1 **Machine Learning Analysis of Lifeguard Flag Decisions and Recorded Rescues**

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12 **Abstract**

14 Rips currents and other surf hazards are an emerging public health issue globally. Lifeguards,

15 warning flags and signs are important and to varying degrees they are effective strategies to

16 minimize risk to beach users. In the United States and other jurisdictions around the world,

17 lifeguards use coloured flags (green, yellow and red) to indicate whether the danger posed by the

18 surf and rip hazard is low, moderate, or high respectively. The choice of flag depends on the

19 lifeguard(s) monitoring the changing surf conditions along the beach and over the course of the

20 day using both regional surf forecasts and careful observation. There is a potential that the chosen

21 flag is not consistent with the beach user perception of the risk, which may increase the potential

22 for rescues or drownings. In this study, machine learning is used to determine the potential for

23 error in the flags used at Pensacola Beach, and the impact of that error on the number of rescues.

24 Results of a decision tree analysis indicate that the colour flag chosen by the lifeguards was

25 different from what the model predicted for 35% of days between 2004 and 2008 (n=396/1125).

26 Days when there is a difference between the predicted and posted flag colour represent only 17%

27 of all rescue days but those days are associated with ~60% of all rescues between 2004 and 2008.

28 Further analysis reveals that the largest number of rescue days and total number of rescues is

29 associated with days where the flag deployed over-estimated the surf and hazard risk, such as a

30 red or yellow flag flying when the model predicted a green flag would be more appropriate based

31 on the wind and wave forcing alone. While it is possible that the lifeguards were overly cautious

32 it is argued that they most likely identified a rip forced by a transverse-bar and rip morphology

33 common at the study site. Regardless, the results suggest that beach users may be discounting

34 lifeguard warnings if the flag colour is not consistent with how they perceive the surf hazard or

35 the regional forecast. Results suggest that machine learning techniques have the potential to

36 support lifeguards and thereby reduce the number of rescues and drownings.

37

38 **Keywords:** *rip current, surf zone, beach safety, beach hazard*

Introduction

Rip currents are the main hazard to recreational swimmers and bathers, and, in recent years, have been recognized as a serious global public health issue (Brighton et al., 2013; Woodward et al., 2013; Kumar and Prasad et al., 2014; Arozarena et al., 2015; Brewster et al., 2019; Vlodarchyk et al., 2019). Rips are strong, seaward-directed currents that can develop on beaches characterized by wave breaking within the surf zone (Castelle et al., 2016), and are capable of transporting swimmers a significant distance away from the shoreline into deeper waters. Weak swimmers or those who try and fight the current can become stressed and experience panic (Brander et al., 2011; Drozdzewski et al., 2015) leading to increased adrenaline, an elevated heart rate and blood pressure, and rapid and shallow breathing. On recreational beaches in Australia and the United States, rips have been identified as the main cause of drownings and are believed to be responsible for nearly 80% of all rescues (Brighton et al., 2013; Brewster et al., 2019). It is estimated that the annual number of rip current drownings exceeds the number of fatalities caused by hurricanes, forest fires, and floods in Australia, the United States (Brander et al., 2013; NWS, 2017), while rip-related drownings on a relatively small number of beaches in Costa Rica account for a disproportionately large number of violent deaths in the country (Arozarena et al., 2015). However, recent evidence suggests that public knowledge of this hazard is limited (Brander et al., 2011; Williamson et al., 2011; Brannstrom et al., 2014; 2015; Gallop et al., 2016; Fallon et al., 2018; Menard et al., 2018; Silva-Cavalcanti et al., 2018; Trimble and Houser, 2018), and that few people are interested in rip currents compared to other hazards (Houser et al., 2019).

