



1       **Causes and consequences of the Sinkhole at “El Trebol” of Quito,**  
2       **Ecuador - Implications to economic damage and risk assessment**

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27



28 **Abstract**

29 The so-called “El Trébol” is a critical road interchange in Quito connecting the north  
30 and south regions of the city. In addition, it connects Quito with the highly populated  
31 “Los Chillos” valley, one of the most traveled zones in the Ecuadorian capital. El  
32 Trébol was constructed in the late sixties in order to resolve the traffic jams of the  
33 capital city and for that purpose the Machángara river was rerouted through a concrete  
34 box tunnel. In March 2008, the tunnel contained a high amount of trash furniture that  
35 had been impacting the top portion of the tunnel, compromising the structural  
36 integrity. On the 31st of March 2008 after a heavy rainfall a sinkhole of great  
37 proportions was formed in the Trébol traffic hub. In the first few minutes, with an  
38 initial diameter of 30 meters. The collapse continued to grow in the following days  
39 until the final dimensions of 120 meters in diameter and some 40 meters of depth,  
40 revealing the Machángara river at the base of the sinkhole.

41 A state of emergency was declared, the cause of the sinkhole was a result of the lack  
42 of monitoring of the older subterranean infrastructure where trash had accumulated  
43 and damaged the concrete tunnel that channelized the Machángara river until it was  
44 worn away for a length of some 20 meters, leaving behind the sinkhole and the fear of  
45 recurrence in populated areas.

46 In an intend to understand the causes and consequences of this sinkhole event, rainfall  
47 data are shown together with hydrogeological characteristics and a view back to the  
48 recent history of sinkhole lineation or arrangement of the city of Quito. The economic  
49 impact is also emphasized, where the direct costs of the damage and the  
50 reconstruction are presented and compared to indirect costs associated with this socio-  
51 natural disaster. These analyses suggest that the costs of indirect financial damage,  
52 like time loss or delay, and subsequent higher expenses for different types of vehicles,



53 are equivalent to many times the costs of the reconstruction of El Trébol.

54

55 **Keywords:** Subsidence, sinkholes, economic damage, Quito

56

### 57 **1. Introduction**

58 The so-called “El Trébol” is a critical road interchange in Quito connecting the north  
59 and south regions of the city. In addition, it connects Quito with the highly populated  
60 valley “De los Chillos”, one of the most traveled zones in the Ecuadorian capital. El  
61 Trébol was constructed in the late sixties in order to resolve the traffic jams of the  
62 capital city and for that purpose the Machángara river was rerouted through a concrete  
63 box tunnel. In March 2008, the tunnel contained a high amount of trash such as  
64 refrigerators, furniture, old parts of vehicles and even some motorbikes. These  
65 materials were impacting the top portion of the tunnel, compromising the structural  
66 integrity.

67 Considering this context, on the 31st of March 2008, during a regular working day, a  
68 heavy rainfall took place within an already extremely wet season, and around 2 p.m.,  
69 a sinkhole of great proportions was observed in the Trébol traffic hub. In the first few  
70 minutes, the sinkhole started to be generated in the form of a crater with a diameter of  
71 30 meters. The collapse continued to grow in the following days until the final  
72 dimensions of this almost round sinkhole reached approximately 120 meters in  
73 diameter and some 40 meters of depth, revealing base of the sinkhole, and the  
74 Machángara river.

75 Although fortunately no person was harmed in any way, the generation of this  
76 sinkhole paralyzed the traffic of the south-central part of the city for the following  
77 weeks and therefore the state of emergency was declared. Soon the cause of the



78 sinkhole was a result of the lack of monitoring of the older subterranean infrastructure  
79 where trash had accumulated and compromised the concrete tunnel that channelized  
80 the Machángara river until it was worn away for a length of some 20 meters leaving  
81 behind the sinkhole and the fear of recurrence in populated areas.

82 In order to understand the causes and consequences of this sinkhole event, rainfall  
83 data are shown together with hydrogeological characteristics and a view back to the  
84 recent history of sinkhole lineation or arrangement of the city of Quito. The economic  
85 impact is also emphasized, where the direct costs of the damage and the  
86 reconstruction are presented and compared to indirect costs associated with this socio-  
87 natural disaster. These analyses suggest that the indirect financial damage, like time  
88 loss or delay, and subsequent higher expenses for different types of vehicles, has been  
89 many times the costs of the reconstruction of El Trébol.

