



35 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters–CRED (2015). Sivakumar et al., (2005) mentioned that extreme climatic
36 events have increased both in frequency and intensity, making it more difficult for farmers to maintain their crop productions
37 (Cai et al., 2014; Isch, 2011). These climatic phenomena, which are further accentuated by climate change, are key drivers of
38 economic losses that hit especially Tropic’s small rice farmers (Harvey et al., 2014), and are one of the main reasons behind
39 rice cropping area loss in Ecuador (Eymond and Santos, 2013; Poveda and Andrade, 2013). For instance, the 2012-winter’s
40 impact census over agriculture (MAGAP, 2012), showed that from 140,000 cultivated hectares analysed, 56,562 ha were
41 entirely destroyed by flood and 24,103 ha were partially damaged by the same event. In this context, risk management
42 mechanisms, such as agricultural insurance, can importantly contribute to reduce rice producers’ vulnerability and to protect
43 them against the economic losses driven by climatic extremes.

44 Agricultural insurance is an effective tool for transferring production risk from farmers to other entities. It allows farmers to
45 meet their credit obligations and minimize the effect of extreme climatic events on their revenue (Xu and Liao, 2014).
46 Moreover, agricultural insurance contributes to maintain farmers in the agricultural business, improve their resilience and
47 preserve food security (Bullock et al., 2017; Patt et al., 2009). In pursuit of these goals, Ecuador started to implement in 2010
48 conventional insurance through the AgroSeguro system that includes a 60% subsidy of insurance’s premium cost (MAG,
49 2018). This is a multi-peril insurance system that covers some crops, including rice, requiring an in situ verification in case of
50 disaster occurrence. Under the coverage of this insurance, in case of a generalized extreme event, the insurance company’s in
51 situ verification capacity could be exceeded, delaying payouts, and some remote regions could be uncovered. Moreover,
52 (Medina, 2017) suggest that conventional insurance in Ecuador may be inefficient due to asymmetric information that may
53 increase adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore, even if current AgroSeguro insurance system has importantly
54 supported farmers along the last decade, it is important for the Ecuadorian Government to step forward to the next level in
55 agricultural insurance field to expand the insurance coverage and reduce transaction costs resulting in lower premium prices
56 and a more efficient system.

57 Among different types of agricultural insurance schemes, index-based insurance (IBI) is a promising tool to provide coverage
58 to large agricultural areas around the world (Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2013), based on the use of a highly losses-correlated
59 index that avoids the need for field losses verification (Carter et al., 2011). The use of such an index as trigger for indemnity
60 payments reduces significantly the costs for the insurance company in relation to losses verification and payment procedure,
61 and reduces fraud, moral hazard and adverse selection (Barnett and Mahul, 2007; de Leeuw et al., 2014) that are frequent
62 drawbacks of conventional insurance. IBI has been underlined as a feasible and efficient risk management tool (Jensen and
63 Barrett, 2017; Jensen et al., 2018; Takahashi et al., 2016), and several studies demonstrated its successful implementation
64 using weather and vegetation index among small and medium farmers in developing countries (Mcintosh et al., 2013; Mude
65 et al., 2009, among others) that can benefit from lower insurance premiums due to lower implementation costs. In this regard,
66 IBI represents an alternative to conventional insurance in Ecuador, which could be applied by insurance companies and the
67 Government to satisfy the risk management needs of rice producers.

68 However, the technical, economic and administrative hurdles are significant. A major problem that may arise in the
69 implementation of the IBI is the lack of proper correlation between the index and the losses experienced by farmers in the
70 index influence area (IIA), which is the area for which a defined index is representative (Elabed et al., 2013). This problem,
71 known as basis risk, occurs when some farmers from the pool of insured agents do not receive any compensation even
72 experimenting losses, and some others not being affected are indemnified (Clarke, 2016; Hellmuth et al., 2009). To avoid this,
73 IBI can only be applied over spatially homogeneous areas because its main principle is based on the use of a single index over
74 the IIA. Nevertheless, these conditions of homogeneity are rarely found because agriculture is practiced in heterogeneous



75 areas. To keep basis risk in non-significant levels, index selection and analysis may be crucial, very especially with respect to
76 the way variability within the IIA could influence index values.

77 Among the indexes used in IBI design, several authors (e.g. Jensen et al., 2018; Rao, 2010) underlined vegetation indexes such
78 as those based on the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), as options that reduce basis risk and provide reasonably
79 accurate loss estimations, and that can significantly profit from recent advances in remote sensing, geographical information
80 systems, and satellite and drone imagery among others. In line with this, in this research we aim to design an IBI based on
81 NDVI for rice crop in Ecuador that covers farmers against drought and flood events, accounting for variability within the IIA.
82 For this, we build upon previous work developed by Arias et al., (2018) for the rice-producing coastal region of Ecuador that
83 identified agro-ecological homogeneous zones (AHZ), based on topographic, soil, and climatic characteristics using principal
84 components and hierarchical cluster analysis. Within that area, in the Babahoyo canton, two AHZs (*f7* and *f15*) were located
85 and their influence over the NDVI in rice cultivation was found significant (Valverde-Arias et al., 2019). For the IBI design,
86 two thresholds in the NDVI values will be defined. The physiologic threshold evidences the occurrence of an extreme climatic
87 event and its impact over rice-crop yield. While, the economic threshold is reached when a moderate climatic event occurs,
88 and its impact over the rice-crop yield is not so deep, letting farmers at least to cover the production costs. For these thresholds,
89 two scenarios are contemplated; the first one considers a differentiated production cost for each AHZ. The second scenario
90 uses the same average production cost for both zones *f7* and *f15*. Then, the damage compensation and the premium cost are
91 calculated for each threshold considering the two scenarios and the AHZs.


92 **2 Materials and methods**

93 This section presents the data and methods followed for the development of an IBI. Starting with a description of the study
94 area location (section 2.1) and data used (section 2.2), section 2.3 explains how we assessed the significance of AHZs impact
95 on NDVI. Then, we estimate the functional relationship between NDVI and rice yield (section 2.4), determine the NDVI
96 thresholds (section 2.5), and we assess risk in each AHZ (section 2.6). Finally, for the design of the IBI contract, in section 2.7
97 we explain first how indemnities are calculated and how the insurance premiums are estimated considering different zones and
98 different coverages.