Many beaches have warning signs at primary access points to warn beach users of the rip hazard, but recent studies suggest that signs may not be effective (e.g. Matthews et al., 2014; Brannstrom et al. 2015). Many beaches also use a combination of beach flags to either designate the location of supervised and safe swimming areas (e.g. Australia and the United Kingdom), or areas and times to avoid entering the water (e.g. Costa Rica and the US). Unfortunately, not every country uses the same flagging convention and there are regional variations that can lead to confusion amongst beach users. The United States and Canada use green, yellow, and red coloured flags to indicate whether the danger posed by the surf and rip hazard is low, moderate, or high, respectively (ILSF, 2004). A beach manager or lifeguard decides on the surf hazard and the flag colour to fly based on a combination of daily updates on rip conditions provided by local lifeguards

70   as well as a rip forecast from the US National Weather Service (NWS). Most rip forecasts are

71   based on a simple correlation between the number of rip-related rescues and meteorological and

72   oceanographic conditions on that day (Lushine, 1991a, b; Lascody, 1998; Engle, 2002; Dusek and

73   Seim, 2013; Kumar and Prasad, 2014; Scott et al., 2014; Moulton et al., 2017). These forecasts do

74   not account for the surf zone morphology, which may be conducive to the development of rips on

75   days when wave breaking is relatively weak. Even under 'green flag' days, the presence of shore-

76   attached nearshore bars (called a transverse bar and rip morphology; Wright and Short, 1984) can

77   force a current of ~0.5 m s^{-1} that can pose a threat to weak swimmers (Houser et al, 2013).

78   Rip currents can still be present even if a regional forecast predicts that the hazard potential

79   is low based on wind and wave conditions. Beach users can be at risk if the flag colour is based

80   solely on the regional forecast. To be effective, the flag system requires lifeguards to continuously

81   assess surf conditions and monitor swimmers and bathers, and ultimately intervene if someone

82   does not heed the warning implied by a yellow or red flag indicating moderate and high ('do not

83   enter the water') hazard levels respectively. Recent evidence suggests that many beach users do

84   not adhere to warnings if their own experience (whether accurate or not) or behavior of others on

85   the beach, contradicts the hazard, as indicated by the warning flag (Houser et al., 2017; Menard et

86   al., 2018). Beachgoers may lose trust in authority (i.e. the lifeguards) if a forecast is perceived,

87   wrongly or rightly, to be inaccurate (Espluga et al., 2009). If the forecast is for dangerous surf

88   conditions and a yellow or red flag is placed on the beach when conditions appear to the beach

89   user to be relatively calm, the beach user may discount or ignore the forecast now and, in the

90   future, if they enter the water and do not experience any difficulties. Trust and confidence in the

91   authority figures can be eroded if they believe that the lifeguards are being overly cautious. It can

92   be difficult to change (or 'reset') public perception about the accuracy of the flag system as soon

93   as a discrepancy is perceived, and subsequent visits and experiences may confirm the biases of the

94   beach user (Houser et al., 2018). It is a situation analogous to the boy who cries "*wolf*" (Wachinger

95   et al., 2013).

96   This study examines the consistency of flag warnings at Pensacola Beach, Florida between

97   2004 and 2008 when daily data is available for flag colour, wind and wave forcing, as well as the

98   daily number of rescues performed by lifeguards. A decision tree, a form of machine learning, is

99   used to predict the posted flag colour using lifeguard observations in combination with wind and

100   wave forcing. The modelled flag colour, based solely on wave and wind forcing, can be compared

101 to the flag colour posted by the lifeguards on a particular day to identify days when there is a

102 difference and how that influences the number of rescues performed on that day. It is hypothesized

103 that there will be a greater number of rescues performed on days when there is a difference between

104 the predicted and posted flag colour. Specifically, it is hypothesized that a greater number of

105 rescues will occur on days when the model underestimated the hazard level compared to the

106 lifeguard who made their decision based on local observations including the presence of semi-

107 permanent rip channels. In this scenario, the public may believe that the lifeguard is being overly

108 cautious leading to people entering the water.

109

110 **Study Site**

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112   The analysis was completed at Pensacola Beach, Florida (Figure 1), where there is

113 available records of daily flag colours, wind and wave forcing, and lifeguard-performed rescues

114 between 2004 and 2008. The beaches of the Florida Panhandle have been described ''*as the worst*

115 *in the nation for beach drowning*'' (The Tuscaloosa News, 2002), based on the presence of semi-

116 permanent rips along the length of the island (Houser et al., 2011; Barrett and Houser, 2012). These

117 rips can be active and pose a threat to swimmers when conditions may appear to be safe for

118 swimming (Houser et al., 2013). During the period of the study (2004-2008), the Santa Rosa Island

119 Authority maintained a flagging system to alert beach users about the heavy surf and rip hazard

120 based on the NWS rip forecast. The highest flag colour for that day was recorded by the Island

121 Authority, along with the number of prevents, assists, and rescues. The Island Authority reserve

122 the rescue definition for those persons in extreme difficulty who, in the opinion of the lifeguard,

123 would have drowned without assistance.