90 Sinkholes can be of artificial, natural or ~~combined origin~~ as studied and observed in a  
91 variety of cities and regions (Peak, 1991; Aisong and Jianhua, 1994; Salvati and  
92 Sasowsky, 2002; Williams, 2003; Beck, 2004; Waltham et al., 2005). Sinkhole  
93 collapses in urban areas however, may be a man-made result of a forgotten and  
94 covered as well as outdated sewer system, of which its real magnitude appears to be a  
95 potential risk of unknown proportions. ~~Such sinkholes may be absolutely devastating~~  
96 ~~in the area where they appear and the appearance itself may be with signs or without~~  
97 ~~any warning.~~ Prominent examples of sinkholes appeared in recent years in the United  
98 States like the Macungie Sinkhole in 1986 (Dougherty and Perlow Jr., 1988), Daisetta  
99 Sinkhole in 2008 (Paine et al., 2009), and in Guatemala City, Guatemala 2007 and  
100 2010 (Hermosilla, 2012) and even in desert areas like in Kuwait (Shaqour, 1994).  
101 Man induced sinkholes are associated with the increasing industrialization and  
102 urbanization of cities and the intense human economic activity in the investment of



103 the corresponding hydrological systems (Reese et al., 1997; Gutiérrez et al., 2007;  
104 Brinkmann et al., 2008; Gutiérrez et al., 2009).

105 Based on considerably high economic damages caused by sinkholes in urban areas,  
106 the monitoring and detection with geophysical tools and geographic as well as historic  
107 data of sinkholes has recently been a major focus in city planning and hazard  
108 prevention (Gondorff and Lagueux, 2000; Lei et al., 2004; Gutiérrez-Santolalla et al.,  
109 2005; Gutierrez et al., 2008; Brinkmann et al., 2008; Bruno et al., 2008; Kaufmann  
110 and Romanov, 2009; Krawczyk et al., 2012; Margiotta et al., 2012).

111 In Quito (Ecuador), a variety of sinkholes occurred during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However,  
112 it has not been until 2008, when the great sinkhole within the area called “El Trebol”  
113 appeared and reminded the city population and city planners to re-evaluate the spatial  
114 distribution of past sinkholes and further areas, which might be vulnerable of such a  
115 hazard. It is of fundamental interest to society, and authorities, to identify their  
116 potential distribution and to prevent the occurrence of further sinkholes, and assess  
117 the potential economic damage and loss of lives. Therefore, the aim of this study is of  
118 twofold as it focuses firstly on the causes of the sinkhole in 2008 and its direct and  
119 indirect economic damage, while secondly a historic reconstruction of past sinkholes  
120 and the older sewer system may be able to help to indicate where future hazards may  
121 be triggered in order to monitor and prevent them involving adequate and corrective  
122 mitigation measures in time.

123

## 124 **2. Geological setting and geo-mechanical behavior of involved deposits**

125 In Ecuador two prominent cordilleras limit to the west and to the east the so-called the  
126 Interandean Depression, which was created at the end of Lower Pliocene and where  
127 many thousands of meters of pyroclastics and sediments were deposited, mostly due



128 to the erosion and high volcanic activity up to the present day (Winter and Lavenù,  
129 1989; Tibaldi and Ferrari, 1992; Coltori and Ollier, 2000). The “El Trebol” (traffic  
130 hub) sinkhole is situated within the thick sequence of sediments of the Interandean  
131 Depression, right next to the western flanks of the Pichincha Volcanic Complex  
132 (Monzier et al., 2002; Robin et al., 2008). These Quaternary deposits are composed of  
133 the (a) Cangahua formation, (b) Conglomerates, (c) alluvial sediments and (d)  
134 refilling of sediments and materials (Clapperton and Vera, 1986).

135 The Cangahua Formation is a 25–30-m-thick sequence has usually a yellowish-  
136 brownish color and is composed of paleo-soils, fine-grained volcanic tuff, pumices,  
137 eolian-reworked volcanic ash and glacial loess as well as occasionally having mud-  
138 flows and alluvial channels (Hall and Mothes 1997). Generally the grain size  
139 distribution of the Cangahua Formation is silty to sandy, well consolidated, with low  
140 permeability and extremely stable when dry. In contact with water, the strength of  
141 these materials is highly reduced producing instability of slopes, which in turn  
142 collapse in forms of big blocks (O'Rourke and Crespo, 1988).

