

1 **Causes and consequences of the Sinkhole at “El Trebol” of Quito,**
2 **Ecuador - Implications to economic damage and risk assessment**

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27

28 **Abstract**

29 The so-called “El Trébol” is a critical road interchange in Quito connecting the north
30 and south regions of the city. In addition, it connects Quito with the highly populated
31 “Los Chillos” valley, one of the most traveled zones in the Ecuadorian capital. El
32 Trébol was constructed in the late sixties in order to resolve the traffic jams of the
33 capital city and for that purpose the Machángara river was rerouted through a concrete
34 box tunnel. In March 2008, the tunnel contained a high amount of trash furniture that
35 had been impacting the top portion of the tunnel, compromising the structural
36 integrity. On the 31st of March 2008 after a heavy rainfall a sinkhole of great
37 proportions was formed in the Trébol traffic hub. In the first few minutes, ^{VERB MISSING} with an
38 initial diameter of 30 meters. The collapse continued to grow in the following days
39 until the final dimensions of 120 meters in diameter and some 40 meters of depth,
40 revealing the Machángara river at the base of the sinkhole.

41 A state of emergency was declared, the cause of the sinkhole was a result of the lack
42 of monitoring of the older subterranean infrastructure where trash had accumulated
43 and damaged the concrete tunnel that channelized the Machángara river until it was
44 worn away for a length of some 20 meters, leaving behind the sinkhole and the fear of
45 recurrence in populated areas.

46 In an intend to understand the causes and consequences of this sinkhole event, rainfall
47 data are shown together with hydrogeological characteristics and a view back to the
48 recent history of sinkhole lineation or arrangement of the city of Quito. The economic
49 impact is also emphasized, where the direct costs of the damage and the
50 reconstruction are presented and compared to indirect costs associated with this socio-
51 natural disaster. These analyses suggest that the costs of indirect financial damage,
52 like time loss or delay, and subsequent higher expenses for different types of vehicles,

53 are equivalent to many times the costs of the reconstruction of El Trébol.

54

55 **Keywords:** Subsidence, sinkholes, economic damage, Quito

56 *IN THE FIRST TWO PARAGRAPHS REFERENCES TO FIGURES (1-4) IS COMPLETELY MISSING*

57 **1. Introduction**

58 The so-called “El Trébol” is a critical road interchange in Quito connecting the north
59 and south regions of the city. In addition, it connects Quito with the highly populated
60 valley “De los Chillos”, one of the most traveled zones in the Ecuadorian capital. El
61 Trébol was constructed in the late sixties in order to resolve the traffic jams of the
62 capital city and for that purpose the Machángara river was rerouted through a concrete
63 box tunnel. In March 2008, the tunnel contained a high amount of trash such as
64 refrigerators, furniture, old parts of vehicles and even some motorbikes. These
65 materials were impacting the top portion of the tunnel, compromising the structural
66 integrity.

67 Considering this context, on the 31st of March 2008, during a regular working day, a
68 heavy rainfall took place within an already extremely wet season, and around 2 p.m.,
69 a sinkhole of great proportions was observed in the Trébol traffic hub. In the first few
70 minutes, the sinkhole started to be generated in the form of a crater with a diameter of
71 30 meters. The collapse continued to grow in the following days until the final
72 dimensions of this almost round sinkhole reached approximately 120 meters in
73 diameter and some 40 meters of depth, revealing ^{THE} base of the sinkhole, and the
74 Machángara river.

75 Although fortunately no person was harmed in any way, the generation of this
76 sinkhole paralyzed the traffic of the south-central part of the city for the following
77 weeks and therefore the state of emergency was declared. Soon the cause of the

RECOGNIZED AS

78 sinkhole was a result of the lack of monitoring of the older subterranean infrastructure
79 where trash had accumulated and compromised the concrete tunnel that channelized
80 the Machángara river until it was worn away for a length of some 20 meters leaving
81 behind the sinkhole and the fear of recurrence in populated areas.

82 In order to understand the causes and consequences of this sinkhole event, rainfall
83 data are shown together with hydrogeological characteristics and a view back to the
84 recent history of sinkhole lineation or arrangement of the city of Quito. The economic
85 impact is also emphasized, where the direct costs of the damage and the
86 reconstruction are presented and compared to indirect costs associated with this socio-
87 natural disaster. These analyses suggest that the indirect financial damage, like time
88 loss or delay, and subsequent higher expenses for different types of vehicles, has been
89 many times the costs of the reconstruction of El Trébol.