99 **2.1 Location of study area**

100 Rice production in Ecuador concentrates in the coastal area of the country, very especially in the provinces of Guayas and Los
101 Rios (55% and 37% of rice cropping area respectively during the rainy season). This study focuses on rice cultivation area in
102 the Babahoyo Canton, which is one of the main rice producer areas in Los Rios Province (Fig. 1). 84% of the rural population
103 of Babahoyo is involved in agriculture, being rice the main crop in the region with 46,556 ha that represent 45% of the total
104 cultivated area in this canton (IEE, 2009; MAGAP, 2014). The location of Babahoyo in an extensive plain of the Ecuadorian
105 coastal region makes it very vulnerable to flood, and as Valverde-Arias et al., (2018) mentioned in their study this canton is
106 also susceptible to droughts. Therefore, given the importance of rice production in the region's economy and its vulnerability
107 to hazardous climatic events, designing and implementing an IBI that accounts for variability within the area and that provides
108 accurate premium prices and indemnities may importantly contribute to rice producers' welfare and stability.

109




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111 **Figure 1: (A) Babahoyo canton with rice crop coverage, (B) location of Babahoyo canton in Ecuador, and (C) location of Ecuador**
112 **in South America**

113 2.2 Cartographic Data

114 2.2.1 Agro-ecological Homogeneous zones map

115 In this research we build on the AHZ map generated for the Ecuadorian Coastal region in the study of Arias et al., (2018) that
116 includes our study area (Babahoyo canton). In this map, portions of land with similar agro-ecological characteristics were
117 grouped in homogeneous zones (AHZs) using a statistical method of principal component analysis and a hierarchical cluster
118 analysis. According to the map, there are eleven AHZs in Babahoyo, from which seven include rice crop cultivation land. Two
119 of these seven AHZ, *f7* and *f15*, were selected for the study as they account for more than 90% of the total rice-cultivated area
120 in Babahoyo (Valverde-Arias et al., 2019) (see Fig. 2).



121

122 **Figure 2: Agro-ecological homogeneous zones *f7* and *f15* over rice cultivation area with yield observations in Babahoyo canton**



123 **2.2.2 Data from satellite imagery**

124 Satellite imagery data were obtained from the MODIS MOD13Q1V6 product, which has the following characteristics
125 (NASA LP DAAC, 2015), see Table 1.

126 **Table 1.** Technical characteristics of MODIS imagery set

Characteristic	Description
Temporal Granularity	16-day
Temporal Extent	2001-2017
Spatial Extent	Ecuador
Coordinate System	Projected to Universal Transverse Mercator
Datum	WGS 1984 Zone 17 S
File Format	HDF-EOS
Geographic Dimensions	1200 km x 1200 km
Number of Science Dataset (SDS) Layers	12
Rows/Columns	4800 rows x 4800 cols
Pixel Size	250 m

127 Adapted from (Didan, 2015)

128 The imagery covers the rice cycle during the rainy season (January to May). There is one image for each 16-day period from
129 2001 to 2017, which makes 170 images in total (17 years x 5 months x two per month). The rice crop cycle in Ecuador takes
130 120 days. The sowing date starts around January 15th, and sometimes it is delayed depending on the onset of the precipitations.

131 The downloaded imagery have a hierarchical data format (HDF), which is a multilayer file (twelve layers) (Didan, 2015);
132 however, we used only the layer Hdf:0 that corresponds to NDVI values.

133 **2.3 Statistical analysis**

134 NDVI values over rice along its crop cycle were analysed for the period 2001 to 2017. NDVI_ave is the average of all NDVI
135 measures of rice crop cycle (January to May) for each observation point. We sampled 30% of the total pixels of rice crop in
136 Babahoyo canton resulting in 31,756 observations: 13,498 in AHZ_{f7} and 18,258 in AHZ_{f15}.

137 Descriptive statistics were applied to the NDVI_ave data set, including the normality test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov, which is
138 recommended for more than 50 observations (Razali and Wah, 2011). If the data set fits a normal distribution, an analysis of
139 variance ANOVA will be applied for comparing means of two variability factors (zones and years). Otherwise, we will
140 determine which distribution this data set fits, and the test of Kruskal-Wallis for comparing median of AHZs and years will be
141 used. If significant differences are found among years, the Least Significance Difference (LSD) multiple rank test for means
142 (Williams and Abdi, 2010) or the Bonferroni test for medians will be applied. Years that are not significantly different will be
143 grouped into five categories based on NDVI_ave values: very low, low, normal, high, and very high years.

144 **2.4 Rice-Yield estimation through NDVI_ave**

145 According to Huang et al., (2013) remote sensing products can be used for generating yield estimation models that do not
146 require variables, as crop management or fertilizer applications. Robust results are obtained in rice-yield prediction even at
147 province level. Quarmbly et al., (1993) mentioned that rice and maize yields could be estimated accurately by a simple linear
148 regression between NDVI and yield; in addition, Son et al., (2014) suggested that the use of multi-temporal NDVI data for
149 estimating rice-yield in large scale should be a possible and accurate alternative. In this research, we used the normal
150 distribution Eq. (1) for estimating rice yield from NDVI_ave values, quantifying in this way the economic losses in rice



151 cultivation caused by extreme climatic events. The estimation of rice yield was based on the relationship with the NDVI_ave
152 and the crop state.

$$153 \quad Y = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{(X-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}} \quad (1)$$

154 Where:

155 σ = Standard deviation

156 σ^2 = Variance

157 X = Independent variable (NDVI_ave)

158 Y = Dependent variable (estimated rice yield)

159 μ = Arithmetical Mean of NDVI_ave in years 2016 and 2017

160 The General Coordination of the National Information System (CGSIN-acronym in Spanish-) of Ecuadorian Agricultural and
161 Livestock Ministry (MAG) has conducted a rice-yield estimation project since 2014 when it began sampling yields across
162 mapped rice areas. Thus, 369 georeferenced rice -yield observations (t/ha) were available for 2014-2017 rainfed cycles
163 (January to May) in the study area over AHZs *f7* and *f15* (see, Fig. 2). Therefore, we used these rice yield observations with
164 their corresponding spatial and temporal NDVI_ave values for obtaining the parameters included in Eq. (1) (Valverde-Arias
165 et al., 2019). The robustness of this model was evaluated through the RMSE (%) and R-squared coefficient.

166 2.5 Thresholds determination

167 There are three different levels of rice crop loss impacts, caused by drought and flood, that should be evaluated based on the
168 vegetation index selected. In the first one, catastrophic impact, the crop is acutely affected and the farmers cannot recover any
169 part of their investment. In the second level, physiological impact, the crops are strongly affected but farmers can recover part
170 of their investment. Finally, economic impact, the crop loss impact still allows farmers to recover their investment to break-
171 even or have a null profit. To differentiate in these three levels two NDVI_ave thresholds are needed.