143 The conglomerates, that outcrop in the vicinity of the sinkhole, are composed sub-  
144 rounded to rounded blocks and gravels, with a silty to sandy compacted matrix.  
145 Nonetheless, these deposits are absent in the stratigraphy of the sinkhole. In the lower  
146 part of the sequence are sub-rounded, up to meter-sized fluvial transported blocks,  
147 surrounded by smaller material of previous terraces. This deposit is very compact,  
148 presenting a high resistance to loosening



149 In order to construct the transport exchanger designed for that site, the deviation of  
150 the Machángara river has been performed on a stretch of approximately 300 m. Above  
151 this structure a silty-sand compacted filling was placed, corresponding to materials  
152 involved in the subsidence. At the northeastern side of the compacted filling, a non



153 damaged area was observed, having a middle-high strength, these materials presented  
154 N values between 17 and 28 obtained by a Standard Penetration Test (SPT)drilling.  
155 No water phreatic level has been observed in this area. Nonetheless, at the southern  
156 and southwestern side of the slopes of the sinkhole water flows have been observed at  
157 a depth of 20 m, which will be discussed in this paper.

158

### 159 **3. Hydrological conditions**

160 The distribution of rainfall along the year considering data from 1962 shows the  
161 prevalence of two periods with abundant rainfall being these, February-May and  
162 October-November respectively, while the drier seasons correspond to June-  
163 September and December-January (EMAAP-Q, 2006; Fig. 5). On the other hand, as  
164 for the multiannual distribution of rainfall it is important to highlight that the wet  
165 season between January and March of 2008 was considered the strongest of the last  
166 20 years with accumulated rainfall during the first three months of 2008 being much  
167 higher than the recorded during other heavy rainy seasons of 1989, 1993 and 2000  
168 (Salazar et al., 2009). In particular, a peak of 21.2 l/m<sup>2</sup> was registered on the 31st of  
169 March, 2008 during a heavy rainfall that lasted 4 hours from 1p.m. to 5 p.m (INAMHI,  
170 2008; El Comercio, 2008; Salazar et al., 2009). Additionally, within the whole 2008  
171 and coinciding in the three meteorological stations closest to El Trebol, March  
172 recorded continuous raining since it was the month with the highest number of days of  
173 rain, with 27 and 29 out of 31 days in Iñaquito and Izobamba respectively (Fig 5a, 5b,  
174 5c).

175 The hydrographic network of the South Valley of Quito is classified as dendritic,  
176 having the Machángara as its main river course. The Machángara rises in the steep  
177 foothills of Atacazo volcano and crosses the valley from south-west to north-east  
178 running parallel to the basin until it reaches the Trebol area (Panecillo) where it takes



179 a turn to the East, gets deeper and flows to the valleys of Cumbayá and Tumbaco.  
180 Another important drainage is the so-called “Quebrada Grande” that has its source in  
181 the northwest foothills of Atacazo volcano and for a stretch it aligns parallel to the  
182 Machángara river until it becomes its tributary. When it exits to the valley, the  
183 Machángara river flow varies between 3 m<sup>3</sup>/sec during dry season and 170 m<sup>3</sup>/sec  
184 during the wet season. Furthermore, the Machángara river is the main sewage receiver  
185 of Quito.

186

#### 187 **5. Hydrogeology of the study area**

188 After the subsidence and collapse took place, groundwater emerged in the south and  
189 southwestern slopes at a depth of 20 meters from the upper rim of the slope (Fig. 6),  
190 These water springs contributed with a total flow of around 6 l/s, which decreased  
191 50% due to drilling of pumping wells strategically located. These springs revealed the  
192 presence of a free aquifer located in the south side of the sinkhole. Indeed, the  
193 existence of the aquifer was determined after field observations followed by three  
194 drillings, the water table is located between 12 and 15 meters deep. The aquifer is  
195 composed by granular materials within a silty sandy matrix, with a thickness of  
196 around 18 m with a gradient from southwest to northeast, the direction to the  
197 Machángara River (Fig. 7). The aquifer recharge probably takes place in the  
198 Luluncoto gorge situated 2 km to the southwestern.