90 Sinkholes can be of artificial, natural or combined origin as studied and observed in a
91 variety of cities and regions (Beck, 1991; Aisong and Jianhua, 1994; Salvati and
92 Sasowsky, 2002; Williams, 2003; Beck, 2004; Waltham et al., 2005). Sinkhole
93 collapses in urban areas ~~however,~~ may be a man-made result of a forgotten and
94 covered as well as outdated sewer system, of which its real magnitude appears to be a
95 potential risk of unknown proportions. Such sinkholes may be absolutely devastating
96 in the area where they appear and the appearance itself may ~~be with signs or~~ without
97 any warning. Prominent examples of sinkholes appeared in recent years in the United
98 States like the Macungie Sinkhole in 1986 (Dougherty and Perlow Jr., 1988), Daisetta
99 Sinkhole in 2008 (Paine et al., 2009), and in Guatemala City, (Guatemala) 2007 and
100 2010 (Hermosilla, 2012) and even in desert areas like in Kuwait (Shaqour, 1994).
101 Man-induced sinkholes are associated with the increasing industrialization and
102 urbanization of cities and the intense human economic activity in the investment of

103 the corresponding hydrological systems (Reese et al., 1997; Gutiérrez et al., 2007;
104 Brinkmann et al., 2008; Gutiérrez et al., 2009).

105 Based on considerably high economic damages caused by sinkholes in urban areas,
106 the monitoring and detection with geophysical tools and geographic as well as historic
107 data of sinkholes has recently been a major focus in city planning and hazard
108 prevention (Orndorff and Lagueux, 2000; Lei et al., 2004; Gutiérrez-Santolalla et al.,
109 2005; Gutierrez et al., 2008; Brinkmann et al., 2008; Bruno et al., 2008; Kaufmann
110 and Romanov, 2009; Krawczyk et al., 2012; Margiotta et al., 2012).

111 In Quito (Ecuador), a variety of sinkholes occurred during the 20th century. However,
112 it has not been until 2008, when the great sinkhole within the area called “El Trebol”
113 appeared, ~~and reminded~~ ^{THAT} the city population and city planners ^{WERE REMINDED} to re-evaluate the spatial
114 distribution of past sinkholes ~~and further areas, which~~ ^{IN} might be vulnerable of such a ^{THAT}
115 hazard. It is of fundamental interest to society, and authorities, to identify their
116 potential distribution ~~and~~ ^{IN ORDER} to prevent the occurrence of further sinkholes, and assess
117 the potential economic damage and loss of lives. Therefore, the aim of this study is of
118 twofold as it focuses firstly on the causes of the sinkhole in 2008 and its direct and
119 indirect economic damage, ~~while~~ ^S secondly, a historic reconstruction of past sinkholes
120 ~~and the older sewer system may be able to help to indicate where future hazards may~~ ^{HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT}
121 be triggered in order to monitor and prevent them involving adequate and corrective ^{BY}
122 mitigation measures in time.

123

124 2. Geological setting and geo-mechanical behavior of involved deposits

125 In Ecuador two prominent cordilleras limit to the west and to the east the so-called ~~the~~
126 Interandean Depression, which was created at the end of Lower Pliocene and where
127 many thousands of meters of pyroclastics and sediments were deposited, mostly due

128 to the erosion and high volcanic activity up to the present day (Winter and Lavenù,
129 1989; Tibaldi and Ferrari, 1992; Coltori and Ollier, 2000). The “El Trebol” (traffic
130 hub) sinkhole is situated within the thick sequence of sediments of the Interandean
131 Depression, right next to the western flanks of the Pichincha Volcanic Complex
132 (Monzier et al., 2002; Robin et al., 2008). These Quaternary deposits are composed of
133 the (a) Cangahua formation, (b) Conglomerates, (c) alluvial sediments and (d)
134 refilling of sediments and materials (Clapperton and Vera, 1986).

135 The Cangahua Formation is a 25–30-m-thick sequence ~~has~~ ^{WITH} usually a yellowish-
136 brownish color ~~and~~ ^{THAT} is composed of paleo-soils, fine-grained volcanic tuff, pumices,
137 eolian-reworked volcanic ash and glacial loess as well as occasionally ~~having~~
138 flows and alluvial channels (Hall and Mothes, 1997). Generally, ^{THAT} the grain size
139 distribution of the Cangahua Formation is silty to sandy, well consolidated, with low
140 permeability and extremely stable when dry. In contact with water, the strength of
141 these materials is highly reduced producing instability of slopes, which in turn
142 collapse in forms ^{OF} of big blocks (O'Rourke and Crespo, 1988).

143 The conglomerates, that outcrop in the vicinity of the sinkhole, are composed ^{OF} sub-
144 rounded to rounded blocks and gravels, with a silty to sandy compacted matrix.
145 Nonetheless, these deposits are absent in the stratigraphy of the sinkhole. In the lower
146 part of the sequence are sub-rounded, up to meter-sized fluvial transported blocks,
147 surrounded by smaller material of previous terraces. This deposit is very compact,
148 presenting a high resistance to loosening.

149 In order to construct the transport exchanger designed for that site, the deviation of
150 the Machángara river has been performed on a stretch of approximately 300 m. Above
151 this structure a silty-sand compacted filling was placed, corresponding to materials
152 involved in the subsidence. At the northeastern side of the compacted filling, a non

153 damaged area was observed, having a middle-high strength, these materials presented
154 N values between 17 and 28 obtained ^{WITH} ~~by~~ a Standard Penetration Test (SPT)drilling.
155 No water phreatic level has been observed in this area. Nonetheless, at the southern
156 and southwestern side of the slopes of the sinkhole water flows have been observed at
157 a depth of 20 m, which will be discussed ^{LATER ON} in this paper.