172 According to LSD and Bonferroni multiple range tests, years with the lowest NDVI_ave means and medians are selected as
173 the more representative of physiological threshold. Then, we contrast if these years have been actually affected by flood or
174 drought through the climatic application of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2018). Finally, we
175 verified that these thresholds correspond to the reality comparing the estimated yield obtained using the NDVI_ave thresholds
176 with the expected yields in each AHZ and *cantonal* (at Babahoyo canton level) in normal years.

177 For the economic threshold, we set an NDVI_ave value that let farmers cover at least their production cost. Thus, we considered
178 the sale price at farm gate for a tonne of rice and the production cost in two scenarios: scenario 1 (when we consider
179 differentiated production cost for AHZs *f7* and *f15*) and scenario 2 (non-differentiated production cost for AHZs).

180 According to CGSIN, there are officially three different rice-crop production systems in Ecuador for rainfed agriculture and
181 two for irrigated agriculture in 2017. Each of them has different production costs as shown in Table 2, and they depend on the
182 level of farm modernization and whether they are rainfed or irrigated.

183

184



185

Table 2. Official production cost of different rice-production systems in Ecuador in 2017

Rice cultivation production cost (USD/ha)				
Rainfed production system			Irrigated production system	
Non-technical	Semi-technical	Technical	Semi-technical	Technical
1022.0	1629.7	1955.9	1631.0	1997.4

186

Source: MAG, (2017)

187 Since we assessed rice production during rainy season (January-May), irrigation is not required in normal conditions. For this
 188 reason, we use production costs of rainfed agro-systems. Among rainfed production systems, we chose the non-technical and
 189 semi-technical systems, which are more exposed to suffer the impacts of extreme climatic events, and therefore are the ones
 190 that should adopt insurance. We assigned to $f7$ the production cost of a non-technical production system (1022 USD/ha) and
 191 for $f15$ the cost of semi-technical production system (1629 USD/ha) for the scenario one (see Table 2), as according to
 192 Valverde-Arias et al. (2019) $f15$ has an expected yield higher than $f7$'s yield in regular years that could be explained by $f15$'s
 193 better soil conditions and to a more technical production system than in $f7$. Then, when we do not consider AHZs i.e., at
 194 *cantonal* level, we used a weighted average production cost of these two systems (1259 USD/ha). In scenario two, i.e. when
 195 similar costs are assumed for both AHZ, we used the weighted average (1259 USD/ha) for all the cases ($f7$, $f15$, and *cantonal*).

196 2.6 Risk assessment in AHZs

197 Once, we found the distribution that fits our data for each AHZ and *cantonal*, we simulated through these distributions a
 198 determined number of NDVI_ave values. Then, we compared the frequency of observed NDVI_ave values with the estimated
 199 ones. The basis risk of the estimation was evaluated through the Adjusted R-squared coefficient (Vedenov and Barnett, 2004).

200 Lastly, we calculated the proportion of positive events, that is, the number of events equal or under each threshold (physiologic
 201 and economic) for each estimated distribution ($f7$, $f15$ and *cantonal*). Finally, we tested whether these proportions of $f7$ and
 202 $f15$ are significantly different from each other or not. This analysis was performed through the Z- test of two independent
 203 proportions. It consists in contrasting if these two proportions which came from two different populations are equal (Pardo et
 204 al., 1998; Polasek, 2013).

205 1. Hypothesis:

206 $H_0: p_1 = p_2; H_1: p_1 \neq p_2$

207 2. Postulation: the studied variable (NDVI_ave) is dichotomous (below/equal or above the threshold) in these two
 208 populations ($f7$ and $f15$). From these two populations, two random samples were extracted independently with n_1 and
 209 n_2 sizes. These samples had p_1 and p_2 success probability, which are constant in each extraction. Positive events
 210 occur when the observation is equal or below the threshold.

211 3. Contrast statistics:

212 Sample $f7$: n_1, P_1 ; where n_1 = population of $f7$ and P_1 = ratio of positive events

213 Sample $f15$: n_2, P_2 ; where n_2 = population of $f15$ and P_2 = ratio of positive events

214

215
$$P = \frac{n_1 P_1 + n_2 P_2}{n_1 + n_2} \quad (2)$$

216

217
$$Z = \frac{P_1 - P_2}{\sqrt{P(1-P)\left(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2}\right)}} \quad (3)$$

218

219 4. Critical ratio



220

221 Bilateral:

222
$$Z \leq \alpha/2Z$$

223
$$Z \geq 1-\alpha/2Z$$

224 5. Decision.- Reject H_0 if contrast statistics falls in critical rate or $p \leq \alpha$

225 **2.7 Insurance contract design**

226 **2.7.1 Indemnity calculation**

227 The indemnity is the amount of money that an insured individual receives when a covered hazard occurs. In this case, we have
228 two insurance policies options. The first one is the working capital, where the insured amount corresponds to the money
229 necessary for recovering the investment (production cost) that a farmer has spent. The second one is the profit (gross margin),
230 where the insured amount is the money that a farmer would obtain selling his production after covering his production cost in
231 a normal year.

232 In other words, for the first option the compensation will cover the yield reduction between the economic and physiologic
233 threshold. In the second case, the compensation will cover the difference between the expected yield in a normal year and the
234 yield obtained at the economic threshold.

235 Thus, the indemnity calculation follows the next equation (Maestro et al., 2016):

236
$$I_{sz} = Y_z \times P - Pc_{sz} \tag{4}$$

237 Where:

238 I_{sz} is the net income expected per hectare (USD/ha) in a normal year, differentiated by s scenario (it could be 1 or 2), and z
239 zone ($f7$, $f15$ or *cantonal*).

240 Y_z is the expected yield (tones/ha), in normal years for z zone.

241 P is the price of a ton of rice at farm (USD/t).

242 Pc_{sz} is the production cost per hectare of rice cultivation (USD/ha) , differentiated by s scenario (it could be 1 or 2), and z
243 zone ($f7$, $f15$ or *cantonal*).

244 Y_z is obtained applying Eq. (1), P was calculated from rice price monthly variation along the last two years. This value is
245 assumed to be constant (371 USD/t) for both AHZs and *cantonal*, and for scenario 1 or 2.

246 To estimate Pc_{sz} , we evaluated two scenarios. Scenario 1, with production costs differentiated for each z zone ($f7$, $f15$ or
247 *cantonal*); and scenario 2, with the same production costs for all z zones ($f7$, $f15$ or *cantonal*).

