



1 **The street, an area exposed to earthquakes (the Lorca**
2 **case, Spain 2011)**

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4 **M. B. Rojo, E. Beck, C. Lutoff.**

5 PACTE-Université de Grenoble-Alpes, PACTE UMR 5194 (CNRS, IEPG, UJF, UPMF),
6 Grenoble, 38041, France

7 Contact: M. B. Rojo (marcbertranrojo@gmail.com)

8 **Abstract**

9 The Lorca earthquake (Spain, 11-05-2011) caused considerable damages, including a building
10 collapse. This earthquake killed 9 persons affected outside the buildings, on the street, and
11 more than 300 people injured. Studying this specific human exposure requires an adapted
12 methodology. This article proposes a dynamic and spatio-temporal approach of individual
13 mobility during the seismic crisis. Its application on Lorca case shows spatial and temporal
14 variability of individual exposure level in the street during the hours following the shake. Not
15 really studied until now, this specific human exposure deserves more attention particularly in
16 zones of moderate seismicity, like Euromediterranean area.

17

18 **1 Introduction**

19 On May 11, 2011, exactly two months after the Fukushima disaster in Japan, a double
20 earthquake shook Lorca, a city located some 60 kilometers southwest of Murcia in southern
21 Spain. The earthquake mostly concerned the urban city centre of Lorca where 60,000 of the
22 90,000 city residents live (Figure 1). The Lorca earthquake was not one of the deadliest in the
23 Mediterranean context but however shows several features making it an unprecedented one.



24

25 Figure 1 Location of Lorca and map of Lorca's city centre. SPOT source provided by « ©
26 l'Institut Geogràfic Nacional de Espanya »

27 The Iberian peninsula had never experienced such a deadly earthquake since 1956 when an
28 earthquake killed 13 in the southeast of Spain, near the city of Granada (Solares 2012). In
29 2011 the magnitude Mw 5.2 quake occurred around 18.47 local time (16.47 GMT) and
30 another magnitude Mw 4.6 tremor had occurred almost two hours before. With an epicentre
31 intensity of VII (EMS 98) the quake killed 9 and wounded 300. A building totally collapsed
32 and 1,164 other buildings were severely damaged. The economic loss was estimated in 2011
33 at €1,200 million by the municipality of Lorca (Oterino *et al.* 2012). The victims were hit out
34 on the street next to buildings. Casualties were not wounded or killed by buildings collapsing
35 on them but by the fall of cornices, balconies and other facade elements (Martínez Moreno *et*
36 *al.* 2012).

37 The tremor duration was very short (a few seconds). It developed a 0.37 g maximum
38 acceleration (recorded in the city 3 kms away from the epicentre). This has been the strongest
39 acceleration recorded in Spain since the first accelerometers were installed in the region in
40 1984 (Rodríguez *et al.* 2011). The site effects, the shallow focal depth, the strong acceleration
41 as well as the relatively high vulnerability of infrastructures seem to be the main factors
42 explaining the reason for observed damage (Díaz 2012). This probably helped to concentrate
43 the damage in the city of Lorca while this damage was hardly visible a few kilometers away
44 from the city.



45 Given the reasons for casualties and above all the location of individuals during the tremor we
46 focused our study on the populations and their specific exposure in time. Yet the Lorca
47 casualties were found outside the buildings while they are usually located in the ruins of
48 damaged buildings. This leads us into modifying the most frequent approach for the analysis
49 of earthquakes which emphasizes the study of structural failures. In the case of Lorca the
50 public thoroughfare in the vicinity of buildings was the main exposed area. Our work aims at
51 studying the individual exposure characterizing the Lorca case.

52 **2 Individual exposure to earthquakes : latest developments**

53 Relying on an analysis studying the reasons for casualties in the literature (in 2.1) we intend
54 to examine why the public thoroughfare could constitute a particular area of exposure (2.2)
55 and how this affects the way we address the event's social dimension compared to a more
56 classical approach to vulnerability (2.3).

57 **2.1 Origin of the casualties during an earthquake**

58 According to Coburn (1992), as far as the urban environment is concerned 75% of the death
59 toll is due to buildings collapsing, which represents more than 1.5 million dead between 1900
60 and 1992 (N=1,528,000 dead). This is verified in the Euro-Mediterranean countries where we
61 can notice that most of the casualties resulted from building collapse (Galindo-Zaldívar *et al.*
62 2009; Tapan *et al.* 2013; Alexander 2011). However some necessary aspects need to be
63 considered.

64 A collapsed building causes many casualties in the same place. This can be noticed for
65 example in the case of the San Giuliano di Puglia earthquake in Italy in 2002 where among 29
66 dead 25 were due to the collapse of a school (Vallée and Di Luccio 2005). Similarly and still
67 in Italy during the 2012 earthquakes 12 people lost their lives in the collapse of 5 factories.
68 We can thus understand that most research intends to minimize the impact of a tremor on
69 buildings using paraseismic constructions. Those were generalized in particularly sensitive
70 areas by way of a paraseismic legislation and a systematic reinforcement of building
71 standards.