124   Rescues, assists, and prevents are recorded regardless of whether they are conducted in a

125 'guarded' area, a designated swimming area where there are typically many beach users (Casino

126 Beach, Fort Pickens Gate Beach, and Park East), or along the ~13 kms of unguarded beach where

127 lifeguards conduct regular patrols and respond to emergency calls. As shown by Barrett and

128 Houser (2013), there are rip current hotspots with semi-permanent alongshore variation in the

129 nearshore morphology due to a ridge and swale bathymetry on the inner shelf. The innermost bar

130 varies alongshore at a scale of ~1000 m, consistent with the ridge and swale bathymetry (Houser

131 et al., 2008), and tends to exhibit a transverse bar and rip morphology immediately landward of

132   the deeper swales (Barrett and Houser, 2012; see Figure 1). Historically, most drownings and
133   rescues on this popular beach have occurred at these rip hotspots because they correspond to the
134   main access points along the island (Houser et al., 2015; Trimble and Houser, 2018).

135   Santa Rosa Island experienced widespread erosion and washover during Hurricane Ivan in
136   September 2004. The storm reinforced the alongshore variation in the nearshore bar morphology
137   and forced the bars farther offshore. As described in Houser et al. (2015), the nearshore bars
138   migrated landward and recovered to the beachface for 3 years following the storm. During this
139   period, the inner-bar morphology transitioned from a rhythmic bar and beach morphology to a
140   transverse bar and rip morphology before ultimately attaching to the beachface in May 2008
141   (Houser and Barrett, 2010). This changing bar morphology is a primary control on the presence of
142   rip channels, with the greatest density of rips present in 2005 as the inner-most bar first started to
143   develop a transverse bar and rip morphology (Houser et al., 2011).

144

145   **Methodology**

146

147   Offshore wave conditions and wind forcing function are based on long-term meteorological
148   and oceanographic records from an offshore wave buoy located ~100 km southeast of the study
149   area (buoy 42039; Figure 1). Between 2004 and 2008, this was the closest buoy to Pensacola Beach
150   and had been previously used to estimate the incident wave field (Wang and Horwitz, 2007;
151   Claudino-Sales et al., 2008; 2010; Houser et al., 2011) and was the basis for the rip hazard at
152   Pensacola Beach until a new buoy was placed closer to the beach in 2009. The available wave
153   data from buoy 42039 included offshore significant wave height, significant wave period, and
154   direction, and the wind data included speed and direction. Local water level data was acquired
155   from a station at the Port of Pensacola just north of the study site. A decision tree analysis was
156   used to determine what combination of wave and wind forcing was associated with the flag posted
157   by the Santa Rosa Island Authority on that day. After training on the available dataset, the model
158   produces a decision tree that can be used for future decisions about what flag colour should be
159   posted, although further training would be required to validate the model and operationalize. The
160   modelled (*i.e.* predicted) flag colour is then compared to the posted flag colour for all days to
161   determine if there is a relationship between the flag colour and the number of rescues. The

162   comparison is also used to determine if there is a specific combination of wind and wave forcing

163   on the days when the modelled flag colour and the posted flag colour do not align.

164   A decision tree model was developed using the Chi-square Automatic Interaction Detector

165   (CHAID) technique developed by Kass (1980). The goal of CHAID analysis is to build a model

166   that helps explain how independent variables (wind speed, wave height, wave period, wave

167   direction, wind direction and water level) can be merged to explain the results in a given dependent

168   variable. To develop a decision tree, the first step is declaring the root node, this corresponds to

169   the target variable that will be predicted throughout the model. Then, the independent variable that

170   provides the most information about the target values is identified. The root node is then split on

171   this independent variable into statistically significant different subgroups using the F-test. These

172   subgroups are then split using the predictor variables that provide the most information about them.

173   CHAID analysis continues this process until terminal nodes are reached and no splits are

174   statistically significant. Previous use of CHAID analysis in hazard studies include landslide

175   prediction (e.g. Althuwaynee et al., 2014), farmer perception of flooding hazard (Bielders et al.,

176   2003; Tehrany et al., 2015), and property owner perception and decision making along an eroding

177   coast (Smith et al., 2017).

