



1

2 **Analysis of Employment Change in Response to Hurricane** 3 **Landfalls**

4 Yuepeng Cui¹, Daan Liang² and Bradley Ewing³

5 1. Department of Transportation, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350118, China;
6 2. Department of Civil, Environmental, & Construction Engineering, Texas Tech University, Lubbock
7 79409, USA; 3. Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, Lubbock 79409, USA)

8 *Correspondence to:* Yuepeng Cui (ypcui916@hotmail.com)

9 **Abstract.** Hurricanes cause extensive harm to local economies and in some cases the recovery may take
10 years. As an adequate, skilled, and trained workforce is a prerequisite for economic development and
11 capacity building, employment plays an important role in disaster reduction and mitigation efforts. The
12 statistical relationship between hurricane landfalls and observed changes in employment at the county level
13 is investigated. Hurricane impact is classified into temporary and permanent categories. In the former
14 category, the level of economic activities is lowered following a hurricane landfall but quickly recovers to
15 the pre-storm norm. In contrast, the permanent shift alters the mean value of the data and results in lasting
16 losses in future years. The results show that Hurricane Katrina produced significant permanent impact on
17 Orleans County, Louisiana. Chambers and Fort Bend counties experienced significant temporary impact
18 due to the landfall of Hurricane Ike. The results are further discussed through qualitative analysis of various
19 social, economic, and engineering factors in these affected communities. The findings support the notion
20 that higher resilience level leads to quicker recovery after a disaster. However, the underlying data-
21 generating processes are characterized and tested in a more detailed manner.
22 **Key Words:** Employment, Hurricane impact, Resilience Level, Time Series

23 **1. Introduction**

24 Natural hazards are an ongoing part of human history, and coping with them is a critical element of how
25 resource use and human settlement have evolved (Adger 2005). It is estimated that during the period of
26 2006 to 2016, natural disasters affected more than 3 billion people, resulted in over 750,000 deaths, and
27 cost more than \$600 billion around the world (Hallegatte et.al 2017). Globally, 1.2 billion people, or 23%
28 of the world's population, live within 100 km from the coasts (Nichols 2003), and the percentage is likely
29 to increase to 50% by 2030. Many of these coastal areas have high exposure to hurricane, tsunami,
30 earthquake, and other disasters.

31 Based on the statistics from Congressional Budget Office, the annualized economic losses due to hurricanes
32 in the United States are estimated at \$28 billion. The top state contributing to that sum is Florida (55
33 percent), followed by Texas (13 percent) and Louisiana (9 percent). Hurricane Katrina was the costliest
34 storm by far at \$160 billion (in 2019 dollars).



35 In the aftermath of hurricanes, disruption to business activities and supply chains, and failure of
36 infrastructures, often results in the redistribution of resources (Chow and Elkind 2005; Kaisera, et al. 2009;
37 Comfort and Haase 2006). The capability to produce goods and services may be lost and the natural rate of
38 employment may drop making for higher levels of unemployment (Ewing 2009). During the subsequent
39 recovery phase, the affected communities engage in debris cleanup and redevelopment designed to quickly
40 restore local employment and other economic activities to pre-storm levels (King 2008) The process of
41 economic recovery may require months or even years (Mel and McKenzie 2011). As an example, U.S.
42 economic growth slowed to 1.3 percent in the quarter after Hurricane Katrina, compared to the previous
43 quarter's 3.8 percent.

44 The research presented in this paper is focused on analyzing temporary (i.e. transitory) and permanent
45 impacts of hurricanes on affected communities. More specifically, we examine the disruption of
46 employment and investigate the statistical relationship between hurricane landfalls and observed changes in
47 local employment. In some counties the time series are lowered following a hurricane landfall before
48 quickly returning to the pre-storm level. In contrast, other counties experience permanent shifts in the mean
49 value and sustain long-lasting losses. Understanding the dynamic response of employment to hurricanes
50 can help the local communities to assess their future risk to hurricanes and devise effective mitigation
51 measures.

52 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe three historical hurricanes
53 selected for the study. In Section 3, data specifications of employment for counties affected are presented.
54 In Section 4, we introduce the Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model and discuss
55 its application to the data. Results are discussed in Section 5, and qualitative explanation of the results are
56 described in Section 6. Concluding remarks and future extensions are given in Section 7.

57 **2. Hurricanes Under Study**

58 Hurricanes often bring highly detrimental consequences when they made landfall in urban areas (Voogd
59 2004). Two historical hurricanes-Hurricane Ike and Hurricane Katrina are selected in this study, because
60 they produced big impact on densely populated areas of New Orleans, LA and Houston, Texas,
61 respectively.