72 The long European history however leaves ancient real estate heritage notably dwelling in
73 mountains or rural areas, a great number of urban historical centres (Guardiola-Víllora and
74 Basset-Salom 2015; Moreno González and Bairán García 2012), as well as a great number of
75 religious buildings and historical monuments (Martínez 2012; Milani 2013). Some



76 earthquakes that succeeded each other in the 2000's in Turkey (2002, 2004, 2010, 2011) or in
77 Italy (2009) for example caused much damage and many ancient buildings collapsed. Besides
78 the practice of self-build according to which buildings are designed following local building
79 practices without taking parasismic standards into account could also have been the reason
80 for some damage (Ellidokuz *et al.* 2005; Doğangün 2004; Celep *et al.* 2011; Tapan *et al.*
81 2013; Alexander 2011). Through these examples religious buildings appear to be the weakest
82 facing earthquakes. This could be observed during the recent events in Italy (Martínez 2012;
83 Milani 2013) and also during the Lorca earthquake. In this latter case 33 historical buildings
84 have suffered damage that was economically speaking very hard to quantify. Damage is
85 visible on domes, abutments, arches and decorative elements which suffered in several cases
86 rotations and loss of balance (Martínez 2012).

87 Beyond these particular buildings and even if recent constructions are submitted to
88 parasismic standards some incorrect practices leave houses fragile. This is the case for
89 instance with the use of short pillars or floors with various flooring heights, particularly for
90 masonry constructions (Bechtoula and Ousalem 2005; Tibaduiza *et al.* 2012). Thus even if
91 Euro-Mediterranean countries are not located on the most active faults in the world some
92 ancient and more recent buildings are very sensitive to tremors that can hit their very
93 structures or make some facade elements fall towards neighbouring streets and reach the
94 population in various ways.

95 Existing studies on death causes during an earthquake show that crushed or asphyxiated
96 victims are the most common (Ramirez and Peek-Asa 2005). However some analyses of
97 specific events find out interesting conclusions and slightly moderate comments.

98 During the Liege earthquake in Wallonia (Belgium) on November 8. 1983 around 01.49 a.m
99 (local time) most damage was linked to the fall of numerous chimneys (Camelbeek *et al.*
100 2006). Other construction elements such as cut stone pediments or chimney covers also fell.
101 The fall of all those objects caused much damage to roofs and vehicles parked at the foot of
102 the buildings but this could have been the reason for many more deaths if the quake had
103 happened during the day. Therefore the study authors come to the conclusion that in Wallonia
104 « the first cause of mortality in a low intensity earthquake is the fall of non-structural
105 elements that are incorrectly fixed or little resistant and that are placed high up : chimneys,
106 decorative facade elements, partitions and interior dividing walls which are simply built on
107 the floor but not fixed » (Camelbeek *et al.* 2006).



108 Besides, following the Darfield (Canterbury, United Kingdom) earthquake in 2010 non-
109 structural elements which suffered much damage were studied. During the quake only two
110 people were severely wounded, one of them because of a chimney fall. Considering the state
111 of the streets next to the buildings, full of ruins, it seems obvious that the main determining
112 factor explaining the small number of casualties was that the quake happened at 04.35 a.m.
113 (Dhakal 2010).

114 Even if building collapse is one of the main factors of mortality during an earthquake
115 population exposure on the public thoroughfare and in the vicinity of buildings should then be
116 regarded as a factor that should be considered and more specifically in regions with moderate
117 seismicity. Considering the study of the Afyon quake (Turkey) in 2002 even if the death toll
118 was higher inside than outside of buildings the difference was not statistically significant in
119 the words of Ellidokuz *et al.* (2005). For this very earthquake other reports underlined that
120 numerous non-structural elements of the buildings suffered severe damage. The most
121 frequently observed problem comes from the poor quality of partitions which were not drawn
122 on the initial architectural plans and were added later (Tapan *et al.* 2013).

123 In the Lorca case only one building collapsed and did not injure anybody inside. The people
124 affected by this quake were hit on the public thoroughfare next to buildings. Here again the
125 wounds are not explained by building collapse but by the fall of cornices, balconies or other
126 facade or roof elements (Martínez Moreno *et al.* 2012).

127 **2.2 Exposure on the public thoroughfare**

128 Putting people at the centre of our studies means considering carefully the new environment
129 people have to face following an earthquake. Several reports stemming from psychologists or
130 doctors list the types of wounds and traumas caused by earthquakes. Some try to understand
131 what were the origins of the wounds (Ellidokuz *et al.* 2005; Armenian *et al.* 1997; Chou *et al.*
132 2004). Even if they are a minority others try to describe people's behaviours during the crisis
133 as well as the reasons for those behaviours by assessing the way danger is perceived (Bolton
134 1993; Weiss *et al.* 2011; Goltz *et al.* 1992). But to the best of our knowledge there is no
135 existing work in the field of seismic hazard establishing a relation between people's
136 behaviours and the dangers to which they are exposed when on the public thoroughfare during
137 the protection and evacuation phases.



138 Following an earthquake such as the Lorca one people have to adapt to a more or less altered
139 environment. The awareness of the new situation and following decision-making processes
140 are linked to the individual and collective assessment of this new environment (Weiss *et al.*
141 2011). But in a troubled situation (notedly with disturbances in electric and phone networks)
142 this assessment is mainly done physically by walking to the area and watching what happened
143 which increases individual mobility. And those journeys can happen next to weakened
144 buildings leading to an increased individual exposure.

145 In order to analyze individual exposure on the public thoroughfare we thus needed to
146 understand how people travel across the area after the tremor until they are totally out of
147 danger. For that and to carry out our study we took inspiration from the approach proposed by
148 Time Geography which considers individuals and their daily journeys and activities over time
149 and space. Those works and methods have been developed since the 1960's to evaluate the
150 daily mobilities of a population at the scale of a territory, usually an urban area (Chardonnel
151 and Stock 2005; Thevenin *et al.* 2007). So to study and get the best representation of people's
152 journeys in their environment we used the concept of spatio-temporal trajectories developed
153 by Time Geography. This approach provides for a representation of mobility as a succession
154 of places (or positions) and journeys in a finely-defined time and space. It then looks perfectly
155 adapted to analyze people's journeys in crisis time (André-Poyaud *et al.* 2009) and has already
156 been tested for other types of high-speed phenomena : flash floods.