178

179   **Results**

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181   The decision tree model was trained on the 1125 days with complete data between 2004

182   and 2008. Over this same period there were 145 days with rescues. The annual number of rescues

183   and rescue days (ie. days with one or more rescues) varied by year, with a peak in both the total

184   number of rescues and the number of rescue days in 2005. The number of rescues was at a

185   minimum in 2007, while the number of rescue days was at a minimum in 2006 (Figure 3). The

186   number of rescues decreased linearly between 2005 and 2007 as the nearshore bar morphology

187   continued to recover following Hurricane Ivan and welded to the beachface consistent with

188   previous observations at the site (Houser et al., 2011). It is important to note that the CHAID

189   Analysis does not incorporate nearshore morphology as an independent variable because changes

190   in nearshore morphology were not tracked daily over the study period. In this respect, differences

191   between the posted and predicted flag colour may reflect lifeguard observations of nearshore

192   morphology conducive to the development of rip currents despite winds and waves typical of green
193   flag conditions.

194   The decision tree analysis suggests that the posted flag colour was not predicted by the
195   model on 35% of days between 2004 and 2008 (n=396). There was a total of 342 rescues over 66
196   days when the model predicted a different flag than was posted representing over 60% of all
197   rescues (Table 1). By comparison, 40% of all rescues (n=224) occurred over 79 days when the
198   predicted and posted flags were the same. Chi-square analysis suggests that the number of rescue
199   days is significantly greater at the 95% confidence level when the predicted and posted flags are
200   different (χ^2=7.77, ρ~0.005). This supports the hypothesis that there are a greater number of
201   rescues performed on days when there is a discrepancy between the predicted and posted flag
202   colour.

203

204   **Table 1.** Results of Chi-square analysis of posted and predicted flag colour versus rescue and no
205   rescue days at Pensacola Beach, Florida between 2004 and 2008.
206

	Rescue Days	No Rescue Days	
Posted=Predicted	79	650	χ^2=7.77, ρ~0.005
Posted≠Predicted	66	330	

207

208   Chi-square analysis was also used to determine if the number of rescue days depends on
209   whether the model predicts a flag of greater or lesser hazard compared to the posted flag (Table
210   2). Results suggest that the number of rescue days is greater when the model predicts hazardous
211   surf (i.e. red or yellow flag), but the posted flag was either yellow or green (χ^2=18.11, ρ~0.0001).
212   The number of rescue days was over-represented when the posted flag colour was red or yellow,
213   but the model predicted that the flag should have been yellow or green, respectively, suggesting
214   that posting what a beach user may perceive as an overly cautious flag can present a danger. These
215   47 days were associated with 268 of the total 566 rescues between 2004 and 2008, or ~7.2 rescues
216   per day when the island authority posted a more cautious flag then was predicted by the model .
217   In comparison, the number of rescues (n=298) was under-represented on days when the posted
218   flag suggested conditions were not as hazardous (n=74) as the model or were identical to the model
219   (n=224).

220

Table 2. Results of Chi-square analysis of posted and predicted flag colour versus rescue and no rescue days at Pensacola Beach, Florida between 2004 and 2008.

	Rescue Days	No Rescue Days	
Posted>Predicted	47	171	$\chi^2=18.11$, $\rho\sim0.0001$
Posted<Predicted	19	159	
Posted=Predicted	79	650	

The greatest number of rescues were performed on days when the posted flag was yellow (moderate hazard, moderate surf and/or currents), but the model predicted a green flag (low hazard, relatively calm surf and/or currents) based on the wind and wave forcing. Specifically, a total of 231 rescues were performed on 37 of the 168 days when the posted flag was yellow, and the model predicted that the flag colour should be green. In comparison, there were only 12 rescues on 3 of 20 days when the posted flag was red (high hazard, strong surf and/or currents) and the model predicted flag colour was green.. Finally, there were 25 rescues preformed on 7 of 30 days when a red flag was posted, and the model predicted a yellow flag was appropriate. The number of rescues and rescue days when the posted flag was more cautious than predicted by the model were at a maximum in 2005 and linearly decreased to a minimum in 2007 as the bar morphology recovered from Hurricane Ivan.

