

1 From Tsunami Risk Assessment to Disaster Risk Reduction. The case 2 of Oman

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9 **Abstract.** Oman is located in an area of high seismicity, facing the Makran Subduction Zone, which is the major source of
10 earthquakes in the eastern border of the Arabian plate. These earthquakes, as evidenced by several past events, may trigger a
11 tsunami event. The aim of this work is to minimize the consequences that tsunami events may cause in coastal communities
12 by integrating tsunami risk assessment and risk reduction measures as part of the risk-management preparedness strategy. An
13 integrated risk assessment approach and the analysis of site-specific conditions permitted to propose target-oriented risk
14 reduction measures. The process included a participatory approach, involving a panel of local stakeholders and international
15 experts. One of the main concerns of this work was to obtain a useful outcome for the actual improvement of tsunami risk
16 management in Oman. This goal was achieved through the development of comprehensive and functional management tools
17 such as the Tsunami Hazard, Vulnerability and Risk Atlas and the Risk Reduction Measures Handbook, which will help to
18 design and plan a roadmap towards risk reduction.

19 The integrated tsunami risk assessment performed showed that the northern area of Oman would be the most affected,
20 considering both the hazard and vulnerability components. This area also concentrates nearly 50% of the hot spots identified
21 throughout the country, 70% of them are located in areas with a very-high risk class, in which risk reduction measures were
22 selected and prioritized.

23 1 Introduction

24 Tsunamis are low-frequency natural events but have a great destructive power when striking coasts around the world, involving
25 loss of life and extensive damage to infrastructures and coastal communities worldwide. Between 1996 and 2015, estimated
26 tsunami disaster losses reached 250,000 lives, more than 3,500,000 affected people and more than 220,000 million of USD
27 (International Disaster Database, EM-DAT; UNISDR/CRED, 2016).

28 Oman is located in an area of high seismicity, facing the Makran Subduction Zone (MSZ), which is the major source of
29 earthquakes in the eastern border of the Arabian plate (Al-Shaqsi, 2012). These earthquakes may trigger a tsunami event, as
30 evidenced at least three times in the past (Heidarzadeh et al., 2008a,; Jordan, 2008). The high potential for tsunami generation
31 of MSZ makes it one of the most tsunamigenic areas of the Indian Ocean. The most recent tsunami event of seismic origin
32 was the 1945 Makran tsunami, which caused more than 4,000 fatalities and property losses in Iran, Pakistan, Oman and the
33 United Arab Emirates (Heck, 1947; Heidarzadeh et al., 2008, 2009, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Mokhtari, 2011, Latcharote et al.,
34 2017). Similar episodes may occur again in this area.

35 In addition to the tsunami threat on the coast of Oman, the rapid development and industrialization of this area explains the
36 need to develop specific studies on tsunami vulnerability and risk, especially in the northern low-lying coastal plain, which is
37 the most densely populated and most exposed to the MSZ.

38 Suitable tsunami vulnerability and risk assessments are essential for the identification of the exposed areas and the most
39 vulnerable communities and elements. They allow identifying appropriate site-specific risk management strategies and

40 measures, thus enabling to mainstream disaster risk reduction (DRR) into development policies, plans and programs at all
41 levels including prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and vulnerability reduction, considering its root causes.
42 Most methods for risk assessment are quantitative or semi quantitative (usually indicator-based). Quantitative risk assessments
43 are generally better related to the analysis of specific impacts, which require large scales and high resolution for all the
44 components **contributing** the risk. Results are usually expressed in terms of potential losses both economic (derived from
45 building damage or even infrastructure damage) and human (derived from mortality estimations). **There are several works**
46 **following this approach, among others Tinti et al. (2011) and Valencia et al. (2011) within the frame of the European project**
47 **SCHEMA¹, Leone et al. (2011), Suppasri (2011), Mas et al. (2012), Suppasri et al. (2013), Sohi and Nakamura (2017), and**
48 **Suppasri et al. (2018), with a main focus on infrastructure and building damage. Sato et al. (2003), Sugimoto et al. (2003),**
49 **Koshimura et al. (2006), Jonkman et al. (2008) and Løvholt et al., 2014 focused on human damage and casualties whereas**
50 **Berryman et al. (2005) and Harbitz et al. (2016) dealt with both aspects.**

51 Although not as common, quantitative risk assessments are sometimes applied at global scale such as the case of the GRM -
52 Global Risk Model (last version in GAR, 2017), which addresses a probabilistic risk model at a world scale to assess economic
53 losses based on buildings damage (Cardona et al., 2015).

54 However, when the scope requires a holistic and integrated approach in which several dimensions, criteria and variables with
55 different magnitudes and ranges of values **have to be taken** into consideration, such as the case of the present work, it is
56 necessary to apply an indicator-based method. Some works following this approach may be found in ESPON (2006), Dall'Osso
57 et al. (2009a, 2009b), Taubenböck et al. (2008), Jelínek (2009, 2012), Birkmann et al. (2010, 2013), Strunz et al. (2011),
58 Aguirre-Ayerbe (2011), Wegscheider, et al. (2011), González-Riancho et al. (2014), the European TRANSFER² project, the
59 Coasts at Risk report (2014), the World Risk Report (last version: Garschagen et al., 2016) and the INFORM Global Risk
60 Index (INFORM, 2017).

61 Nevertheless, very few of **the previous works** tackle with the direct link between integrated tsunami risk results and risk
62 reduction measures (RRM). González-Riancho et al., (2014) propose a translation of risk results into disaster risk management
63 options and Suppasri et al. (2017) describe some recommendations based on the lessons learned in recent tsunamis.

64 Therefore, it has been identified that there is not a clear applicability of science-based tsunami hazard and vulnerability tools
65 to improve actual DRR efforts, highlighting a general disconnection between technical and scientific studies and risk
66 management.