157 For a dozen years works have been developed to better understand the processes of alert and
158 people's adaptations in an environment altered by a sudden rise of water (Ruin and Lutoff
159 2004; Ruin 2007; Ruin *et al.* 2008; Creutin *et al.* 2009; Ruin *et al.* 2013; Calianno *et al.*
160 2013). A specific methodology to collect and analyze data was developed in the framework of
161 those studies. Analyzing several hydrometeorological episodes the study found out that
162 people's mobility and their position on the public thoroughfare were determining factors in
163 populations' exposure (Ruin 2007). In this way the fact that people may, must or want to
164 move during a flood can put individual lives in danger. Is it a similar situation for
165 earthquakes ? We suggest to use the mobility analysis method in a situation of flash floods to
166 implement it to the Lorca seismic event and thus explore the conditions for exposure in a
167 seismic crisis time.



168 **2.3 Exposure VS Social vulnerability**

169 This focus on the notion of exposure requires some theoretical explanations in the field of the
170 geography of risk.

171 The literature on the social approach of risks - notably in geography – largely develops the
172 notion of vulnerability but not the notion of exposure very much. According to Reghezza,
173 « *The approach centred upon vulnerability leaves exposure with a secondary role, notably*
174 *because of the difficulties met in characterizing the interaction between the element exposed*
175 *and the event* » (Reghezza 2006). Our objective was to face these difficulties and enter this
176 analysis of human exposure fluctuations in the time and space of a seismic crisis. We then
177 retained the definition of exposure provided by Leone as a spatial and temporal coincidence
178 between a hazard and an individual (Leone 2007).

179 So as to meet the objective it was necessary to consider a dynamic rather than a static
180 approach. Yet it comes to analyzing how people get exposed after an earthquake according to
181 their journeys and to the way the quake could alter the built environment. Analyzing exposure
182 then requires a dynamic approach to take both the spatial and the temporal dimensions of
183 people's journeys and of the threat into account (Chardonnel and Stock 2005). In our case the
184 temporal window analyzed corresponded to the time needed by individuals surveyed to
185 evacuate the wrecked city. The spatial dimension is determined by the scope of damage, very
186 concentrated in the urban centre in the Lorca case (Alfaro *et al.* 2011; Tibaduiza *et al.* 2012).
187 This definition of the spatio-temporal window observed drove us to a more accurate definition
188 of the concept of evacuation : evacuating requires to get out of the area hit by the quake and
189 thus to reduce one's exposure in getting away from buildings weakened by the earthquake.
190 Consequently the limit of the time window considered corresponds to the evacuation of the
191 city for each individual observed, which allowed us to temporally define what we consider as
192 a seismic crisis.

193 Works centred upon the crisis period are not new. Research conducted in the late 80's and
194 early 90's highlighted the importance of addressing seismic crisis periods (Quarantelli 1982;
195 Goltz *et al.* 1992; Bolton 1993). These studies – mainly quantitative – built from significant
196 samples mainly focus on individuals' main actions, on the damage endured and the reasons for
197 evacuation. They bring about statistically valid information helping us understand what the
198 affected individuals mainly did but this information is disconnected from the time and place
199 in which it happened. They then do not allow to analyze a likely difference in exposure



200 according to the activities performed that is to say to assess whether those activities lead to
201 increasing or decreasing human exposure or whether they have no influence on exposure.

202 **3 Analysis methodology of dynamic exposure**

203 The spatio-temporal window retained for the analysis included the seismic crisis period as it
204 occurred in the urban city centre of Lorca. We are going to focus on a sample of individuals
205 who were inside the city when the tremor hit Lorca and until they were evacuated. When
206 anybody interviewed gets out of the city we consider that they are no more in a seismic crisis
207 period and the collection of data for these people is then finished.

208 We present here the method retained to collect data and the processing required to analyze
209 dynamic exposure in the Lorca case.

210 **3.1 Data**

211 Data was collected in two phases. The first mission took place four days after the quake. It
212 allowed to make participating observations, to make contacts and produce graphic material
213 (pictures and movies) in this immediate post-crisis period. The second mission was conducted
214 nine months after the event to make interviews. This interval with the event could let the
215 population get out of the trauma period and leave time for recovery after the event. If they had
216 precise memories of what happened the individuals interviewed could then express
217 themselves with hindsight without the emotional dimension (fear, anxiety) taking over the
218 story of the events.

219 We carried out 20 interviews among the population using qualitative enquiries that relied on
220 how people reacted during the crisis. These interviews enabled to collect and map all the
221 journeys each interviewee made between the first tremor (May 11, 2011 at 17.05 local time)
222 and the evacuation of the city.


223 We performed a snowball sampling looking for the widest diversity of spatial situations
224 (despite the limited number of interviewees). Yet a great deal of spatial parameters can
225 influence people's behaviours such as the place of residence, the workplace, the situation
226 when the first or second tremor hit. Considering more classical vulnerability parameters noted
227 in the literature we also attempted to get a diversity of interviewees in terms of age and
228 gender (Cutter *et al.* 2000). Each interview lasted between 1 and 3 hours. In all we
229 interviewed 8 men and 12 women aged 24 to 80, 9 with children to support. In total with these



230 people we collected a database gathering 229 activities and 115 journeys during the seismic
231 crisis period.