While there were fewer than expected rescue days when the posted flag was green or yellow and the model predicted a yellow or red flag, rescues were still performed on those days. There was a total of 66 rescues on 13 of 80 days when the posted flag was yellow, but the model predicted a red flag should be posted (Table 3). Only 7 rescues were performed on 5 of the 83 days when the posted flag was green and the model predicted a yellow flag, with even fewer rescues performed on days when the posted flag was green, but should have been red. The number of rescues and rescue days when the posted flag was lower than the predicted flag decreased from 2004 to 2007, with a statistically significant outlier in 2008. The large number of rescues in 2008 is the result of 2 days with 13 rescues each (April 19 and September 14), when a yellow flag was being flown, but the model predicted a red flag was more appropriate. This suggests that the difference between posted and predicted flag colours can vary inter-annually with changes in the nearshore morphology and/or changes in the individual who makes the flag decision.

Table 3. Number of days and rescues (in brackets) based on the combination of posted and predicted flag colours.

		Predicted Flag		
		G	**Y**	**R**
Posted Flag	**G**	475 (48)	83 (7)	15 (1)
	Y	168 (231)	154 (125)	80 (66)
	R	20 (12)	30 (25)	100 (51)

Discussion

Results of the present study suggest that over 60% of all rescues at Pensacola Beach, Florida between 2004 and 2008 occurred on days when the posted hazard flag was different from the flag colour predicted by a decision tree model. The posted flag colour was not predicted by the model on 35% of days between 2004 and 2008 (n=396), with one or more rescues occurring on 66 of those days (~17%). While rescues did not occur on a vast majority of the days when the posted and predicted flag colours were different, days when the predicted and posted flag colours were different accounted for a majority of the rescues. This is not to suggest that Santa Island Authority made a mistake in their flag choice. Rather, the results suggest that the difference between the posted and predicted flag colour could be associated with the lifeguards noting that the nearshore had a transverse bar and rip morphology, which is common at this location. The morphology of the nearshore and other variables that could influence whether a beach user will enter the water or not (e.g. weather, number of beach users or presence of seaweed) are not captured by the current model, which is based on wind and wave forcing alone. The model developed in this study is similar to rip forecasts produced by the US National Weather Service (NWS), and does not include local variables known to the beach manager based on experience and years of careful observation. Discrepancies between the predicted and posted flag colours provide a basis for future model development and expansion. Incorporating more data into the model will it to evolve and better capture the variables that influence the colour of flag chosen by the lifeguards, while ensuring that the model remains computationally efficient. Introducing additional variables, such as nearshore morphology, to the model has the potential to better capture a lifeguard or beach manager's understanding of what constitutes dangerous surf conditions at their beach. At the same time, it is also important to examine the accuracy of beach managers and lifeguards in assessing the nearshore morphology and potential for rip development.

276   The model predictions and most forecasts are based solely on wind and wave forcing

277   (Lushine, 1991a, b; Lascody, 1998; Engle, 2002; Dusek and Seim 2013; Arun Kumar and Prasad,

278   2014; Scott et al., 2014; Moulton et al., 2017). Noticeably absent from the current model is surf

279   zone morphology, which ultimately determines whether a rip can develop under those conditions

280   or not. The beach manager and lifeguard can observe the nearshore morphology and assess the

281   potential for rip development, which would lead to them putting out a yellow or red flag when the

282   model would predict a green or yellow flag as being appropriate. While beach managers and

283   lifeguards are being prudent, their assessment may not conform to those of the beach user who

284   decides on whether the water is safe or not based on wave breaking conditions (Caldwell et al.,

285   2013; Brannstrom et al., 2013; 2015). Most beach users assume that larger breaking waves are

286   more dangerous, and many will not enter the water if they (and the model) believe that it is a 'red'

287   flag condition. This may partially explain why there were fewer than expected rescues on days

288   when the posted flag colour was green or yellow flag and the model predicted a yellow or red flag,

289   respectively. Independent of the flag or warning signs, beach users appear to be making personal

290   decisions about the surf and rip hazard (Brannstrom et al., 2015) based on experience at the site or

291   elsewhere (see Houser et al., 2018). Whether this causes beach users to lose confidence in the

292   lifeguards and other authorities managing the beach is an important question for future research.

