to their short lifetime), but are still functioning properly, even at the time of a short  
915 disruption or big disasters. Therefore, one of the focuses of future studies in designing resilient  
916 infrastructures should be on analysis of what worked well in the system rather than only looking at



917 what went wrong during a disturbance. Within this perspective, resilience engineering has to take a  
918 larger view into account on human errors, but also on human capabilities and regular maintenance of  
919 the infrastructure that would increase the efficiency/function of a system in many cases. A cognitive  
920 approach that appears to have been less investigated in the current resilience literature, offers an  
921 applicable measure for better understanding of this important issue.

922

923 It is also suggested to have a different way of thinking about the resilience of infrastructure systems.  
924 Resilience should be considered as a relative quantity, rather than an absolute quantity. Infrastructure  
925 systems are better to be designed in a way to become “more resilient”, rather than being “resilient”.  
926 Therefore, instead of setting a threshold to call a system resilient, comparing a system with its  
927 previous situation is suggested. In this context, the recovery speed represents a good measure to  
928 indicate whether a system is “more resilient” than it used to be. However, the work described in this  
929 review also demonstrates a challenge, in that resilience measured on the ground using conventional  
930 assessment methods did not always correspond to effective recovery.

931

932 With respect to the new engineering-based technology, the data provided by remote sensing  
933 techniques cannot always explain well the reason of having different level of recovery between  
934 infrastructure systems. Knowing this limitation, the obtained information is not yet actionable, calling  
935 for future studies on how to make the obtained data useful in identifying the factors that create  
936 different recovery characteristics (i.e., quicker/slower, complete/partial). Work is now emerging to  
937 couple image-based recovery assessment with macro-economic agent-based modelling that aims at  
938 explaining better the observed recovery patterns. If successful this can be used to identify socio-  
939 economic, as well as legal and political measures to improve the process. Such efforts can provide  
940 better insight into the little-known issue of differential impacts and recovery rates across communities,  
941 as well as feedback processes and dynamic of the systems after a shock has occurred. This may also  
942 serve as a government’s tool to find out what are the most significant responsible parameters to inform  
943 the success of recovery.

944

#### 945 **Author contribution**

946 S. Mehvar and K.M. Wijnberg conceived the overall approach and the main conceptual design of the  
947 article. All the co-authors provided constructive inputs, textual additions/editions and helpful  
948 suggestions in writing and improving the content of this article. S. Mehvar wrote the article and  
949 conducted the literature review and interviews with the experts at University of Twente.

950

#### 951 **Competing interests**

952 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

953



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961

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