199 A flow of around 10 l/s was obtained from the aquifer considering two sources: (1)  
200 the continuous pumping from the wells and (2) the water springs from the south slope  
201 of the sinkhole. Despite this 10 l/s flow that was permanently extracted, the aquifer  
202 kept on flowing, suggesting that its recharge must have been higher than 10 l/s.  
203 Therefore, this flow should be taken into account when performing any reconstruction





204 work in the area (Table 1).

205

## 206 **5. Historical hydraulic facilities of the area**

207 The site where El Trébol was constructed is about 300 - 600 m. downstream of the  
208 confluence of Jerusalem and El Tejar streams with the Machángara River. ~~Today, the~~  
209 ~~channeled stream of Jerusalem is the Boulevard 24 de Mayo Avenue and its extension~~  
210 ~~to the old bus station, current Qumandá Park.~~ The channeled stream of El Tejar, after  
211 passing below the historic center, merges and flows ~~with the stream of Manosalvas~~  
212 ~~down in the low neighborhood of San Juan,~~ in the area that is the center's transit  
213 transfer, now known as La Marin, before reaching Machángara River.

214 As a result of uncontrolled growth of the city, this natural drainage system was  
215 conducted on sewer channels below the construction of roads for vehicular traffic. ,  
216 Historical records include 12 sinking holes (Table 2; Fig. 8) of different magnitudes,  
217 defined as "... declines or collapses of roadway in the filler material streams, caused  
218 by faulty sewers"; as well as the filling, initially performed with debris and garbage,  
219 the age, type of construction and degree of deterioration of the physical work of the  
220 channels, sewers and collectors (Pewter, 1986).

221 The former sinkholes were located on the old bed of the filled streams, so we can  
222 assume that it will continue to occur, especially in periods of daily rainfall above the  
223 historical average. In the area of El Trébol, the first serious collapse was registered the  
224 31<sup>st</sup> of March 2008, 10 years after channels were made for the construction of the  
225 infrastructure to solve the problems of the traffic jams. Furthermore, there was a  
226 second sinkhole of lower rate on 10 January 2014 (Fig. 9).

227

## 228 **6. Analysis of the causes of the sinkhole**



229 The sinkhole generated in “El Trébol” site, involved 25.000 m<sup>3</sup> of earthy material  
230 disappeared. This area is the most important southern inter-connector of the city to the  
231 “Los Chillos” Valley in the eastern end of Quito, but serves as well to connect the  
232 southern to the northern side of the city, where an extremely high amount of vehicles  
233 transit daily. This site was constructed four decades before its collapse. The sinkhole  
234 started in form of a crater with a diameter of approximately 30 m, amplifying its size  
235 constantly due to the instability of the slopes, when contact water from the high  
236 precipitations prior to the event. Further presence of groundwater has been noticed in  
237 the southern slope of the sinkhole, when the diameter reached some 120 m in  
238 diameter and a depth of 40 m, determined from the top part down to the previously  
239 covered river. That river was detected after the visible collapse of the squeezed river  
240 concrete channel of the river Machángara for a distance of some 20 m. The result of  
241 this subsidence led to a traffic collapse and the declaration of the state of emergency  
242 of the Municipality of Quito. This analysis intend to identify the causes of this  
243 subsidence and afterwards to search for further areas with similar problems and  
244 vulnerabilities in order to avoid future disasters where potentially people could be  
245 involved.

246 Three hypothesis were taken into consideration as the most potential cause for this  
247 disaster: (a) extreme water discharge, (b) erosive process and chemical alteration  
248 through time and finally (c) influence of the groundwater.

### 250 **6.1. Extreme water discharge**

251 One of the most likely triggers may be the high amount of flowing and floating  
252 material that was carried by the river. A strong rainfall with 21 liters per m<sup>2</sup>, appears  
253 to have damaged the weakest area of the vault, located 145 meters from the gate of  
254 the Machángara river. Materials found two meters above the highest tunnel entrance



255 point, indicate that the channel was working under a high pressure. The detachment of  
256 the concrete cover of the vault of the channeled part of the tunnel produced a drag  
257 filler, which formed in a few hours a conduct of about 30 meters in diameter at the  
258 surface, which later got even extended.