232 To collect data we adapted an interview grid created for the analysis of mobility behaviours
233 during flash floods (Ruin *et al.* 2013) . This grid is based on a chronological scale in which
234 time is divided in a succession of places (or positions) and journeys. For each of them we
235 asked several qualitative details which at any time were linked to a precise space and time for
236 each interviewee. We thus collected the addresses, the time schedules, which activities were
237 performed and with who. For the journeys we noted the mode of transport used, how and why
238 the itinerary was adapted (for example a detour to see the state of a property), the abnormal
239 characteristics of the itinerary like traffic jams for example. This grid allows to work with
240 precise time schedules (« I remember calling my son at 20.14 ») or durations by default (« I
241 do not know what time I got there but I usually do this trip in 15 minutes »).

242 As we filled the grid with the interviewees we drew their itinerary, the places they usually go
243 to and the places where they had experienced the earthquake on a map (Figure 2). Using the
244 map during the interviews allowed people to better remember the details of their journey and
245 to be more precise with time schedules. This also allowed them to better remember the way
246 journeys were modified by the event (for example to avoid streets that were blocked or cut).



247

248 Figure 2 Example of the itinerary map drawn during one of the enquiries. Base map :
249 shopkeepers' book.

250 3.2 Processing

251 From the data and maps collected this way two types of processing were applied : a spatial
252 analysis of the journeys and new dangers of the built environment following the earthquake ;
253 a temporal analysis of the succession of people's journeys and their resulting exposure.

254 3.2.1 Spatial analysis of exposure

255 From the 20 interviews carried out among the population we performed a digitalization of the
256 journeys. With a view to identifying spatial consistency between the individuals and the
257 hazards – and exposure then – we crossed two layers of information using the Qgis¹ software.
258 We provide details here of those two layers and the related information.

259 a) Individual journeys

260 This layer represents all the journeys performed by the 20 interviewees. The digitalization
261 protocol described here was defined to standardize this layer.

¹ QGis is a free GIS (Geographic Information System) software



262 *All individuals walk in the same places* : we supposed that individuals walking on the same
263 road, in the same square or in the same open space walk exactly in the same place. This
264 simplification offers greater data homogeneity from a spatial point of view.

265 *Evacuation* : because damage was very much localized in the Lorca case, when somebody
266 evacuates the itinerary record is precise within the city boundaries but beyond it is simplified
267 by a straight line to the destination place without any exact digitalization of the itinerary
268 outside the city.

269 *Getting into or coming out of a building* : for journeys from the inside to the outside of a
270 building we determined that the time it takes to get out is one minute when an individual is
271 located higher than the ground floor. For example if people living on the fourth floor asserted
272 that they went out just after the tremor the itinerary within the building was represented and
273 lasts 60 seconds.

274 **b) Characterizing damaged buildings**

275 The second layer represents the altered environment and the characterized hazards from the
276 buildings weakened by the tremor which may partially or totally collapse in case of an
277 aftershock.


278 Following the second earthquake several teams of architects, engineers and volunteers were in
279 charge of an emergency evaluation of the state of the buildings in Lorca and the surroundings.
280 The objective of this first evaluation was to estimate the safety and habitability of the
281 buildings and to detect the buildings which were extremely hazardous for the population.

282 Following each evaluation a coloured mark was applied at the entrance of buildings to
283 indicate hazardousness. A green colour indicated that the residents could come back into the
284 building because it did not suffer significant structural damage. A yellow mark was used for
285 buildings requiring repairs but which could possibly be occupied, the building structure
286 showing no hazard. Buildings in red presented severe structural and non-structural problems
287 and could not be occupied. Finally buildings in black – also called ruined buildings – were
288 considered irreparable and were the first demolished. Access was then totally forbidden for
289 the public.

290 In our analysis of individual exposure we retained buildings classified red and ruined, defined
291 as « fragile » by the first evaluation (Figure 3). They were yet the ones that presented an
292 important danger for people approaching them. Information on buildings identified as fragile



293 during this first inspection were provided by the *Servicio de Urbanismo de Planeamiento y*
294 *Gestion de Lorca (SUP)*². Here we did not integrate data regarding emergency improvements
295 to the structures in the days following the earthquake so as to obtain the closest state to the
296 situation experienced by Lorca residents just after the tremor.



297
298 Figure 3 Extract from the maps of buildings classified in red or black (ruined). IGN land
299 register data. Map base : PNOA images *del Instituto Geografico Nacional*. Evaluation of
300 buildings : Source Servicio de Urbanismo de Planeamiento y Gestion. Production : Marc
301 Bertran Rojo 2014.

302

303 3.2.2 Temporal analysis of exposure using actograms

304 The temporal analysis of interviews was based on the use of a specific tool : actograms. The
305 latter are a form of graphic representation that is widely used in medicine or biology.
306 (Thinus-Blanc and Lecas 1985) but also to analyze people's daily activity schedules in the
307 approach of Time Geography (Thévenin *et al.* 2007). Actograms are matrixes into which each
308 individual is represented by a line and each column symbolizes a time step defined according
309 to the subject of the study. Cells indicate with a code and/or a colour the type of activity

² Servicio de Urbanismo de Planeamiento y Gestion de Lorca in charge of developing and implementing urban planning tools defined in the general plan for urban territorial planning.



310 performed by the individual for each time step. Regarding the thematic issue of risks this tool
311 was already used to analyze mobility in a hydrometeorological crisis period (Ruin *et al.*
312 2013).