158

159 3. Hydrological conditions

160 The distribution of rainfall along the year considering data from 1962 shows the
161 prevalence of two periods with abundant rainfall ^{*} ~~being these~~, February-May and
162 October-November respectively, while the drier seasons correspond to June-
163 September and December-January (EMAAP-Q, 2006; Fig. 5). On the other hand, as
164 for the multiannual distribution of rainfall, ^{IT} ~~it~~ is important to highlight that the wet
165 season between January and March of 2008 was considered the strongest of the last
166 20 years with accumulated rainfall during the first three months of 2008 being much
167 higher ^{THAN} ~~that~~ the recorded during another heavy rainy seasons of 1989, 1993 and 2000
168 (Salazar et al., 2009). In particular, a peak of 21.2 l/m² was registered on the 31st of
169 March, 2008 during a heavy rainfall that lasted 4 hours from 1p.m. to 5 p.m (INAMHI,
170 2008; El Comercio, 2008; Salazar et al., 2009). Additionally, within the whole 2008
171 and coinciding in the three meteorological stations closest to El Trebol, March
172 recorded continuous raining since it was the month with the highest number of days of
173 rain, with 27 and 29 out of 31 days in Iñaquito and Izobamba respectively (Fig 5a, 5b,
174 5c).

175 The hydrographic network of the South Valley of Quito is classified as dendritic,
176 having the Machángara as its main river course. The Machángara rises in the steep
177 foothills of Atacazo volcano and crosses the valley from south-west to north-east
178 running parallel to the basin until it reaches the Trebol area (Panecillo) where it takes

* PLEASE ALSO
REPORT THE
RAINFALL VALUE
IN MILLIMETERS

→ 2010 IN THE REFERENCE LIST
→ MISSING IN THE
REFERENCE LIST

179 a turn to the East, gets deeper and flows to the valleys of Cumbayá and Tumbaco.
180 Another important drainage is the so-called “Quebrada Grande” that has its source in
181 the northwest foothills of Atacazo volcano and for a stretch it aligns parallel to the
182 Machángara river until it becomes its tributary. When it exits to the valley, the
183 Machángara river flow varies between 3 m³/sec during dry season and 170 m³/sec
184 during the wet season. Furthermore, the Machángara river is the main sewage receiver
185 of Quito.

186

187 5. Hydrogeology of the study area

188 After the subsidence and collapse took place, groundwater emerged in the south and
189 southwestern slopes at a depth of 20 meters from the upper rim of the slope (Fig. 6),

190 These water springs contributed with a total flow of around 6 l/s, which decreased
191 50% due to drilling of pumping wells strategically located. These springs revealed the
192 presence of a free aquifer located in the south side of the sinkhole. Indeed, the

193 existence of the aquifer was determined after field observations followed by three
194 drillings; the water table is located between 12 and 15 meters deep. The aquifer is
195 composed by granular materials within a silty-sandy matrix, with a thickness of

196 around 18 m with a gradient from southwest to northeast, ~~the direction to the~~
197 Machángara River (Fig. 7). The aquifer recharge probably takes place in the
198 Luluncoto gorge situated 2 km to ^{THE} the southwestern.

199 A flow of around 10 l/s was obtained from the aquifer considering two sources: (1)
200 the continuous pumping from the wells and (2) the water springs from the south slope
201 of the sinkhole. Despite this 10 l/s flow that was permanently extracted, the aquifer
202 kept on flowing, suggesting that its recharge must have been higher than 10 l/s.

203 Therefore, this flow should be taken into account when performing any reconstruction

204 work in the area (Table 1).

205

206 5. Historical hydraulic facilities of the area

207 The site where El Trébol was constructed is about 300 - 600 m~~X~~ downstream of the
208 confluence of Jerusalem and El Tejar streams with the Machángara River. Today, the
209 channeled stream of Jerusalem is the ~~Boulevard~~ 24 de Mayo Avenue and its extension
210 to the old bus station, current Qumandá Park. The channeled stream of El Tejar, after
211 passing below the historic center, merges and flows with the stream of Manosalvas
212 down in the low neighborhood of San Juan, in the area that is the center's transit
213 transfer, now known as La Marin, before reaching Machángara River.

