

## ***Interactive comment on “Risk to life due to flooding in post-Katrina New Orleans” by A. Miller et al.***

### **Anonymous Referee #1**

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I am in doubt about what my recommendation of this paper. It is well structured, language is good, in general the methods are state-of-the-art, and the results seem to be sound. So no doubt that it is a nice case study and as a manager in New Orleans I would take it into consideration when reviewing contingency planning. However, I cannot identify what is novel in the methodology and/or the application. Highlighting that in the paper would make it easier to justify publishing the paper. Below I give two suggestions on what direction I would follow if I were to rewrite the paper myself. Both suggestions point towards exploring the socio-technical systems, assuming that that would be the most attractive path for the authors. Naturally other directions could be explored as well.

The literature on flood risk management is abundant. Nevertheless I am surprised  
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that no reference is given to ICHARM (<http://www.icharm.pwri.go.jp/>). They have good observations regarding differences in national paradigms for flood risk management and both the US and the Netherlands are given some consideration because their approaches are quite different. The paper is written assuming that UN, US, and dutch paradigms can be mixed, but this is not necessarily the case. Perhaps the book Large-Scale Floods Report should be a starting point in such a discussion, also because it specifically addresses post-Katrina findings ([http://www.ifi-home.info/icfm-icharm/Large\\_Scale%20Flood%20Report\\_Web.pdf](http://www.ifi-home.info/icfm-icharm/Large_Scale%20Flood%20Report_Web.pdf)).

I miss detail on construction of the scenarios. As an example, why is it assumed that 90% is evacuated? Is it based on historical data and/or extrapolated to the future, what do people and societies learn from an event like Katrina and how long does it last? Why has New Orleans developed in a way where the differences between generally acceptable criteria and actual risk are so large? Why has the post-Katrine decisions been so different from post-1953 decisions in the Netherlands and how does this impact the construction of scenarios?

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