62 On the morning of September 13, 2008, Hurricane Ike as the fourth most destructive hurricane in the
63 United States made final landfall at Galveston island as a Category 2 hurricane with maximum sustained
64 winds nearing 110 mph (175 km/h) and then moved onto the mainland which covered over 425 miles of
65 Texas coastline (Berg 2009). It was the first hurricane to hit Houston area since the landfall of Hurricane
66 Jerry in 1989. Hurricane Ike ripped through the Houston area, and the eye of the storm passing over Harris
67 County, TX. Houston MSA as the fourth largest city in the U.S., at least 20 people died due to the landfall
68 of Hurricane Ike. Nearly 2,900 units were deemed unfit for living, with losses exceeding \$208 million. The
69 storm led to minor damage for about 251,000 residential homes. The total damage cost was estimated are



70 around 4.6 billion (Harris County Texas 2009). According to the estimation of the U.S. Department of
71 Energy, about 2.6 million customers experienced power failure in Texas and Louisiana. Due to the high
72 wind of Hurricane Ike, many windows of the city's tallest building in downtown Houston had broken
73 (Clark 2008).

74 Hurricane Katrina made its final landfall as a Category 3 hurricane near the Pearl River at the
75 Louisiana/Mississippi border. Hurricane Katrina's high wind combined with its enormous size at landfall
76 caused the tremendous storm surges along the Gulf Coast area. The hurricane severely impacted or
77 destroyed business buildings and residential homes in New Orleans and some other heavily populated
78 areas (NOAA 2005 and USGS 2008). Approximately 80% of the city of New Orleans flooded, and the
79 depth of the flood is up to 20ft following the landfall of hurricane. The total economic damage from
80 Hurricane Katrina is around \$160 billion (in 2019 dollars), nearly two times the cost of the previously most
81 expensive hurricane, Hurricane Andrew (USDC 2006).

82 **3. Data Specification for Hurricanes and Employment**

83 A brief introduction of the data used in the empirical analyses and some initial observations for the entire
84 hurricane periods will be introduced in this section. The Hurricane-relevant parameters such as wind speed,
85 central pressure and radius were considered as important atmospheric factors for assessing and predicting
86 the physical damages caused by hurricanes (Zhang and Wang 2003). Storm parameters data are obtained
87 from the National Hurricane Center (NHC) for two hurricanes including latitude, longitude, wind speed and
88 pressure. Sample storm track data about Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Ike are shown in Table 1. In
89 addition to physical damage, hurricanes also pose a risk to local employment market and economic
90 situation (Zhang et al., 2008). To date, researchers have identified several general classes of elements that
91 could explain the connection between disaster impact and economic performance (Ewing, Kruse and
92 Thompson 2009; Ewing, Kruse and Wang 2007; Ewing, Hein and Kruse 2006; Ewing and Kruse 2005,
93 Tompkins 2005, Cutter, et. al. 2008). The performance of local economic situation may not return to
94 normal level after the landfall of hurricane, and the process may take many months or years (Mel and
95 McKenzie 2011).

96 Table 1 Historical hurricane tracks for Hurricanes Ike (2008) and Katrina (2005)
97 The population in New Orleans declined from over 400,000 to near zero in less than a week after Hurricane
98 Katrina swept the Gulf of Mexico (Vigdor 2008). The number of layoff events in Louisiana and Mississippi
99 increased greatly and rapidly in September 2005 soon after Hurricane Katrina (USBS 2006). The number
100 of workers and the number of firms operating in New Orleans were also reduced. The subsequent rebuild
101 process was hindered by absent employees as many of them had homes destroyed or their family required
102 urgent care. It's previously reported that employees who experience injury from the disaster may be more
103 likely to be absent from work in the weeks following the event (Byron and Peterson 2002). In September
104 2005, Mickey Driver, a spokesperson for Chevron stated, "we are trying to find out where they've (our



105 employees) gone, what their current situation is and what we can do to help them”. The organization’s
106 ability to recover from the disaster can be weakened due to the lack of employee access to work
107 (Durkin1984 and Kroll. et al 1991).

108 Employment has been shown as a key driver of economic activities as well as a major social concern. Local
109 area employment provides a measure of labor market conditions, and firms gain insight into output
110 performance through adjusting employment to match the changes in demand (ILO 2008). Employment is
111 associated with the level of preparedness for disaster and ability to take proactive actions. Higher
112 employment in a county, for example, often translates into higher resilience and quicker recovery process
113 through purchasing insurance, and upgrading houses (Mayunga 2007). Therefore, examining the changes in
114 employment following the landfall of hurricane would not only present the health of business environment
115 but also indicate the state of broad economic recovery. Monthly employment data for the counties within
116 Houston MSA and New Orleans MSA are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
117 (<http://www.bls.gov>).