67 This work attempts to be complementary to preceding efforts and to fill the gap found in previous studies. The developed
68 methodology is based on the direct relationship found between risk components (hazard, exposure and vulnerability) and
69 specific DRR measures and integrates tsunami risk assessment and site-specific characteristics to select a suitable set of
70 tsunami countermeasures. The ultimate goal is the application of the method and the generation of useful management tools
71 to minimize the consequences that a potential tsunami could have on the coast of Oman.

72 **2 Methodology**


73 The methodology comprises two main phases: (i) the integrated tsunami risk assessment and (ii) the identification, selection
74 and prioritization of appropriate DRR measures. These two different but complementary tasks will guide the entire
75 methodology applied in this work.

¹ SCHEMA Project: Scenarios for Hazard-induced Emergencies Management. European 6th Framework Programme Project no. 030963, August 2007 - October 2010.

² TRANSFER project: Tsunami Risk and Strategies for the European Region. European 6th Framework Programme no. 37058, October 2006-September 2009.

76 As regards the conceptual framework, the methodology applied is fundamentally adapted from the definitions of UNISDR
 77 (2004, 2009), ISO/IEC Guide 73 (2009), UNESCO (2009b) and UN (2016). Accordingly, the sequence of the work is
 78 summarized schematically in Figure 1. Within the disaster risk assessment phase and prior to any risk study, it is necessary to
 79 define the consequence to be analysed and the type of result pursued (for example, the estimation of buildings damages **or** the
 80 community's affection from a holistic perspective, as the case presented in this article). The establishment of this main goal
 81 determines the specific method, the dimensions to include in the study and the spatial and temporal scales (point 1 of Figure
 82 1).

83




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85 **Figure 1. Schematic workflow**

86 Next, the assessment of the hazard, explained in detail in section 2.1 Hazard Assessment, requires the selection of the variable
 87 associated to the event (e.g. **flow depth**) mainly determined by the general goal defined in the first step. The hazard evaluation
 88 drives to the analysis of the individuals and elements exposed (e.g. people, buildings and infrastructures located in a flooded
 89 populated area) together with its vulnerability (e.g. sensitive age groups). The risk assessment is performed by the combination
 90 of the vulnerability assessment -of what is exposed- and the hazard intensity (points 3, 4 and 5 of Figure 1, explained in detail
 91 in sections 2.2 Vulnerability assessment and 2.3 Risk Assessment). Both, exposure, vulnerability and the integration of all risk
 92 components, circumscribed to a given spatial, cultural and socioeconomic context, are necessary for the preliminary selection
 93 of risk reduction strategies and measures. These countermeasures are essential to prevent new and reduce existing risk, as
 94 stated by UN (2016), contributing to the strengthening of resilience and reduction of disaster losses (point 6 in Figure 1.
 95 Schematic workflow, detailed in section 2.4 Risk reduction measures).

96 The determination of the efficiency of each proposed countermeasure is essential for the success of the risk reduction planning.
 97 When an appropriate countermeasure is selected, the overall risk assessment must be conducted again to understand how and
 98 to what extent it will actually reduce the risk.

99 DRR measures are framed in the disaster risk management cycle proposed below, which brings together four main strategies
 100 for risk reduction (Figure 2): (i) prevention and (ii) preparedness strategies in the pre-event stage and (iii) emergency/response
 101 and (iv) recovery in the post-event phase. Each of the strategies includes several actions that may be overlapped on time and
 102 that may even belong to more than one strategy. At the centre of the figure, research is presented as an essential element to
 103 improve disaster management enriching the process through the integration of various disciplines and studies. This particular
 104 study focuses on the strategies related to the pre-event phase: the prevention and the preparedness, which are explained in
 105 section 2.4 Risk reduction measures.



106

107 **Figure 2. Disaster risk management cycle.**

108 Risk and vulnerability assessments are performed both for a specific place and at a specific time. For this reason, both the
 109 analysis and the proposal of measures for risk reduction must be updated periodically, considering the changes that may occur
 110 over time and their influence on the results, such as a significant variation in population, land-use changes, new constructions
 111 or new lessons learnt.

112 The involvement of key local stakeholders and decision-makers in coastal risk management is essential throughout the entire
 113 process, both to include their knowledge and expertise and to enhance the usefulness of the results of the project throughout
 114 their encouragement. Thus, a stakeholder panel composed of local and international experts on coastal risks and risk
 115 management supported the entire process, driven to actively participate and collaborate to achieve the goal of DRR. Their
 116 main contribution focused on the validation of the methodological approach, the identification of hot spots and the analysis of
 117 the technical, institutional and financial capacities of the country for implementing each one of the countermeasures. In the
 118 last stage of the study, they prioritized each measure according to their knowledge and expertise.

119 **2.1 Hazard Assessment**

120 The hazard analysis allows determining the areas that would be affected due to the potential tsunamis that may strike the study
 121 area. The analysis is carried out considering the worst possible tsunami scenarios based on the seism-tectonic characterization
 122 of the area, so that the maximum impact that a tsunami would cause is calculated. Similar approaches may be found in Jelínek
 123 et al. (2009, 2012), Álvarez-Gómez et al. (2013) and Wijetunge (2014) among others. The deterministic tsunami hazard
 124 analysis allows identifying, locating and analysing the elements at risk in a conservative approach. It is worth considering this
 125 method when dealing with intensive risks, i.e. derived from low frequency but high severity hazards, such as tsunamis, where
 126 the catastrophic consequences of the impact are complex and difficult to estimate.


127 **In this study, only potential earthquake sources were considered as the tsunami generation mechanism.** A seism-tectonic
 128 analysis was performed to identify and characterise the major seismic structures with capacity to generate a tsunami affecting
 129 the coast of Oman (see Aniel-Quiroga et al., 2015). The study area was divided in three tectonically homogeneous zones
 130 including eleven main structures. The geometrical characterization of the fault planes (from the tectonics and the focal
 131 mechanisms analysis) allowed identifying 3181 focal mechanisms with a magnitude varying from Mw 6.5 to Mw 9.25.