214 As a result of uncontrolled growth of the city, this natural drainage system was
215 conducted on sewer channels below the construction of roads for vehicular traffic. ~~X~~

216 Historical records include 12 ~~sinking holes~~ ^{SINKHOLES} (Table 2; Fig. 8) of different magnitudes,
217 defined as "~~X~~ declines or collapses of roadway in the filler material streams, caused
218 by faulty sewers"^{*)} as well as the filling, initially performed with debris and garbage,
219 the age, type of construction and degree of deterioration of the physical work of the
220 channels, sewers and collectors (Pewter, 1986). ^{THIS IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND POSSIBLE SIMILARITIES WITH EL TREBOL SINKHOLE}

221 The former sinkholes were located on the old bed of the filled streams, so we can
222 assume that ~~it~~ ^{THEY} will continue to occur, especially in periods of daily rainfall above the
223 historical average. In the area of El Trébol, the first serious collapse was registered the
224 31st of March 2008, 10 years after channels were made for the construction of the
225 infrastructure to solve the problems of the traffic jams. Furthermore, there was a
226 second sinkhole of lower rate ^{*} on 10 January 2014 (Fig. 9). ^{* WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY "LOWER RATE"? "SMALLER"? WHAT CAUSED IT?}

227

228 6. Analysis of the causes of the sinkhole

229 The sinkhole generated in "El Trébol" site, involved 25.000 m³ of earthy material
230 ~~disappeared~~. This area is the most important southern inter-connector of the city to the
231 "Los Chillos" Valley in the eastern end of Quito, but serves as well to connect the
232 southern to the northern side of the city, where an extremely high amount of vehicles
233 transit daily. This site was constructed four decades before its collapse. The sinkhole
234 started in form of a crater with a diameter of approximately 30 m, amplifying its size
235 constantly due to the instability of the slopes, when contact water from the high
236 precipitations prior to the event. Further presence of groundwater has been noticed in
237 the southern slope of the sinkhole, when ~~the diameter~~ reached some 120 m ~~in~~
238 ~~diameter~~ and ~~a depth~~ of 40 m, determined from the top part down to the previously
239 covered river. That river was detected after the visible collapse of the squeezed river
240 concrete channel of the river Machángara for a distance of some 20 m. The result of
241 this subsidence led to a traffic collapse and the declaration of the state of emergency
242 of the Municipality of Quito. This analysis intend to identify the causes of this
243 subsidence and afterwards to search for further areas with similar problems and
244 vulnerabilities in order to avoid future disasters where potentially people could be
245 involved.
246 Three hypothesis were taken into consideration as the most ~~potential~~ cause for this
247 disaster: (a) extreme water discharge, (b) erosive process and chemical alteration
248 through time and finally (c) influence of ~~the~~ groundwater.

DISPLACED

THIS PART IS NOT APPROPRIATE HERE =

* PLEASE REPHRASE

DIAMETER

IN DEPTH

IT

IN

THIS IS MORE APPROPRIATE IN THE INTRODUCTION

PROBABLE

6.1. Extreme water discharge

251 One of the most likely triggers may be the high amount of flowing and floating
252 material that was carried by the river. A strong rainfall with 21 liters per m², appears
253 to have damaged the weakest area of the vault, located 145 ~~meters~~
254 the Machángara river. Materials found two ~~meters~~ above the highest tunnel entrance

USE MILLIMETERS

↓
DO YOU MEAN "UPSTREAM/UPHILL"?

HOW WAS THIS INDICATED?

255 point, indicate that the channel was working under a high pressure. The detachment of
256 the concrete cover of the vault of the channeled part of the tunnel produced a drag
257 filler, which formed in a few hours a conduct of about 30 meters in diameter at the
258 surface, which later got even extended.

WHAT DO YOU MEAN
BY "DRAG FILLER"?

260 6.2 Erosive processes and chemical alteration with time

261 As previously described, the Machángara river has a variable behavior in time.
262 Typical significant decreases in dry seasons reached a minimum of $3 \text{ m}^3 / \text{s}$, while
263 sharp increases in wet season, generated floods up to $170 \text{ m}^3 / \text{s}$. These variations
264 have been the main cause for the deterioration of the structural elements of the
265 channel (iron and concrete) and will be described below.

267 6.2.1. Potential damage of structures by the river in dry season

268 Considering that the Machángara River is the largest recipient of discharges of
269 sewage and industrial effluents from the city of Quito and water consumption in the
270 city is about $7 \text{ m}^3 / \text{s}$ and 40% of this flow ($2.8 \text{ m}^3 / \text{s}$), is ~~for use~~ ^{A PRODUCT} of the southern part
271 of Quito, then we imply* that in dry seasons the flow through the river Machángara
272 corresponds to sewage and industrial effluents that are produced in the south of the
273 city (Arias Jiménez, 2008). Furthermore, at drier times the potential of chemically
274 altered waters may ~~be~~ ^{AND} additionally influence structures by corrosion, ~~also~~ may cause
275 systematic deterioration of the elements and the weakening of the structures as a
276 whole. Nonetheless, as the waters flowing though the Machángara river are
277 sometimes altered, being slightly basic, this aspect may be disregarded.