118 Figure 1 Monthly employment time series in Orleans County before and after Hurricane Katrina

119 Figure 1 shows the monthly employment time series in Orleans County. The red ‘X’ marker denotes the
120 month in which Hurricane Katrina made landfall. The MSA lost more than 80,000 jobs (or 33%)
121 immediately after Katrina, gained some back during the initial one month of recovery, and then lost again
122 during the recession. Casual observation indicates that Hurricane Katrina was a contributing factor
123 responsible for such a major reduction in employment.

124 Figure 2 Monthly employment time series in St.Charles County before and after Hurricane Katrina

125 Figure 2 presents the historical monthly employment data in St. Charles County. It is clear at first glance
126 that the storm led to an initial drop in employment (2000 jobs or 8%) but the magnitude wasn’t as severe as
127 Orleans County. The ensuing trajectory was also markedly different, enjoying a long expansion after the
128 Great Recession.

129 Figure 3 Monthly employment time series in five counties within Houston MSA before and after Hurricane
130 Ike

131 Figure 3 presents the historical monthly employment data for five counties within the Houston MSA. Again,
132 the red ‘X’ marker denotes the month when Hurricane Ike made landfall. Comparing to Hurricane Katrina,
133 it is not apparent whether or not Ike led to a drop in employment as the five counties appear to have been in
134 the midst of a decline (or period of slowing growth) preceding the storm. However, it does appear that
135 there is an abatement in cyclical behavior (i.e. volatility) in the post-storm period and perhaps even a
136 uptick in Brazoria County.

137 4. Methodology for Quantifying Hurricane Impact

138 The ARIMA (Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average) model of time series mainly include three
139 parameters p , d , and q . The process of determining the integral number of auto-regressive p , integrated d ,



140 and moving average q could identify the patterns of the model. It generally started with finding accurate
141 value of parameter d because it provides important information about the order of time series being
142 investigated. P is the number of auto-regressive terms that describes the number of lag observations
143 included in the model. For example, in a model with three auto-regressive terms ($p=3$) indicates that the
144 current date observation depends on three previous period observations. The value of q represents the
145 moving average term which is only related to the random errors that occurred in past time periods. For
146 example, a model with one moving average term suggests that the current date observation is determined
147 by the preceding random shock to the series. If a parameter equals to a value of 0, which indicates to not
148 use that element of the model.

149 Two common unit-root tests are implemented to test the stationary of the respective time series and to
150 identify the value of d in the model. Phillips and Perron (1988) and the Augment Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
151 tests are applied in our study to analyze the stationary of employment variables in different counties. d
152 equals to 0 indicates that time series is stationary in levels, if not, the first(or second, third....) difference of
153 the time series will be examined until the time series is shown as stationary time series data.

154 The results of the ADF unit root test suggest that each series of employment in different counties is non-
155 stationary in levels, but it is stationary in the first difference. PP unit root test presents the same result of the
156 ADF test. Therefore, the first difference of each sequence is used as input to identify ARIMA model in
157 order to compare the results of each county. Box-Jenkins methodology (Maddala 1992) is involved in the
158 identification and estimation of ARIMA ($p,1,q$) which applies partial auto-correlations and auto-
159 correlations of stationary time series data to obtain the best fit of time series data. The values of p and q
160 is determined by choosing the minimum value of Akaike information criterion(AIC).

161 ARIMA model with intervention analysis is mainly applied to estimate the impact caused by specific
162 external event such as natural hazards, policy change ,etc (Enders 2009). Baade and Baumann (2007) use
163 ARIMA model with intervention analysis to estimate the Hurricane Andrew impact on taxable sales in the
164 respective cities. This technique has been widely used in many fields of research studies ranging from
165 evaluating the impact of the financial crisis on Nigeria crude oil export(Adubis and Jolayem 2015) to assess
166 the effects of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) policies change on employment in
167 hurricane-stricken cities (Ewing and Kruse 2005). Intervention analysis offer a formal test to evaluate
168 several patterns of distortions (changing the mean function or trend) as a result of external shock.

169 *Table 2* presents the result of ARIMA model selection based on standard Box-Jenkins methodology with
170 Akaike information criterion. Consequently, the first difference in each series is used as input to identify
171 the values of p and q in ARIMA model, thus the results of hurricanes impact on different counties can be
172 compared.

