



Interactive comment on “Optimisation of decentralisation for effective Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) through the case study of Indonesia” by A. Grady et al.

Anonymous Referee #2

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This paper is timely and I am very glad to hear that the topic of decentralisation is discussed in this journal.

However, I would like to suggest some revision from the authors.

First, the authors do not provide enough reflection of decentralisation in other developing countries on other sectors such as agriculture, and other public sectors. The question is is DRR very unique? Or in fact most sectors are poorly governed at by local governments level?

On the page 5515 - line 3, it was claimed that "local government is the first responders

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during disasters" - this is very bold claim and I cant see at all in the case of the recent haze in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Better to claim 'community as the first responders' - otherwise you have some good source to back up this claim?

Second, please be careful and check again the nature of decentralisation in Indonesia.

Three provinces such as Jakarta, Aceh and Jogjakarta, they have different decentralisation settings. These province enjoyed what is called as "provincial decentralisation" - meaning that the governors have much more stronger power than the rest of provinces in Indonesia. However, there is variation among these three. In Jakarta, Mayor are not elected but appointed by the governor, at any time he wanted. In Aceh, the mayor and the regents are elected but overall, they are subordinates of the governors. Aceh's model is similar to Jogjakarta but the difference is the governor is the King of the Jogjakarta. Please read your Section 4.4 again.

Now, even though the DRR folks in Indonesia are not aware of the complex governance model in Indonesia, please be careful when you want to make a bold statement about power dimension in the context of the provinces as I noticed you cite a case from Jakarta, Aceh and West Sumatra. These three are not comparable. Mayors and head of disticts in West Sumatra are not subordinates of the Governor. There is a new law giving higher roles to the governor back in 2014. So better to also tell the readers that you are looking at the system before 2014.

The term 'risk assistance' in page 5515 (line 21) sounds odd to me.

In page 5518, line 14, you said BNPB is a non-departemental agencies. Better to say "non-ministerial" agencies; However, it can be departemental.

In page 5520, you put Bappenas into non-ministerial institutions. The truth is, Bappenas is a ministerial position as it is part of the cabinet members. BNPB is not a cabinet member. The head of TNI is a cabinet member. The national police is not a cabinet member.

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In page 5522, the paragraph from line 16-22, there are some conflicting notes in there. Please keep in mind that NOT all public affairs are decentralised. Only certain things are decentralised. Education curriculum is still governed by the central government but there are rooms left for the local governments as well as the schools governing bodies to add necessary subjects; While all the compulsory subjects are set by the central government.

In page 5528, line 13-29, you made a very strong claim which is not true. There have been a process of multi-level consultation and participation. MUSRENBANG-PROV is a deliberative process for provincial level planning - it has been practiced for 10 years. Still not perfect but there are mechanism. The problem is whether you can influence the process or not? Most DRR advocats are not capable in influencing this process and this process is often co-hosted by provincial planning agencies (Provincial Bappeda).

Fiscal dependent on BNPB can be seen as positive or negative. Indonesia adopted FEMA system where the local governments, under the federal system, local governments are not obliged to follow FEMA's guidelines. However, incentives are pooled at BNPB - to make it stronger - so it has the power to set the conditions for the local governments to access the funds. Why? because under local decentralisation, local governments set their own priorities and they do not always follow national guidelines (e.g. to have a proper risk assessment). However, with the resources pooled at BNPB, their interest can be shaped according to the incentives/ additional funds.

Lastly, the stats in your Figure 3 (e.g. 921 cities) can be recheck again. What does that mean? Does it mean Indonesia has 921 mayors? Obviously not.

Some of the reference below could be useful:

How can Climate Change Vulnerability Assessments best impact policy and planning?: Lessons from Indonesia. IIED Asian Cities Climate Resilience Working Paper Series, No 22/2015: 1-33. Further Information: pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10743IIED.pdf

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From shared learning to shared action in building resilience in the city of Bandar Lampung, Indonesia. *Environment and Urbanization*, 27 (1): 161-180. Further Information: eau.sagepub.com/content/27/1/161

Disaster Policy Change in Indonesia 1930-2010: From Government to Governance?. *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, Vol 31, No. 2 130-159
http://www.zef.de/uploads/tx_zefportal/Publications/jlassa_download_Lassa_Disaster%20Policy%20Change.pdf

Interactive comment on *Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss.*, 3, 5511, 2015.

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