259

## 260 **6.2 Erosive processes and chemical alteration with time**

261 As previously described, the Machángara river has a variable behavior in time.  
262 Typical significant decreases in dry seasons reached a minimum of  $3 \text{ m}^3 / \text{s}$ , while  
263 sharp increases in wet season, generated floods up to  $170 \text{ m}^3 / \text{s}$ . These variations  
264 have been the main cause for the deterioration of the structural elements of the  
265 channel (iron and concrete) and will be described below.

266

### 267 **6.2.1. Potential damage of structures by the river in dry season**

268 Considering that the Machángara River is the largest recipient of discharges of  
269 sewage and industrial effluents from the city of Quito and water consumption in the  
270 city is about  $7 \text{ m}^3 / \text{s}$  and 40% of this flow ( $2.8 \text{ m}^3 / \text{s}$ ), is for use of the southern part  
271 of Quito, then we imply that in dry seasons the flow through the river Machángara  
272 corresponds to sewage and industrial effluents that are produced in the south of the  
273 city (Arias Jiménez, 2008). Furthermore, at drier times the potential of chemically  
274 altered waters may be additionally influence structures by corrosion, also may cause  
275 systematic deterioration of the elements and the weakening of the structures as a  
276 whole. Nonetheless, as the waters flowing though the Machángara river are  
277 sometimes altered, being slightly basic, this aspect may be disregarded.


278

### 279 **6.2.2 Potential damage of structures by crescents of the river**




280 In winter times the river has high flow rates, reaching up to 170 l / s, there is sufficient  
281 capacity to both receive sewage and cause a dilution of the elements, changing hereby  
282 dramatically the water chemistry (reduction of the conductivity, pH, etc.), becoming a  
283 less aggressive water (Arias Jiménez, 2008).

284 ~~The water with the chemical conditions described above, does not cause a significant~~  
285 ~~effect on the elements of the collector at all.~~ The potential alteration is rather directly  
286 related to the high speeds of the water and sediment carried by the river (boulders  
287 large, scrap wood, etc), which colliding with the structures produce weakening,  
288 fracturing and erosion, mainly at the floor (see figure 10a) (Arias Jiménez, 2008).

289 Based on the analysis of the behavior of the river in dry and wet seasons, we may be  
290 assured  that the collapse of the channel was caused by a systematic alteration of  
291 structural elements by the erosion produced by big sediments and to a very less extend  
292 by the chemical action of the waters.

293 This hypothesis is based on the fact that in the collapsed collector on the left margin  
294 of the channel there are no vestiges of the floor. It would have a higher weight  
295 considering that the channel on that site makes a small break and the force of the  
296 water colliding directly in the union of the right gable with the floor, causing  
297 weakening and faulting. The water caused floor erosion, leaving the right transept  
298 without support and initiated a process of dragging of sediments filling and covering  
299 the channel, causing the phenomenon known as piping, a process that accelerated due  
300 to the presence of underground streams water (Arias Jiménez, 2008), as illustrated in  
301 Figures 10a-c.

302 As a result of piping a cavern was formed,  the soil lost sustainability and collapse of  
303 the filling occurred leading to the formation of the sinkhole in form of a crater. As  
304 stated above at first the sinkhole had a diameter of 30 to 40m, while a little later due



305 to the constant landslides caused by the action of rain and the presence of  
306 groundwater it reached finally a diameter of 120 to 40 m.

307 Nonetheless, we do not rule out the hypothesis that the modification of the river with  
308 the channel and squeezed river has been a factor in the collapse, because the river  
309 sought its natural course.

310

### 311 **6.3 Influence by the groundwater.**

312 A last hypothesis to be considered is the potential influence of groundwater, directly  
313 related to the construction process. For the construction of the channel and subsequent  
314 filling thereof, the designs did not consider a drainage system for groundwater that  
315 surfaces in the south slope, to avoid saturation of the filling material and control the  
316 pore pressure, which may reach very high values. There are many examples where  
317 pore pressure is associated with the fracture of walls in hydraulic works such as dams,  
318 tunnels, reservoirs, viaducts, etc. (Arias Jiménez, 2008).