173

174 Intervention analysis is carried out in the following steps. We first identify the ARIMA model for each
175 county before the month of hurricane landfall. A binary (intervention) variable with a value of 1 or 0 is



176 defined as an intervention variable, where a value of 1 flags the hurricane periods (either the month of
177 hurricane at landfall or entire post-hurricane period accordingly) and takes the value zero at other times.
178 Then, the model with intervention variable is re-estimated for the whole time series data (i.e., pre- and post-
179 hurricane period). The effect of hurricanes on employment can be understood by examining the magnitude
180 and statistical significance of coefficients on intervention variables.
181 Two types of intervention variables are added to the ARIMA model separately to evaluate the hurricane
182 impact on the employment at the county level. The “temporary” impact of hurricane may be captured by
183 the intervention variable that equals one in the month of hurricane landfall and zero at other times. The
184 “permanent” effect of the hurricane may be modeled by the intervention variable that equals one since the
185 month of hurricane landfall through the end of the sample period and zero elsewhere. Note that the latter
186 represents changing mean or trend in the growth rate of employment. Equation (1) shows the ARIMA
187 model with intervention analysis.
188

$$189 \quad \Delta y_t = c + a_1 \Delta y_{t-1} + \dots + a_p \Delta y_{t-p} + e_t + b_1 e_{t-1} + \dots + b_q e_{t-q} + \beta D \quad (1)$$

190 where D is the intervention variable (i.e., temporary or permanent), β is the associated coefficient, and c is
191 a constant term, p is the number of lags on the auto-regressive term, a_1, \dots, a_p are the coefficients for AR
192 model, and c is constant. b_1, \dots, b_q are the coefficients of the MA part in the model.
193 There are several points worth paying attention on ARIMA intervention model. The design of the ARIMA
194 intervention method focuses on the time series relationship between a specific variable and an event
195 (especially the time period of the occurrence of the events) and isolates the effects of changes in time series
196 behavior of the variable before and after the event. In addition, an appropriate defined ARIMA model can
197 achieve this without adding additional control variables, and these variables are effectively handled in the
198 error term (Enders 2009). Excessive specification (i.e. adding irrelevant or statistical redundant control
199 variables) leads to multi-collinearity, and standard errors often result in lower accuracy in the time series
200 models. Therefore, diagnostic tests are conducted on residual errors to determine that 1) they perform well
201 (normal, constant variance) and 2) the error items do not contain additional information that can be used to
202 improve the prediction accuracy of the model. In generally, ARIMA model has the ideal characteristics
203 with less and better error terms. Results for the temporary effect are presented in Table 3, and the
204 permanent effect results are shown in Table 4. Statistical significance at the 5% level is indicated by “***”.
205 The adjusted R-square represents the extent of the total variance of the dependent variable which can be
206 explained by the independent variable, and estimated number of independent variables are also considered.
207 The adjusted R-squares reported in Table 3 are fully within the acceptance range of the model specified in
208 the first difference. The F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the constant term are
209 equal to zero. The results of F-statistics shown in the tables below indicate that the null hypothesis is
210 rejected, which prove the rationality of the existence of the model.



211 Hurricane Ike produced significant temporary impact in Chamber and Fort Bend County as the
212 employment growth rate slows down by 8.2% in Chambers County, and 4.3% in Fort Bend County. In
213 contrast, permanent change in the mean growth rate is found to be significant in Orleans County where the
214 mean growth rate slows down by 8.6%.

215 Table 3 Results of temporary impact for employment

216
217 Table 4 Results of permanent impact for employment

218 Figures 4 and 5 further illustrate the temporary and permanent impacts that hurricanes have on
219 communities. The shaded area in these figures represents the post-storm period. Actual and forecast values
220 are shown as well as the (one standard deviation from the mean) upper and lower bounds for the forecast
221 (or confidence bands). The temporary reduction from Hurricane Ike occurred in Chambers County where
222 employment dropped by 8.1% but recovered within two years (see *Figure 4*) when the series re-entered the
223 areas shown within the confidence bands. In contrast, it took Orleans County about 7 years (2005 through
224 2012) to return to the pre-storm employment level following Hurricane Katrina. These two cases present a
225 clear difference in time scale in how local employment recovered from hurricanes.

226 Furthermore, others have founds that long term recovery from disasters usually takes three-five years
227 (Webb, Tierney and Dhlhamer 2002, Fussell 2015 and Marks 2015). Therefore, we define the threshold for
228 permanent effect in this study as 3 years or longer. In other words, if it takes 3 years or more for
229 employment to return to within the forecast confidence bands, the impact will be considered permanent.
230 Otherwise, it will be considered as temporary impact.