132 Once these scenarios are established, the analysis includes the characterization of the quake (fault location, **magnitude**, length
 133 and width of the fault, fault dislocation angles, epicentre location and focal depth of the epicentre) and the sea level. The
 134 numerical modelling applied to conduct the simulations is COMCOT (Wang, 2009), **which solves shallow water equations**

135 using Okada model (Okada, 1985) model to generate the initial deformation of the sea surface. This model uses moving
 136 boundary technique for land flooding. Based on the bathymetry, the propagation of each potential tsunami is modelled from
 137 the source to the coast. Finally, according to the topography, the coastal area is flooded, with a final resolution (grid size) of
 138 45 m onshore.

139 The approach is described in detail in Aniel-Quiroga et al. (2015) and is based on the works of Álvarez-Gómez et al. (2014)
 140 and Gutiérrez et al. (2014).

141 Figure 3 shows the distribution of the major seismic structures and the number of events propagated for each of them. The
 142 seism-tectonic study was particularly focused in the Makran subduction zone, since it is possibly the most active area in the
 143 western Indian Ocean and located very near the north coast of Oman.



144
 145 **Figure 3. Main seismic areas surrounding the study area and number of events propagated for each area**

146 On one side, the complete set of the 3181 scenarios were included in a tsunami-scenarios database, which is the basis of the
 147 current early warning system in the country. On the other, seven scenarios were selected to perform the deterministic hazard
 148 assessment, including the historical event of 1945, which took place in the Makran subduction zone (Heidarzadeh et al., 2008).
 149 Hazard variables are calculated at each time step of every single simulation and then the maximum values are selected. These
 150 scenarios were aggregated into a map that shows at each point of the study area the worst possible situation. This enveloping
 151 map is the base for the risk assessment and includes the variables of flow depth (vertical distance between the water surface
 152 and the ground, also called inundation depth by some authors, e.g., Aniel-Quiroga et al., 2015), water velocity, and a proxy
 153 for the drag force, the depth-velocity product (drag level).

154 Hazard variables were finally classified into five levels of intensity to be subsequently combined with vulnerability, as
 155 described in section 2.3 Risk Assessment Risk Assessment. Tsunami drag level classification is based on previous works
 156 carried out by Xia et al. (2014), Jonkman et al. (2008), Karvonen et al. (2000), Abt et al. (1989), which establish different
 157 thresholds related to the people stability. As for the flow depth variable, the classification is based on the work developed in
 158 the SCHEMA project (Tinti et al., 2011) to establish building damage levels, based on empirical damage functions considering
 159 building materials and water depth.

160 2.2 Vulnerability assessment

161 The method applied to assess the vulnerability relies on an indicator-based approach. The process include three main stages:
 162 (a) the definition of criteria for selecting the dimensions and variables to be analysed for the exposed elements, (b)
 163 establishment, calculation and classification of indicators and (c) the construction of vulnerability indexes and its classification.
 164 These steps are explained in the following paragraphs.

165 Two different dimensions are selected: human and infrastructures, with the aim of developing an analysis with a human-centred
 166 perspective. On one side, the human dimension allows analysing the intrinsic characteristics of the population. On the other,

167 the infrastructure dimension allows the analysis of buildings and critical facilities, to consider their potential worsening
 168 implications for the populations, following the rational described in González-Riancho et al. (2014). In this sense, it is
 169 considered that an increase in the number of victims is likely to occur due to the loss or damage of emergency services, or the
 170 recovery capacity may decrease due to the loss of strategic socioeconomic infrastructures such as ports.
 171 The criteria to analyse the human dimension **are** the population capacities related to their mobility and evacuation speed, and
 172 the ability to understand a warning message and an alert situation. The criteria determined to analyse the infrastructure
 173 dimension **are** the critical buildings housing a large number of people (schools, hospitals, etc.), the emergency facilities and
 174 infrastructures, the supply of basic needs, the building and infrastructures that could generate negative cascading effects, and
 175 the economic consequences.
 176 Consequently, a set of 11 indicators has been defined (see Table 1) to develop a framework that allows to encompass the major
 177 issues related to the community's vulnerability This framework was developed in agreement with local stakeholders and
 178 international experts through the participatory process.
 179

Index	Indicator	Variable
Human Vulnerability Index	Human Exposure H1 - Population	Number of persons exposed
	H2 - Sensitive age groups	Number of persons <10 and > 65years
	Human Sensitivity H3 - Disability	Number of disabled persons (physical / intellectual)
	H4 - Illiteracy	Number of illiterate persons
	H5 - Expatriates	Number of expatriates
Infrastructure Vulnerability Index	Infrastructures Exposure I1 - Buildings and infrastructures	Number of exposed buildings and infrastructures
	I2 - Critical buildings	Number of critical buildings (health, educational, religious, cultural, governmental)
	I3 - Emergency	Number of emergency infrastructures (civil defence, police, firemen, military, royal guard)
	Infrastructures Sensitivity I4 - Supply	Number of water supply (desalination plants) and energy supply (power plants) infrastructures
	I5 - Dangerous	Number of dangerous/hazardous infrastructures
	I6 - Strategic	Number of strategic infrastructures (ports and airports)

180 **Table 1. Exposure and sensitivity indicators built for the tsunami vulnerability assessment in Oman.**

181 Indicators H1 and I1 **identify** and **locate** the number and type of exposed population and infrastructures respectively, **i.e. the**
 182 **number of people and buildings and infrastructures located in the flooded area**. The human indicators H2-H5 are oriented to
 183 measure weaknesses in terms of evacuation and reaction capacities of the exposed population. Specifically, H2 and H3 are
 184 related to problems with mobility and evacuation velocity whereas H2, H3, H4 and H5 are related to difficulties in
 185 understanding a warning message and an alert situation.