248 **2.7.2 Premium determination**

249 The commercial or loaded premium cost CP_{sc} is equal to the net premium multiplied by a factor that covers the insurance
250 company profit and loading cost. The net premium or risk premium NP_{sc} has to cover the expected compensations that an
251 insurance company would have to pay during the analysed period. The net premium is calculated as a percentage of I_{sz} . This
252 percentage corresponds to the probability that the insurance company have to compensate I_{sz} in a period of time (Jasiulewicz,
253 2001; van de Ven et al., 2000). It was expected that the probability of occurrence is different for each AHZ ($f7$ and $f15$). It is



254 also different when the NDVI_ave measure is made at *cantonal level*. Thus, we calculated differentiated premium rates for
 255 each one of these cases.

$$256 \quad NP_{sz} = I_{sz} \times Pr_{sz} \quad (6)$$

$$257 \quad CP_{sz} = NP_{sz}(1 + (\beta_1 + \beta_2)) \quad (7)$$

258 Where:

259 NP_{sz} is net premium rate (USD/ha) for scenario s (scenario 1 or 2) and z zone ($f7, f15$ and *cantonal*).

260 CP_{sz} is commercial premium rate (USD/ha) for scenario s (scenario 1 or 2) and z zone ($f7, f15$ and *cantonal*).

261 Pr_{sz} is the probability of sinister occurrence for s scenario (scenario 1 or 2) and z zone ($f7, f15$ and *cantonal*).

262 β_1 is the insurance company profit (20% of NP_{sz}).

263 β_2 is the operative cost of the insurance plus taxes (5% of NP_{sz}).

264 The commercial premium value CP_{sz} in index-based insurance is generally subsidized by the government in around 60% to
 265 small farmers in developing countries (Peter Höppe, 2007; Ricome et al., 2017).

266 3 Results and discussion

267 3.1 Statistical analysis

268 From descriptive statistical analysis, the kurtosis (0.56) and a skewness (-0.78) indicated that the data set of NDVI_ave fits a
 269 normal distribution; however, the Lilliefors (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) normality test showed: $D = 0.080207$ and a p-value $< 2.2e^{-16}$
 270 lower than 0.05; then we rejected the null hypothesis because the data set does not come from a normal distribution. We
 271 have found that our data fits a Generalized-minimum extreme value (GEVmin) distribution (Kotz and Nadarajah, 2000) for
 272 the *cantonal* data set and for the two AHZs ($f7$ and $f15$) based on χ^2 statistics (Table 3).

273 **Table 3. Parameters of Generalized-minimum extreme value (GEVmin) distribution for each AHZ and cantonal and distribution**
 274 **adjustment statistic of maximum likelihood**

	Mode	Scale	n	k	F.D. (n-1)x(k-1)	Chi-squared table	Chi-squared calculated
<i>Cantonal</i>	0.52	0.09	100	11	990	1064.31	9.42
$f7$	0.51	0.11	100	11	990	1064.31	2.75
$f15$	0.53	0.08	100	10	891	961.55	2.16

275 Because the data sets did not fit normal distributions, we used a non-parametric test to determine if NDVI_ave medians in
 276 zones $f7$ and $f15$ are significantly different. The Kruskal-Wallis test for these zones ($\chi^2 = 345.48$, F.D. = 1, p-value $< 2.2e^{-16}$)
 277 shows us that the null hypothesis of $f7$ and $f15$ being equal can be rejected because the p-value is lower than 0.05. The same
 278 test mentioned before shows us that years are also significant different ($\chi^2 = 7507.4$, F.D. = 16, p-value $< 2.2e^{-16}$ is also lower
 279 than 0.05). Five categories in years are establish when LSD (Mean) and Bonferroni (Median) test are applied on NDVI_ave
 280 values (see Table 4).

281




282 **Table 4. Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) test for comparing means, and Bonferroni test for comparing medians, for**
 283 **years**

Year	Mean (NDVI_ave)	Year	Median (NDVI_ave)	Category
2008	0.39	2008	0.39	<i>Very low</i> (Years affected by extreme climatic events)
2012	0.40	2013	0.42	
2013	0.40	2016	0.43	
2016	0.40	2012	0.43	
2017	0.42	2017	0.44	<i>Low</i> (Years affected by moderate climatic events)
2014	0.42	2014	0.45	
2015	0.45	2010	0.47	
2010	0.46	2015	0.48	
2002	0.48	2011	0.48	<i>Normal</i> (Normal years)
2005	0.49	2005	0.49	
2011	0.49	2002	0.49	
2001	0.51	2001	0.52	<i>High</i> (Years with good climatic conditions)
2009	0.51	2009	0.52	
2007	0.52	2007	0.52	
2003	0.54	2004	0.54	<i>Very High</i> (Years with very good climatic conditions)
2004	0.55	2003	0.55	
2006	0.55	2006	0.56	

284 **3.2 Rice yield estimation**

285 The observed rice yield was plotted versus NDVI_ave in a rice crop cycle. A normal accumulative curve was adjusted, see Eq.
 286 (1) in Fig. 3 A, to relate both variables; where μ (0.49) is the mean of NDVI_ave measured in yield sampling points of years
 287 2014 through 2017; σ (0.14) is the standard deviation, and X is the NDVI_ave value for which, we want to estimate rice yield
 288 (Y). The RMSE (%) of 3.3 and an R^2 of 0.71 indicate a robust model. This type of curve was selected, instead of a linear
 289 regression, to take into account the high values of the NDVI saturation effect on plant biomass (Gu et al., 2013) and the soil
 290 saturation effect on low NDVI values (Rondeaux et al., 1996). The correlation coefficient of observed versus estimated rice-
 291 yield was high (0.89), showing that NDVI_ave is an adequate indicator for assessing the impact of drought and flood over rice
 292 crop (Fig. 3 B).



293

294 **Figure 3: (A) Scatter plot of observed rice-yield and NDVI_ave, curve of Eq. (1) for estimating yield (Valverde-Arias et al., 2019);**
 295 **and (B) correlation of observed and estimated rice-yield**



296 **3.3 Thresholds determination**

297 Once that the years have been classified in five categories, we could define the different levels of impact or no impact over
 298 rice crop (NDVI_ave), as shown in Table 4. When rice yield is less than 0.5 t/ha (NDVI_ave ≤ 0.26), due to damage in rice
 299 crop by extreme events, the total loss threshold is neither detectable at cantonal level nor at AHZs (*f7* and *f15*) level. Individual
 300 NDVI_ave observations equal or under the total losses' threshold can be found but not as a regional measure of NDVI_ave.
 301 However, in our IBI design the index measure is an average of all observations within a homogeneous zone, being these
 302 cantonal or AHZs (*f7* and *f15*).