231 Figure 4 Temporary effects of Hurricane Ike in Chambers County

232 Figure 5 Permanent effects of Hurricane Katrina in Orleans Parish County

233 Qualitative Explanation of the results

234 Based on the analysis above, Hurricane Ike produced significant but temporary impact on employment in
235 Chambers and Fort Bend Counties while Galveston, Harris and Brazoria counties didn't experience any
236 significant impact. Then the question is raised: what has contributed to a community's ability to withstand
237 and recover from disaster?

238 We attempt to address this question through the prism of resilience. Disaster resilience is defined as the
239 capacity or ability of a community to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover quickly from impacts
240 of disaster (Foster 2006). According to Walker et al. (2006), adaptability is mainly controlled by all forms
241 of capital, the number of government and institutions in the system. The capitals of the system are
242 fundamental components for the resilience study of the entire community, e.g., social, human, economic,
243 physical and natural, which are referred to as elements of resilience. The evaluation of community
244 resilience is a complex process due to the dynamic interactions among people, community, society, and
245 environment (Foster 2006; Tierney 2006 and Borie, Pelling et. al. 2019). Several indicators have been
246 applied to assess the community resilience under each element of resilience are shown in Table 5.



247

Table 5 Framework of evaluating resilience (Mayunga 2007)

248 Hurricane Ike made a direct hit in Galveston but failed to produce any significant impact on its employment.
249 A possible explanation for this is that while Galveston County is highly susceptible to hurricanes and
250 tropical storm-force winds, it has experienced several hurricanes in the past and may have adapted
251 accordingly (e.g. Hurricane Alicia in 1983, Hurricane Allison and Hurricane Jerry in 1989). Thanks to
252 advanced weather monitoring systems, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) predicted correctly that
253 Hurricane Ike would hit the Galveston (FEMA 2008). This triggered a mandatory evacuation for Brazoria
254 (located to the south of Galveston County) and Galveston Counties. Residents who followed the order took
255 necessary steps to protect themselves, their families and properties. As a result, residents in these two
256 counties by and large were better prepared for Hurricane Ike than those living in other counties.
257 Harris County, the biggest county within Houston MSA, has a highly diversified economy. Cutting edge
258 technologies allow the energy industry to continue to power the Houston region's growth, while research
259 and development breakthroughs regularly occur at the world's largest medical complex - The Texas
260 Medical Center – which adds to regional prosperity. Besides, it has a growing population represented by all
261 major racial/ethnic groups. Harris County's well-developed financial infrastructure, skilled workforce,
262 good labor relations and diverse population attracts many international companies. All of these factors in
263 turn could be responsible for raising its capability to resist external shocks like Hurricane Ike and recover
264 more quickly in the aftermath.
265 In Fort Bend County, tropical storm wind force lasted for approximately 14 hours, causing 67% of its
266 residents to lose electricity. And 25% still didn't have electricity after one week (Office of Emergency
267 Management 2009). Hurricane Ike also wreaked havoc to traffic signals in the county and created serious
268 problems with its transportation infrastructure. Heavy rainfall caused severe flooding in Sugar Land, a city
269 within Fort Bend County. The deficiencies in natural capital and human capital elements had made Fort
270 Bend more susceptible to hurricane.
271 Unlike Harris County, Chambers County is very rural and a population of just over 26,000. Hurricane Ike
272 damaged its utilities and critical infrastructures, including power lines, substations, and water and sewer
273 plants. The estimated loss was \$12.1 billion (TEES 2009). At the same time, the storm disrupted many of
274 its economic engines, including the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), the ports and waterways,
275 agricultural and natural resources, and the tourist industries (USHUD 2009). The University of Texas
276 Medical Branch (UTMB) at Galveston recorded an employment decline during this time, largely due to the
277 effects of Hurricane Ike, which damaged several buildings.
278 According to Abel et al. (2006), the ability to self-organize is the foundation of resilience. A need exists for
279 local systems to be interconnected and connected to a larger, national system in order to deal with
280 disturbances. It is also important that these local networks maintain self-reliance, or the ability to subsist
281 without the larger system (Baker and Refsgaard 2007). This can be accomplished through establishing trust
282 among the population through networks and institutions, their leaders, and the information disseminated to
283 the community (Nkhata et al. 2008, Longstaff and Yang 2008). Collaboration among networks can greatly



284 improve resilience of a community. The management method frequently taken by the New Orleans
285 government was a command and control approach that targeted a specific variable and reduced resilience
286 by ignoring other parts of the system (Gunderson 2009).
287 Lastly, it's worth noting that the hurricane's impact doesn't permeate all elements of a community on an
288 equal basis. Previous analysis of the same two hurricanes on building permits (Cui, Liang and Ewing 2015)
289 reveals that significant temporary impact was evident in Orleans, Chambers, Fort Bend, Harris, Liberty and
290 Montgomery while significant permanent impact was evident only in St. Charles. We suggest that three
291 counties - Orleans, Chambers, Fort Bend - were least resilient among their peers and suffered the most
292 during these two hurricanes.