YOU STATE THAT
THE RIVER HAS
A CORROSIVE
POTENTIAL AND
THEN YOU NEGATE IT.
THIS IS VERY CONFUSING.
PLEASE EXPLAIN

279 6.2.2 Potential damage of structures by crescents of the river

* I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE REASON BEHIND THIS ASSUMPTION. INSTEAD I IMPLY THAT THIS PERCENTAGE IS KEPT ALSO IN DRY SEASON. ~~WHY NOT~~ PLEASE EXPLAIN THIS ASSUMPTION AND WHY IT IS NECESSARY

Equation $= m^3/s?$
↑

280 In winter times the river has high flow rates, reaching up to 170 l / s, there is sufficient
281 capacity to both receive sewage and cause a dilution of the elements, changing hereby
282 dramatically the water chemistry (reduction of the conductivity, pH, etc.), becoming a
283 less aggressive water (Arias Jiménez, 2008).

284 The water with the chemical conditions described above, does not cause a significant
285 effect on the elements of the collector at all. The potential alteration is rather directly
286 related to the high speeds of the water and sediment carried by the river (boulders
287 ~~large~~, scrap wood, etc), which ~~colliding~~ ^{COLLIDE} with the structures ~~produce~~ ^{PRODUCING} ~~weakening~~,
288 fracturing and erosion, mainly at the floor (see figure 10a) (Arias Jiménez, 2008).

289 Based on the analysis of the behavior of the river in dry and wet seasons, we may be
290 assume that the collapse of the channel was caused by a systematic alteration of
291 structural elements by the erosion produced by big sediments and to a very less extend
292 by the chemical action of the waters.

293 This hypothesis is based on the fact that in the collapsed collector on the left margin
294 of the channel there are no vestiges of the floor. It would have a higher weight
295 considering that the channel on that site makes a small break and the force of the
296 water colliding directly in the union of the right gable with the floor, causing
297 weakening and faulting. The water caused floor erosion, leaving the right transept
298 without support and initiated a process of dragging of sediments filling and covering
299 the channel, causing the phenomenon known as piping, a process that accelerated due
300 to the presence of underground streams water (Arias Jiménez, 2008), as illustrated in

THIS WHOLE SENTENCE IS NOT CLEAR (WHAT WEIGHT?) AND THE ENGLISH MUST BE REVISED

301 Figures 10a-c.

302 As a result of piping a cavern was formed, the soil lost sustainability and collapse of
303 the filling occurred leading to the formation of the sinkhole in form of a crater. As
304 stated above at first the sinkhole had a diameter of 30 to 40m, while a little later, due

* WHERE DO YOU THINK THAT ALL THE COLLAPSED MATERIAL GO? TRANSPORTED BY THE RIVER TO THE SEA? DO YOU HAVE ANY NOTION ABOUT THIS?

305 to the constant landslides caused by the action of rain and the presence of
306 groundwater, it reached finally a diameter of 120 to 40 m.

307 Nonetheless, we do not rule out the hypothesis that the modification of the river with
308 the channel and squeezed river has been a factor in the collapse, because the river
309 sought its natural course.

PLEASE
EXPLAIN MORE
IN DETAIL

311 6.3 Influence by the groundwater.

312 A last hypothesis to be considered is the potential influence of groundwater, directly
313 related to the construction process. For the construction of the channel and subsequent
314 filling thereof, the designs did not consider a drainage system for groundwater that
315 surfaces in the south slope, to avoid saturation of the filling material and control the
316 pore pressure, which may reach very high values. There are many examples where
317 pore pressure is associated with the fracture of walls in hydraulic works such as dams,
318 tunnels, reservoirs, viaducts, etc. (Arias Jiménez, 2008).

320 7. Direct and indirect financial damage

321 The Sinkhole in the traffic exchanger known as "El Trebol" was the consequence of
322 previous downpour rain. According to Salazar et al. (2009) January, February and
323 March of 2008 ~~was a record making~~ ^{EXPERIENCED RECORDED RECORD RAINFALL.} just the day before of the sinkhole creation, rain
324 fell with an intensity of 21,2 ^{mm} ~~lts/m²~~. All these heavy rain triggered an enormous
325 pressure ^{THE} on old drainage system, which induced Machangara's River drainage vault to
326 collapse.

327 The day after ^{THE} sinkhole, the Ecuadorean Government created a line of credit of 60
328 million USD to help the city and start the reconstruction (La Hora, 2008). ^{ON} At the same
329 day, the Quito's Major and the City's Council created an emergency fund of 200

330 thousand ^{USD} dollars. This emergency fund was increased to about 1 million. The day
331 after ^{THE} drainage vault collapsed, rebuilding process started with a team of five hydraulic
332 excavators, five power shovels, ten roll-off trucks, ^{AND} four system ~~equipment~~ of mobile
333 industrial lighting. In the rebuilding process 210 workers teams were at the site 24/7
334 (El Universo, 2010). The reconstruction of the cloverleaf interchange took 8 months
335 ^{BEFORE} ~~to~~ full traffic recovery, yet the entire reconstruction of the site took 22 months (El
336 Universo, 2010). El Trebol total reconstruction cost reached over 13 million USD
337 ~~dollars~~ (Table 3). ^{2008 IN THE REFERENCES}

338 However, this overall cost ^{DOES} ~~do~~ not reflect the real cost because it does not take ^{INTO} in
339 account the externalities implicit with the sinkhole. An externality is defined as
340 uncompensated effects that affect user utility ^{OR} wellbeing the social cost (Cowen,
341 1992), meaning how users were affected by the sinkhole and cloverleaf interchange
342 reconstruction. For instance, local authorities closed schools during the first week
343 after the event, cost of students losing classes are not included neither teachers income
344 lost who were in per hour contracts.