319

## 320 **7. Direct and indirect financial damage**

321 The Sinkhole in the traffic exchanger known as “El Trebol” was the consequence of  
322 previous downpour rain. According to Salazar et al. (2009) January, February and  
323 March of 2008 was a record making, just the day before of the sinkhole creation, rain  
324 fell with an intensity of 21,2 lts/m<sup>2</sup>. All these heavy rain triggered an enormous  
325 pressure on old drainage system, which induced Machangara’s River drainage vault to  
326 collapse.

327 The day after sinkhole, the Ecuadorean Government create a line of credit of 60  
328 million USD to help the city and start the reconstruction (La Hora, 2008). At the same  
329 day, the Quito’s Major and the City’s Council created an emergency fund of 200



330 thousand dollars. This emergency fund was increased to about 1 million. The day  
331 after drainage vault collapsed, rebuilding process started with a team of five hydraulic  
332 excavators, five power shovels, ten roll-off trucks, four system equipment of mobile  
333 industrial lighting. In the rebuilding process 210 workers teams were at the site 24/7  
334 (El Universo, 2010). The reconstruction of the cloverleaf interchange took 8 months  
335 to full traffic recovery, yet the entire reconstruction of the site took 22 months (El  
336 Universo, 2010). El Trebol total reconstruction cost reached over 13 million US  
337 dollars (Table 3).

338 However, this overall cost do not reflect the real cost because it does not take in  
339 account the externalities implicit with the sinkhole. An externality is defined as  
340 uncompensated effects that affect user utility o wellbeing the social cost (Cowen,  
341 1992), meaning how users were affected by the sinkhole and cloverleaf interchange  
342 reconstruction. For instance, local authorities closed schools during the first week  
343 after the event, cost of students losing classes are not included neither teachers income  
344 lost who were in per hour contracts.

345 We analyzed those costs of users who were affected by and were not compensate for.  
346 Because of lack of official information, we concentrated our efforts to estimate the  
347 cost of losing time during the reconstruction of reconstruction of the cloverleaf  
348 interchange and drainage vault, as well as the additional cost in gasoline of users of  
349 this crucial cloverleaf interchange.

350 In case of additional cost in gasoline, there were eighty thousand of vehicles circulate  
351 and use El Trebol every day, in addition of 400 inter-parish public transportation  
352 buses (La Hora, 2008). In order to estimate the value lost by user, we concentrated in  
353 private transportation under the assumption that a car-owner who uses his car to go to  
354 his job and back home fill his car gas tank once a week. This assumption seems



355 reasonable for most of car owners. Yet, we did not include public transportation  
356 because we don't know how many times a transportation unit fills bus gas tank in a  
357 week. Based on public estimations, we used a value of 0.07 US dollars as additional  
358 cost that an owner has to pay to fill his gas tank. It is reasonable also to assume that a  
359 car owner spend 20 dollars/week filling his car tank. These 0.07 dollars seems a low  
360 bound, but still reasonable. Then, we multiply the value of one gallon of gasoline  
361 adding these 0.07 dollars.

362 Based on AIHE statistics (AIHE, 2015), we know that 21% of car owners used a  
363 "super premium" gasoline which has a price of 2,00 dollars/gallon and 78% uses  
364 "extra" gasoline with a price of 1,48 dollars/gallon. Based on the number of vehicles  
365 which circulated at that time "El Trebol" every day, 80.000 cars/day, we can say that  
366 approximately 17 thousand cars used "super premium" gasoline and over 62 thousand  
367 used "extra" gasoline type. We estimated that additional cost in gasoline for private  
368 car owners was 85 million of dollars for those 8 months of traffic problems at "El  
369 Trebol".

370 We did not include capital depreciation, even now, it is well known that keep a car  
371 running while waiting depreciate its value faster than normal conditions. We didn't  
372 include both public transportation and car owners who own a diesel engine car.