293 **5. Concluding Remarks and Future Research**

294 The results from this empirical study illustrate the impact of hurricanes on local employment. An
295 interesting finding is that, regardless of storm, the effects are limited to either being temporary or
296 permanent in nature. In the temporary impact case, the level of employment is lowered following a
297 hurricane landfall but quickly recovers to the pre-storm norm. In contrast, the permanent impact shifts the
298 mean value of the time series data and persists for a longer period of time. The results may be explained
299 through five forms of capital used to evaluate the resilience of an affected community. The comparison
300 among communities identifies strengths and weakness in these various forms of capital and their
301 contribution to recovery. Understanding the empirical results in the context of social, economic, human,
302 physical and natural capital provides local officials with insight and possible actions to ensure the outcomes
303 can be significantly improved.

304 Hurricane Harvey highlights the idea that people are a critical link in the effort to build community
305 resilience (Savio 2018). Business owners need to form a recovery plan in which several aspects of human
306 capital are considered. For example, could employees continue working safely during recovery? Can they
307 work remotely? Are they trained in disaster preparedness? For businesses relying on local customers, will
308 they be able to access goods and services?

309 Future work in this area of study should target two main unresolved issues. The first one is to examine
310 employment across different demographic groups stratified by income, age, race, etc. at the local scale,
311 which is critical for planning, mitigation and recovery from hurricanes. The goal is to identify the
312 distributional and disproportionate impacts of hurricanes in various sub-populations so that policies and
313 programs could be tailored for their specific needs. The second issue is to improve our understanding of
314 fundamental factors and underlying processes of disaster recovery. To that end, we need to extend the
315 analysis to other socioeconomic settings. For example, a cross-country panel data set can be used to
316 analyze critical drivers of community resilience in developed and developing countries.



317 The methodology presented in this paper could be considered as an entry point to addressing the complex
318 problems related to disaster resilience. Focused, limited-scope empirical studies like ours play a major role
319 in bridging the knowledge gaps and catalyzing innovations.
320

321 **Author Contribution**

322 Yuepeng Cui are responsible for model development, calculation, plot figures and writing. Daan Liang are
323 responsible for data specification part and revising the manuscript. Bradley Ewing are responsible for
324 giving guidance about model development, result discussion and conclusion.

325 **Data availability**

326 The data are publicly accessible, the description of the data are present in the Data Specification section.

327 **Competing interests**

328 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

329 **Acknowledgement**

330 This material is partially based upon work in part supported by the National Science Foundation
331 under Grants CMMI-1000251 and CMMI-1131392. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
332 recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
333 views of the National Science Foundation.

334 **References**

- 335 [1] Adger, W.N. Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters. *Science* 309 (5737):1036-1039, 2005
336 [2] Berg, R. Hurricane Ike Tropical Cyclone Report. National Hurricane, January 23, 2009
337 [3] Center U.S. Census Bureau. National population datasets: Entire data set. U.S. Census Bureau,
338 Population Division, Washington, D.C.,2007
339 [4] Borie, M., Pelling, M., Ziervogel, G. and Hyams, K. Mapping narratives of urban resilience in the global
340 south. *Global Environmental Change*, 54: 203-213, 2019
341 [5] Byron, K. and Peterson, S. The impact of a large-scale traumatic event on individual and organizational
342 outcomes: exploring employee and company reactions to September 11, 2001. *Journal of Organizational*
343 *Behavior*. 23(8): 895-910, 2002
344 [6] Clark, A.C. The vision Hurricane IKE. Houston-Galveston Area Council Transportation Department,
345 2008