303 The physiologic threshold represents the maximum rice-crop damage that can be detected through NDVI_ave at regional scale,
 304 which has been caused by an extreme climatic event. It is fixed (0.4) for both AHZ (*f7* and *f15*) and cantonal (see Table 5).
 305 The years when we reached the physiologic threshold in our data set were 2008, 2012, 2013, and 2016. These years belong to
 306 the “very low category”; and according to climatic application (NOAA, 2018) these years were affected by extreme climatic
 307 events. This application contains and plots historical climatic data. In this case, we analysed the combined precipitation
 308 anomalies. Zero represents no precipitation anomaly, i.e. average precipitation; positive anomalies occur in years that
 309 precipitation is above the average (floods) and negative anomalies when the precipitation is below the average (drought). As
 310 we can see in Fig. 4 A and B, Babahoyo canton presented positive anomalies of precipitation (floods) in 2008 and 2012 and
 311 negative anomalies of precipitation (drought) for 2013 and 2016 (Fig. 4 C and D).

312 **Table 5. Different categories of impact thresholds for scenarios of differentiated and non-differentiated production costs**

	Differentiated production cost (Scenario 1)						Non differentiated production cost (Scenario 2)						Type of Insurance		
	Cantonal		<i>f7</i>		<i>f15</i>		Cantonal		<i>f7</i>		<i>f15</i>		Occurrence verification by	IBI	Conventional
	NDVI_ave	Yield (t/ha)	NDVI_ave	Yield (t/ha)	NDVI_ave	Yield (t/ha)	NDVI_ave	Yield (t/ha)	NDVI_ave	Yield (t/ha)	NDVI_ave	Yield (t/ha)			
Expected Yield	0.51	5.65	0.49	5.11	0.55	6.68	0.51	5.65	0.49	5.11	0.55	6.68	Index	NSC	NSC
Economic Threshold	≤0.43	3.39	≤0.41	2.75	≤0.47	4.39	≤0.43	3.39	≤0.43	3.39	≤0.43	3.39	Index	Profit	NSC
Physiological Threshold	≤0.40	2.65	≤0.40	2.65	≤0.40	2.65	≤0.40	2.65	≤0.40	2.65	≤0.40	2.65	Index/in-situ	Profit	Investment
Total losses	≤0.26	≤0.5	≤0.26	≤0.5	≤0.26	≤0.5	≤0.26	≤0.5	≤0.26	≤0.5	≤0.26	≤0.5	In-situ	No detectable	Investment


313 IBI (index based Insurance); NSC (not susceptible of compensation)

314 On the other hand, the economic threshold depends on economic factors such as sale rice price and production cost. These are
 315 not constant, and must be set regarding the necessary yield for covering the farmer's expenses during the rice cultivation
 316 campaign, as it is shown in Table 5.

317 The economic threshold represents the minimum yield that farmers must reach for covering at least the production cost. It is
 318 higher than physiologic threshold, and it varies according to the scenario. In scenario 1, the economic threshold is different for
 319 each AHZ (*f7* and *f15*); *f7*'s being lower production cost (1022 USD/ha) than that for *f15* (1629 USD/ha). Thus, the economic
 320 threshold of *f7* is 0.41, while for *f15* is 0.47 (see Table 5). The years from our dataset that reached the economic threshold were
 321 2010, 2014, 2015 and 2017. They were impacted by moderate climatic events (flood for 2010 and 2017 and drought for 2014
 322 and 2015) according to NOAA (2018), see Fig. 4 E, F, G and H.

323 For scenario 2, the production cost is a weighted average (1259 USD/ha) both for AHZs (*f7* and *f15*) and cantonal. Therefore,
 324 the economic threshold (0.43) is the same for AHZs and cantonal, see Table 5.

325



326


327
 328

Figure 4: Positive anomalies of precipitation (flood) in (A) year 2008, (B) year 2012, (E) year 2010, (F) year 2017; negative anomalies of precipitation (drought) in (C) year 2013 and (D) year 2016, (G) year 2014 and (H) year 2015. Source: (NOAA, 2018)



329 **3.4 Risk assessment of AHZ and Babahoyo canton**

330 The risk status of *f7* and *f15* were found to differ based on the following results. 25% of events were found under the physiologic
331 threshold for *f7* and 17% for *f15* (see Fig. 5 B, C); and when we do not consider AHZs (*cantonal*) 21% (Fig. 5A). AHZ *f7*'s
332 probability is higher because of its soil conditions (see Table 6). These conditions make the zone more vulnerable to floods
333 due to its very fine texture (>60% clay), flat lands (0-5% slope), very low altitude (1-12m) and proximity with rivers' banks
334 that contribute to very poor drainage of this zone. In the same way, these characteristics could give to *f7* better capacity for
335 long-term water retaining, during a drought. However, when drought is extreme, the *f7*'s soil (Vertisol) gets very dried (Soil
336 Survey Staff, 2014); consequently, it becomes very hard and develops deep cracks. This phenomenon affects physically the
337 crop's roots and hinders considerably the soil tillage (Valverde-Arias et al., 2019).



338

339 **Figure 5: Physiologic threshold (red line) within Generalized-minimum extreme value (GEVmin) distribution of NDVI_ave; (A)**
340 **cantonal, (B) *f7* and (C) *f15* zones**

341

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
Table 6. Soil and climatic characteristics of Agro-ecological homogeneous zones AHZs in Babahoyo Canton

	Zone <i>f7</i>	Zone <i>f15</i>
Slope	0-5%	5-12%
Altitude	1-12m	>12-35
Clay	>50%	35-50%
Effective depth	50-100 cm	>100 cm
pH	5.6-6.5	6.6-7.4
Organic matter	2-4%	2-4%
Temperature	24-25 °C	24-25 °C
Precipitation	500-700 mm	700-900 mm
Soil Classification*	Typic Hapluderts	Vertic Eutrudepts

345

Source: (Valverde-Arias et al., 2019); *According to USDA Soil Taxonomy (Soil Survey Staff, 2014)

346 For economic thresholds, we also found differences between the risk status of AHZs *f7* and *f15*. Furthermore, for scenario 1,
 347 the probability of having events equal or under the economic threshold is higher in *f15* (37%) than that in *f7* (26%) and that in
 348 *cantonal* (29%), as we can see in Fig. 6 A, C and E. The reason for this is that in this scenario, *f15*'s farmers have to cover a
 349 higher production cost (which corresponds to semi-technical production system), and, therefore, they have to reach an
 350 economic threshold also higher (0.47) than that one in the *f7*.