THE ENGLISH
HERE MUST BE
HEAVILY REVISED.
ALSO, I SUGGEST
THE USE OF THE
TERM "INDIRECT
COST" INSTEAD OF
"EXTERNALITY"

345 We analyzed those costs of users who were affected by and were not compensate ^{DI} for.
346 Because of lack of official information, we concentrated our efforts ^{IN} ~~to~~ estimate ^{-ING} the
347 cost of losing time during the reconstruction ~~of reconstruction~~ of the cloverleaf
348 interchange and drainage vault, as well as the additional cost in gasoline of users of
349 this crucial cloverleaf interchange.

DO YOU MEAN THE
ADDITIONAL ~~USE~~
GASOLINE USED
DURING THE
TRAVEL ALONG THE DEVI-
ATED ROUTE?

350 In case of additional cost in gasoline, there were eighty thousand of vehicles circulate
351 and use El Trebol every day, in addition of 400 inter-parish public transportation
352 buses (La Hora, 2008). In order to estimate the value lost by user, we concentrated in
353 private transportation under the assumption that a car-owner who uses his car to go to
354 his job and back home ^{*} fills his car gas tank once a week. This assumption seems

POOR ENGLISH
ENTER

ASSUMING AN AVERAGE FUEL TANK OF 35 LITRES I THINK IT IS VERY UNLIKELY THAT AN AVERAGE USER CONSUMES 35 l IN A WEEK. THIS ASSUMPTION IS OVERESTIMATING. AROUND HALF OF THAT AMOUNT IS MORE PROBABLE IN MY OPINION, UNLESS YOU CAN CITE STATISTICS PROVING DIFFERENTLY

* USE ALWAYS THE SAME NAME. CHOSE AMONG USD OR US DOLLARS OR (WORSE) DOLLAR
A

355 reasonable for most of car owners. Yet, we did not include public transportation
356 because we ~~don't~~ ^{DID NOT} know how many times a transportation unit fills bus gas tank in a
357 week. Based on public estimations, we used a value of 0.07 US dollars ^{*} as additional
358 cost that an owner has to pay to fill his gas tank. It is reasonable also to assume that a
359 car owner spends 20 dollars/week filling his car tank. These 0.07 dollars seems a low
360 bound, but still reasonable. Then, we multiply the value of one gallon of gasoline
361 adding these 0.07 dollars. ^{USE LITRES}

362 Based on AIHE statistics (AIHE, 2015), we know that 21% of car owners used a
363 "super premium" gasoline which has a price of 2,00 dollars/gallon and 78% uses
364 "extra" gasoline with a price of 1,48 dollars/gallon. Based on the number of vehicles
365 which circulated at that time "El Trebol" every day, 80.000 cars/day, we can say that
366 approximately 17 thousand cars used "super premium" gasoline and over 62 thousand
367 used "extra" gasoline type. We estimated that additional cost in gasoline for private
368 car owners was 85 million of dollars for those 8 months of traffic problems at "El
369 Trebol".

370 We did not include capital depreciation, even now, it is well known that keep a car
371 running while waiting depreciate its value faster than normal conditions. We ~~didn't~~ ^{DID NOT}
372 include ~~both~~ ^{NOR} public transportation ^{and} car owners who own a diesel engine car. ^{UNCLEAR. PLEASE REWRITE}

373 Concerning the cost of time lost (an opportunity cost), we estimate its value from per
374 hour salary multiply ^{IED} for the additional time that users had to spend during the
375 reconstruction process. We ~~considered~~ ^{ASSUMED} that a time between 25 up to 35 minutes are
376 ~~reasonable to believe~~ users lost during their travel to workplaces or going back their
377 homes. User lost between 2,23 up to 3,12 dollar/hour. This value is multiply ^{IED} for the
378 total time lost during site reconstruction. Since users came from different directions,
379 we estimate the lost value separately. According to media reports, at that time 80.000

* WHAT ARE THESE 4 DIFFERENT NAMES? WHY DO NOT YOU CALL THEM JUST CATEGORY A, B, C, D?

380 private ~~own~~ vehicles circulated throughout "El Trebol" per day, 48.000 came ^{FROM} "Los
381 Chillos" Valley (CPVTOTAL), 22.000 came from southern part of Quito
382 (CPSTOTAL), 10.000 were coming toward the valley or southern part of the city
383 (CPAvVITOTAL) and 400 units of public transportation (~~CPITOTAL~~). Regarding
384 public transportation, we assume ^D that each unit was carrying 40 passengers each trip,
385 which it is a low bound because ^{DURING} rush hour, these units can be a full capacity (around
386 72 passengers).