313 Actograms then show a succession of activities organized from temporal information relating
314 to a single individual. The superposition of actograms from a group of people at the same
315 temporal scale allows vertical reading (per column) and to know the number of individuals
316 performing the same activity (or moving) at the same time. Adding the cells from each
317 column we obtained the number of individuals moving and those not moving for each time
318 step.

319 In our case the information contained in the actograms had a one-minute time step. We were
320 aware that this choice led to a bias linked to the accuracy of somebody's memory in a state of
321 panic. However given the great number of very short journeys – in the range of one minute –
322 we opted for this fine time step. Working with a time step in the range of 5 minutes would
323 have compelled us to overestimate the duration of very short journeys or to forget them. For
324 example a one-minute journey consisting in getting out of home would have been considered
325 as a 5 minute journey or would have been integrated into the next activity, which in all cases
326 constitutes an important bias.

327 **4 Results**

328 Results are presented in two parts : the first one deals with the exposure areas to consider for
329 the evacuation phase in a post-seism altered environment ; the second focuses on the
330 classification of exposure situations to see how the latter are distributed over time.

331 **4.1 Analysis of exposure areas (methodological proposal)**

332 Here we consider how individual exposure can be increased or decreased by people's journeys
333 next to weakened buildings during the evacuation phase.

334 **4.1.1 Evaluation of the impact area**

335 Human exposure being considered as the spatial and temporal coincidence between an
336 individual and a possible hazard we observed here how this spatio-temporal coincidence
337 occurred for the interviewees in Lorca.



338 The exposure situation supposes that the individuals considered are in the vicinity of
339 buildings becoming hazardous following the tremor. But what does this « vicinity » mean ?
340 Which distance can we consider people get exposed to the fall of facade elements on the
341 public thoroughfare ? When they touch the facade ? When they walk one to ten metres away
342 from it ?

343 To clarify these elements we studied the distances reached by the debris of elements falling
344 off a building or resulting from a complete building collapse after the Lorca seism. In order to
345 calculate this debris area for each building classified fragile we studied the images collected
346 on the internet in the days following the earthquake, photographs (35 pictures) and videos
347 from TV news or private individuals.

348 The idea was to use these pictures to measure the maximum distance reached by the debris
349 which came off the buildings. This distance is defined as the furthest point from the facade
350 where debris approximately the size of a brick can be observed (110 x 70 x 230 mm). This
351 size was used to set a limit and not take small parts into account for they can result from the
352 fracturing of the debris impacting the ground. The point from which distance was calculated
353 was the facade of the building from which the debris came off. Two examples of how the
354 maximum impact distance was studied are given below.

355 Each had distinctive features but we tried to collect as many reliable references as possible
356 from which we could deduce the width of the impact area. There was still some uncertainty
357 linked notably to the different photograph perspectives. We preferred to underestimate impact
358 distances rather than overestimate them to avoid exaggerating situations when results were
359 interpreted.

360 **First example : a cornice (Figure 4)**

361 We had five photographs at our disposal for this case (two of them are provided as an
362 example here). A reference point corresponding to the coloured logo of a restaurant present on
363 both photos allowed us to link both pictures (yellow arrow on figure 4). First we identified the
364 brand and model of the car (Hyundai Tiburon) on the first photograph which let us define its
365 total width (1.73 m according to the manufacturer) which was used as a benchmark. Still on
366 the same picture we could notice that the biggest debris were spread on a distance similar to
367 the size of the car on the traffic lane beyond the parked cars. On the second picture we could
368 see that the width of the car was similar to that of the pavement (i.e 1.73 m wide). Adding



369 these three distances we could conclude that the maximum impact distance was roughly 5
370 metres.



371
372 Figure 4 An example of the maximum impact distance evaluation. The yellow arrow provides
373 for a common point of reference for the three pictures (restaurant logo). Photographs by : 1
374 Andrés Ribón, 2 Marc Bertran Rojo.

375 **Second example : Collapsed building (Figure 5)**

376 We wanted to calculate the maximum impact distance of a single collapsed building. This
377 case being rather spectacular photographs and movies were largely available. The impact area
378 covered the whole street width. It was then 7 metres wide or even a little more as the building
379 collapsed into the display window of the shop across the street (Figure 5). However we
380 preferred to round the estimation to 7 metres.



381

382 Figure 5 An example of the maximum impact distance evaluation. Photographs by : 1 Marc
383 Bertran Rojo, 2 (Google Street).

384

385 We implemented this method to the 9 cases of the buildings for which we could collect
386 sufficient information. This methodology provided us with a rough estimate of the impact
387 area for each precise case. Nevertheless the small number of cases did not allow to create a
388 statistically representative average.

389 We wondered whether the height of the building could influence the facade elements' impact
390 area. However in the 9 cases observed the relation between the height and the impact area was
391 not confirmed (Rojo 2014). For 3 and 4-floor buildings the most frequent value characterizing
392 the impact area was 6 metres. In the case of Lorca 92% of fragile buildings had less than 4
393 floors. So it seemed relevant to set a maximum impact area of 6 metres for all buildings
394 regardless of their height.




395 4.1.2 Exposure areas and exposure sections

396 It comes here to comparing the impact areas as they were defined and people's journeys. With
397 this in mind exposure areas were created using a 6-metre buffer area around fragile buildings
398 (red and ruined). The methodology provided hereafter describes the way those areas impact
399 people's journeys and thus increase their exposure.