351

352 **Figure 6: Economic threshold (red line) within Generalized-minimum extreme value (GEVmin) distribution of NDVI_ave for**
 353 **differentiated production cost (scenario 1) for: (A) cantonal, and Agro-ecological homogeneous zones (C) *f7* and (E) *f15*; and for**
 354 **non-differentiated production cost (scenario 2) for: (B) cantonal, and Agro-ecological homogeneous zones (D) *f7* and (F) *f15***



355 In scenario 2, the economic threshold is equal (0.43) for *f7*, *f15* and *cantonal*, but the probability to find events under the
 356 threshold is higher in *f7* (32%) than that in *f15* (25%) and that in *cantonal* (29%). Although the economic threshold is the same
 357 for both AHZs (*f7* and *f15*) and at *cantonal* level, in this scenario, the frequency distributions of NDVI_ave were different for
 358 each zone. Consequently, they accumulated different probabilities under the same threshold, as shown in Fig. 6 B, D and F.

359 At this point, we evaluated the Z-test results for determining if the found differences have statistical significance. Based on
 360 the Z-test (see Table 7), the null hypothesis ($H_0: p_1 = p_2$) can be rejected in both scenarios 1 and 2, so we can assert that the
 361 proportion of positive cases (equal or under physiologic and economic thresholds) in *f7* are significantly different from that in
 362 *f15*. For economic threshold in scenario 1 (differentiated production cost), the calculated Z is negative because in this case the
 363 probability in *f15* is higher than in *f7*.

364 **Table 7. Z-test for probability of events susceptible of compensations ESC under physiologic and economic thresholds in Agro-**
 365 **ecological homogeneous zones (*f7* and *f15*) and cantonal**

	Type of threshold	Observations	Positive events	Probability	Critical rate	Z test
Non differentiated production cost/ differentiated production cost	<i>Physiological threshold cantonal</i>	31,756	6669	0.21	$Z \leq z_{0.025} = -1.96$	
	<i>Physiological threshold f7</i>	13,498	3375	0.25	$Z \geq z_{0.975} = 1.96$	18.06
	<i>Physiological threshold f15</i>	18,258	3041	0.17		
Differentiated production cost (scenario 1)	<i>Economic threshold cantonal</i>	31,756	9209	0.29	$Z \leq z_{0.025} = -1.96$	
	<i>Economic threshold f7</i>	13,498	4320	0.32	$Z \geq z_{0.975} = 1.96$	13.59
	<i>Economic threshold f15</i>	18,258	4565	0.25		
Non differentiated production cost (scenario 2)	<i>Economic threshold cantonal</i>	31,756	9209	0.29	$Z \leq z_{0.025} = -1.96$	
	<i>Economic threshold f7</i>	13,498	3510	0.26	$Z \geq z_{0.975} = 1.96$	-21.35
	<i>Economic threshold f15</i>	18,258	6756	0.37		

366

367 As NDVI_ave dataset fits a GEVmin distribution, we used this distribution, with its specific parameters (Mode and Scale,
 368 shown in Table 3) for estimating NDVI_ave density frequencies for *f7*, *f15*, and *cantonal*. With these distributions, we
 369 calculated the positive events under physiological and economic thresholds in scenarios 1 and 2. Then, we estimated the basis
 370 risk of these calculations. In this case, basis risk could arise if the estimated distribution does not fit properly with the
 371 distribution observed from measured data.

372 We have found that the basis risk for this estimation is negligible according to Adjusted R-squared shown in Table 8. Therefore,
 373 we can confidently use these estimations for determining the events proportion that reached the physiologic and economic
 374 thresholds, i.e. the occurrence probability of extreme events that warrant compensations.

375

376

377

378



379 **Table 8. Simulation of NDVI_ave by GEVmin distribution for AHZs and cantonal, and basis risk calculation between observed**
 380 **(O) and estimated (E) frequencies of NDVI_ave**

NDVI_ave Class	Frequency					
	O f7	E f7	O f15	E f15	O Cantonal	E cantonal
0.08	25	204	8	73	330	34
0.16	310	391	171	117	434	482
0.24	758	590	462	357	957	1228
0.32	1215	1098	817	869	2032	2036
0.40	1963	1912	1583	2125	4119	3569
0.48	2929	2902	4751	4417	7345	7705
0.56	3413	3356	6863	6300	9375	10,267
0.64	2206	2355	3232	3690	6141	5404
0.72	598	653	354	310	1004	933
0.80	78	37	17	0	19	95
0.88	3	0	0	0	0	3
Total Observations	13,498	13,498	18,258	18,258	31,756	31,756
Adjusted R-Squared	$R^2_{f7} = 0.99$		$f15 = 0.98$		$Cantonal = 0.98$	

381

382 3.5 Indemnity calculation

383 The indemnity for farms that reach the physiological threshold in scenario 1 is reported in Table 9. These values show us the
 384 deficit (negative numbers) that farmers face for recovering their production costs when their crop yield falls below the break
 385 even, in each AHZ (*f7* and *f15*) and *cantonal*. The indemnity would make up the difference between crop's costs and revenue
 386 in case of extreme event. In *f7* the indemnity would be 38 USD/ha, it means that when a farmer reaches physiologic threshold,
 387 he only lacks 38 USD/ha for covering his production cost. A farmer from this scenario could dispense with the insurance
 388 contract, because the deficit to hit the break-even is not representative. On the contrary, when *f15* reaches the physiologic
 389 threshold, its deficit is very high (645 USD/ha), which is the money that an *f15*'s policyholder would receive as compensation
 390 in case of an extreme event occurrence.

391 **Table 9. Indemnity calculation for physiologic threshold in Agro-ecological homogeneous zones (*f7* and *f15*) and *cantonal***

	Expected yield at physiologic threshold (tonnes/ha)	Price (USD/ton)	Gross incomes (USD/ha)	Differentiated production cost (USD/ha)	Deficit for covering Investment (USD/ha)
<i>Cantonal</i>	2.65	371.5	984.4	1259.00	-274.6
<i>f7</i>	2.65	371.5	984.4	1022.00	-37.6
<i>f15</i>	2.65	371.5	984.4	1629.00	-644.6

392

393 For scenario 2 of physiological threshold, the indemnity would be 275 USD/ha for all AHZ (*f7* and *f15*) and for *cantonal*, due
 394 to their same production cost (1259 USD/ha). As was mentioned before, in Ecuador, it already exists an agricultural
 395 conventional insurance that covers the rice growers' working capital; but we included this calculation as an alternative to
 396 conventional insurance or for these areas where conventional insurance is not feasible.