387 Finally we estimate users' opportunity cost multiplying per hour lost times the time of
388 "El Trebol" reconstruction, which was ~~total of~~ 8 months. The users' opportunity cost
389 for each category is presented table 5.

390 Users lost a considerable amount of time when reconstruction took place. ^A Adding all
391 users (the aggregate value) it turned out that the real cost of the sinkhole increases
392 significantly. As ~~the~~ ^S table shows, under the assumption that users lost only 25 min,
393 the opportunity cost reaches over 68 million dollars during the 8 months of
394 reconstruction, and under the assumption that user lost up to 35 minutes, the
395 opportunity cost reaches over 95 million. As a result, the real cost (under 25 min

396 assumption) ~~reached~~ ^{LEADS TO} 133.316.960,61 dollars, ^{WHILE} a ~~below~~ 35 min assumption ~~reached~~ ^{LEADS TO}
397 160.665.120,61 ^{USD} as real cost. ~~HOW DO YOU OBTAIN THESE VALUES BY SUMMING THE RECONSTRUCTION~~

398 The ratio between reconstruction cost and the other cost presents that reconstruction ^{COSTS}
399 cost is only a low percent of real cost, as table 6 shows, the ratio between
400 reconstruction cost and additional gasoline cost is only 0,26 meaning that
401 reconstruction cost is only about 26% of real cost, only 19,8% of opportunity cost for
402 25 min, and 14,2% for 35 min.

403

404 **8. Conclusions**

ECONOMIC LOSSES

405 As main conclusion of this event, after the analysis of ~~cost damages~~ we consider as a
 406 priority to carry out corresponding actions to prevent future collapses. Taking in
 407 consideration the alignment of the actual and past sinkholes, the zones in which the
 408 alignments appear, need to be reinforced in order to avoid future disasters ~~in these~~
 409 ~~areas~~. Besides the potential risk of lives losses, as demonstrated in our study, ~~the real~~
 410 ~~costs of damages are much higher in the indirect damage of such sinkhole events~~
 411 ~~rather in the reconstruction of the disaster site itself~~. Unfortunately, the enforcement
 412 of the potential subsidence areas did not take place yet, as demonstrated by a new
 413 sinkhole in 2014 in a zone where the vulnerability has been previously emphasized.
 414 To prevent future collapses, from a risk-management approach we ~~mainly~~ suggest: (1)
 415 ~~the need for~~ a detailed study about hydrological and hydrogeological characteristics of
 416 urban and industrial areas; (2) an action plan to act on areas identified as potentially
 417 vulnerable with monitoring and mitigation measures; and (3) the need to develop in
 418 the future ~~sustainable and~~ sustainable urban and industrial projects considering a
 419 hydrogeological approach.


REPLACE WITH THE FOLLOWING:
 COSTS
 "THE INDIRECT DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE STUDIED SINK HOLE RESULTED TO BE MUCH HIGHER THAN THOSE DUE TO THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DISASTER SITE ITSELF"

421 Acknowledgements

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 423 support. We also acknowledge the inspiration of the Facebook group called "All scary
 424 sinkholes in one place" to publish this article. Fernando Mato acknowledges support
 425 from the Prometeo Project of the National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science,
 426 Technology and Innovation (SENESCYT), Ecuador.




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- 555
- 556
- 557

557 Table captions

558

559

Table 1: Characteristics of wells and slopes

Description	Depth (m)	Diameter (inches) (cm)	Depth of phreatic level (m)	Depth of static level (m)	Depth of DYNAMIC LEVEL pumping (m)	DISCHARGE VOLUME 1/s. m ³ /D
Well 1	32	8	12	20	25	1.2
Well 2	37	8	15	22	24	2.0
Well 3	38	8	15	23	27	4.0
Slopes	20		-	-	-	3.0
					TOTAL:	10.2

MAYBE "SPRING"?

WHAT DO YOU MEAN? I UNDERSTAND THE PRESENCE OF TWO LEVELS, BUT WHAT IS THE THIRD?

PLEASE STICK TO THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CONCERNING MEASURING UNITS

SPRING

560

561 Table 2: Historical register of sinkholes and collapses

Former event	Streets (on top of former streams) where sinkholes occurred	Associated former stream
29/05/1907	Morales (La Ronda), Benalcázar y García Moreno	Jerusalem
09/05/1909	Benalcázar, Espejo	Manosalvas/La Marín
02/03/1910	Benalcázar, Sucre	El Tejar
10/04/1911	Avenida 24 de Mayo	Jerusalem
07/01/1919	Pereira al norte de Santo Domingo	Manosalvas/La Marín
06/03/1920	Flores (Manosalvas), Sucre	Manosalvas/La Marín
24/02/1921	Del Correo (Venezuela), Espejo	Manosalvas/La Marín
06/10/1922	Guayaquil, Manosalvas	Manosalvas/La Marín
06/10/1922	Mideros	Manosalvas/La Marín
14/12/1922	Morales (La Ronda), García Moreno	Jerusalem
10/01/1928	Venezuela	Manosalvas/La Marín
21/03/1928	Guayaquil, Sucre, Bolívar	Manosalvas/La Marín
25/04/1950	Rocafuerte, Guayaquil	Manosalvas/La Marín
24/01/1983	Paredes, Morales (La Ronda)	Jerusalem
29/01/1983	García Moreno, Venezuela, Guayaquil	Manosalvas La Cava