186 The infrastructure indicators I2-I6 measure the number of critical facilities and buildings that would be affected by
 187 administrative area, bearing in mind the implications for the population. I2 provides the number of buildings that would require
 188 a coordinated and previously planned evacuation due to the high number of people in them (in some cases sensitive population),
 189 such as hospitals, schools, geriatrics, malls, stadiums, mosques, churches, etc. I3 calculates the loss of emergency services that
 190 are essential during the event. I4 reports on the potential number of power plants and desalination plants affected, hindering
 191 the long-term supply of electricity and water to local communities. I5 analyses the generation of cascading impacts that could
 192 take place due to affected hazardous/dangerous industries. Finally, I6 considers the loss of strategic ports and/or airport
 193 infrastructures, essential for the economy of the country and the local livelihoods (fishing ports).

194 The construction of vulnerability indexes is performed through the weighted aggregation of the previously normalized
 195 indicators via the min-max method **(OECD, 2008)**. Aggregated indexes are then classified considering the data distribution

196 via the natural breaks method (Jenks, 1967) and grouped in five classes, obtaining homogeneous vulnerability areas that are
 197 expected to need similar DRR measures.
 198 Indicators and indexes have been applied to every wilayat along the coast of Oman (wilayat is an administrative division in
 199 Oman). Comparable results are obtained among all areas due to the methods of normalization and classification, which take
 200 into account the values of the index for all areas when establishing classes' thresholds. This method depends on the distribution
 201 of the data, therefore the study of any index evolution over time, for comparable purposes, must maintain the thresholds
 202 established in the initial analysis. In the same way, if new study areas were added, they should be included and new thresholds
 203 should be established.

204 **2.3 Risk Assessment**

205 Risk results are obtained by combining hazard and vulnerability components through a risk matrix (Greiving et al., 2006;
 206 Jelínek et al., 2009; Aguirre-Ayerbe, 2011; González-Riancho et al., 2014; Schmidt-Thomé, 2006; ESPON, 2006; IH
 207 Cantabria-MARN, 2010 and 2012 projects). Classes derived from the hazard assessment are blended with vulnerability classes
 208 by means of a risk matrix, as shown in Figure 4, to obtain two types of results, partial risks for each dimension and a combined
 209 risk result from the weighted aggregation of both dimensions. The results are finally classified into five risk classes.




210
 211 **Figure 4. Risk matrix combining hazard and vulnerability classes.**

212 The hazard variable differs according to each dimension of the study to analyse specifically the potential impacts. The
 213 combination of water depth and velocity, as a proxy for the drag force, which is related to the loss of people's stability (Jonkman
 214 et al., 2008), is applied to the human dimension whereas the flow depth variable is applied to the infrastructure dimension.
 215 The results obtained from the risk matrix reveal areas at high risk, which are expected to have serious negative consequences
 216 due to the combination of hazard and vulnerability conditions. In-depth analysis of these areas allows to identify the causes of
 217 these results and to propose adequate RRM according to each of the components, dimensions and variables considered to
 218 perform the risk assessment.

219 **2.4 Risk reduction measures**

220 A method has been developed to identify, recommend and prioritize most-suitable alternatives for tsunami risk reduction based
 221 on the risk analysis and site-specific conditions. The very first step has been the development of a RRM catalogue, to finally
 222 obtain a set of site-specific and target-oriented countermeasures. This method facilitates the decision-making process by
 223 connecting scientific and technical results with risk management.

224 The work focuses on the straightforward feeding/reduction relation among the different risk components (i.e. hazard, exposure
 225 and vulnerability) and the risk reduction measures focused on the pre-event stage (see Figure 5).



226
 227 **Figure 5. Interactions between the different components of risk assessment and the pre-event approaches of risk reduction measures**

228 Accordingly, two main strategies are identified to achieve a long-term coastal flooding risk reduction: preparedness and
 229 prevention, which are based on the concepts defined by UN (2016) and UNISDR (2009).

230 Preparedness actions focus on the knowledge, capacities and skills developed to anticipate and respond to the impacts of the
 231 event, and include the following: (i) risk assessment and mapping, (ii) social and institutional awareness, educational and
 232 capacity building measures, and (iii) emergency measures. The risk assessment and planning is the first step of the risk
 233 management cycle, providing essential guidance within the decision-making process. The social and institutional measures
 234 enhance the knowledge and capacities developed by communities and individuals to effectively anticipate and respond to the
 235 impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events, as stated by UN (2016). The emergency measures ensure public safety
 236 by issuing alerts and planning evacuation of people and certain goods (e.g. vessels) at risk, to safe areas or shelters when a
 237 tsunami is detected. There are some other preparedness measures, which are oriented to the post-event phase of the disaster
 238 management, such as contingency planning, stockpiling of equipment and supplies and arrangement for coordination.

239 Prevention refers to actions that aim at shielding or protecting from the hazard through activities taken in advance, by reducing
 240 the hazard itself, the exposure to that hazard or the vulnerability of the exposed people or goods. These include (i) engineering-
 241 based measures, (ii) nature-based measures, and (iii) coastal planning and architectural measures. The engineering-based
 242 measures, i.e., controlled disruption of natural processes by using long term man-made structures (hard engineering solution)
 243 help to reduce the intensity of the hazard. The nature-based measures, i.e., the use of ecological principles and practices (soft
 244 engineering solution) help to reduce the intensity of the hazard and to enhance coastal areas safety while boosting ecological
 245 wealth, improving aesthetics, and saving money. The coastal planning and architectural measures, i.e. regulations and good
 246 practices, reduce the exposure and vulnerability mainly related to the infrastructure dimension.