397 When looking at the economic threshold, as we can observe in Table 10, the indemnity (Gross Margin) in scenario 1 is very
 398 similar between AHZs (*f7* and *f15*) and *cantonal* though their expected yields are different. This is because their assigned



399 production cost has been related with their expected yield. For example, since farmers have invested more money in their crop
 400 in *f15*, their expected yield is higher. Moreover, the difference in the premium price of these zones will be determined by the
 401 different probability of extreme events occurrence in each AHZ (*f7* and *f15*) and *cantonal*.

402 **Table 10. Indemnity calculation (gross margin) for economic threshold, for each AHZ (*f7* and *f15*) and cantonal, both in scenario 1**
 403 **and 2**

	Expected Yield (t/ha)	Price (USD/t)	Gross incomes (USD/ha)	Production cost scenario 1 (USD/ha)*	Gross margin scenario 1 (USD/ha)	Production cost scenario 2 (USD/ha)**	Gross margin scenario 2 (USD/ha)
<i>Cantonal</i>	5.65	371	2099	1259	840	1259	840
<i>f7</i>	5.11	371	1899	1022	877	1259	640
<i>f15</i>	6.68	371	2482	1629	853	1259	1223

404 * = Differentiated production cost and ** = Non differentiated production cost

405 In scenario 2, on the other hand, we have assumed the same production cost for *f7* and *f15*; thus, *f15* has higher expected yield
 406 in normal years than *f7*. Obviously, in this scenario *f15* obtains the highest gross margin (1223 USD/ha), having also the highest
 407 compensation, which would be reflected in a higher premium cost. However, *f7* has the lowest insured amount (640 USD/ha),
 408 so that its premium cost should be low. But we have to consider that premium cost calculation also depends on the occurrence
 409 probability of the insured event.

410 For economic threshold, the indemnity calculation (840 USD/ha) for *cantonal* is equal in both scenarios 1 and 2; as shown in
 411 Table 10. Because, we used the same weighted average as production cost (1259 USD/ha). For *f7* it is expected a higher gross
 412 margin in scenario 1 than that in scenario 2, due to scenario 2's production cost being higher. On the contrary, for *f15* the gross
 413 margin is higher in scenario 2 than that in scenario 1; because in scenario 2, *f15* has lower production cost than in scenario 1.

414 3.6 Premium determination

415 The premium value is related to the insured amount (the indemnity or compensation that insurance company must pay to
 416 farmers when an insured extreme event occurs), and the probability of the insured extreme event occurs in a determined period.
 417 Table 11 shows the net and commercial premium calculation for the two different thresholds under both scenario 1 and scenario
 418 2, and for each AHZ and at *cantonal* level.

419 In general terms, it can be appreciated that premium cost for economic thresholds are more expensive than that for physiologic
 420 threshold, in both scenarios (1 and 2). This is because the insured amounts for economic threshold are higher than that for
 421 physiologic threshold. In the first case, the compensation covers the entire lost profit; while in the second one, the compensation
 422 covers only the deficit necessary for recovering the investment (production cost).

423 If the insured amounts are similar among AHZ (*f7* and *f15*) and *cantonal*, the difference in premium cost is determined by the
 424 occurrence probability. However, when there are sharp differences among insured amounts of AHZs (*f7* and *f15*) and *cantonal*,
 425 these are more determinant in the premium cost variation than the occurrence probability.

426 Moreover, for physiologic threshold in scenario 1, the premium cost is determined mainly by the insured amount, for instance,
 427 for *f15* the premium cost is the highest (136.98 USD/ha) despite of its occurrence probability being the lowest. On the contrary,
 428 for *f7* its premium cost is very low, despite its highest occurrence probability, because of having a greater insured amount.

429 While under economic threshold in scenario 1, the insured amount of AHZs (*f7* and *f15*) and *cantonal* are similar, the premium
 430 cost for *f15* is the highest (394.66 USD/ha), due to its highest occurrence probability.



431 When costs are not differentiated across AHZ (scenario 2), for the physiologic threshold the insured amount is equal in all
 432 AHZs (*f7* and *f15*) and *cantonal*, and thus their premium cost has been differentiated through the occurrence probability, being
 433 the highest for *f7* (85.82 USD/ha). In the same scenario, for the economic threshold *f15* has the highest gross margin, and
 434 therefore a high-insured amount despite its low occurrence probability (0.25). It has a high premium price (382.29 USD/ha),
 435 but it is lower than in scenario 1 (394.66 USD/ha) where the occurrence probability is the highest (0.37).

436 As it can be appreciated in Table 11, after we divided the study area through AHZs map in *f7* and *f15* zones, we can perform
 437 more accurate calculations and reduce basis risk of the premium costs according to the expected yield, insured amount, and
 438 occurrence probability of each AHZ (*f7* and *f15*). This means that by differentiating the study area through AHZs, we can
 439 design an accurate insurance policy where farmers from each zone pay a premium that corresponds to the risk that they are
 440 facing. To illustrate this, for physiological threshold in scenario 1, if we do not divide Babahoyo canton through AHZs and
 441 instead use *cantonal* as IIA, an average Babahoyo's producer (~20 ha) from *f15* would pay only 72.09 USD/ha as insurance
 442 premium. But if an extreme event occurs, he would receive as compensation only 4915.68 USD which is less than half of the
 443 actual loss in a year that an extreme event occurs (11,796.56 USD). At the same time, for the same threshold and scenario,
 444 farms from *f7* would pay a much lower premium (11.76 USD/ha), and in case of disaster receive a small compensation which
 445 is adjusted to the actual losses experienced by the farmers. This can be of great relevance, as if we assume that farms in *f7* are
 446 non-technical production systems that achieve lower yields and get lower economic returns, providing access to affordable
 447 insurance with fair premium prices may importantly contribute to expand insurance uptake and reduce substantially socio-
 448 economic vulnerability in this area.