- 346 [7] Chow, E., and Elkind, J. Hurricane Katrina and US Energy Security. *Global Politics and Strategy*, 7(4):
347 145-160, 2005
- 348 [8] Comfort, L. K., and Haase, T. W. The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Infrastructure.
349 *Public Works Management Policy*, 10(4): 328-343, 2006
- 350 [9] Cui, Y.P., Liang, D. and Ewing, B.T. Empirical Analysis of Building Permits in Response to Hurricane
351 Landfalls. *Natural Hazards Review*. 16(4):04015009, 2015
- 352 [10] Cutter, S.L., Barnes, L. Berry, M., Burton, C., Evans, E., Tate, E. and Webb J. A place-based model for
353 understanding community resilience to natural disasters. *Global Environmental Change*, 18(4):598-606,
354 2008
- 355 [11] Ewing, B. T., Kruse, J. and Thompson, M. Employment Dynamics and the Nashville Tornado.”
356 *Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy*, 34: 47–60, 2004
- 357 [12] Ewing, B. T., Kruse, J., and Thompson, M. Empirical Examination of the Corpus Christi
358 Unemployment Rate and Hurricane Bret. *Natural Hazards Review*, 6: 191–196, 2005a
- 359 [13] Ewing, B. T., Kruse, J. and Thompson, M. Transmission of Employment Shocks before and after the
360 Oklahoma City Tornado. *Environmental Hazards*, 6: 181–188, 2005b
- 361 [14] Ewing, B. T., Kruse, J., and Thompson, M. Twister! Employment Responses to the 3 May 1999
362 Oklahoma City Tornado. *Applied Economics*, 41: 691–702, 2009
- 363 [15] Ewing, B. T. and Kruse, J. The Impact of Project Impact on the Wilmington, North Carolina Labor
364 Market. *Public Finance Review*, 30: 296–309, 2002
- 365 [16] Foster, K. A. A case study approach to understanding regional resilience. A working paper for
366 building resilience network. Institute of urban regional development. University of California, 2006
- 367 [17] Hallegatte, S, Vogt, S.A., Bangalore, M. and Rozenberg, J. Building the Resilience of the Poor in the
368 Face of Natural Disasters. *Climate Change and Development Series*. Online access:
369 [http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/512241480487839624/pdf/110618-PUB-Box396333B-](http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/512241480487839624/pdf/110618-PUB-Box396333B-PUBLIC-PUBDATE-11-24-16-UNIT-ITSKI.pdf)
370 [PUBLIC-PUBDATE-11-24-16-UNIT-ITSKI.pdf](http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/512241480487839624/pdf/110618-PUB-Box396333B-PUBLIC-PUBDATE-11-24-16-UNIT-ITSKI.pdf), 2017
- 371 [18] Kaisera, M. J., Yua, Y., and Jablonowski, C. J. Modeling Lost Production from Destroyed Platforms in
372 the 2004–2005 Gulf of Mexico Hurricane Seasons. *Energy*, 34(9): 1156–1171, 2009
- 373 [19] Kroll, C.A., Landis, J.D., Shen, Q. and Stryker, S. Economic impacts of the Loma Prieto earthquake: a
374 focus on small business. Transportation Center, University of California, Berkeley, CA, 1991.
- 375 [20] Mayunga, J.S. Understanding and Applying the Concept of Community Disaster Resilience: A
376 Capital-Based Approach, draft working paper prepared for the summer academy, Mega-cities as Hotspots
377 of Risk: Social Vulnerability and Resilience Building, Munich, Germany, 22–28 July, 2007
- 378 [21] MelDe, S., McKenzie, D. and Woodruff, C. Enterprise Recovery Following Natural Disasters. *The*
379 *Economic Journal*. 122(3):64-91, 2011
- 380 [22] Murphy, V. Fixing New Orleans thin grey line. *BBC News*. October 4, 2005. Retrieved on 2006-06-
381 05.
- 382 [23] Savio, K. Looking Back at the Big Flood: Time to Examine Your Human Supply Chain. online access:
383 <https://www.riskmanagementmonitor.com/tag/hurricane-harvey/>, 2018
- 384 [24] Stevenson, J. R., Emrich, C.T., Mitchell, J.T. and Cutter, S. L. Using Building Permits to Monitor
385 Disaster Recovery: A Spatial-Temporal Case Study of Coastal Mississippi following Hurricane Katrina.
386 *Cartography and Geographic Information Science*, 37(1): 57-68, 2010
- 387 [25] Tompkins, E. L. Planning for climate change in small islands: Insights from national hurricane