247 Table 2 shows the set of RRM developed (based on UNFCC, 1999; Nicholls et al., 2007; UNESCO, 2009a, Linham et al.,
 248 2010), organised by strategies, approaches and specific goals.


Strategy	Approach	Code	Mitigation measure	Specific Goal
Preparedness	Risk Mapping and Assessment	RA. 1	Hazard, Vulnerability and Risk	V
	Social and institutional capacity	PR. 1	Raising awareness	E _t and V
		PR. 2	Capacity building	
		PR. 3	Education	
	Emergency planning	EM. 1	Early Warning Systems	E _t
		EM. 2	Evacuation planning	
Prevention	Engineering-based	EN. 1	Seawalls and sea dykes	H
		EN. 2	Breakwaters	
		EN. 3	Movable barriers and closure dams	
		EN. 4	Land claim	
	Nature-based	NA. 1	Managed realignment	H
		NA. 2	Beach nourishment	
		NA. 3	Artificial sand dunes and dune restoration	
		NA. 4	Living shorelines	
		NA. 5	Wetland restoration	
	Coastal Planning and Architectural	PL. 1	Building standards	V
		PL. 2	Flood proofing	
		PL. 3	Coastal setbacks	E _p

249 **Table 2. Strategies, approaches, measures and specific goals for risk reduction derived from coastal risk due to tsunami hazard (H:**
250 **hazard, E_p: permanent exposure, E_t: temporary exposure, V: vulnerability).**

251 The catalogue has been developed following this concepts and structure. Each measure is analysed and characterised by means
252 of individual RRM-cards that include the specific objective pursued and description of the measure in several sections:
253 rationale, preliminary requirements, supplementary measures, efficiency, durability and initial cost analysis. Each card
254 includes a list of stakeholders involved in the implementation of the specific RRM in Oman, and the estimation of the current
255 capacity for implementation, based on the information provided by the stakeholder panel of experts. Each card also contains a
256 scheme, several figures and a suitability analysis, which is performed through a SWOT analysis. Finally, it is incorporated a
257 specific bibliographic reference list that permits a deeper study of each measure.

258 This RRM catalogue is the basis for the next step, the selection and prioritization of the specific set of countermeasures for
259 each area. It is also worth to mention that a combination of measures from different approaches often offers an effective risk
260 reduction strategy, even enhancing the performance of the individual measures when implemented at the same time.

261
262 The methodology for the selection and prioritization of the RRM has been designed to ensure its adequacy to site-specific
263 conditions at local scale among those proposed in the catalogue. It is summarized in three main steps (see Figure 6): (i)
264 determination of the hotspots, (ii) selection of the recommended RRM through a decision matrix and (iii) the prioritization of
265 RRM.



266

267 **Figure 6. Scheme of the methodology for the prioritization of recommended tsunami risk reduction measures (S: participation of**
 268 **stakeholder panel of local and international experts on coastal and risk management).**

269 **2.4.1 Determination of hotspots**

270 The first step is the determination of hotspots, which are the zones in which RRM will be further proposed. Coastal hotspots
 271 (HS) are identified in consensus with the stakeholder panel, including built-up populated areas and the following areas of
 272 special interest: (i) relevant infrastructures such as transport and communications infrastructures (airports and sea-ports),
 273 supply infrastructures (power and water) and dangerous infrastructures (refineries, dangerous industries areas and military
 274 bases); (ii) touristic regions, where there is significant seasonal variation in the population and (iii) environmental conservation
 275 areas, to consider the fragile and complex systems where the coastal ecosystems converge with the marine dynamics and the
 276 human activities, which include lagoons, mangroves and turtle nesting areas.

277 After the identification of the HS, it is evaluated whether they are exposed to tsunami hazard (i.e. located in the flooded area)
 278 and if they exceed the risk class threshold as shown in Figure 6, in order to determine the units that will feed the decision
 279 matrix into the second phase. Because of their significance, the scarcity of data when performing the vulnerability assessment
 280 and the relevance given by local stakeholders, touristic regions and environmental conservation areas will move to the next
 281 step if the HS is exposed, regardless the risk level. In all other cases, for those HS under very low, low risk or not expose, no
 282 countermeasures will be assigned. The HS characterization is carried out by assigning elevation characteristics (highlighting
 283 low-lying areas and wadis), a geology categorization (bare consolidated or non-consolidated substratum) and the land cover
 284 (cropland, built-up areas and vegetation-covered areas).

285 **2.4.2 Selection of risk reduction measures**

286 The second stage consists in the preliminary assignment of RRM to each HS according to the decision matrix. The matrix,
 287 which was validated by the stakeholder panel, is fed by the specific characteristics of each HS and by type of HS, as described


288 previously. Table 3 shows the decision matrix, already sorted by the ratings of the stakeholder panel of experts on coastal risk
 289 management in Oman, as explained in section 2.4.3.
 290 The assignment of each recommended measure (highly recommended, recommended or not recommended) is based on the
 291 information described in each of the RRM-cards and depends on the characteristics that have determined the type HS. On one
 292 hand, the topography of the area, with a focus on the low-lying areas and wadis, where coastal and pluvial flooding occurs on
 293 a regular basis, at least annually. Likewise, the geology and land cover is analysed to consider the bedrock and type of land
 294 use, that condition the suitability of one or another measure. Finally, as shown in the decision matrix, the type of hotspot also
 295 conditions the suitability of the RRM preliminary selection. The sets of RRM obtained according to the decision matrix for
 296 each of the determinants are merged, and finally the most restricted recommendation is considered.