400 So as to estimate how much individuals met exposure areas we considered that all the
401 individuals walked in the middle of the public thoroughfare. The primary reason for this
402 choice is that safety instructions recommend to keep away from buildings. The farthest point
403 from the buildings is the very centre of the street. In addition we used videos and photographs
404 made by the population after the tremor to check whether these instructions had been
405 followed during the Lorca seism. The majority of the pictures we could collect on this subject
406 (20 photos and videos) yet confirmed this type of behaviour. This was notably explained by
407 the fact that after the earthquake the pavements were more or less cluttered with debris of all
408 sizes which naturally forced them to walk away from the buildings.

409 Among the 115 journeys listed in total 86 were retained to analyze their exposure : journeys
410 made between both tremors (and just before the strongest tremor) were not taken into account.
411 We chose to work only with journeys made after the second tremor because weakened
412 buildings were listed only after the second earthquake. Figure 6 shows the way a journey is
413 made across exposure areas to generate sections of exposure taken into consideration in the
414 following analyses. This operation was performed under the supervision of a GIS using a
415 geoprocessing tool (intersection).



416

417 Figure 6 Production of exposure sections from an « intersection » geospatial tool between
418 the journeys (lines) and exposure areas around fragile buildings (ruined or red).

419

420 Among those 86 journeys 32 were made across « ruined » areas and 39 across red building
421 related areas at least once (it is yet likely that a single journey was made across several
422 exposure areas).

423 Among the 20 interviewees only 3 of them never travelled across any area of exposure (in
424 blue, Table 1). In most cases journeys were made across several areas of exposure. Regardless
425 of the number of journeys we counted how many times individuals were exposed as an
426 individual can get exposed several times during a single journey. In total we obtained 151
427 exposure sections among which 49 ruined exposure sections and 102 red exposure sections.



428 Then we noticed that 5 people totalled up almost 100 exposure sections and that one of them
 429 totalled 29. The dimension of the exposure sections vary according to the facade length. On a
 430 total of almost 100 kilometer journeys in the city after the seism journeys within the exposure
 431 areas covered 3.6 kilometers (1.1 kilometer in ruined building exposure areas and 2.5
 432 kilometers in red exposure areas).

433 At this point we could wonder why an individual did not walk next to fragile buildings while
 434 others were exposed several times. We wanted to analyze whether there was a correlation
 435 between the number of added exposure sections for each individual (column 3) and the total
 436 distance walked or the number of journeys (columns 4 and 5). The objective here was to
 437 define which was the best exposure indicator. We then relied on Table 1.

Individual (ID)	Exposure sections :			Total distance for each individual (in metres)	Number of journeys for each individual	Distance per journey (in metres)
	red	ruined	red and ruined			
1	17	12	29	4784	8	598
2	17	5	22	5388	4	1347
3	18	1	19	18292	7	2613
4	13	1	14	10808	7	1544
5	6	4	10	2457	8	307
6	2	7	9	9043	9	1005
8	5	3	8	6917	5	1383
7	5	3	8	813	3	271
9	6	1	7	1804	5	361
10	3	3	6	3088	4	772
11	3	3	6	4938	4	1235
12	2	2	4	3019	1	3019
13	2	1	3	3128	8	391
14	0	3	3	149	3	50
15	1	0	1	1031	2	516
17	1	0	1	2087	2	1044
16	1	0	1	405	1	405
19	0	0	0	78	2	39
20	0	0	0	397	2	199
18	0	0	0	4	1	4
TOTAL	102	49	151	78630,0	86	

438

439 Table 1 This table summarizes the spatial and temporal convergence between people's
 440 mobility after the second tremor and the weakened buildings following the same seism. Lines
 441 in blue correspond to individuals who never travelled across any impact area. The last four
 442 columns show an increasing colour gradient equal to a distribution per centiles. The highest
 443 values are coloured in red and the lowest in green.



444 This table is in descending order according to how many times people were exposed to fragile
445 buildings (red and ruined are in this case considered indifferently) so as to highlight the most
446 critical situations. It shows the sections of exposure to buildings classified red, ruined and the
447 addition of both red and ruined (columns 2, 3 and 4). Besides it lists the total distance for all
448 their journeys, the total number of journeys made by each individual and the distance per
449 journey (columns 5, 6 and 7). The colours allow to rapidly see the order of values in each
450 column : the highest values for each column are represented in red and they progressively
451 decrease, they turn to orange, yellow and green for the lowest values.

452 We can notice that while individuals moving a little do not usually travel across exposure
453 areas, it is less clear that those who move the most are the most exposed. The number of
454 journeys done does not look determining as regards human exposure after a seism. For
455 example individual 2 made only 4 journeys but the second individual is the most exposed
456 while individual 13 made twice more journeys but his/her combined exposure is largely less.
457 Distance neither looks to be an explanatory variable of human exposure. We can for example
458 notice that the individual who travelled a maximum distance (ID 3) was 10 times less exposed
459 than the one who travelled less than a third of this distance (ID 1). On the contrary we can
460 notice that some people were greatly exposed without travelling long distances (individuals 7
461 and 9 for example). This analysis shakes up the general idea according to which the more
462 journeys or the bigger distance, the greater exposure. Considering exposure after a seism
463 other factors ought to be considered.

464 Conditioned by the small sample we did not further extend the analysis of how influential is
465 the location of buildings that generate the greatest exposure. However we noticed that among
466 the 20 individuals a lot of them travelled on the same streets, either because they are wide or
467 because they lead to open spaces in the city, or even because they are the city's exit roads. We
468 can see that some fragile buildings on these roads generated a great number of exposure
469 sections.