- 388 preparedness in the Cayman Islands. *Global Environmental Change*, 15(2):139-149, 2005
- 389 [26] United States Department of Commerce. Hurricane Katrina Service Assessment Report, 2006
- 390 [27] U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Comprehensive Housing Market Analysis,
391 Houston, Texas. Office of Policy Development and Research, 2009
- 392 [28] Vigdor, J. L. The Katrina Effect: Was There a Bright Side to the Evacuation of Greater New Orleans?
393 The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Advances, 7(1): Article 64. Available at:
394 <http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art64.>, 2007
- 395 [29] Voogd, H. Disaster Prevention in Urban Environments. *European Journal of Spatial Development*,
396 2004
- 397 [30] Walker, B.H., Anderies, J.M., Kinzig, A.P. and Ryan, P. Exploring resilience in social- ecological
398 systems through comparative studies and theory development: Introduction to the special issue. *Ecology*
399 *and Society*, 11(1), 12, 2006
- 400 [31] Young, I. M.: Post volcano reconstruction and rehabilitation – a case study. Proceedings of the
401 Second International Conference on Post-disaster Reconstruction: Planning for Reconstruction, 22-23 April,
402 Coventry University, Coventry, UK, 2004
- 403 [32] Zhang, D. L., and Wang, X. Dependence of hurricane intensity and structure on vertical resolution and
404 time-step size. *Advances in Atmospheric Sciences*, 20(5): 711-725, 2003
- 405
- 406
- 407
- 408
- 409
- 410
- 411
- 412
- 413
- 414
- 415
- 416
- 417
- 418
- 419
- 420
- 421
- 422
- 423
- 424
- 425
- 426



427

Table 1: Historical hurricane tracks for Hurricanes Ike (2008) and Katrina (2005)

Hurricane Katrina				
Date/Time	Longitude	Latitude	Wind Speed(kt)	Pressure(mb)
26/1800	24.9	82.6	85	968
27/1200	24.4	84.7	100	942
28/1200	25.7	87.7	145	909
29/0600	28.2	89.6	125	913
Hurricane Ike				
10/1800	24.2	85.8	85	958
12/1800	27.5	93.2	95	954
13/1200	30.3	95.2	85	959
14/1200	37.6	91	40	987

428

429

Table 2: ARIMA model selection

Hurricane Name	County	ARIMA Model	Adjusted R-Square	F-statistic
Hurricane Katrina	Orleans	(0,1,3)	0.672650	28.05442
	St. Charles	(1,1,3)	0.548294	18.19573
	Brazoria	(2,1,3)	0.302821	11.41402
	Chambers	(2,1,3)	0.362174	12.12940
Hurricane Ike	Fort Bend	(0,1,2)	0.534298	12.91547
	Galveston	(2,1,2)	0.428823	15.30493
	Harris	(1,1,2)	0.478316	28.94065

430

431

Table 3: Results of temporary impact for employment

Hurricane	County	Temporary		Adjusted R-square	F-statistic
		P-value	Beta		
Hurricane Katrina	Orleans	0.8609	0.005476	0.521029	47.76391
	St. Charles	0.7781	-0.003473	0.274538	7.856402
Hurricane Ike	Brazoria	0.3020	-0.001221	0.416745	31.35297
	Chambers	0.0000**	-0.081789**	0.342465	15.52769
	Fort Bend	0.0387**	-0.043339**	0.350011	19.28911
	Galveston	0.65491	-0.217338	0.318773	18.22978
	Harris	0.18665	0.001188	0.256785	9.798675

432

433

Table 4: Results of permanent impact for employment

Hurricane	County	Permanent		Adjusted R-square	F-statistic
		P-value	Beta		
Hurricane Katrina	Orleans	0.0000**	-0.08653**	0.5692541	30.89562
	St. Charles	0.2882	-0.003649	0.387652	10.76492
Hurricane Ike	Brazoria	0.3020	-0.001221	0.386158	19.22739
	Chambers	0.3942	-0.003558	0.257711	10.99645
	Fort Bend	0.1407	-0.002233	0.278219	15.99100
	Galveston	0.9467	-0.003265	0.378517	19.06807
	Harris	0.2271	-0.057741	0.339228	20.68832

434

435

436




437

Table 5: Framework of evaluating resilience (Mayunga 2007)

Element of resilience	Indicator of resilience	Explain
Social Capital	Trust, Norms and Networks	Facilities coordination and cooperation Facilities access to resources.
Economic Capital	Income, savings and investment	Reduces poverty Increases capacity e.g. insurance speeds recovery process
Human Capital	Education, Health Skills Knowledge/Information	Increase knowledge and skill to understand community risks Increase ability to develop and implement risk reduction strategy
Physical Capital	Housing, Public facilities, business/industry	Communication and transportation evacuation
Natural Capital	Resources stocks, land and water ecosystem	Sustains all forms of life Increase protection to storms and floods Protects the environment

438


439



440

Figure 1: Monthly employment time series in Orleans County before and after Hurricane Katrina

442




443




444
445

Figure 2: Monthly employment time series in St. Charles County before and after Hurricane Katrina




446



447

Figure 3: Monthly employment time series in five counties within Houston MSA before and after Hurricane Ike


448
449



450

451

Figure 4: Temporary effects of Hurricane Ike in Chambers County



452

453

Figure 5: Permanent effects of Hurricane Katrina in Orleans Parish County