RRM Code	Risk Reduction Measure	Topography Flood prone areas (Low-lying/wadis)	Geology			Land cover			Types of HS				Prioritization Stakeholders ranking
			Bare non - consolidated	Bare consolidated	Built-up	Crop land	Covered by vegetation	Lagoons/ mangroves	Turtle nesting areas	Touristic areas	Relevant infrastructures		
PR. 1	Social and Institutional Raising awareness	++	+	+	++	+	+	++	++	++	++	1	
EM. 1	Emergency Planning Early Warning Systems	++	+	+	++	+	+	+	+	++	++	2	
PR. 3	Social and Institutional Education	++	+	+	++	+	+	++	++	++	++	3	
RA. 1	Hazard, Vulnerability and Risk Assessment	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	4	
EM. 2	Emergency Planning Evacuation planning	++	+	+	++	++	+	+	+	++	++	5	
PR. 2	Social and Institutional Capacity building	++	+	+	++	+	+	++	++	++	++	6	
EN. 2	Breakwaters	++	+	+	++	+	+	-	-	+	++	7	
NA. 3	Artificial sand dunes and dune restoration	++	++	+	-	+	++	-	++	+	+	8	
NA. 4	Living shorelines	++	+	-	++	+	++	++	++	+	+	9	
PL. 3	Coastal setbacks	++	+	+	++	+	++	+	+	+	+	10	
NA. 5	Wetland restoration	++	+	-	-	+	++	++	++	+	+	11	
PL. 1	Building standards	++	+	+	++	+	+	+	+	+	+	12	
EN. 4	Land claim	++	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	++	13	
NA. 2	Beach nourishment	++	++	+	-	+	++	-	++	+	+	14	
PL. 2	Flood proofing	++	+	+	++	+	+	+	+	+	+	15	
NA. 1	Managed realignment	++	+	-	-	+	+	-	++	+	+	16	
EN. 1	Seawalls and sea dykes	++	+	+	++	+	+	-	-	+	++	17	
EN. 3	Movable barriers and closure dams	++	+	+	++	+	+	-	-	+	++	18	

297 **Table 3. Decision matrix for the selection of recommended RRM (+: highly recommended; ++: recommended; -: not recommended).**
 298 **Last column: prioritization of RRM according to the stakeholder panel ratings on Oman risk management. The matrix is presented**
 299 **ordered by these prioritization results.**

300 **2.4.3 Prioritization of risk reduction measures**

301 Finally, in the third phase, the prioritization analysis considers the characteristics of each measure, its technical and economic
 302 requirements, efficiency and durability, the SWOT analysis and the capacity of the country to implement them. In addition to
 303 technical criteria, there are subjective aspects, including local knowledge and expertise, which should be taken into account
 304 when selecting certain recommended RRM as preferred over others. Results of this preferences, shown in figure Figure 7, are
 305 also reflected in the sorting of Table 3, based on the last column.



306
 307 **Figure 7. Scoring of the RRM according to the stakeholder panel ratings (1: the least preferred; 5: most preferred)**

308 **3 Results**

309 This section presents two types of results. First, sections 3.1 Tsunami risk assessment and 3.2 Tsunami risk reduction in
 310 Oman deal with technical results obtained from the application of the methodology to the Sultanate of Oman. Section 3.1
 311 Tsunami risk assessment describe the most relevant results of the tsunami risk assessment and 3.2 one example regarding the
 312 risk reduction measures selected and prioritized for a specific site. Finally, section 3.3 Science-based support for the tsunami
 313 DRR decision making process describe the management tools developed and its usefulness for the tsunami DRR decision-
 314 making process.

315 **3.1 Tsunami risk assessment**


316 The tsunami hazard analysis indicates that the greater flooded area is located in the northern plain and in one section of the
 317 eastern face of the country, as shown in figure Figure 8a (country’s wilayats are sorted from north to south in this and following
 318 graphs). However, the greatest flooded area does not necessarily yield the greatest the impact. In fact, the vulnerability analysis
 319 show that the elements at risk are not homogenously distributed along these flooded areas. The greatest values for the exposure
 320 are on the northern plain, especially between Shinas and Bawshar Wilayats (see figure Figure 8b and Figure 8c). Saham,
 321 Suwayq, Al Musanaah, Barka and As Seeb Wilayats have the highest percentage of exposed population, all above 10%, the
 322 latter two more than 15%, whereas there is almost no exposure in the coastline from Sur to Dalkut Wilayats, with most of
 323 relative values below 1%. The Wilayat Al Jazir, even if having a low absolute number of exposed population, represents about
 324 8% of the total, ranking on the side of the most exposed in relative terms. Regarding the exposure of buildings and
 325 infrastructures, the pattern is very similar. The highest rates of exposure take place in the northern area, especially from Sinas
 326 to As Seeb Wilayats (with exposure values over 40%), with the exception of Liwa. In the rest of the country, Jaalan Bani Bu
 327 Ali and Al Jazir have the highest values, with 45% (about 8,300 items) and 25% (about 750 elements) respectively.

328 The vulnerability assessment reveals the different characteristics of each wilayat in terms of both population and infrastructure,
329 being the highest values correlated to the highest exposure values. In general, the most representative variables of the human
330 vulnerability assessment along the entire coast are the “expatriates” and the “sensitive age groups”, both around the 30% of
331 the total population exposed (Figure 8b). The variable that contributes less to the human vulnerability is “disable”, but even if
332 not very representative in relative values (about 2% of total exposure), it was maintained in the analysis because of its relevance
333 and importance within the risk assessment.


334 As for the infrastructure dimension (Figure 8c and Figure 8d), the vulnerability analysis highlights that “critical buildings”
335 category are the most affected, being around 96% of all sensitive and exposed buildings. The 70% of the buildings within this
336 class are religious, being the wilayats Saham and As Suwayq the most affected. Despite their lower absolute number, it is
337 necessary to consider the other variables that feed the infrastructure vulnerability analysis due to their significant relevance in
338 case of an emergency (emergency, supply, dangerous and strategic), as described in the risk assessment section. In this sense,
339 Figure 8d shows their distribution along the coastal wilayats, highlighting Sohar, where ten petrochemical industries, three
340 container terminals, two bulk liquid terminals, one general cargo terminal and a sugar refinery could be affected. All of these
341 industries are located within the area and surroundings of the Port of Sohar.