470 These results require validation with a bigger sample. Furthermore a deep analysis of
471 activities and journey motivations in a seismic crisis period must be carried out to understand
472 the complexity of factors taking part into the generation of human exposure.

473 **4.2 Space classification according to induced exposure**

474 As a supplement to the previous results the approach proposed here aims at defining the
475 categories of situations that correspond to a specific exposure so as to better understand how



476 individual exposure changes over time and space. These situation categories are not
477 associated with precise places but rather to some features of those places, notably hazard
478 sources. In this way we sought to model the temporal evolution of human exposure in an
479 indirect way by observing people's locations in those specific situations. With this aim in
480 mind we considered the four following situation categories : inside the buildings, on the
481 public thoroughfare, in open spaces and outside hazardous areas (outside Lorca). These
482 spatial categories let us translate the hazards individuals get exposed to after a tremor.

483 4.2.1 Definition of the types of exposure situations

484 We depict here the four situation categories considered. The aim of this section is to get an
485 overview of the events' sequences through the behaviours of the interviewees' sample and to
486 identify the collective reactions leading to a fluctuation in human exposure.

487 **Inside**

488 People are inside the buildings whatever their type (houses, blocks, etc.) or the associated
489 social functions (homeplace, workplace, at friends' or others). When an individual falls within
490 this « inside » category an aftershock can generate a partial or total building collapse and
491 directly affect the individual. As we already mentioned in the case of Lorca only one building
492 collapsed during the seism without any casualties inside it.

493 **Public thoroughfare**

494 The public thoroughfare corresponds to the exteriors of buildings. This space is almost
495 exclusively used to travel but it can become a meeting place for individuals.

496 Considering that most people wounded and all people killed were located on the public
497 thoroughfare we can associate this space with the highest exposure in the case of Lorca.

498 **Open spaces**

499 These spaces are found inside the city but unlike the previous ones it is very difficult or even
500 impossible that the population gathering here be put at risk by a building or debris.

501 The nature of these places may vary a lot : squares, gardens or wastelands for example. In
502 these places exposure can be considered as almost nil. In some cases however in order to go
503 to or leave those places people need to travel across hazardous areas (public thoroughfare)
504 and walk next to fragile buildings likely to become a threat in case of aftershocks. In addition
505 those places have limited capacity : the greater the number of people, the less secure places



506 they are. Some people standing on the sides of those places will be more exposed for they will
507 be directly near the surrounding buildings. Finally in some cases (as for example parvis as on
508 the Square of España in Lorca) one of the sides of the square is built up with very high and
509 fragile religious buildings (Martínez 2012). Exposure there is then not nil.

510 **Outside hazardous areas**

511 With the help of PNOA's aerial orthoimages and the land register we defined a polygon
512 around the city. Anybody walking beyond this limit was outside Lorca and out of danger
513 wherever they were : inside a house, on the public thoroughfare or in an open space. This
514 category is yet characterized by a total decrease of human exposure because the seism had a
515 very limited spatial impact.

516 **4.2.2 Fluctuation of exposure over time**

517 The graph in Figure 7 shows the location of 20 interviewees according to their situation of
518 exposure as the crisis developed. Each line of the graph corresponds to the number of
519 individuals present in each space category counted using the actograms. The sum of all
520 individuals present in each space always equals 20. The red arrows indicate the time of the
521 first and second earthquakes as well as a magnitude Mw 3.9 aftershock. Looking at the
522 « low » curve (in yellow) we can notice an important number of short journeys largely
523 corresponding to the journeys made immediately after the seism. These journeys allowed
524 people to get out of the buildings after the tremor. On the same curve we can notice several
525 situations reported in the interviews. A few minutes after the first tremor some individuals
526 went back inside their home because they thought they were out of danger. This phase is well-
527 known to psychologists and identified as a denial phase which in some cases affects the
528 perception of external reality. These unconscious mechanisms help some people put a rather
529 shocking situation into perspective allowing them to better control their fears or anxieties
530 (Páez *et al.* 1995). Other individuals went out of the buildings because there was a rumour of
531 an aftershock or to watch the damage done by the first seism or even to exchange on the event
532 with people on the street.

533 The second tremor made people who had remained inside the buildings get out immediately
534 when this was possible or a few minutes later when they had people to look after (elderly
535 people notably) or if they were panic-stricken. This phenomenon is clearly visible on the
536 graph with a substantial decrease in the number of people present inside a building.




537 We then can observe the behaviour consisting in gathering family members to plan for
538 evacuation. Sometimes this gathering can increase the exposure for one or several family
539 members. This phenomenon can be observed by looking at the curve corresponding to the
540 « inside » situation after the main seism. Yet the people who went back into the buildings
541 after the earthquakes did it to help their close families and friends evacuate. Within one
542 minute after the main seism a majority of people were on the public thoroughfare where the
543 deadly accidents and serious injuries occurred (13 in 20 people). Very rapidly (a few minutes
544 on average) we can notice an increase in the number of people present in these open spaces
545 and so *a priori* protected from the potential fall of building elements.

546 Until the city was completely evacuated some individuals went back again into the buildings
547 after the second tremor. However this action was immediately followed by a complete
548 evacuation of the city. It was not an action to protect close families and friends but a last
549 effort to organize oneself before evacuation : looking for the keys of the car or of the second
550 home for example.

551 Evacuation mainly started almost two hours after the main seism ; then the number of
552 evacuated individuals increased regularly until 7 hours after the tremor.