293   A large number of rescues occurred when the posted flag was yellow, but the model

294   predicted the wind and wave forcing warranted a green flag. Rightly or wrongly, the beach user

295   will observe that wave breaking is limited and assume that conditions must be safe. As shown by

296   Caldwell et al. (2013) and Brannstrom et al. (2013) most beach users along the Gulf Coast of the

297   United States assume that the calm flat water of a rip is safer than adjacent areas where the waves

298   are breaking. The lifeguard, however, may observe a bar morphology that is conducive to the

299   development of rips and post a yellow flag to warn about the potential for rips, despite the weak

300   wind and wave forcing. As observed by Houser and Barrett (2012), rips with speeds of ~0.5 m/s

301   can develop on 'green flag' days because of the transverse bar and rip morphology that is present

302   in the inner-nearshore. This would suggest that posting a green flag should never be permitted

303   when wind and swell waves are breaking over the bar, even if the regional forecast suggests a low-

304   level hazard that day. As shown by Scott et al. (2014), rescues are still possible with seemingly

305   'fine weather' conditions when a green flag would be predicted by the model or in regional

306   forecasts. Even in the presence of small swell wave, breaking can be induced as water levels fall
307   with the tide (Castelle et al. 2016).

308   It is difficult for beach users to spot a rip or assess the potential for rip development, and
309   they may assume that the lifeguard is being overly cautious if they perceive fine-weather
310   conditions and the lifeguard posts a yellow or red flag. Going to the beach is a reward-based
311   activity, and many people commit significant personal and financial investment to be at the beach
312   (Houser et al., 2018). If they believe that the lifeguard is 'wrong' they will ignore the warning and
313   remain committed to entering the water. The longer and more times that their perceptions are
314   inconsistent with the experience and knowledge of the lifeguard, the more trust in authority is lost
315   - a beach that is perceived to be safe based on experience will always be safe despite warnings to
316   the contrary (Menard et al., 2018). This is an example of confirmation bias, in which an opinion
317   quickly becomes entrenched and subsequent evidence is used to either bolster the belief or is
318   rapidly discarded. How this can be addressed to reduce the number of rescues is an important focus
319   for future research on rips and other hazards in general.

320   The results of this study also highlight the limitations of regional rip forecasts that are used
321   in the United States and elsewhere around the world. A forecast based solely on the wind and wave
322   forcing does not account for the nearshore morphology, which determines the potential for rip
323   development. This raises one of the most important considerations for future modeling efforts
324   based on machine learning techniques - the model will only be accurate if the bar morphology and
325   conceptual knowledge of the lifeguard is included as input variables. Getting the beach user to
326   observe and heed that forecast and warning, however, will remain a challenge.

327

328   **Conclusions**

329   Lifeguards and beach managers decide on warnings and flag colours based on careful
330   monitoring of the changing surf conditions along the beach and over the course of the day using
331   both regional surf forecasts and direct observation. A decision tree analysis predicts a flag colour
332   different to the one flown on ~35% of days between 2004 and 2008 (n=396/1125), and that those
333   differences account for only 17% of all rescue days and ~60% of the total number of rescues. The
334   posting of a yellow flag when the model would predict a green flag based solely on the wind and
335   wave forcing was found to be responsible for the largest number of rescues over the study period.
336   Variables such as the nearshore morphology and the potential for rip development is not included

337   in traditional forecasts or the model developed in this paper, and most beach users use a simple

338   assessment of wave breaking to determine if the water is safe. Even though a lifeguard will post

339   the appropriate flag based on direct observation of the bar morphology and experience, the beach

340   user, like simple models based solely on meteorological data, may not believe that warning and

341   still enter the water. This suggests that reducing the number of rip and surf rescues will require

342   that we are able to address confirmation bias on the part of the beach user, which can cause them

343   to lose their confidence in the lifeguards.

344

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349

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470   **Figures**

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
474   **Figure 1.** Map of study site showing location of flagged section of beach and approximate
475   location of the wave buoy used in the analysis and for regional rip forecasts.

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489   **Figure 2.** Satellite image of the flagged section of beach in 2004 (before Hurricane Ivan)
490   showing the presence of transverse-bar and rip morphology of the innermost bar and the variable
491   nature of the outermost bar for the flagged section of beach. The aerial image is not necessarily
492   representative of the nearshore morphology throughout the remainder of the study.

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
495 **Figure 3.** Interannual variation in number of rescues and rescue days at Pensacola Beach between
496 2004 and 2008.