449 **Table 11. Calculation of commercial premium rate for physiologic and economic thresholds in scenarios 1 and 2 and for AHZ (*f7*
 450 and *f15*) and *cantonal***

Threshold type	Zone	Threshold value	Insured amount (USD/ha)	Occurrence probability of IEE	Net premium cost (USD/ha)	Commercial premium cost (USD/ha)	Production cost + subsidized premium cost (USD/ha)	Compensation to a policy holder of a farm of 20 ha (USD)*
<i>Scenario 1 (Differentiated production cost)</i>								
Physiologic	<i>Cantonal</i>	0.40	274.62	0.21	57.67	72.09	1287.83	4915.68
	<i>f7</i>	0.40	37.62	0.25	9.4	11.76	1026.70	658.32
	<i>f15</i>	0.40	644.62	0.17	109.59	136.98	1683.79	11,796.56
Economic	<i>Cantonal</i>	0.43	840.21	0.29	243.66	304.58	1380.83	14,367.56
	<i>f7</i>	0.41	877.28	0.26	228.09	285.12	1136.05	15,264.64
	<i>f15</i>	0.47	853.31	0.37	315.73	394.66	1786.86	13,908.92
<i>Scenario 2 (Non differentiated production cost)</i>								
Physiologic	<i>Cantonal</i>	0.40	274.62	0.21	57.67	72.09	1287.83	4915.68
	<i>f7</i>	0.40	274.62	0.25	68.65	85.82	1293.33	4805.84
	<i>f15</i>	0.40	274.62	0.17	46.68	58.36	1282.34	5025.52
Economic	<i>Cantonal</i>	0.43	840.21	0.29	243.66	304.58	1380.83	14,367.56
	<i>f7</i>	0.43	640.28	0.32	204.89	256.11	1361.44	10,756.72
	<i>f15</i>	0.43	1223.32	0.25	305.83	382.29	1411.91	21,408.08

451 * In a year when an ensured extreme event (drought and flood) occurs, 20 ha is the average size of a rice-farm in Ecuador

452 Yet, the price of the premium could be expensive for some farmers, but we must consider that this insurance will cover both
 453 of the most frequent and intense extreme events that affect Babahoyo canton (drought and flood). For example, for the
 454 economic threshold in scenario 1, the premium cost without subsidy would reach the 22% of the total production cost of a
 455 policy holder of *f7* and the 20% for *f15*. This means that subsidizing premium cost may still be necessary in order to incentivize



456 the insurance contract taking (Garrido and Zilberman, 2008; Yuanchang and Jiyu, 2010), and the Government subsidy of 60%
457 of the premium cost that it is currently offered in Ecuador with the conventional insurance would still be required.

458 Furthermore, if Government would apply prevention policies to promote farms' modernization, farmer's technical training,
459 and civil works the occurrence probability of extreme events could be reduced or at least mitigated. For instance, dams and
460 irrigation infrastructure could improve the risk status of Babahoyo's farmers facing drought and floods. Consequently, it could
461 be reflected in an insurance premium price reduction.

462 **4 Conclusions**

463 Floods and droughts are a major threat for rice production in Ecuador that undermine food security and endanger sustainability
464 of rural livelihoods in many areas of the country. Risk management mechanisms, such as agricultural insurance, may play an
465 important role in stabilizing production and contributing to reduce the vulnerability of rice farmers. In this context, IBI is a
466 promising tool that facilitates the implementation of agricultural insurance and reduces operational and transaction costs.
467 However, basis risk may lead to inadequate premium prices and to unfair indemnity calculations and payment. To avoid this,
468 the identification of an adequate index and a proper knowledge of variability within the IIA are crucial.

469 In this research, we developed an IBI based on NDVI_ave that accounts for variability across the insured area. For this, we
470 considered AHZs as the starting point for risk assessment and indemnity calculation and compared it with the insurance design
471 at cantonal level. Two levels of climatic impact over rice cultivation have been identified. The first one is the physiological
472 impact that is determined by a physiological threshold when a climatic event is extreme, its policy contract will cover losses
473 related to the rice grower's working capital. The second level is the economic impact when the climatic event is moderate, and
474 its policy will cover the crops' gross margin.

475 The results of the analysis performed evidence that the two AHZs show significantly different risk profiles for physiologic and
476 economic thresholds. Therefore, the design of differentiated premium calculation based on the risk status and insured amount
477 of each AHZ (*f7* and *f15*) will facilitate that farmers pay a fair insurance premium. This insurance premium would be as
478 consistent as possible with their risk status and would help them to receive compensations that effectively cover the totality of
479 their losses.

480 The basis risk arising from modelling the risk frequency of drought and flood events in Babahoyo (cantonal) and in AHZs (*f7*
481 and *f15*) through GEVmin distribution is negligible. The basis risk associated with the spatial heterogeneity of Babahoyo
482 canton has been reduced in our IBI design. We have accomplished this by dividing this canton into *f7* and *f15* homogeneous
483 zones which have a significant different risk status, different expected yields and may have also different production costs.
484 Regarding all these factors and the two different impact levels for the IBI design, have allowed to set up a fair premium and
485 reduce in this way the possible bias caused for not discriminating Babahoyo variability.

486 The cost for contracting an insurance policy could be expensive in some cases. However, the fact that this kind of insurance is
487 generally partially subsidized by the government in developing countries (as Ecuador) could make this insurance affordable
488 to farmers. Moreover, even if the premium price may be high, the index design guarantees to policyholders that the premium
489 price is fair and proportional with the risk they are facing.

490 The implementation of IBI for rice crop in Babahoyo could let Ecuadorian Government to respond efficiently and rapidly in
491 the case of an extreme climatic event, paying compensations faster than with the conventional insurance. It could stabilize
492 rice-producer incomes and reduce small farmers' vulnerability by providing access to insurance through premium and



493 indemnities adjusted to the specific risk and technology conditions. Consequently, it can incentivise rice cultivation to the
494 desirable levels for covering national demand ensuring food security of Ecuador.

495 Finally, it is worth mentioning that even if the IBI has been defined for rice crop in a particular area, the methodology applied
496 for developing such an insurance scheme can be applied for other crops and regions if the data to define AHZs, NDVI
497 distributions, crop yield and cost productions are available. This is, therefore, a promising approach for defining IBI schemes
498 minimizing basis risk, which can importantly profit from current advances in remote sensing, satellite imagery and improved
499 information systems.

500 **Author contribution**

501 Omar Valverde has developed the research idea and write the original draft of the manuscript, guided and supervised by
502 Alberto Garrido, Ana Tarquis and Paloma Esteve. Ana Tarquis has contributed with the imagery and statistical analysis and
503 generation of agro-ecological homogeneous zones. Alberto Garrido contributed with the insurance design and Paloma with
504 the policy and socio-economic implications of the insurance implementation. Alberto, Ana and Paloma have reviewed and
505 edited the manuscript for obtaining the final version.

506 **Competing interest**

507 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest

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