553 We can notice with this figure that the individuals did not feel the need to go to an open space
554 after the first seism and preferred to stay on the public thoroughfare. On the contrary,
555 following the main seism most of the witnesses decided to rapidly reach open spaces rather
556 than stay on the public thoroughfare. This difference in behaviour seems to be directly linked
557 to the intensity of the seisms.




558

559 Figure 7 Evolution of the location of individuals in various categories of spaces during the
560 seismic crisis (inside, public thoroughfare, open spaces and outside Lorca).

561 From this analysis completed by the interviews we propose in Figure 8 a mobility model
562 during a seismic crisis period. This model allows to understand that the evacuation of the city
563 is the outcome of a complex series of journeys more or less subjected to exposure. It
564 compares individuals' locations and their mobility over time as well as their specific exposure.
565 This exposure is assessed starting from the case of Lorca. Time on the abscissa is specific to
566 each individual which means that the time it takes to travel from the inside to the outside of
567 the city varies according to individual constraints. The model also represents two types of
568 journeys according to the objectives pursued by individuals: on one side the journeys
569 corresponding to protection (black arrows) and on the other side those linked to evacuation
570 (blue arrows). As long as individuals stay inside the buildings, on the public thoroughfare or
571 even in open spaces in some cases they remain exposed. Their exposure only decreases when
572 they are outside the city. In the case of Lorca we can say that the public thoroughfare is a
573 more exposed place than inside the buildings.

574



575

576 Figure 8 According to Géorisque (Rojo *et al.* 2013), a conceptual model of mobility in
577 connection with exposure in a seismic crisis period. A model built from the analysis of the
578 seismic event on May 11, 2011 in Lorca, Spain.

579 5 Limits and perspectives

580 It is difficult to collect significant samples on the type of subjects that we sought to study here
581 with a sufficient level of detail to address our initial questions. Identifying witnesses several
582 months after the event was not easy. Yet 9 months after the seism the reconstruction of the
583 city had not started. The first building rebuilt was inaugurated on July 3, 2013, i.e more than
584 two years after the earthquake. A big percentage of Lorca's population was still living outside
585 the city. Besides, though the emotional dimension was lessened over time it was still present
586 and sometimes interfered with the interviews.



587 Nevertheless the analyses carried out from the 20 interviews could provide substantial
588 information on the journeys and time schedules of these journeys and offer the opportunity to
589 carry out analyses going beyond the sole analysis of interviews. Likewise the method retained
590 allows to project all the accounts on the same spatial and temporal scale and thus to compare
591 them.

592 In this way the Lorca seism highlights that the outside of the buildings is also a high exposure
593 space and the facade elements can be at the origin of substantial hazards. In terms of safety
594 recommendations in countries of low seismicity where the risk of building collapse remains
595 limited it would be necessary to emphasize the behaviours that need to be adopted during and
596 after a seism. Yet for the time-being information leaflets stop when an individual is in an open
597 space. But the analysis of Lorca shows that the population should not only be informed on the
598 reaction when the earthquake occurs but also on the best decisions to allow an evacuation of
599 the city reducing potential individual exposure to a minimum. In this way limiting journeys in
600 the city, prioritizing large avenues instead of the shortest routes, knowing in advance which
601 exit roads are best adapted to each person and home could be interesting instructions to
602 integrate.

603 As regards paraseismic building standards we can see that they are modified according to
604 events (Aribert 2002) and zoning maps for seismic risks integrate a bigger section of the
605 territory in each review (Frechet 1978; Martin *et al.* 2002; SISMORESISTENTS 2003). Ever
606 stronger seisms are expected and in a greater number of regions. This analysis is equally
607 confirmed in France, Italy or Spain. Considering the Lorca case we can say that the Spanish
608 paraseismic standards were implemented because only one building collapsed. The typical
609 building techniques used in Spain such as concrete cornices at the top of buildings are
610 however elements that proved very fragile and hazardous. When those elements are stronger
611 than the main structure itself the building response to the earthquake is conditioned by those
612 elements. Several examples have become topics among technicians and architects and the
613 substantial number of reports published provide further evidence (Alfaro *et al.* 2011; Diez and
614 Sanz Larrea 2011; Martínez 2012; Tibaduiza *et al.* 2012). We showed that even if the victims
615 were hit at the time of tremors several factors were converging to increase the number of
616 casualties. Yet stronger aftershocks would have certainly made a greater number of
617 unbalanced facade elements fall, possibly wounding pedestrians on the public thoroughfare.
618 So we think the priority is to make populations exposed to earthquakes aware of the hazards



619 that threaten them also during the evacuation phase. It is also important to better integrate
620 instructions into the paraseismic standards that could make non-structural elements more
621 secure.

622 This work is moreover a methodological proposal for the dynamic analysis of human
623 exposure during moderate seisms that can be notably observed in a Euro-Mediterranean
624 context. Imported and adapted from a methodology initially created for another risk (flash
625 floods) the approach shows that methodologies can be transferred from a hazard to another.
626 This possibility is highly interesting in the case of seisms which remain less frequent in
627 Europe than floods. This work of adaptation (from flash floods to seisms) is likely to be
628 implemented to other seismic events. The results obtained could be comparable with those
629 presented here for the Lorca case.

630 **Acknowledgements**

631 The authors thank the Rhône-Alpes Region, research cluster nb 6, Environment (2011-2013)
632 which funded this work. We also thank all the people we met during our field surveys and
633 who gave their time to answer our questions. Finally many thanks to JL Pinel who translated
634 this document from French into English.

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