342


343 Integrated vulnerability results are shown in Figure 9a for both human and infrastructure dimensions. According to the
344 vulnerability classification, the colour ramp varies from green to red, being the green the lowest value of the index and red the
345 highest. Note that, for a better understanding, the representation is at the wilayat level, while the vulnerability analysis is
346 performed exclusively for the potentially inundated area due to the tsunami hazard considered. The highest vulnerability scores
347 mainly corresponds with the wilayats located in the northern plain area. Analysing the differences among them, it may be
348 concluded that the most vulnerable wilayats (sorted from north to south) are Sohar, Saham (highest IVI score), As Suwayq,
349 Barka, As Seeb (highest HVI score) and Bawshar.




a)



b)




c)



d)

350
351 **Figure 8. Tsunami Risk assessment: (a) Tsunami flooded area and exposure, (b) Human exposure and vulnerability variables, (c)**
352 **and (d) Infrastructures exposure and vulnerability variables.**


353 Finally, Figure 9b shows the integrated risk map as a synthesis, indicating the amount of area disaggregated by each risk level
354 and wilayat, which permits to know the amount of population and infrastructures per level. Therefore, it is shown that the
355 northern area of the country would be the most affected by the tsunami scenario modelled in this work, both because of the
356 greater impact of the hazard and the higher degree of exposure and vulnerability.



357

358 **Figure 9. (a) IVI and HVI: Infrastructure and human vulnerability indexes; (b) Integrated tsunami risk assessment**

359 Summarizing tsunami risk results, Figure 10a shows the distribution of the exposed population by risk level and wilayat, the
 360 greater consequences being on As Seeb and Barka wilayats. Almost 55% of the exposed population is located in very high-
 361 risk areas and around 25% in high-risk areas. Regarding the infrastructure dimension, most of the exposed built-up area is
 362 located in medium risk zones (about 60%), and around a 25% in high-risk zones. Less than 1% of the built up area result in
 363 very high infrastructure risk areas. Built-up area by risk level and wilayat is presented in Figure 10b, showing that Sohar and
 364 As Seeb are the most affected wilayats both in terms of built-up area exposure and risk level.




365
 366 **Figure 10. People and built up area by risk level**

367 **3.2 Tsunami risk reduction in Oman**

368 The methodology applied for the selection and prioritization of optimal RRM, resulted in the identification of 89 hot spots
 369 (HS) along the entire coast of the country, half of them located on the north coast, mainly from Liwa to Sur wilayats. About
 370 25% of them are concentrated in the southeast area of the country, especially in wilayats Salalah (12) and Sadah (9). Mashira
 371 and Ad Duqm concentrates 10 and 5 HS respectively. According to the method followed, 79 out of the initial 89 were assigned
 372 with a set of RRM.

373 Next, an example is included to show the whole procedure, focused on the wilayat As Seeb. This wilayat concentrates the
 374 largest amount of population exposed to the highest level of risk and is the second wilayat with the greatest infrastructures risk
 375 level. The target area (the HS) is the Muscat International Airport and surroundings where, in addition to the airport itself the
 376 building of the Public Authority for Civil Aviation of Oman (PACA) that houses the Multi Hazard Early Warning System and
 377 the National Tsunami Warning Centre **is located**.

378 Figure 11 shows the selected HS, a simple view of the risk assessment results, a summary of the characterization, and the
 379 preliminary set of RRM recommended resulting from the decision matrix. The list is sorted (most preferred on top) according
 380 to the prioritization made by the stakeholder panel, based on their knowledge and expertise on the feasibility and the
 381 institutional, economic and technological capacity of the country for their implementation.




382

383 **Figure 11. RRM preliminary proposal for Wilayat As Seeb relevant infrastructure area**

384 The first six recommended RRM are related to the preparedness strategy. Based on this result, the implementation of these
 385 measures require specific supplementary studies at a greater resolution. These may be: high-resolution data collection for the
 386 risk analysis (topo-bathymetry, tsunamigenic sources characterization, and vulnerability), in-depth numerical modelling of the
 387 flooding physical process, development of a strategy for education of critical groups (most vulnerable members, leaders,
 388 institutions, government, educators, etc.), and the cooperation between the government, relief agencies and local communities
 389 to enhance the early warning systems and the evacuation planning process.

390 Regarding the prevention strategy, the first recommended countermeasure is the construction of breakwaters (EN. 2 in
 391 Figure 11). Tsunami breakwaters are usually constructed in the mouth of a bay or estuary, not in open coasts. However,
 392 according to the general workflow developed and presented in Figure 1 (point 6) a detached breakwater has been modelled
 393 to understand the efficiency of the measure. The model resulted in a local increase in the elevation of the waves in the study
 394 area **due to the transformation that the breakwater generates in the tsunami waves. The waves overtop the structure**
 395 **generating an acceleration of the flow that penetrates inland, thus increasing the flooded area** (see Figure 12 Figure 12b and
 396 Figure 12c). Therefore, although more detailed studies would be necessary, this prevention measure should be discarded at
 397 this site. The second recommended prevention measure is the “artificial sand dunes and dune restoration”. Accordingly, a
 398 more detailed study has been done in a subset of the area by means of modelling an artificial sand dune with a crest height of
 399 3 metres, showing an efficient reduction of the flooded area, as shown in Figure 12d.

400



401
 402 **Figure 12 . Detailed analysis of preliminary engineering RRM: a) Zoomed sample area; b) Modelled flooded area; c) with the**
 403 **breakwater option; d) with artificial sand dune option.**

404 Similar procedures for obtaining a preliminary set of RRM have been developed for all the hotspots and for some local areas.
 405 In-depth studies should be made to perform a second stage analysis of the recommended countermeasures, considering higher
 406 resolution of the hazard analysis and detailed information provided by the vulnerability variables and indicators.