373 Concerning the cost of time lost (an opportunity cost), we estimate its value from per  
374 hour salary multiply for the additional time that users had to spend during the  
375 reconstruction process. We considered that a time between 25 up to 35 minutes are  
376 reasonable to believe users lost during their travel to workplaces or going back their  
377 homes. User lost between 2,23 up to 3,12 dollar/hour. This value is multiply for the  
378 total time lost during site reconstruction. Since user came from different directions,  
379 we estimate the lost value separately. According to media reports, at that time 80.000



380 private own vehicles circulated throughout “El Trebol” per day, 48.000 came “Los  
381 Chillos” Valley (CPVTOTAL), 22.000 came from southern part of Quito  
382 (CPSTOTAL), 10.000 were coming toward the valley or southern part of the city  
383 (CPAvVITOTAL) and 400 units of public transportation (CPúTOTAL). Regarding  
384 public transportation, we assume that each unit was carrying 40 passengers each trip,  
385 which it is a low bound because rush hour, these units can be a full capacity (around  
386 72 passengers).

387 Finally we estimate users’ opportunity cost multiplying per hour lost times the time of  
388 “El Trebol” reconstruction, which was total of 8 months. The users’ opportunity cost  
389 for each category is presented table 5.

390 Users lost a considerable amount of time when reconstruction took place, adding all  
391 users (the aggregate value) it turned out that the real cost of the sinkhole increases  
392 significantly. As the table shows, under the assumption that users lost only 25 min,  
393 the opportunity cost reaches over 68 million dollars during the 8 months of  
394 reconstruction, and under the assumption that user lost up to 35 minutes, the  
395 opportunity cost reaches over 95 million. As a result the real cost (under 25 min  
396 assumption) reached 133.316.960,61 dollars, a below 35 min assumption reached  
397 160.665.120,61 as real cost.



398 The ratio between reconstruction cost and the other cost presents that reconstruction  
399 cost is only a low percent of real cost, as table 6 shows, the ratio between  
400 reconstruction cost and additional gasoline cost is only 0,26 meaning that  
401 reconstruction cost is only about 26% of real cost, only 19,8% of opportunity cost for  
402 25 min, and 14,2% for 35 min.

403

## 404 **8. Conclusions**





405 As main conclusion of this event, after the analysis of cost damages we consider as a  
406 priority to carry out corresponding actions to prevent future collapses. Taking in  
407 consideration the alignment of the actual and past sinkholes, the zones in which the  
408 alignments appear, need to be reinforced in order to avoid future disasters in these  
409 areas. Besides the potential risk of lives losses, as demonstrated in our study, the real  
410 costs of damages are much higher in the indirect damage of such sinkhole events  
411 rather in the reconstruction of the disaster site itself. Unfortunately, the enforcement  
412 of the potential subsidence areas did not take place yet, as demonstrated by a new  
413 sinkhole in 2014 in a zone where the vulnerability has been previously emphasized.  
414 To prevent future collapses, from a risk-management approach we mainly suggest   
415 the need for a detailed study about hydrological and hydrogeological characteristics of  
416 urban and industrial areas; (2)  action plan to act on areas identified as potentially  
417 vulnerable with monitoring and mitigation measures; and (3) the need to develop in  
418 the future sustainable and sustainable urban and industrial projects considering a  
419 hydrogeological approach.

420

#### 421 **Acknowledgements**

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424 ~~sinkholes in one place” to publish this article.~~ Fernando Mato acknowledges support  
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557 **Table captions**

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 559

**Table 1: Characteristics of wells and slopes**

Description	Depth (m)	Diameter (inches)	Depth of phreatic level (m)	Depth of static level (m)	Depth of pumping (m)	Volume l/s.
Well 1	32	8	12	20	25	1.2
Well 2	37	8	15	22	24	2.0
Well 3	38	8	15	23	27	4.0
Slopes	20		-	-	-	3.0
					<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>10.2</b>

560

561 **Table 2: Historical register of sinkholes and collapses**

Former event	Streets (on top of former streams) where sinkholes occurred	Associated former stream
29/05/1907	Morales (La Ronda), Benalcázar y García Moreno	Jerusalem
09/05/1909	Benalcázar, Espejo	Manosalvas/La Marín
02/03/1910	Benalcázar, Sucre	El Tejar
10/04/1911	Avenida 24 de Mayo	Jerusalem
07/01/1919	Pereira al norte de Santo Domingo	Manosalvas/La Marín
06/03/1920	Flores (Manosalvas), Sucre	Manosalvas/La Marín
24/02/1921	Del Correo (Venezuela), Espejo	Manosalvas/La Marín
06/10/1922	Guayaquil, Manosalvas	Manosalvas/La Marín
06/10/1922	Mideros	Manosalvas/La Marín
14/12/1922	Morales (La Ronda), García Moreno	Jerusalem
10/01/1928	Venezuela	Manosalvas/La Marín
21/03/1928	Guayaquil, Sucre, Bolívar	Manosalvas/La Marín
25/04/1950	Rocafuerte, Guayaquil	Manosalvas/La Marín
24/01/1983	Paredes, Morales (La Ronda)	Jerusalem
29/01/1983	García Moreno, Venezuela, Guayaquil	Manosalvas La Cava