562

563 Table 3: List of the costs of the reconstruction in US\$. Data from MDMQ (2015)

NEW TUNNEL	7.575.872,21
RENTAL OF EQUIPMENT	352.622,93
LAND MOVEMENT	151.526,15
LABOR	801.546,35
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS	435.495,03
SERVICES	219.061,16
OTHER COSTS	31.236,78
EMOP	2.000.000,00
VIDA PARA QUITO	2.000.000,00
TOTAL	13.567.360,61

USE A CONSISTENT NOTATION

EXPLAIN THESE TWO

564

565

Table 4: Vehicle type and different gasoline prices in US\$

VEHICLE TYPE	GASOLINE PRICE DOLLAR/GALLON	TOTAL COST ¹
17456	2,00	11.210.941,44
62544	1,48	40.168.258,56
TOTAL GASOLINE		51.379.200,00

1 adding 0,07 dollars

THIS TABLE IS NOT REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT. HOWEVER IT CAN BE ELIMINATED AND THE INFORMATION IN HERE CAN BE ADDED IN THE TEXT. THE VOICE "TYPE" IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE

566
567

Table 5: Cost category expressed in delay of 25 and 35 minutes

COST CATEGORY	25 min	35 min
CPVTOTAL	34.185.200,00	47.859.280,00
CPSTOTAL	15.668.216,67	21935503,33
CPAvITOTAL	7.121.916,67	9970683,333
CPdTOTAL	11.395.066,67	15953093,33
TOTAL COST	68.370.400,00	95.718.560,00

568
569


Table 6: Cost category

COST CATEGORY	AMOUNT \$	RATIO → BETEWE WHAT?
RECONSTRUCTION COST	13.567.360,61	
ADDITIONAL GASOLINE COST	51.379.200,00	0,264
OPPORTUNITY COST 25 min	68.370.400,00	0,198
OPPORTUNITY COST 35 min	95.718.560,00	0,142

570

571

572 **Figure captions**



573

574 Figure 1: Overview of the setting of a) Ecuador, b) Province of Pichincha, c) city of Quito, d) El Trebol and
 575 surrounding infrastructure

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO GREY ARROWS IS ALMOST INVISIBLE; EITHER PROVIDE A COLORED FIGURE OR USE A DIFFERENT SYMBOLOGY (E.G. A DASHED ARROW).

CAN YOU TRACE THE ROUTE OF THE RIVER UNDERGROUND AS WELL?



576

577 Figure 2: Initial stage of sinkhole at "El Trebol".



578


579 Figure 3: Panoramic view of the final stage of the sinkhole at "El Trebol". On the background the Panecillo
580 volcanic dome.



581


582

Figure 4: View into the sinkhole with the appearance of the Machángara river at its base.



583


584 Figure 5 a, b, c: Total monthly rainfall, average multiannual rainfall number of days with rain per month
 585 (higher than 0.1 mm) of the three meteorological stations closest to El Trebol (, Iñaquito and La Tola). A)
 586 Izobamba: Lat.: -0.366089, Long.: -78.555061; Alt.: 3085.00 m.a.s.l.; B) Iñaquito: Lat.: -0.175000; Long.: -
 587 78.485278; Alt.: 2789.12; C) La Tola Lat.: -0.175000; Long.: -78.485278; Alt.: 2789.12 m.a.s.l. From INAHMI
 588 (2010).



589

590

Figure 6: Southern and southwestern side of the inner part of the sinkhole, where water flows.




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
Figure 7: Conceptual model of the aquifer with the site of the wells and the flowing direction.

* WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY SUBSIDENCES? SINKHOLES? IN THE TEXT (LINE 216) YOU SAY THAT ONLY 12 SINKHOLES HAVE BEEN RECORDED



593


594 Figure 8: Historical subsidences at Machángara river, including the El Trébol sector (marked with the red
595 circle).



596

597 Fig. 9: El Trébol sector with the flowing direction of the Machángara river including the sinkholes of ^{31/03/2008} ~~2008~~
598 (big red circle) and the ^{SMALLER ONE OF 10/01/2014} ~~recent in 2014~~ (small red circle).
599

THIS LINE INDICATES A PERSPECTIVE BUT THIS IS NOT CLEAR IN A CROSS-SECTION LIKE THIS ONE. IT SEEMS SOME SORT OF DIVISION. PLEASE REMOVE IT



600

601 Figure 10: a) Schematic view of the channelized river, the characteristics of the terrain and of the compacted

602 fill; b) Alteration of the compacted fill, process of piping and migration of materials, initial stage of the

603 collapse; c) Formation of sinkhole, material drags surroundings due to river activity.

604

605