407 3.3 Science-based support for the tsunami DRR decision making process

408 One of the main objectives of the study is to improve tsunami risk management through the effective use of the results
 409 obtained. In this sense, science and technical results are translated into two risk management tools: (i) the Tsunami Hazard,
 410 Vulnerability and Risk Atlas, and (ii) the Risk Reduction Measures Handbook. These tools have been implemented and
 411 activated by the Directorate General of Meteorology of Oman (DGMET). In addition, a knowledge and technology transfer
 412 strategy has been carried out to ensure adequate long-term management.

413 The “Tsunami Hazard, Vulnerability and Risk Atlas”, contains a comprehensive description of the methodology applied to
 414 assess the risk and all maps from the hazard analysis and vulnerability variables and indices to the final risk results. It is
 415 expected to be used as the main source for awareness and education regarding tsunamis and as the basis for further local and
 416 detailed studies. In this regards, DGMET efforts are focused in distributing and conducting follow-up meetings to all
 417 involved stakeholders, including Supreme Council for Planning, Ministry of Education, The Public Authority Of Radio And
 418 Television, National Committee for Civil Defence (NCCD), Public Authority for Civil Defence and Ambulance and Royal
 419 Oman Police-Operation. Follow up meetings are also included in the general strategy to explain the atlas information and
 420 discuss the best approaches to utilize such information for the planning and implementing policies and strategies.

421 The “Tsunami Risk Reduction Measures Handbook” is a useful manual to help in the decision-making process related with
 422 the tsunami prevention and preparedness. It includes a brief explanation of the methodology developed to select and
 423 recommend each set of measures, the catalogue of RRM, containing individual RRM-cards for each countermeasure and the
 424 results obtained for each area along the coast of Oman, including the set of recommended RRM for each specific location.
 425 Similar to the hazard, vulnerability and risk atlas, DGMET has forwarded the handbook to the government cabinet to
 426 distribute among all stakeholders, especially to the Supreme Council for Planning.

427 Finally, as an additional result of this study, a web based tool to support the tsunami early warning system (called MHRAS)
 428 was also developed, implemented and linked to the DGMET Decision Support System.

429 **These tools are the necessary starting point for the development of a strategy for education, raising awareness and capacity**
 430 **building of emergency management authorities and society in general.**

431

432 4 Conclusions

433 Integrated risk assessments are essential for identifying the most vulnerable communities and worst expected consequences,
434 as well as for designing and planning a roadmap towards risk reduction. For this reason, they should be the basis to link
435 scientific and technical advances with appropriate decision-making and effective risk management.

436 The methodology presented was developed to build an effective connection between tsunami risk assessment and tsunami risk
437 reduction, with the objective of supporting risk managers by facilitating science-based decision-making in the phases of
438 prevention and preparedness, before an event occurs.

439 The tsunami hazard modelling, based on potential earthquake sources, permitted to perform an analysis to identify the worst
440 possible scenario, considering the low frequency/high severity nature of the hazard. Thus, it permitted to estimate the worst
441 negative consequences as the main outcome of the risk assessment. The potentially most affected areas in Oman, in terms of
442 tsunami-prone flooded areas, are the northern plain of the country especially Barka and As Seeb as well as Mahawt and Al
443 Jazir wilayats on the eastern area.

444 The semi quantitative indicator-based approach for the vulnerability and risk assessment, which integrates risk components
445 (hazard, exposure and vulnerability) and the human and infrastructure dimensions, has been proved useful to discern the more
446 sensitive areas from a human-centred perspective. The indicators system is helpful for the decision-making process in two
447 ways. First, the information at the index and indicator level allows a broad insight of where the exposed elements are and
448 which are more susceptible to suffering the impact of the hazard, i.e., where to focus the efforts towards risk reduction. Second,
449 the approach permits to easily track back to the variables. This information is essential to understand the precise root causes
450 of vulnerability and risk results, to be tackled by adequate and specific DRR measures. In Oman, the most vulnerable areas
451 are located in the northern plain of Oman, highlighting wilayat As Seeb, both in the human and infrastructure dimension and
452 wilayats Saham and Suwayq in the infrastructure dimension. The eastern part, although affected by the inundation, is not so
453 vulnerable. The combination of hazard and vulnerability assessments reveals that the worst expected consequences are for As
454 Seeb and Barka wilayats in terms of human risk and for Sohar and As Seeb in terms of infrastructure risk, according to the
455 tsunami modelled in this work.

456 As for the connection between risk assessment results and risk management, for each defined tsunami-risk management area,
457 the methodology allows identifying, selecting and prioritizing a preliminary set of suitable and site-specific RRM. This analysis
458 discards non-suitable measures and allows a more in-depth exploration, defining the basis for analysing the feasibility of its
459 implementation, including its technical and economic viability.

460 The involvement and support of relevant stakeholders in charge of the risk management process is essential for the success
461 and usefulness of the method. Their encouragement has been one of the priorities throughout the application of the method to
462 achieve the main objective of minimizing the consequences that a potential tsunami could trigger in this area.

463 Through the example shown for the area of Muscat International Airport, it has been illustrated the usefulness of the
464 methodology, which can be applied in other parts of the world facing other natural events that may trigger a disaster. Local
465 conditions should be always considered in the definition of the vulnerability indicators, in order to integrate site-specific
466 conditions.

467 In this sense, with the aim of producing a useful outcome for the risk management, all the results obtained and the detailed
468 description of the method were compiled in two handy management tools. These tools permit to analyse and facilitate the
469 decision-making, to replicate and to update the study by the tsunami disaster managers of Oman, thus contributing to the
470 connection between science-based risk results and disaster risk management.

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475 2016. We also thank and appreciate the collaboration of the International Oceanographic Commission of the United Nations
476 Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization personnel (IOC-UNESCO).

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