562

563 **Table 3: List of the costs of the reconstruction in US\$. Data from MDMQ (2015)**

NEW TUNNEL	7.575.872,21
RENTAL OF EQUIPMENT	352.622,93
LAND MOVEMENT	151.526,15
LABOR	801.546,35
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS	435.495,03
SERVICES	219.061,16
OTHER COSTS	31.236,78
EMOP	2.000.000,00
VIDA PARA QUITO	2.000.000,00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13.567.360,61</b>

564

565 **Table 4: Vehicle type and different gasoline prices in US\$**

VEHICLE TYPE	GASOLINE PRICE DOLLAR/GALLON	TOTAL COST <sup>1</sup>
17456	2,00	11.210.941,44
62544	1,48	40.168.258,56
<b>TOTAL GASOLINE</b>		<b>51.379.200,00</b>

1 adding 0,07 dollars



566  
567

**Table 5: Cost category expressed in delay of 25 and 35 minutes**

<b>COST CATEGORY</b>	<b>25 min</b>	<b>35 min</b>
CPVTOTAL	34.185.200,00	47.859.280,00
CPSTOTAL	15.668.216,67	21935503,33
CPAvVITOTAL	7.121.916,67	9970683,333
CPúTOTAL	11.395.066,67	15953093,33
TOTAL COST	68.370.400,00	95.718.560,00

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
**Table 6: Cost category**

<b>COST CATEGORY</b>	<b>AMOUNT \$</b>	<b>RATIO</b>
RECONSTRUCTION COST	13.567.360,61	
ADDITIONAL GASOLINE COST	51.379.200,00	0,264
OPPORTUNITY COST 25 min	68.370.400,00	0,198
OPPORTUNITY COST 35 min	95.718.560,00	0,142

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572 **Figure captions**



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Figure 1: Overview of the setting of a) Ecuador, b) Province of Pichincha, c) city of Quito, d) El Trebol and surrounding infrastructure





576

577 Figure 2: Initial stage of sinkhole at "El Trebol".




578

579 Figure 3: Panoramic view of the final stage of the sinkhole at "El Trebol". On the background the Panecillo  
580 volcanic dome.



581

582 Figure 4: View into the sinkhole with the appearance of the Machángara river at its base.




583

584 Figure 5 a, b, c: Total monthly rainfall, average multiannual rainfall number of days with rain per month  
 585 (higher than 0.1 mm) of the three meteorological stations closest to El Trebol (, Iñaquito and La Tola). A)  
 586 Izoambamba: Lat.: -0.366089, Long.: -78.555061; Alt.: 3085.00 m.a.s.l.; B) Iñaquito: Lat.: -0.175000; Long.: -  
 587 78.485278; Alt.: 2789.12; C) La Tola Lat.: -0.175000; Long.: -78.485278; Alt.: 2789.12 m.a.s.l. From INAHMI  
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
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590 Figure 6: Southern and southwestern side of the inner part of the sinkhole, where water flows.




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592 Figure 7: Conceptual model of the aquifer with the site of the wells and the flowing direction.



593


594 Figure 8: Historical subsidences at Machángara river, including the El Trébol sector (marked with the red  
595 circle).



596

597 Fig. 9: El Trébol sector with the flowing direction of the Machángara river including the sinkholes of 2008  
598 (big red circle) and the recent in 2014 (small red circle).

599



600

601 Figure 10: a) Schematic view of the channelized river, the characteristics of the terrain and of the compacted  
602 fill; b) Alteration of the compacted fill, process of piping and migration of materials, initial stage of the  
603 collapse; c) Formation of sinkhole, material drags surroundings due to river activity.

604

605